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Introduction 
These papers grew out of a workshop in the Division of Pacific and Asian History in the Australian 
National University in December 1996. A December workshop has become a regular mechanism 
for assembling Pacific h istorians, their affines and agnates, without the formality of registration, a 
secretariat - or much of a budget. Accordingly, we owe a great debt to the participants who came 
largely at their own expense or funded by their own institutions. We owe an equal debt to Maeve 
O 'Collins and Mary Mortimer, for hosting the parties which allow the networking for which these 
events are best remembered. 
Participation was greater than expected, so that the agenda became more formal than usual ;  yet 
ideas and propos itions flowed from one session to another, in ways which these proceedings cannot 
capture. On the other hand we include three papers which complement those presented at the 
workshop. The scale and qual ity of the response reflects the fact that decolonisation has become 
salient again - its seeming completeness an illusion. 
A minimal argument about the incompleteness of decolonisation points to the continuing saga of 
negotiations over the status of New Caledonia (Small, chapter 9), as well as France 's  other overseas 
territories in Polynesia and the Wallis and Futuna islands. Even with formal independence, 
sovereignty is sometimes hedged by formal l imitations ('free association '  with the ex-colonial 
power) in the former American Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Petersen, chapter 10; Statham, 
chapter 1 1) as wel l as in the Cook Islands and New Zealand ' s  other territories. More broadly, the 
institutional and ideological inheritance of the colonial period continues to influence people 's  
behaviour and forms of pol ity and economy, with profound consequences even for generations born 
long after independence. It is these issues which Kabataulaka and Bouma address in Solomon 
Islands (chapters 20 and 21)  and Nadile for Papua New Guinea (chapter 22). They propose the 
urgent need for intellectual decolonisation, partly through closer attention to school and university 
curricula. A strategy on these lines was attempted by Ulli and Georgina Beier in the 1970s 
(Denoon, chapter 24), and Lacey (chapter 23) describes a much longer-term venture in the Enga 
province of Papua new Guinea. By contrast, resource companies and other agencies, who employ 
personnel with backgrounds in colonial administration, tend to perpetuate some of the values and 
procedures of an earl ier era (Ballard and Banks, chapter 1 9). Manifestly the struggles to create an 
autonomous intell igentsia, and education systems for post-colonial societies are neither easy nor 
certain in their outcomes. Even where an independent government with ample financial resources 
attempts to undo the damage of a predatory colonial ism (Pollock, chapter 12), it is difficult to avoid 
dependence upon the technical expertise - and the value systems - of former colonial powers . 
A more radical critique goes beyond colonial ism as residual, and finds signs of recolonisation in 
much of the third world, and especially in the Pacific. Evidence for this suspicion includes relations 
within the South Pacific Commission and other regional agencies, in which Austral ia and New 
Zealand now lobby for the appointment of their own nationals to key positions. Stewart Firth 
(chapter 2) judges that the high tide of decolonisation has passed, to be replaced by a variety of 
more complex arrangements. Barrie Macdonald (chapter 1) draws attention to the new prominence 
of 'governance ' in the agendas of aid-donors, and of multilateral agencies including the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Donors increasingly coordinate their influence on 
recipient countries, and argue that economic development cannot be separated from the 
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governmental institutions and social circumstances in which it takes place. Perversely, this 
potentially neo-colonial analysis restates Kwame Nkrumah ' s  famous anti-colonial injunction ' Seek 
Ye First The Pol itical Kingdom' .  Assuming that 'good governance ' is a precondition of economic 
transformation, financial support is made dependent upon a variety of specific conditions. These 
range far beyond the economic concerns have long preoccupied aid donors and their agencies: so 
much so that they may infringe on sovereignty itself. 
Glenn Petersen (chapter 10) takes th is argument a long stride further. He argues that colonisation -
and decolonisation - can be understood as chapters in a longer narrative of hegemony and 
subordination, so that many empires conform to a predictable scenario. In the experience of the 
early United States, territorial expansion replicated many British imperial practices in creating and 
administering colonies of settlement. The democratic and anti-colonial rhetoric of the War of 
Independence made it intolerable for the United States to imagine itself as a colonial power, yet the 
substantive issues of governance had to be addressed. When the United States expanded into 
Mexico and the Caribbean, inhabited by ' alien ' populations which might not be assimilable into the 
United States ' political culture and institutions, participatory democracy and territorial expansion 
became awkward bed-fellows. In the long run the denial of colonial ism entailed lack of clarity in 
dismantl ing what were essentially colonial institu tions. The consequent constitutional and pol itical 
muddle is elegantly analysed by Statham (chapter 1 1). Peterson argues persuasively that 
Geopolitics is the most helpful  framework in which to comprehend United S tates relations with the 
Asia-Pacific region generally, and Micronesia in particular. On that view, both colonisation and 
decolonisation are incidental. 
Similar trends can be perceived in the regional penumbra of white Austral ia. Among the most 
original chapters are those which treat Torres Strait Islanders as Pacific Islanders, rather than their 
more common context as remote or marginal Austral ians. Elu (chapter 16) argues that Queensland 
and the Australian Commonwealth have both imposed colonial controls and constraints on the 
people of the Torres Strait. The struggle to democratise government institutions (Mull ins, chapter 
17) therefore amounts to a long overdue essay in decolonisation. Autonomy for Torres Strait 
Islanders, however, can also be seen as a sub-plot in the longer struggle by Aboriginal Australians 
to achieve a measure of self-government through the institution of ATSIC (the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Commission). Together with Fletcher' s account (chapter 1 8) of the 
unresolved issues confronting Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Austral ians, and the vulnerabil ity of 
Aboriginal autonomy to the vagaries of white Australian politics, we perceive that decolonisation is 
as much an issue in continental Austral ia, as in the more conventional ex-colony of Papua New 
Guinea. The salience of a ' Pacific' perspective on Austral ian affairs is equally clear in Clive 
Moore ' s  account of South Sea Islanders ' sustained struggle for recognition as a d istinct, deeply 
disadvantaged immigrant community (chapter 25). The impact of that struggle on the formulation 
of school curriculum materials is dramatic. While niVanuatu and Solomon Islanders are 
comfortable with ' revisionist' history which emphasises their agency during the labour trade era 
( 1860s to 1905), their Austral ian cousins insist on narratives which represent their ancestors as 
simple victims of blackbirding. 
Seen from Austral ia, the Pacific Islands are dominated by Papua New Guinea, the home of three 
quarters of all Pacific Islanders, by far the largest of Australia 's former colonial territories, the site 
of the biggest and bloodiest resource projects in the region, and the source of most Pacific news in 
the Austral ian media. It is also the source of current legends, with Australian pol iticians vying with 
each other for the praise (or opprobrium) due to the decision to decolonise. Not least of  Nelson 's  
v irtues ( in chapter 13) is h is  reconstruction of the decision-making chronology, and h is consequent 
abil ity to butcher some sacred cows. May (chapter 14) reveals some of the decolonising dynamics 
and surprising influences within Papua New Guinea, while MacWilliam (chapter 15) demonstrates 
how the largest Austral ian company in Papua New Guinea addressed the challenges of a post­
colonial economic regime. 
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These papers focus more strongly on metropol itan policy-making than on colonial independence 
movements .  Th is d istinction is arbitrary, since each interacted with the other discourse; but it does 
serve to narrow the agenda and to focus our attention on manageable questions. Peter Larmour 's  
overv iew (chapter 26) offers a range of ways of thinking about decolonisation. His framework 
helps us to understand some Pacific paradoxes, whereby (for example) the most powerful anti­
colon ial movements (Pouvanaa a Oopa's  Rassemblement Democratique des Populations 
Tahitiennes and its successors in Tahiti, and the FLNKS in New Caledonia) have not so far 
succeeded, whereas the reluctance of many Fij ian leaders to contemplate independence was 
eventually overcome by a British government determined to depart (Lal , chapter 4). Conversely the 
relatively early independence of Western Samoa, commonly attributed either to divine guidance or 
the power of the mau protest movement of the 1920s and 1930s, clearly requires a more nuanced 
analysis of the kind which Liua 'ana offers (chapter 5). Ambrose (chapter 6) and Morgan (chapter 
7) go a long way to penetrate the orthodox interpretations of Vanuatu 's release from the Anglo­
French Condominium of the New Hebrides, demonstrating that secessionist and autonomists in 
Santo and Tanna were far from pass ive puppets of neo-colonial manipulation, and had compell ing 
reasons for the strategies which led them to oppose the dominant Vanua'aku Pati. Both the 
ind igenous and the metropolitan politics of decolonisation prove much more subtle than was 
believed in the heady days when independence was formally achieved. 
Donald Denoon, Canberra, June 1997. 
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Decolon isation and 'Good' Governance: 
Precedents and Continuities 
Barrie Macdonald, Massey University 
Decolonisation, or ' the Transfer of Power ' ,  is often regarded as the end-point of a process that began 
with imperial expansion and colonisation. There is a neat balance between colonialism and 
decolonisation that, depending on the point of view, reflects either the advance and retreat of imperial 
power, or the loss and recovery of sovereignty. This process is one of the defining features of empire, 
decolon isation, and the post-colonial world. Even so, it is not a universal process : some dependencies 
retained their sovereignty; and some former dependencies still retain a compromised sovereignty. 
Tonga under its Treaty of Friendship with Britain, and Solomon Islands as a protectorate, did not 
formally rel inquish sovereignty; and, in New Guinea, Nauru and Western Samoa under League of 
Nations Mandates and United Nations Trusteeships, sovereignty was held in abeyance. Now, under 
Free Association agreements, there are restraints on the sovereignty of the Cook Islands and several 
countries of Micronesia. Despite these qualifications in terms of formal status,  the countries of the 
Pacific Islands, together with many Asian, African and Caribbean countries, have shared a colonial 
experience that passed through decolonisation, culminating in ' independence ' ,  or something close to 
it, with all appropriate national (and national ist) celebrations. 1 
Despite the focus on independence as the primary outcome of decolonisation, there are continuities. 
Most obv iously, these relate to continu ing relations between the colonial power and its former 
dependency - in ways like the provision of financial and technical assistance, trade and financial 
relations, but also in more subtle  forms l ike the structure and language of government, educational 
curricula, sources of private sector investment, the cultural orientation of all that is not indigenous, and 
even the predominance of certain brands of vehicles, appl iances and consumer products .  Few newly 
independent countries have the means, or the inclination, to commit the major self-denial involved in 
rejecting these artifacts of a past relationship. Moreover, continuing investment by transnational 
companies, especially in resource-exploitation, can represent an imperial presence no less potent than 
formal colonial rule. 
J\ longer-term view of the relationship between those countries that were once the governors and those 
that were governed also suggests that decolonisation is just one phase in a relationship, beginning with 
imperial encroachment, in which power or leverage has fluctuated. On the pre-colonial frontier, the 
initiative often lay with hosts rather than intruders, and annexation did not necessarily reflect or s ignal 
the dominance of the imperial power. Colonial ism brought control, fragile in cases, before nationalist 
challenges to that control in some cases caused, and in others hastened, decolonisation. Independence 
in much of J\sia, Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific Islands coincided with the Cold War which 
gave Third World countries generally the opportunity to play off one power against the another, and 
thus maximise access to aid funds, and minimise the control over aid-expenditure or other aspects of 
the recipient nation ' s  internal affairs. Within the last decade, the ending of Cold War competition, and 
other factors, have allowed aid donors to apply conditions to aid and Third World relationships which 
shift the balance of leverage back towards donors. With their preoccupation with human rights and 
'good governance ' ,  these donors and their international agencies, now impose conditions reminiscent 
of decolonisation policies and the 'conditions ' for independence in the 1940s and 1950s.  
J\s the first modern decolonising power, Britain set in place a number of conditions for the 
independence of its dependencies : these included a form of parliamentary democracy based on the 
Westminster model, an independent public service, guarantees for basic human rights, and mechanisms 
for administrative support and financial accountability. There was emphasis on trade union 
development (a condition of Colonial Development and Welfare funds), growth in h igher education 
and the development of mass media. It was also assumed that, within the l imits imposed by resources, 
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the basic admin istrative and communications infrastructure, and social services, had been developed . 
And it was bel ieved that a balanced budget, and a capacity to pay the recurrent costs of government (if 
not the capital cost of development) were an important guarantee of ' true '  independence. The 
government of the emergent nation had to win the mandate of i ts people and demonstrate its capacity 
to provide a stable government. 
The good governance agenda has the same concern with democratisation, sound economic 
management, and the development of civil society, and presents them as conditions not for 
decolonisation, but for aid-flows and international acceptance. This raises the question whether, when 
a country fails to meet these conditions, it will face the alternatives of an effective loss of sovereignty, 
or a loss of development ass istance - in effect, a reversion to some form of external control . 
There is now a substantial l iterature on the emergence of the good governance agenda, including policy 
statements by the World Bank and several b ilateral donors.2 As well as debating the antecedents of 
good governance, its preconditions and implications, aid donors have shown increasing interest in 
' check-lists ' which, though varying in detail, organisation, and specific criteria, have a common set of 
principles: 
a democratic system of government 
the protection of Human Rights 
an impartial and competent legal system 
competent Public Sector Management 
a market-friendly economy 
robust institutions of civil society. 
Emergence of the Good Governance Agenda 
The good governance agenda has d iverse origins . A major influence is the World Bank which began 
to question the foundations of its own development policies in the late 1980s. More weight was placed 
on local participation in project design and implementation, environmental issues, the requirements of 
sustainable development, and on the involvement of women in development. More fundamentally, the 
Bank ' s  preoccupation with macro-economic policy ahead of underlying issues of governance came 
under scrutiny. While recognising that its Charter prevented it from addressing political issues, the 
Bank began to interpret its brief more broadly.3 
In 1989,  a World Bank assessment of development policies and projects in sub-Saharan Africa 
demonstrated a high failure rate of projects and structural adjustment programs undertaken by the 
Bank.4 Even in those countries that had undergone restructuring w ith some effect, private investors, 
sceptical about long-term prospects, remained reluctant to become involved. The survey showed a 
preponderance of authoritarian regimes, large-scale corruption, and abuses of Human Rights. The Bank 
concluded that these factors undermined the prospects for democracy and economic growth and that 
fundamental fai lures of governance were a decisive barrier to sustainable economic growth. In 
subsequent papers, the World Bank identified three key areas of concern : 
• the form of political regime; 
• the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country ' s  economic and 
social resources; and 
the capacity of governments to design, formulate, and implement policies and discharge 
functions. 5 
Advocacy of good governance by major bilateral Western donors also dates from the early 1990s. The 
3 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the ending of the Cold War meant that there was less emphasis on 
pol itical expediency and security imperatives and lower priority given to mil itary assistance and the 
purchase of arms. There was also concern with the effectiveness of aid delivery mechanisms, and more 
emphasis on local participation and wider use of Non-Governmental Organisations. Economic 
difficulties in the donor countries where voters were resistant to h igher taxes and reluctant to fund what 
were seen as corrupt and authoritarian regimes in the Third World, brought a re-examination of the 
principles and levels of assistance. J\s a consequence, the philosophy and moral rationale underlying 
aid distribution were re-defined to place a stronger emphasis on democratisation and economic reform, 
with long term goals of improving the qual ity of governance and the prospects for sustainable 
development.6 
In some respects, the new orthodoxy turns on its head earlier development approaches favoured by the 
former colonial powers, no less than the World Bank, that assumed that stable democracy could only 
be establ ished on a foundation of economic development and national civil institutions and values. On 
this view, economic development and democratisation might prove incompatible, in which case 
democratisation must be subordinated to economic l iberalisation and structural adjustment. What is 
new about the good governance agenda, at least compared with the recent past is ' the proposition that 
democracy is a necessary prior or parallel condition of development, not an outcome of it' .7 
Issues Arising from the Governance Debate 
While there is a degree of commonality in donor v iews of good governance, the agenda has not gone 
unchallenged. Recipient countries, for example, suspect that the good governance agenda has a 
sub-text of a reduction in aid flows to the Third World, partly because of the conflicting demands for 
investment in Eastern Europe, and partly to reduce aid flows overall. The counter argument is that aid 
flows must be at least contained, if not reduced, because of the declining capacity of donors (and the 
will of their taxpayers) to pay. It follows that, if good governance is the key to effective aid del ivery 
and util isation, and to economic growth, then allocations and investments should be made accordingly. 
Critics suggest that the World Bank turned the spotl ight on to governance issues as least partly to 
emphasise the difficulties of project implementation where there is poor governance, and to allay 
concerns that development failure might be caused by fundamental flaws in the economic policies 
advocated by the Bank itself over recent decades. Moreover, it has been suggested that, at least in part, 
the Bank has used governance issues as a mechanism for avoiding that provision in its Charter that 
excludes it from becoming involved in political issues. 
lbese are issues of debate, but the agenda also raises more fundamental questions about the nature of 
development and economic growth. Drawing on models of the Western experience, the good 
governance agenda presupposes that representative democracy will encourage the growth of a market 
economy while providing accountable government. In suggesting that 'good '  government is 
democratic and will lead to economic growth, governance proponents reject the argument (most 
commonly heard from Asian governments) that democracy does not necessarily provide the discipline 
necessary to promote economic development and all eviate poverty. 
This raises the further issue of whether it is the role of the state or free market economics that makes 
a difference. A recent analysis of Asian economies by Clark and Chan explored a range of variables 
and concluded that neither approach - alone or in partnership - can explain the relative success or failure 
of Asian economies over recent decades.8 They argue that ' recourse is necessary to additional 
variables ' , leading them to a call for 'bringing society back in ' .  This means not j ust social factors in 
general , but the structure and values of specific societies. These conclusions coincide with my own 
research in the Republic of Kiribati .9 I have argued elsewhere that the good governance approach, as 
currently conceived, takes insufficient account of social and political processes and structures, and that 
reforms may well fail for this reason. 10 
As it developed its policy on good governance in the l ate 1980s and early 1990s, the World Bank and 
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similar agencies introduced economic conditionality as part of ' adjustment' packages that bailed out 
the economic d isasters of the Third World .  Inevitably, conditionality is seen as an implicit attack on 
sovereignty and as a mechanism for neo-colonial control. The effectiveness of conditionality, however 
it is packaged, has been questioned on several grounds. First, conditionality depends upon the leverage 
that can be exerted by the party imposing the conditions and is effective only while the advantage 
remains unless it succeeds in bringing about a transformation in the recipient state. 
In so far as it seeks to bring about a transformation of political structure and policy in a recipient state, 
th is attempt to exert control over a national government seems at odds with the promotion of 
democratisation, transparency, participation and accountability that are part of the good governance 
agenda. External insistence on changes to human rights practice, multi-party democracy and economic 
l iberal isation create an artificial electoral contest in which important pol icy matters are effectively 
sidelined. This raises the question of the threshold that must be crossed to justify the imposition of 
conditions/sanctions by other nations or, to take it to the ultimate stage, the invasion and ' control '  of 
a recipient state by an outside power or powers. 
There is evidence that the good governance approach is increasingly appl ied in the Pacific, and will be 
a factor in shap ing economic management and the operations of political and administrative systems. 
If we take the most obvious cases, the evidence suggests that the imposition of conditions depends on 
a cris is which cannot be controlled by the recipient government. In the case of the Cook Islands, the 
country was bordering on bankruptcy and had few options once its major aid donors joined behind the 
Asian Development Bank in preparing a package that involved, among other things, a halving of the 
public serv ice and a reduction of salaries and allowances for those who remained. In Papua New 
Guinea, where the World Bank and Austral ia withheld the second phase of an adjustment package 
pending reforms, the government conceded important ground but retains a degree of initiative because 
of the wealth and scale of its export industries. In Solomon Islands, where unsustainable forestry is of 
concern among donors, the level of that exploitation effectively insulates that government from this sort 
of conditionality while commercial stands of forest remain. 
Pacific Islands examples also raise questions about the relative importance of form, process and 
capacity of government in creating good governance for the longer term. While the constitutions of 
Fij i and Tonga have been attacked for the manner in which the democratic rights of indiv iduals and 
ethnic groups are legal ly compromised, it might be argued that the democratic rights of the citizens of 
Papua New Guinea are more compromised, in practice, by their government' s inability to deliver 
services, education, freedom of movement and an orderly society. The capacity of governments is the 
key to the provision of effective pol itical rights and to the guarantee of Human Rights in practice. It 
is also the capacity of governments that governs the delivery of social serv ices, the fostering of mass 
media, even the administration of fair elections, as well as the creation of an informed publ ic which 
remains the most effective check on d ictatorship, oppression and corruption. 
Paral lels with Decolonisation 
All of this is reminiscent of the preoccupations of the colonial powers in the immediate postwar period 
during the development of decolonisation policies - first by the British government, then by other 
European powers. The governance debate also recalls the academic l iterature of the earlier period with 
modernisation theory (with its emphasis on what we now call  the development of civil society) and 
pol itical development theory to the fore. 1 1  The underlying issue, for good governance now as for 
decolonisation a generation ago, is the balance of power between the metropolitan power and the 
former dependency. At stake, is the extent to which the colony or former colony can continue to 
determine its own political structure and economic policy (as measured, for example, in terms of 
corruption, oppression and incompetence) and, ultimately, the shape of its own society. 
In the 1930s and 1940s, Britain began to address more directly the dilemmas of decolonisation that 
were implicit in Empire, and had only been partially resolved by the earlier evolution towards 
Dominion status by the former 'white' colonies of Canada, Austral ia, New Zealand and South Africa. 
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Britain was committed to the decolonisation of India, but it was by no means clear whether this same 
path would be open to other Asian and African dependencies ; at this time, the smallness of the 
Caribbean and Pacific dependencies seemed to preclude independence. Indeed, as late as the 1950s, 
officials of the Commonwealth Office assumed that a population of five million represented a 
reasonable lower threshold for independence - until they real ised that New Zealand had some two 
million people at the time. 12 
'!be expectation was that colonies would proceed to independence within the Commonwealth which, 
in itself, posed issues for Britain. Although the principle was accepted, there was little realisation of 
the pace of change that would be forced upon the colonial powers by their own circumstances and by 
the strength of anti-colonial nationalism. As late as 1939, Malcolm Macdonald, Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, still believed that decolonisation would be a ' slow, evolutionary process ' and that it might 
take 'generations, or even centuries, for the peoples of some parts of the Colonial Empire to achieve 
self-government ' . 1 3  During the Second World War, these issues took on a new urgency which 
prompted moves towards political reform, based on the development of democratic local government, 
replacing indirect rule and district administrations. There was also a dawning real isation that, against 
this tide, there would need to be an accommodation of long-standing strategic concerns in places l ike 
Cyprus and Malta, and priv ileges accorded to white settler groups, especially in East Africa. 14 
The Balfour Declaration of 1926 had declared of the settler dominions that: 
11zey are autonomous communities within the British Empire, in no way subordinate to one 
another in respect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance 
to tlze Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. 
Despite the Balfour Declaration, and the Statute of Westminster which gave it constitutional substance 
in 1931, there was still an assumption that ' autonomous ' meant something more like internal 
self-government than full independence and that, on behalf of the Empire and Commonwealth, Britain 
would continue to have a dominant voice in international affairs. Not until the independence of India 
in 1947, and Krishna Menon ' s  ins istence that India would eschew both West and East in favour of a 
Third, non-aligned, World, were the implications of decolonisation for the world order fully realised. 
Many factors underlay the formulation of these pol icies and mechanisms for decolonisation. 
Anti-colonial national ism, and the implied cost of retaining imperial possessions, was a major factor. 
So, too, was the recognition of the contribution that the Empire had made to the War effort. Following 
on, there was an assumption that the Empire could continue to make an economic contribution but that 
th is might carry a cost in terms of pol itical concessions. India had shown the potential strength of 
colonial national ism, as had parallel movements in Indonesia and the Philippines. Within the Empire, 
the Accra Riots in the Gold Coast in 1948, and the Kenyan Mau Mau from 1952, maintained the 
pressure and removed any l ingering conviction that the Empire could be retained. 
Even so, these pressures accelerated an inexorable process, rather than forcing a new direction. 
Britain ' s  acceptance of decolonisation was not yet shared by all other colonial powers. From about 
1 943, however, the United States became a strong colonial critic. 15 As Britain ' s  banker, and in the 
United Nations, it exerted powerful influence against the maintenance of Empire while, ironically, 
extending its own colonial role in Micronesia. The Soviet Union (extending its own hegemony in 
Eastern Europe) preached independence at the United Nations and in the dependent empires of the 
Western Bloc. France, on the other hand,  seemed unaffected. At the Brazzaville conference of 1944, 
France rejected even the prospect of internal self-government for its African possessions :  
11ze goals of the task of civilization accomplished by France in her colonies rule out any idea 
of autonomy, any possibility of evolution outside the French bloc of the empire; the eventual 
creation, even in tlze distant future, of self-government for the colonies is to be set aside. 16 
G 
Decolon isation in Practice 
In facilitating the decolonisation of its own Empire, once India had moved to independence in 1947, 
Britain developed a number of strategies which, l ike the management of the Empire, were in accord 
with fundamental British interests, met local circumstances, and proved capable of infinite flexibil ity 
and adaptability in their implementation. There was, in other words, a steady ' erosion ' of the principles 
that had informed pol icies of imperial disengagement for a generation or more - for example, an 
innovative use of Westminster model of constitutional development which was predicated on a two­
or multi-party system of parl iamentary democracy. The original expectation that newly decolonised 
countries would  still acknowledge the leadership of Britain in international affairs proved untenable 
. in practice. 
The transition from Empire lo Commonwealth also brought an accommodation of republican status 
within the Commonwealth, and acceptance of the monarch as Head of the Commonwealth, rather than 
as Head of Stale of every Commonwealth country . There were experiments with federal structures in 
Africa and the Caribbean and, briefly, with Free Association as an alternative for very small countries. 
In Af'rica, in particular, local government reforms were intended to prov ide the mechanism for a shift 
from the policies of indirect rule that had dominated the inter-war years, towards participatory 
democracy. Politicisation of local government, in combination with growing expressions of 
anti-colonial ism, and frustrated socio-economic aspirations provided the driving force behind local 
demands for decolonisation. The notion that ' true '  political independence was only meaningful 
alongside economic independence gave way to programs for economic investment, the provision of 
infrastructure and social development under technical co-operation, Colonial Development and 
Welfare projects and similar schemes. These were strategies and mechanisms that would meet the 
British desire for disengagement and the colonial demand for self-determination in terms of underlying, 
and largely unchanging, conditions for moving first to internal self-government, and then independence. 
As indicated above, these bas ic conditions were the existence of a participatory democracy, the 
protection of human rights and minority interests, a functioning and politically neutral bureaucracy, 
economic independence for al least the recurrent budget and a range of private religious, social or 
commercial organisations reflecting what we would now call a functioning civil society. These 
priorities brought the development of economic planning and an emphasis on higher education, 
technical training and the local isation of the public service. 
On these principles, Britain supervised the decolonisation of its South and Southeast Asian 
dependencies from 1947 through the 1950s, and the move to independence of most of Sub-Saharan 
Af"rica between 1 957 and the early 1 960s. The process was accelerated by the arrival of new states at 
the United Nations, and the passing of the General Assembly's celebrated Resolution 1514  of 1960 
which established the Committee of Twenty-Four and declared that a lack of economic and social 
preparedness was no longer a barrier to independence. France experimented first with the French 
Community of De Gaulle's Fifth Republ ic and then settled for a close post-colonial relationship with 
former dependencies. Other developments of that time - the Congo crisis of 1960, the Sharpville 
massacre in South Africa, the British government's recognition of the ' Wind of Change ' ,  and the 
background of the Cold War created irresistible pressures for Third World independence and further 
meant that, once the territories were independent, the conditions that had applied for securing 
independence were no longer enforceable. There was a continuing attempt to protect the territorial 
integrity of new states, but little else remained the same. Parliamentary democracies gave way to 
one-party states, dictatorships, and mil itary coups. The expectation of economic independence, at least 
for the recurrent budget, was abandoned. Events in Rhodesia and Uganda showed that old and new 
Commonwealths were divided on basic principles, and on their degree of will ingness to declare (and 
enforce) sanctions against delinquent states. 
The international politics of the Cold War ensured that the standards or conditions for new states that 
had been largely agreed in the 1940s experienced a continuing erosion over the next forty years. Efforts 
to shift the ground - l ike President Carter's emphasis on human rights in the 1970s, for example - had 
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l i ttle chance of success. UN Resolution 15 14 of 1 960, which made national ist demands the first 
principle of decolonisation, and the resolute refusal of Third World nations to pol ice one another's 
affairs, helped ensure the preservation of the status quo. The looming economic crisis faced by many 
developing countries was deferred if not alleviated in the 1970s by the redistribution of petro-dollars 
after the oil shocks earlier in the decade. In dealing with the subsequent (and to some extent 
consequent) Third World debt cris is of the 1 980s, neither bi-lateral donors nor international agencies 
made much progress against the backdrop of the crumbling Eastern Bloc and a stalled Cold War. 
The end of the Cold War, the determination of the international community to effect change in South 
Africa, and a new willingness of Third World countries to intervene in the affairs of other develop ing 
countries - as the Commonweal th has in Nigeria since 1995 - all help to set the scene for change. A 
reappraisal of aid priorities by donors, and initiatives by the World Bank and other agencies, has also 
had an impact. Poor governance and the denial of democratic rights are now seen, with poor economic 
management, as the root causes of continuing Third World poverty. The failing administrative capacity 
of Third World governments is both a consequence and cause of the difficulty. Donors argue that 
economic restructuring must be undertaken alongside attempts to reform the nature of governments in 
the Th ird World, the promotion of democratic processes, the protection of Human Rights,  and the 
development of civ il society. Freed from the aid-competition of the Cold War, donors are more 
powerful politically, and determined to hold the high moral ground, especially on human rights. These 
developments have seen the introduction of political conditionality in setting aid priorities and the 
approval of aid programs s ince the early 1990s. 
Governance and Decolonisation 
The development of th is conditional ity, and the good governance agenda of which it is a part, brings 
me back to the criteria for independence developed in the 1940s : the guarantee of democratic process; 
effective government; economic independence; and the development of a strong civil society. These 
same features are the essence of the good governance agenda, though justified in different terms. It 
might be argued that these differing justifications make a difference, or that both sets of conditions 
simply reflect un iversal values. Be that as it may, there remains a tens ion between the principles of 
sovereign independence and any attempt from outside to determine the shape of a government or its 
pol icy directions. 
"The supposedly new emphasis on good governance, that binds Western models of  democracy with the 
free market policies of the World Bank, raises the question whether Western donors seek to l ink 
inappropriate cultural and political models of democracy, to economic models that have demonstrably 
failed. Both models l ie at the heart of the conditions now applied by donors. The rejection by recipient 
nations of conditionality imposed by bilateral donors or the World Bank as an affront to sovereignty 
is as central to the rhetoric of the governance debate now as it was to anti-colonialism in the 1960s. 
"Ibe moral h igh ground would now be claimed by those who argued that, where the compact between 
governors and governed has been broken to the point that human rights are j eopardised or poverty 
imposed, external powers have not only a right but a duty to intervene. Such a v iew might be found 
in non-governmental organisations as well as marginalised minorities and opposition groups in Third 
World countries . 
Against this, it might be argued that such a level of external influence over the structure and pol icies 
of national governments as are now sought by donors are more appropriate to a colonial relationship 
than to relations between sovereign nations. While it is difficult to make a definitive case either way 
between good governance as neo-colonialism or as principled reform (or, indeed , as the former as the 
means to the latter), the common features of the debates on development and modernisation in the 
decolonisation era and the post Cold War era are more striking than the differences. For example: 
politics and economics have a close relationship in matters of development. The extension of 
political ji·eedom is an indij]erent objective if the economic basis for the operation of that 
freedom is not properly laid. In any case, progress to a sound economy depends on the 
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co-operation of the people and recognition of their political aspirations . . .  
Self-government and independent status are the natural ambition of most colonial people. 
11zey want to govern themselves as free citizens; they want government that is representative 
and responsible . . .  But if democratic self-government were not to become dangerous and futile, 
inj(>rmed public opinion had to become an essential feature of the system, and that could only 
be secured by social and economic progress. Democratic government in the hands of ignorant 
and politically inexperienced people can easily become unworkable . . .  Widespread education, 
means of information and a critical and responsible press seemed . . .  to be among the 
indispensable factors in the working of political democracy . 
. . . Independence, wizen it comes, is weakened if the country concerned is economically and 
politically unstable, or not economically viable. 17 
The rhetoric of  Arthur Creech Jones, Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1 946 to 1950, is 
remarkably l ike that of modernisation theorists of the 1 960s and ' good governance ' advocates in the 
1 990s. What were the conditions of moving to independence, are fast becoming the conditions of 
exercising sovereignty after the Cold War. Evoking human rights concerns and promoting more open 
government, donors demand more democratic governments, competent governance, and market friendly 
economies in the Third World. As with decolonisation, the outcome of good governance initiatives in 
terms of pol itical structures and economic policy may be to make ' them' appear to be more l ike ' us '  .18 
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The Rise and Fall  of Decolonisation in the Pacific1 
Stewart Firth,  Macquarie University 
Decolonisation has one clear and unambiguous meaning in the history of the international system of states 
since World War II. It refers to the withdrawal of the colonial powers from direct legal and constitutional 
control over their territories. lbe process by which the modern states system of Africa, South-East Asia and 
the Pacific Islands came into being is ' decolonisation ' as envisaged by the United Nations in the 1960 
decolonisation resolutions, which were passed at the height of international enthusiasm for the d ismantling 
of the colonial empires. 
If we adopt this straightforward definition in the Pacific we start with the independence gained by Western 
Samoa from New Zealand in 1962, proceed to the withdrawal of the Netherlands, Britain, Austral ia and 
New Zealand up to 1980, move to the decolonisation of American Micronesia and end with the 
ach ievement of independence by the Republic of Palau in October 1994. We should also note New 
Zealand's delegation of certain powers to Tokelau in 1 994 and preparations for an eventual act of 
self-determination.2 A strictly constitutional definition of this kind underlay the classic surveys by J. W. 
Davidson, Barrie Macdonald, Peter Larmour and Yash Ghai.3 
By th is account, decolonisation is a clearly identifiable process of transferring legal and constitutional 
power from colonial el ites to the elites of newly formed sovereign states, w ith some l imitations in the case 
of the five freely associated states. No further decolonisation is thought necessary within these states 
because the colonised people are deemed to have achieved freedom and self-determination. In the region, 
the most obvious exceptions to this process are the French territories. New Caledonia and French Polynesia 
fit the model of territories that the international community regards as requiring to be decolonised. They 
are under the control of one of the old colonial powers, France, which has retreated from much of the 
remainder of its empire and - so the argument goes - should quit the Pacific as well . In tabular form, 
decolonisation appears thus:  
Year of Independence 
1962 Western Samoa 
1963 Irian .Jaya 
1965 Cook Islands* 
1968 Nauru 
1970 Fij i 
1 970 Tonga 
1 973 Niue* 
1975 Papua New Guinea 
1978 Tuvalu 
1 978 Solomon Islands 
1 979 Kiribati 
1980 Vanuatu 
Colonial  Power 
New Zealand 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Australia 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
New Zealand 
Australia 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom and France 
1986 Marshall Islands* 
1986 federated States of Micronesia* 
1994 Belau * 
*In free association with former colonial power. 
U.S .A. 
U.S .A. 
U.S .A. 
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This simple, constitutional model no longer encompasses the complex reality o f  the issue. Decolonisation 
now assumes a variety of meanings in a variety of contexts, and is the goal of widely disparate political 
movements - traditionally anti-colonial in the French territories, secessionist in Papua New Guinea and the 
Melanesian edge of Indonesia, redistributive and culturally assertive in Hawai'i, Guam, New Zealand and 
Austral ia. Some Pacific Islanders who are not supposed to want decolonisation agitate for it, while others 
who might be expected to want national freedom prefer territorial status. The rhetoric of decolonisation and 
sovereignty has become ubiquitous in the pol itics of the Pacific Islands. 
Recent observers have noted the shift. Robert Kiste's 1994 survey of the United States' role in 
decolonisation includes not only the American withdrawal from the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands 
but also resurgent Hawai'ian nationalism and the movement for a sovereign Hawai'ian nation. In a 
companion study, Terence Wesley Smith examines Western Samoa, the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau 
before adding a discussion of Maori political activism entitled ' Decolonizing New Zealand ' .4 Numerous 
commentators on the Bougainville revolt point to what Peter Larmour calls the problematic relationship 
in Papua New Guinea between 'political system and territory ' ,  while the secessionists have consistently 
appealed to the logic of decolonisation by which every nation deserves its own state. 5 Here I reflect on the 
state of decolonisation, and try to synthesise the diverse strands of the story. 
Legitimating the State 
Pacific Islands decolonisation is bound up with strongly held beliefs about race, nation and culture and 
therefore is deeply rooted in illus ion and ideology. Bel iefs about distinct races have no foundation in 
genetics. 'lbose about nation rest on unsupportable generalisations about homelands and identity. Culture 
is notoriously elusive. Yet race, nation and culture possess a compell ing reality in politics and constitute 
the ideological underpinnings of the modern nation-state. 
'lbe nation, as Benedict Anderson has famously phrased it, is an ' imagined community ' ,  a projection of 
identity by individuals on to others who speak the same language or l ive within the borders of the same 
nation-state; and while th is sense of identity has a natural basis in ease of communication and sharing a 
homeland, it is also the artificial product of symbols, rituals and histories promoted to make people bel ieve 
that they belong to this community and owe it loyalty.6 ' Culture ' might be an indispensable word to 
describe the interconnected beliefs and practices of human groups. But who is to say where cultures begin 
and end? Where does Maori culture, for example, shade into pakeha? 
lbe other actor in decolonisation is less illusory and easier to define. This is the state, the principal political 
legacy of colonialism and the characteristically Western and modern form of organising political 
communities on a large scale. The state, that social organisation which claims a monopoly of ultimate 
pol itical authority within a defined territory, needs sustenance in the form of legitimacy. It needs people 
to bel ieve it has a right to rule. New states must seek legitimacy from new ' nations ' ,  that is, from the belief 
of citizens that their identity and destiny are bound up with those of others within the same political 
communities. At this point the tangible state, consisting of the government, the bureaucracy and the forces 
of coercive authority (police or military or both), comes to depend on the far less tangible ' nation ' or 
'culture ' ,  or in some cases, the genetically non-existent but ideologically potent ' race ' .  
1 2  
B y  creating the modern state, colonialism redefines forms o f  political legitimacy. Whereas earlier claims 
to political authority might have rested on convictions about superior hereditary rank (as in precolonial 
Hawai'i) or superior ability lo amass and d istribute wealth (as in precolonial Vanuatu), and even though 
such beliefs might persist, the new slate el ites nurture beliefs that are themselves ideological inheritances 
of colonial ism. 'Ibey must do so because, like everyone else, they are heirs to the nationalist idea expressed 
in the French Revolution. Governments in the late twentieth century, of old states and new, base their right 
to rule on the claim that state and nation coincide and that the state is the expression in pol itical terms of 
its cu ltural counterpart the nation. 
The rhetoric of decolonisation in Africa, South-East Asia and the Pacific was inspired by the fiction that, 
after a period of foreign domination, an entity called the nation (or the people) was once again permitted 
to ru le itself; either that, or a new nation was being born. At independence ceremonies new states are 'born' 
into the ' family of nations' or, in a related analogy, they are children reaching adulthood and permitted to 
make their own way in the world. President Reagan employed just such a metaphor in h is speech to the 
peoples of the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia when they were 
deemed to have achieved independence in 1 986. But what was the nation and who were the people? 
In fact they were the populations who happened to l ive within borders of the colonial territories that became 
new states and, more often than not, they were divided l inguistically and culturally into antagonistic or 
competitive groups. 7 Sometimes colonial powers could divide such territories before independence so as 
to achieve a better accommodation between self-identifying cultural groups and new states. When territories 
consisted of islands, already separated from others by the ocean, such divisions were easily made. lbe Trust 
Territory of the Pacific Islands was once supposed to succeed to statehood as one country. Under pressure 
from the Islanders, the United States partitioned it into four entities, which became the Commonwealth of 
the Marianas, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republ ic 
of Palau. Similarly Britain accepted the secession of the Ell ice Islands from the Gilberts in 1976 and the 
formation of two independent states instead of one, Tuvalu and Kiribati.8 
In the different cultural and geograph ical circumstances of Melanesia, where hundreds of language groups 
populated each colon ial territory, such partitions were impossible. The same principle appl ied to 
Melanesian colonial territories would have produced a parody of the modern slates system, with hundreds 
of microstates each corresponding to a self-identifying micronational group. The ultimate logic of the 
nation-state would have been fulfilled at the cost of absurdity. Decolonisation was therefore much more 
successful in some parts of the Pacific than in others in creating a strong foundation for the pol itical 
legitimacy of new state el ites. Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea entered independence as 
multinational states susceptible to secessionist movements. The Western Solomons breakaway movement 
briefly threatened to split Solomon Islands at the point of independence in 1 978, Vanuatu confronted a 
secessionist revolt on the island of Santo in 1980 and Papua New Guinea has been torn by the Bougainville 
rebellion s ince 1 988. West Papua has itself sought to secede since it was absorbed into Indonesia as the 
province of Irian Jaya in 1963.9 
Secessions and Sovereignties 
The region's two main secessionist movements are both in Melanesia, one in the Indonesian province of 
Irian Jaya and the other on Bougainville. Secessionists seek freedom from new forms of colonial 
domination created, ironically, by the decolonisation process itself. Most of the Melanesian population of 
Irian .Jaya, as far as we can determine, do not regard their decolonisation in the 1 960s, when the 
international community acquiesced in their being handed over by the Dutch to Indonesia, as 
self-determination. Quite the reverse: an armed struggle against the Indonesian authorities has been pursued 
ever since by the OPM, the Movement for Free Papua, a loosely-knit collection of jungle guerillas who 
regard Indonesia as a new colonial overlord that should be expelled from their homeland. Tbe forgotten war 
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in Irian .Taya has led to the deaths of ten of thousands of Melanesian villagers and should be seen as the 
most important national ist revolt ever undertaken by Pacific Islanders. Sporadic skirmishes continue. OPM 
guerillas are said to have raised the flag of independent West Papua at Tsinga village in southern Irian Jaya 
on two occasions in 1994, and to have killed a bulldozer driver employed by Freeport Indonesia, the mainly 
American-owned mining company that operates the Grasberg mine, in November. Apparently in retal iation, 
the Indonesian armed forces killed an unknown number of Melanesians - just one according to official 
sources and over twenty according to the Austral ian Council for Overseas Aid. S imilar reports came in 
1 995 , in the form of charges by the Catholic B ishop of Jayapura that soldiers were responsible for the 
murder and torture of Melanesians near the town of Timika10 • The Indonesian government does not deny 
that its military forces are in constant conflict with secessionists in d ifferent parts of the country: ' We are 
operating all day long' ,  a military spokesman said in April 1995, ' We operate in Irian Jaya, Aceh and East 
Timar, all day long' . 1 1  
We tend to minimise Irian Jaya i n  the story o f  Islands independence. We are caught i n  a rhetoric o f  region 
that brings the South Pacific to an abrupt end along the Indonesian border. The standard definition of the 
region embraces the twenty-two island states and territories of the South Pacific Commission area from the 
Northern Marianas to Pitcairn Island and excludes the western half of the island of New Guinea. And the 
standard definition of decolonisation is that it can occur only once because new states by definition cannot 
themselves be colonisers. The doctrine is a pol itical necessity for new states threatened by secession, and 
for this reason the international community has consistently endorsed a definition of decolonisation that 
focuses on territories under the control of the old colonial powers. It recognises first-stage decolonisation 
movements, those that seek freedom from the traditional colonial empires, while seeing second-stage 
movements in new states as threats to international security. 
An independence rebell ion of th is second-stage kind has threatened the political stability of Papua New 
Gu inea ever since secessionist rebels brought copper mining operations at Panguna to a halt in 1989. Myths 
of Bougainvillean nationhood have competed with myths of Papua New Guinean nationhood. In fact both 
the island and the country are fractured along linguistic l ines, neither is a nation, and pol itical unity would 
be no more l ikely in an independent Republic of Meekamui than in Papua New Guinea as a whole, as 
fighting among Bougainvilleans themselves has shown. Most villagers have suffered at d ifferent times 
under both the Papua New Guinea Defence Force and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army and s imply 
want peace and the restoration of government services, schools, hospitals and public service salaries. 
Avoidable deaths caused by the withdrawal of services during the blockade by the national government 
number in the thousands. Whether the Bougainville Transitional Government established in April 1995 will 
succeed in bringing a lasting peace to the province remains to be seen . 12 The core issue is how much 
political au tonomy the national government can afford to grant Bougainville without encouraging a general 
disintegration of the Papua New Guinean state, particularly in the form of a breakaway by the New Guinea 
Islands provinces. 1 3  Neither the OPM nor the BRA is at all likely to succeed in forming a new state. Both 
are poorly d iscip l ined organisations without significant external support in the form of money, weapons 
or even recognition. 
Aboriginal Austral ians, Maori, native Hawai'ians and Kanaks are a second group who favour wider 
definitions of decolonisation . Austral ia, New Zealand, Hawai'i and New Caledonia are the four places in 
the region where settler populations have outnumbered the original inhabitants,  taken much of their land 
and constructed l iberal democracies along Western l ines. In each of these societies a clash between d ifferent 
principles of political legitimacy l ies at the heart of d isputes over decolonisation and sovereignty. New 
Caledonia illustrates the point (see Small ,  chapter 8). The French authorities organised a referendum on 
the future of New Caledonia in 1 987 and achieved a resounding vote in favour of French rule. But the 
result, supported by a large majority of those who voted, did not settle the matter. The Kanaks boycotted 
the referendum. Most Kanaks had lost land and become strangers in their own country. They were too 
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al ienated from the political and economic system to accept a decis ion based merely on numbers as 
represented by votes cast in a liberal democratic system: they stood for a d ifferent political principle, rights, 
above al l right<; to land and sovereignty said to belong by inheritance to the descendants of the original 
occupiers . 
Rights to land have a clear place in the l iberal tradition because they are a species of the rights of property 
so v igorously protected by Western law. Ancient, aboriginal rights to land are embodied in legal 
instruments such as the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand and were recognised in the High Court of 
Austral ia's landmark Mabo decis ion of 1992. While such rights are pol itically contested, they can be 
incorporated in to the law of settler societies without difficul ty and without calling into question the 
consistency of that law. Aboriginal Austral ians, Maoris, Kanaks and native Hawai'ians have all asserted 
rights to land in recent years and in varying degrees they have all been successful . 
Rights to sovereignty are a different matter. The l iberal democracies of Australia, New Zealand, France (for 
the French Pacific territories) and the United States (for Hawai'i) embody a fundamental principle of 
universality in the way in which political power is legitimated. Citizenship by itself and without reference 
to ethn icity, descent or original attachment to the land is the sole qualification for participating in the 
regular elections that confer legitimacy on the government. No doubt these societies are far less democratic 
than they appear: pol itical power is distributed much less equitably than the ideology of democracy 
suggests, and wealth and descent are significant prerequisites for exercising such power. But the important 
point is ideological . Numbers matter because they are believed to matter. Those who assert claims to control 
the state on a different basis, such as descent from the original occupiers of the land, are not l ikely to get 
far unless they also have the numbers in terms of votes . 
In most non-settler societies in the Pacific the argument goes the other way. Here Europeans were a tiny 
minority and most people could claim descent from the original occupiers of the land. So rights to land and 
sovereignty based on descent went together with numbers. 'Descent from the original occupiers of the land ' 
is synonymous with the nation, is used in a variety of definitions as a qualification for citizenship in several 
Melanesian countries and qual ifies people for the sovereignty that comes with decolonisation. In the 
absence of large settler populations the two principles, numbers and rights, can be reconciled and can 
justify the political authority of the post-colonial state. 
But where settlers form a large majority, their descendants, not the descendants of the original occup iers, 
decide which principle legitimates political authority. In Austral ia, for example, the descendants of 
European and other foreign settlers are more than 98% of the population, and the special claims of 
Aboriginal Austral ians are dealt with by land rights legislation enacted within the conventional political 
process. The significance of talk about decolonisation in Austral ia does not lie in that possibil ity itself but 
in the pol itical leverage created by such talk, as the Torres Strait Islands show (see Elu, chapter 16,  and 
Mullins, chapter 1 7). Torres Strait Islanders, who number about 8,500 in the islands and 15 ,000 on the 
mainland, have been call ing for self-government since the 1980s. They resent the fact that Federal funding 
comes via the Aboriginal and Torres S trait Islander Commission, an instrumentality which puts them 
together with Aboriginal Austral ians. When Prime Minister Paul Keating v isited Thursday Island in 
September 1 995,  they reminded him that they wanted separate funding and received an encouraging 
response. By emphasising a distinct ethnic identity, the Torres Strait Islanders hope to garner a greater share 
of Canberra' s  resources. 1 4  
New Zealand's 340,000 Maori represent a larger proportion of their country's total population than do 
Aboriginal Australians (13% compared with 1 . 5% ), and have successfully brought the issue of Maori 
self-determination to the mainstream pol itical agenda. In response to Maori pressure, the Labour 
government strengthened the Waitangi Tribunal in 1985 and opened the way for a flood of Maori land 
claims going back to the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi between Maori chiefs and the British in 1840. 15 
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Briefly, before the Labour Party was defeated in 1990, the government tried to set  up a version of Maori 
self-determination by delivering services through local tribal authorities, but the National Party has reversed 
the experiment. From the point of view of most white or pakeha New Zealanders their country was 
decolonised when it became a self-governing Dominion early this century. But for many Maori the 
decolonisation of New Zealand remains incomplete. 
In the heady atmosphere of protest that followed the New Zealand government's 1994 offer of $NZ1 billion 
in settlement of all land claims - the so-called fiscal envelope - some Maori leaders called for sovereignty 
and an independent Maori nation state. Maori activists disrupted the 1995 celebrations of Waitangi Day 
on February G by baring buttocks, spitting and tearing down the New Zealand flag. Soon afterwards Maoris 
occupied Moutoa Gardens in the city of Wanganui and in four other sites of Maori land claims. By the end 
of April a mainly pakeha group of Wanganui citizens were also demonstrating, proclaiming a pakeha 
version of New Zealand nationhood defined in majoritarian terms, with banners saying ' One Nation, One 
People' and 'One Law for All People' . 16 The Maori occupations are meant to dramatise dispossession by 
the invading pakeha population in the nineteenth century, and, in the imaginations of some radicals, to 
prepare the way for the full decolonisation of New Zealand under Maori control . Ironically, many Maori 
beliefs about race, culture and nation have a Western intellectual heritage and are pressed into service to 
achieve Western pol itical goals. 
New Zealand will not be ' decolonised ' in the conventional sense of the term. It will not become the 
sovereign state of Aotearoa under Maori domination. The Maori are too small a minority in the country of 
their ancestors, and few want a Maori nation-state in any case. Yet the resurgence of Maori demands for 
self-determination has critically influenced the political agenda in New Zealand and will continue to be one 
of the ways by which a dispossessed minority, held together by a shared sense of history and cultural 
identity, will bargain for a fairer share of wealth and status in a westernised and capital ist society. 
I lawai'i will not be decolonised in the conventional sense either. Like the Maori, llawai'ians are a 
dispossessed minority who employ an idiom of decolonisation in defence of claims to land and sovereignty. 
On 1 7  January 1 993, a hundred years after the overthrow of the monarchy by Americans, 15 ,000 
l lawai'ians marched on 'Iolani Palace in Honolulu shouting slogans such as Ka Lahui Ilawai'i (the 
Ilawai'ian nation) and 'ea (sovereignty). The fate of the concept of sovereignty in recent debate in Hawai'i 
exempl ifies the clash between rights-based and numbers-based principles of pol itical legitimacy. A group 
of international lawyers and academics who constituted the People's International Tribunal called upon the 
United States and the world in 1993 to ' acknowledge the right of Lahui Kanaka Maoli to decolonize under 
provision of United Nations Resolution 15 14' as if it were possible for Hawai'i to follow the example of 
non-settler colonies such as Western Samoa and Kiribati and to gain sovereignty in the name of the nation. 
By this theory, the international community should support Hawai'i in an act of political independence from 
the colon ising power, the United States. The llawai'ian sovereignty movement Ka Pakaukau, which 
organised the Tribunal, professes to see Hawai'ian independence of this kind as a possibility that belongs 
to the real world of politics. 
The vast majority of American citizens in Hawai'i, many of them native Hawai'ians, do not support such 
a future or regard it as remotely feasible. In the hands of other Hawai'ian sovereignty groups, such as Ka 
Lahui I lawai'i led by Mililani Trask, sovereignty becomes a more achievable goal embracing reconciliation 
under an Apology Bill, the return to direct Hawai'ian control of the Hawai'ian Trust Lands and the forming 
of a 'nation within a nation ' on the model of Ind ian nations in the mainland United States. The goal is 
redistribu tive justice for a dispossessed minority within an existing political system. The state government 
has embraced the rhetoric of sovereignty in order to ensure that it does not mean very much at all, or - to 
put it another way - to ensure that any entity called a sovereign l lawai'ian government or nation is 
compatible with the rule of the majority in Hawai'i . There has been talk of a plebiscite on the question of 
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restoring a I Iawai'ian nation, whatever attenuated form that might take, bu t  not of  one on the question of 
restoring a l lawai'ian s tate . 1 7  In l iberal political systems with principles of legitimacy based on numbers, 
minority claims to land might be accepted, but minority claims to sovereignty based on rights will 
inevitably be resisted. Something given the name sovereignty, if conceded, will be a mere shadow of itself, 
with almost none of the significance it has in international law, yet with significance of another kind in the 
restitution of land and new entitlements to resources. Such will be the case in Hawai'i. 
New Caledonia represents a variation on the theme of settler colonies. Here history delivered an ambiguous 
verdict on the territory's future. The original and settler populations are in rough balance. Settlers (French, 
Vietnamese, Wall isians, Indonesians and others, see Small, chapter 8) outnumber Kanaks, but not by a huge 
margin. As a consequence, the outcome of the territory's d ispute over decolonisation has much less of the 
predictability that comes from the presence of a large majority of settlers. Australia, Hawai'i and New 
Zealand do not fit the model of territories that the international community regards as requiring 
decolonisation. Settlers there have long since overwhelmed original populations and, as far as the world 
is concerned, the die is cast. New Caledonia, however, is the territory of a European power on the other side 
of the world and part of an older colonial empire that once included South-East Asian and African states, 
all of which have achieved independence. The name of its principal independence movement, the FLNKS, 
recalls the FLN of French Algeria. Above all, the French government considered the FLNKS to be so 
serious a threat that it despatched thousands of troops to the territory to keep order. When Jean-Marie 
·nibaou talked of a national l iberation struggle and an independent Republic of Kanaky he was thought not 
he posturing for effect hut to be describing an achievable goal. For these reasons, and under pressure from 
the South Pacific Forum, the United Nations voted in 1986 to put New Caledonia on the l ist of 
non-self-governing territories. New Caledonia conforms with the internationally recognised paradigm of 
a colonial territory. 
The military raid in which French soldiers killed n ineteen Kanaks on Ouvea in May 1988 spurred the 
leaders of both sides to reach an agreement, the Matignon Accords, which have become the basis of what 
Stephen llenningham calls the ' uneasy peace ' . 1 8 The essence of the Accords is that New Caledonia has 
been given a breathing-space of ten years before the territory's people vote again in a referendum on their 
political future in 1998, and that the French government has become committed to public spending in the 
territory on an unprecedented scale. Kanaks in the northern and Islands provinces remain much poorer than 
French in Noumea, but they are beginning to benefit from infrastructure of a kind that does not exist 
anywhere else in Melanesia. This higher standard of living, the French hope, will spl it the Kanak vote 
sufficiently in 1998 to ensure a future for the territory as part of overseas France. Under the '400 managers' 
program, funds are available to give special training to 400 territory residents (the majority Kanak) to 
assume positions of responsib il ity in business and the public sector previously denied them. Smartly dressed 
young Kanaks in new cars can already be seen making their way to business appointments in Noumea. 
France has also made some attempts to redistribute land, for land rights have been at the foundation of the 
Kanak independence movement s ince the 1 970s. Except in the Loyalty Islands, where most of the land 
remained in the possession of the original inhabitants, the history of land is l ike that of Australia. Settlers 
came, took land and pushed villagers into reserves, and today just 1 ,000 French own two-thirds of the 
arable land. The au thorities have redistributed some land but a wholesale re-allocation seems unlikely. 
As the independence movement splits between those who profit from the French connection and those who 
want independence, the initiative is moving decisively to the French government. Politics in New Caledonia 
is losing its polarised, ideological character and, as the 1995 provincial elections showed, the FLNKS is 
increasingly splintering and drawn into deals and cross-party arrangements. Like its loyalist opponent the 
RPCR, the FLNKS now accepts that a simple vote on independence in 1998 would be div is ive, and that 
all major groupings need to reach a consensus on the territory's future before a vote of any kind.19 A 
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number of outcomes is  possible: New Caledonia might follow the example of the former American 
territories in Micronesia and enter into a status of ' independence-in-association ' with France, with some 
of the cultural benefits of independence and a continuing flow of French aid; or the Matignon Accords 
might be extended for years before a final referendum. The least l ikely outcome is that the 1998 referendum 
will be held in the form originally envisaged, and that the territory will become an independent Melanesian 
republic. 
Fij i is a further variation on the theme of settler colonies, in this case an independent Pacific state with a 
history of British colonisation and a s izable Indian minority whose numbers have roughly matched or 
sl ightly exceeded those of the original Fij ians for most of the last fifty years (Lal, chapter 4). Others have 
pondered the causes of the coup of 1 987.2° Fij i  Indians, who were targeted by the coup and whose political 
representation has since been curtailed, cannot employ the rhetoric of decolonisation in defence of their 
interests. Unl ike disadvantaged minorities almost everywhere else in the region they cannot claim land or 
sovereignty on the basis of the rights of the original occupiers. That is an argument which in Fij i  belongs 
to the pol itically dominant F�j ians. So l ike the descendants of settlers in Australia, New Zealand or I lawai'i, 
the Fij i  Indians have appealed to majority rule and race-blind citizenship, liberal democratic ideas which 
they hope might find a more important place in Fij i's constitution after the current constitutional review. 
Uniquely among the Pacific's former settler colonies, and for special historical reasons, Fij i is an 
independent state where rights-based legitimacy has prevailed. S ince the 1 987 coups the ethnic national ist 
argument has appeared in a secessionist form, with calls by some Rotumans for the independence of their 
homeland, the one Polynesian island group in the country. The call was repeated by a high-ranking 
Rotuman Gagaj Sau Lagfatmaro, in 1995 .2 1  
The Territories 
After more than three decades since the Western Samoans became the first Polynesians to gain 
independence ( Liua ' ana, chapter 5), the peoples of the remaining territories in Polynesia and Micronesia 
are not rushing to follow. Underwritten by subsidies from Washington or Paris, the standard of l iving is 
higher in American Samoa, Guam and French Polynesia than in Western Samoa and Tonga. It is higher 
in Palau or the Marshalls than in Kiribati or Tuvalu, at least as most people measure these things . The 
territories do better than the freely associated states, which in turn do better than independent states. A 
direct or indirect connection with a metropol itan power, bringing subsidies and allowing out-migration, 
gives people more choices than independence with foreign aid.  Samoans and Tongans, for example, leave 
their independent homelands behind in order to enter the non-independent territory of American Samoa, 
where employers pay higher wages. The paradox of decolonisation in this part of the Pacific is that 
Islanders want independence most where it will not happen, and least where a genuine possibility exists . 
French Polynesia might appear to be an exception. It is a territory with a substantial Islander majority, a 
history of being used for nuclear tests and a number of independence parties . Media images of Tahiti in 
September 1 995 suggested that French Polynesia was seething with anti-colonial discontent. Following 
France's decision to resume nuclear testing for a final series in 1995 and 1996, and after sustained 
international protest which put French Polynesia in the spotlight as never before, the French detonated their 
first bomb beneath Moruroa lagoon on 5 September. The following day unionists called a general strike 
which qu ickly degenerated into a riot. Demonstrators occupied the runway at the international airport at 
Pape'ete, attacked an Air France DC-10 awaiting takeoff and then stormed the terminal building with 
bricks, iron bars and even a bulldozer. '!be riots spread to Pape'ete itself, where youths rampaged through 
the streets, looting, smashing shop windows and setting buildings al ight. As the French authorities flew in 
extra security forces (including the Foreign Legion) the rest of the world had its first chance to see modern 
Tahiti. What the world saw was a French colonial town ablaze, cars overturned, stores looted and street 
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battles between police and young Tahitians. I n  Austral ia, an ABC radio journal ist reported the riots l ive 
against a background of regular stun grenade explosions, and in the print media subeditors chose headl ines 
such as ' Bomb ignites Pacific rebellion ' ,  ' French provoke dormant independence movement' ,  ' explosion 
of independence ' and the inev itable ' Rebell ion in Paradise ' .  Oscar Temaru, leader of the independence 
party Tavini I lu iraatira, was quoted as saying: 'Today you can hear the French firing on our people . . .  At this 
very moment we appeal to the entire world to call on Jacques Chirac to stop this madness . . .  The whole 
people of th is country are there fighting against the French army. It is a decision made by the people 
themselves. ' International journal ists queued eight deep to interview Temaru, whom they portrayed as a 
Polynesian Nelson Mandela.22 
Despite these dramatic events, French Polynesia will probably remain part of overseas France, well into 
the next century.  The territory is not an equivalent of Vietnam or Algeria in the 1 950s, and the riots are 
unl ikely to be the first steps on French Polynesia's march to independence. A majority of the rioters and 
looters appear to have been unemployed youths from the poorest parts of Pape'ete, venting their anger at 
their relegation to the bottom of the social pile. They are not the shock-troops of a d isciplined and widely 
supported movement for independence. In  fact, many other Polynesians make sharp distinctions between 
opposing nuclear testing and opposing the French presence as a whole. A majority of the thousands who 
marched in a protest around the island of Tahiti in June 1995 wanted an end to testing but not an end to 
French rule. 
The territory's income, after all , fel l  sharply when the nuclear tests were suspended in 1992. The French 
government recognised that the French Polynesian economy required a long term solution founded on more 
than mil itary francs. 'Ibe result was an agreement in 1994 providing for continued development funds until 
2003. This is the Pact for Progress, based in part on a Development Charter drawn up by leading figures 
in French Polynesia soon after the suspension of the tests, when the need for French Polynesia to generate 
more wealth became starkly apparent.23 During the years of nuclear testing (1966- 1992) the French 
Polynesian independence movement in its different manifestations was constantly hampered by the fact that 
the French testing centre brought money to the territory, underwriting the l ivel ihoods of thousands of 
Islanders who were understandably reluctant to call for France to leave. Now it is hampered by the Pact for 
Progress, a less generous subsidy but a guarantee that France will continue to develop the territory. In these 
circumstances the 1 995 riots are more l ikely to weaken the broad political appeal of Tavini Huiraatira than 
to strengthen it. 
French Polynesia has an ' economy of transfer' ,  where money comes from far away in return for strategic 
services. In Bernard Poirine's formulation, an economy of transfer is one version of a wider phenomenon 
of ' economies of rent' ,  and in this case the rent is for nuclear purposes.24 Territorial politics, as Karin von 
Strokirch has argued, operates on the basis of widespread patronage networks, in which jobs, services and 
property routinely change hands in return for votes, and which is ultimately underwritten by financial 
transfers from France and by the lack of ' hard budget constraints ' .  An artificial economy, built on the 
patronage of an external power which values the territory for strategic reasons, thus becomes the conduit 
for patronage at lower levels, territorial and municipal .  Financial responsibility is lacking, political 
allegiances tend to be flexible and wider ideological considerations have traditionally played a small part 
in pol itics.25 
French Polynesia shows that, however much people might want to reassert their cultural identity in a 
decolonised setting, they fear the loss of a generous patron more. The American territory of Guam 
exempl ifies a similar phenomenon in a d ifferent way. Here independence is so remote a poss ibility that 
pol iticians can employ the stirring rhetoric of decolonisation without any fear that it might occur. In Guam 
most talk of decolonisation is strictly for non-decolonising purposes. Representatives of Guam have 
appeared in recent years before the United Nations Decolonisation Committee and the Subcommittee on 
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Small Territories, complaining of U.S .  imperial ism. When Joseph Ada introduced himself to the Clinton 
administration at the White House in 1993, he said he came as 'Governor of the American colony of Guam' 
and that Guam was 'unwilling to remain a colony' .26 Guam, he said, was like the thirteen colonies under 
the British in the eighteenth century. The implication might seem to be that Guam wants to sever ties with 
Washington and become independent. Yet in fact the Chamorro self-determination movement, at least in 
its widely supported form, seeks merely an alternative form of connection with the United States - as a 
Commonwealth rather than an unincorporated territory. American citizenship, that envied resource 
endowment which Guamanians have had s ince 1950, is not to be put at risk, and the calculation is that 
lands will be restored to Chamorros while federal funding continues to flow from Washington. Republican 
control of both houses of Congress has stalled progress towards Commonwealth status for Guam. The 
whole issue may well be submerged for years by other issues such as the closure of military facil ities and 
cutbacks in federal funding.27 
Reflections 
Certain general conclusions suggest themselves. First, decolonisation is an ideological as well as a political 
phenomenon . It is the mechanism of forming new states, and is everywhere accompanied by new beliefs 
of Western origin about pol itical legitimacy and the justification of authority. The new states of the Pacific 
are supposed to be ' nation-states ' along Western lines, legitimated in Western ways. Appl ied to widely 
different cultural and political circumstances across the region, this formula provides a foundation for 
pol itical stab il ity in some Pacific countries but a recipe for secession and civil strife in others . 
Second, ' decolonisation ' is a contested concept. Whether or not a territory deserves to be decolonised and 
whether or not a people deserve to be sovereign are not decided s imply by reference to international law 
and U.N.  resolutions; they are matters of opinion. Whereas the French authorities conceive of French 
Polynesia as naturally part of France, for example, the independence activ ists think of it as naturally an 
independent country, held back from its destiny by foreign occupation. 
lbird, the language of decolonisation and national freedom now serves a d isparate array of anti-colonial, 
secessionist and sovereignty movements, some of which regard independence as catastrophic. 
Fourth, none of the anti-colonial and secessionist movements is l ikely to achieve decolonisation in the 
traditional sense. 
Fifth, rights-based arguments for land are being accepted in liberal democracies in the Pacific but, because 
the legitimating principle for political au thority in such societies is majoritarian, minorities there will not 
succeed with rights-based arguments for sovereignty in its classic sense of independent statehood. 
' Sovereignty' may come to minorities but only in an attenuated form, principally as a fairer share of 
resources - especially land - and greater freedom of cultural expression. For some sovereignty movements, 
this will represent a partial real isation of their original aims, which did not include independence anyway. 
Sixth, many Islanders no longer want to be decolonised. The high tide of decolonisation in the non-settler 
Pacific Islands has receded. One reason l ies in international politics. So long as powerful external states 
wanted Pacific Islands decolonisation, it happened; now that the international community regards 
decolonisation as virtual ly accompl ished, the Islands' political map is l ikely to remain unaltered. But 
another reason is that the distinction between colonial territories and independent or semi-independent 
states is becoming blurred . Pacific Islanders have better l ives and access to more services in most of the 
region's territories than they do in independent countries. In territories such as French Polynesia, American 
Samoa and Guam, as well as Ilawai'i, a decisive majority of Islanders want to remain firmly tied to the 
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metropol itan patron that is the source of their standard of l iv ing and would regard decolonisation as a 
disaster. 
What is left behind in this post-colonial and post-decolonial era d iffers from place to place. In parts of 
Melanesia secessionism continues to inspire armed conflict. In island groups long since overwhelmed by 
settlers descendants of the first occupiers call for land and sovereignty in the name of decolonisation . In 
most of the remaining territories the majority of Islanders are wary of what they suspect is the false promise 
of independence. The path to independence for colonial peoples used to be seen as the march of history, 
temporarily delayed in some territories but ultimately inevitable. From the perspective of the 1990s, this 
particular march of history begins to look l ike an artefact of a period and set of circumstances, and 
decolonisation has lost its s imple teleology. While the rhetoric of decolonisation expands and diversifies, 
the real ity diminishes. 
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Queen Salote and the British Dual Mandate Policy 
Elizabeth Wood-Ellem, Melbou rne 
Dual mandate as a policy could be seen in operation in Tonga in the early years of the reign of Queen 
Salote Tupou III, who succeeded her father, Tupou II, on 5 April 1918, three weeks after her eighteenth 
b irthday. Islay McOwan, British Agent & Consu l  1 9 17-27, initial ly had grave doubts about Salote's 
abil ity to rule, saying, 'The Queen is very young and inexperienced and is  incapable, in my judgment, 
of d ischarging the duties devolving upon her ' .  He deplored 'Her Majesty's inabil ity to d istinguish 
between good and bad adv ice where the interests of the Kingdom are concerned ' ,  and suggested this 
(April 1 9 1 8) was an appropriate time to change Tonga's status . 1  Annexation was not a new idea, as it 
had been considered several times during the reign of Tupou II, along with deportation of that monarch. 
The British at first had so l i ttle faith in Salote that they planned to have her consort, Tungi Mailefihi, 
crowned King at the same time as Salote was crowned Queen, and to make him the effective ruler. By 
an accident of war, Colonial Office consent to this proposal was lost at sea, the replacement message 
arriv ing a few days after Salote's coronation in October 1918 .2 The British then gave Salote an 
opportunity to prove herself, and thereafter constantly evaluated her effectiveness as a ' native ruler ' .  
They preferred the dual mandate (in which a 'native ruler' would be guided by  an Agent & Consul) to 
annexation and government by an administrator, because the former was the more economic way to 
control Tonga. 
With in a few weeks of Queen Salote's accession McOwan reported that 'consultations which I have had 
with Her Majesty and Uiliam i  Tungi have been marked by the good feel ing and the good sense of 
both '  ,3 but he regretted that the Queen could not control Parl iament, which was the most v is ible 
(although largely ineffective) instrument of government. Parliament would be dominated for some years 
by d issident chiefs, who used it to express their opposition to the Tupou dynasty, of which Queen 
Salote was only the third national leader. In 1920 McOwan reported to the High Commissioner for the 
Western Pacific that: 
Tlze Queen lzas not tlze influence over these men [members of Parliament] that her late father 
possessed [but] I am glad to say that neither Her Majesty nor her consort seek to obtain that 
influence by resorting to methods which would be derogatory to their rank, to their dignity and 
to the respect in which they are held by all classes of the community.4 
When the High Commissioner, S ir Cecil Rodwell, visited Tonga in November 1920, he found 
Parl iament out of control, impeaching ministers and refus ing to conduct business until the Queen had 
responded to a petition from the previous session. Rodwell informed the members of Parliament that 
if they could not find common ground with the Queen and Privy Council, he would recommend to the 
Secretary of S tate for the Colonies that the existing status of Tonga be recons idered.5 Rodwell's 
subsequent correspondence with the Colonial Office shows that what he had in  mind was the 
annexation of Tonga. 
This was no empty threat. In earl ier crises, Bri tain had threatened to depose and deport Tupou II, and 
the High Commissioner actually had deported two premiers ( 1890 and 1 905) .  Tupou II had been given 
more than one chance to reform himself and his government. Salote needed only one chance, for 
McOwan soon had further opportunities to observe Salote's good feeling and good sense, and to note 
that one of her outstanding quali ties was her abil ity to distinguish good from bad advice. 
Salote needed the British alliance because of her difficulties with the rebellious chiefs. She was not only 
meticulous in observing Tonga's Treaty of Friendship with Great Britain (1900) and the Supplementary 
Agreement ( 1905), but also in seeking and acting upon the advice of the Agent & Consul and the High 
Commissioner. Salote was wholly sincere when she commented that 'The Friendship of Great Britain 
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is Tonga's dearest possession ' 6, for she, l ike McOwan, genuinely believed that Tonga's interests - as 
well as her own - were best served by the British alliance. 
'Ibe High Commissioner was largely guided by McOwan's assessment, just as the Colonial Office was 
guided hy the High Commissioner. McOwan was soon deeply committed to the Queen, most notably 
when dissident chiefs opposed the royal house over the Church Reunion difficulties of 1923-24. The 
outcome was very sign ificant for Tonga, for the High Commissioner agreed that the Privy Council 
would he the final court of appeal in the legal cases arising from Church Reunion, and this rul ing gave 
Tonga legal independence and greatly increased the l ikelihood of Salote's survival as 'native ruler' . 
That Salote understood the dual mandate policy was demonstrated in a speech at the Opening of 
Parl iament in 1925 , in which she informed the members of Parl iament: 
If we are wise and work faithfully and well, what can restrict our freedom or our increasing 
happiness? I speak freely and confidently, for the obvious desire of Great Britain in these days 
is to deal kindly with those countries over which she exercises protection if they continue to 
administer their affairs justly and well and exercise wisdom in maintaining peace and 
increasing the national well-being. In such circumstances she will respect and protect their 
ft·eedom. 
British support for the Queen was declared publicly very soon after this speech, during an August 1925 
visit by the new High Commissioner, S ir Eyre Hutson. Hutson l istened to a deputation of dissident 
chiefs, but gave them no encouragement. Unlike 1920, there was no talk of deportations or annexation, 
Hutson not only assured the Queen that she had won the wholehearted confidence of the British 
government, but spelt out the very personal nature of the partnership :  Salote and her British advisers 
rather than government-to-government. 
I desire to assure Your Majesty in person . . .  that His [Britannic] Majesty's Government 
desire no departure ft·om the understandings reached with regard to relations between Your 
Majesty's Government and the Britisl1 Agent & Consul and the High Commissioner. Further, 
I have to assure Your Majesty that the aim of His Ma}esty the King, and of His Government 
is one of goodwill towards Tonga; and an earnest desire to see your Kingdom continue to 
prosper under your wise and good Government, and by the continuance of advice to assist in 
promoting the contentment and happiness of your people.7 (my emphasis) 
In turn , at a public function in his honour, Hutson was thanked for the benefits Britain's advice and 
protection had brought to Tonga. In h is subsequent report to the Colonial Office Hutson emphasised 
the personal qualities of the Queen and the personal nature of her rule. 
[the Queen] expressed to me fin a private interview] her deep appreciation of the assistance 
and advice rendered to her by His Ma}esty 's Government. I was deeply impressed with her 
personality, size is only twenty-five years of age: but she displays great dignity in her position, 
has acquired an intimate knowledge of native customs and traditions, and she undoubtedly 
commands the respect of the people. 8 
Queen Salote silently used llutson's v isit to her advantage for she took the highly unusual step of 
inviting Hutson to sit in the ceremonial circle of the taumafa kava over which she presided. It was a 
del icate compl iment to Hutson, but, more importantly, a s ign to all Tongans that he recognised her 
legitimacy. 
The year 1925 was thus a most significant one in Queen Salote's reign. Thereafter the areas of British 
responsibility were fairly clearly defined, but Salote's less so. Both parties were content that the British 
advised on matters relating to external relations, the administration, finance, and foreigners residing in 
the kingdom, leaving the Queen to govern the people through ' influence ' .  Unfortunately for us, while 
the British-influenced areas of government were fully documented, the Queen's rule was largely 
unrecorded, being conducted face to face, when her ' intimate knowledge of native customs and 
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traditions' was fully used to rule the chiefs and people. She also used the church - especially the Free 
Wesleyan Church - as a means of privately conveying her wishes to chiefs and people over the heads 
of the would-be-independent chiefs. 
'Unity and peace ' ,  which Siilote so frequently mentioned in her speeches as what she most desired for 
Tonga, were also greatly desired by her British advisers . In order to gain ' unity and peace ' Queen 
Salote was happy to share power with the British and with her consort, Tungi (who was Premier from 
1923), although not with the other chiefs of Tonga. Indeed the British all iance had benefits for Salote 
that she did not publ icise. The Tongan chiefs, impressed by British confidence in Salote, responded by 
increasing respect for her; while the British were impressed by her abil ity to win over chiefly support 
and found it conven ient to ignore the steadily decreasing number of dissident voices . 
In her reign of 47 years the Queen saw a number of Agent & Consuls and High Commissioners come 
and go. Not all had a full  understanding of the del icate balance required in maintaining pol itical 
responsibil ities . .J . S. Neill (who succeeded McOwan as Agent & Consul in January 1927), for example, 
urged Sainte to allow the Parl iament of Tonga a greater role in government. By this time (the 1930s) 
the Queen and Tungi felt quite comfortable about quietly but firmly ignoring this adv ice. 
With sympathetic British advisers, Queen Salote's policies were very effectively promoted, whether the 
advisers understood them or not. She was gracious when the British refused her requests or failed to 
recognise the traditional rights and prerogatives that her ancestors had exercised as her own. She took 
a long-term view of issues and, instead of protesting, often won her point through patience. For 
example, in 1 939 the Queen asked for the removal of a Chief Justice the Colonial Office has selected 
for Tonga. I ler request was refused. When she repeated the request in 1940 the Colonial Office agreed, 
for the I l igh Commissioner advised the Colonial Office to remove the official ' in the interests of good 
relations, especially in view of the extremely helpful and loyal attitude of that Kingdom in connexion 
with the war' . 9  
The Queen often expressed her gratitude for British protection of Tonga, and this gratitude was amply 
demonstrated during World War Two. Tonga's contribution to the war was outstanding in v iew of her 
small population (33,000 in 1939). Money was raised to buy four spitfires for Great Britain . There were 
substan tial donations to Red Cross and other wartime funds, and a commando unit of the Tonga 
Defence Force was sent to fight in the Solomons .  As well as giving money and being a very active 
patron of wartime organisations, the Queen made available from the royal estates 546 acres of land at 
a peppercorn rent for use as an airfield by the RNZAF and the US forces. 
N'ter the war, the mythology of the universally beloved Queen was dominant, and it would have been 
politically incorrect for either Tongan or foreigner to criticise her. Although she fostered the idea that 
she was unchallengeable by virtue of descent and legitimate succession, she had in fact earned this 
status by proving herself an effective ' native ruler' par excellence. The welcome she received in the 
Great Britain at the coronation of Queen El izabeth II in 1953  began with official recognition of her 
positive relationship with the protecting power before it progressed to personal popularity . 
When, in the early 1950s, Parliament suggested (largely at the instigation of the Crown Prince) that the 
time had come for the Treaty of Friendship to be amended to give Tonga greater financial 
independence, the Queen suggested that the British Government should appear to be the prime mover. 
It fitted her own idea of the benevolent relationship that Britain should itself recognise Tonga's changed 
status. 'Ibe revised Treaty was signed by the Queen in 1958.  It would not be until 1970, five years after 
her death , that the Treaty was revised to make Tonga independent and a ful l  member of the British 
Commonwealth . 
To her chiefs and people Queen Salote always emphasised the benefits of the British alliance, never 
the drawbacks. She also described as being for the advantage to the kingdom, never to herself and her 
dynasty (as was the case). The exception was the bestowal of British honours upon herself, to which 
she gave maximum publicity .  The first three awards - DBE 1932, GBE 1 945, GCVO 1953  - were 
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occasions for national celebrations in Tonga. And shortly before Queen Salote's death, on 16  December 
1965 , Queen Elizabeth II again recogn ised her loyalty to the British all iance by awarding her the 
GCMG. These four British honours were carried by two princes of the royal house in the funeral 
procession, alongside the mats and tapa that confirmed the wealth and pre-eminence of the royal house 
so personally secured by Queen Salote of Tonga. 
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The Decolon isation of Fij i :  
Debate o n  Constitutional Change, 1943-1 963 
Brij V. Lal, ANU 
Fij i  became independent on 10 October 1 970, eight years after Western Samoa, five years after the 
Cook Islands shed their colonial tutelage and two years after Nauru ended its trusteeship. 1  At one level, 
the Fij ian story exhibits the famil iar Pacific patterns of peaceful, negotiated and constitutional 
independence, with warm and intact l inks to the ex-imperial power. But the Fij ian experience also tells 
a different story, of an island nation in (but not always of) the Pacific, d istinguished from its neighbours 
by its multiethnic demography and complex mix of communal pol itics, the peculiar character of its 
colonial administration, a racially-segregated system of electoral representation, the size and 
sophistication of its economic base, and its dominant role in regional affairs. In the Pacific, Fij i is sui 
generis. 
Unl ike most Pacific islands, Fij i enjoyed a semblance of elected government from early this century, 
yet it achieved independence much later than several of them. This chapter seeks to explore this 
paradox . The sometimes useful 'coloniser versus colonised' model or the dichotomous 'pushed out or 
pull ing out' scenario, attractive in some other Pacific contexts,  have limited explanatory value for Fij i .  
A better understanding of Fij i ' s  late independence comes from examining three related sets of variables 
peculiar to Fij i :  the competing (and sometimes incompatible) political demands and aspirations of F�ji's 
three main communities, Fij ians, Inda-Fij ians and Europeans; the approach of the colonial 
administration in dealing with these pol itical interests;  and the overarching influence of the Colonial 
Office in formulating policy and adjudicating d isputes. 
The two dates which enclose this chapter are significant. 1943 saw the first of many post-war debates 
on the constitution, demanding more autonomy and greater self-government. None came to fruition, 
not necessarily because the colonial administration dithered; on several occasions it sought to initiate 
debate with a view to changing the status qua. The failure had more to do with the entrenched position 
of the Fij ian and European communities which regarded even the mildest reform as a threat to their 
privileged positions. Exhausted orthodoxies and old habits of thought were powerful brakes on change. 
1 963 marks a kind of turning point in the debate. The issue after that year was no longer whether Fij i 
should gain a greater degree of self government, and possibly independence eventually. The thrust of 
the debate shifted to the terms and conditions on which independence or a measure of self government 
would be acceptable to the people of Fij i, in particular to indigenous Fij ians. 
In  1 963, the structure and composition of the Legislative and Executive Councils had remained 
unchanged for a quarter of a century. Fij i was governed by the Letters Patent of 1 937 which provided 
for a limited adult male, property and l iteracy based franchise, a communal (racial) system of voting, 
a partial ly elected and partially nominated Legislative Council, the dominance of the Executive 
Council over the Legislative Council, the numerical superiority of official over unofficial members and, 
most important, the controll ing (veto) power of the Governor which he (never she) exercised with the 
sanction of the Colonial Office. The Legislative Council comprised 18 official members (heads of 
departments) and 15 unofficial members, five each from the three main communities . Three each of 
the Inda-Fij ian and European members were elected and two nominated by the Governor, while all the 
five Fij ians were nominated by the Great Council of Chiefs and appointed by the Governor. In short, 
the colonial political system was closed and racially compartmental ised.2 
This arrangement was frequently questioned in the post-war years to make the political structure reflect 
more accurately the demographic, social and economic changes sweeping Fij i, as well as the Colonial 
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Office's commitment to gradual self government in the colonies. Specifically, advocates of 
constitutional change wanted the system of nomination abol ished and peoples' elected representatives 
to be more involved in formulating policy. It is interesting that the debate on constitutional reform after 
the war was initiated not by Indian but by European leaders. The main period of Inda-Fij ian pol itical 
agitation had ended by the mid-1930s .3 Their demand for equal political status on the basis of a 
common roll defeated, the Inda-Fij ian community was resigned to working within the system. With one 
exception, Indo-Fij ian leaders supported, but did not initiate, constitutional debate. Fij ian leaders for 
their part firmly opposed any substantive change to the constitution or any (perceived) d ilution of their 
cherished l inks to the British Monarchy enshrined in the Deed of Cession, which sealed the Fij ian 
chiefs' cess ion of their islands to the United Kingdom in 1874. 
The first post-war debate took place in 1943, when Alport Barker, elected European member of the 
Legislative Council, moved to abol ish nomination in favour of election, and increase the unofficial 
members from five to six for each of the three main communities, giving them dominance in the 
Legislative Council.4 Following a debate along predictable l ines, Barker withdrew his motion once the 
Governor promised to appoint a select committee to investigate the issue. Nothing happened. Fij i  was 
engaged in the Pacific War, and the sugar industry was embroiled in a major industrial dispute. The fact 
that the leading Fij ian member (Ratu George Toganivalu) had opposed the motion did not help Barker's 
cause .  Two years later, however, with the war over and the industrial front calm, the issue of 
constitutional reform was raised again, this time by Harold Gibson, another elected European member. 
Gibson moved to amend the 1 937 Letters Patent ' to increase the number of elected representation of 
the people so that a s ignificant measure of control may be exercised over the raising and spending of 
[the] comparatively huge sums of money which the people of the Colony will  be called upon to 
provide. ' 5  I le proposed a 28 member Council of 18  unofficial members elected from communal rolls, 
and ten nominated official members which would include seven chosen by the Governor to represent 
special interests . Gibson argued that many of the ' gravely disappointed ' public wanted more say in 
financial matters . ' It is the feeling of the public that there are not sufficient elected representatives 
either to voice the opin ions of the people or to vote on the matters brought forward. '  The motion was 
defeated for reasons discussed below. 
Three years later, Amie Ragg, another elected European member, moved yet another motion for an 
expanded Legislative Council ' in view of the increasing population of the Colony and the advances 
made in the social, educational and economic spheres by its peoples . ' 6 Ragg's Council would consist 
of six nominated members and four ex-officio members, and 18 elected members, six from each main 
community. There would be no nominated members in the Legislative Council. The Fij ian people 
would enjoy the same right as other communities of electing their own representatives directly rather 
than through the Council of Chiefs .  For the Executive Council, Ragg proposed, in addition to the four 
ex-officio members, the inclusion of three members chosen by the Governor from a panel of six 
submitted by the elected members of the Legislative Council and one nominated member chosen by 
the Governor to represent special interests . 
Ragg proposed to pursue constitutional reform in a 'vigorous and realistic manner' ,  not in ' a  d ilettante 
manner, and approached from an academic point of view ' .  As president of the newly formed European 
Electors Association, he claimed authority to speak, although his petition to the Colonial Office had 
been rejected in 1948. His case for expanding the number of elected representatives was famil iar. The 
official majority in the Legislative Council s imply preserved ' dictatorship and obstruct[ed] the 
attainment of the people's legitimate political demands. '  He wanted ' a  change that will give the people 
of this Colony a greater say in their own affairs ' .  
J\ rad ical aspect o f  Ragg's proposal was the extension o f  the franchise to Fij ians. H e  deplored the 
' archaic control ' of the Fij ian Administration, rejuvenated under Ratu Sukuna's guidance in 1944, 
because that system gave the government ' an easy way of controll ing the Fij ians and to appear to give 
them control of their own affairs ' .7 The system bolstered the chiefs who feared that ' any departure from 
it will weaken their power and impair their privileges ' .  Ragg, in short, wanted to emancipate Fij ians 
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from a system 'which is barbaric in origin and outmoded in time' . If continued, he predicted, it would 
' lead to their domination and ultimate el imination by other races ' .  A dose of democracy would do the 
Fij ians good, give them ' character' and 'manly qualities ' which they lacked:  'Courage, honour, 
firmness, pure ambition, truthfulness, usefulness - these and kindred qualities are all too rare. ' 8  
Ragg's motion provoked heated debate. The official members did not take part, j ust as they had 
abstained on the two previous occasions. The government was unimpressed with Ragg - a 'windy and 
misguided radical ' 9  - but was itself considering enlarging the franchise by reducing property 
qualifications, and abolishing the system of nomination. But anticipating an acrimonious impasse, and 
hoping for some future compromise, the government persuaded Ragg to withdraw his motion and refer 
it to a select committee. Ragg agreed, and was rewarded with the chairmanship of a select committee 
to investigate h is motion. That committee produced its (divided) report in 1949. 10 The report was a 
' d isappointing document devoid of any constructive proposals ' ,  Governor Freeston informed London. 
It was an accurate assessment. ' Parturiunt montes noscitur ridiculus mus ' ,  agreed S ir John Shockburgh 
of the Colonial Office. 1 1  The select committee majority recommended that the official majority be 
retained, that all European and Ind ian members be elected from communal rolls and the Great Council 
of Chiefs elect its own representatives rather than the governor choosing them from a list presented by 
the chiefs .  But in the debate, only the first of the three recommendations passed. 
European resistance was rooted in several factors. The system preserved their privileged position. In 
1 946, in a total population of 259,638, Europeans numbered 4,594 (and Part-Europeans 6, 142), Fij ians 
1 18,070, and Inda-Fij ian 120,4 14. J\ tiny minority, Europeans enjoyed parity of representation, a 
situation which could be jeopardised in new arrangements. Parity would have to be argued for and not 
assumed, for not everyone agreed that Europeans had the right to it. S ir Charles Jefferies of the 
Colonial Office, for example, suggested in 1 947 that while Inda-Fij ians and Fij ians should each have 
five members in  the Legislative Council, the European number could be  reduced to three. 12 Europeans 
also feared that, despite their assurances, the Inda-Fij ian leaders would use even the minutest reforms 
to push for a common roll (one person, one vote, one value), which would l ead, in view of their 
increasing numbers, to eventual Indian domination. That eventuality - indeed ' any change whatsoever 
in our present political set up ' - Maurice Scott told Secretary of State for the Colonies Lennox Boyd 
in 1 955, he would ' resist to the bitter end ' .13 Self interest was not their main motivation, Europeans 
argued. J\s members of the British ' race ' ,  as trustees of the Deed of Cession, it was their sacred duty 
to safeguard the Fij ian ' race ' from the Inda-Fijians, and indeed from themselves, l ike parents protecting 
children . But that was not the full story. An unspoken but real fear of being swamped by Part­
Europeans, who already outnumbered Europeans, and who shared the same communal roll, stiffened 
European resistance to change. 14 Nomination guaranteed them representation while an elective system 
opened the contest to fraught consequences. The fear of Part-European domination lay deeply buried 
in the political subconscious of the European leaders. 
Fij ian responses were short, effective and unequivocal : no change. Ratu George Toganivalu asked: 
' Why change the system of government when that system is working satisfactorily? ' 1 5 Ratu Tiale 
Vuiyasawa was more pointed. He thought Ragg was in some kind of trance, with a s imple mantra 
' Change the Letters Patent, change the constitution, and all wil l  be well . '  H is own people were not 
ready for change. Joel i Ravai opposed the motion on the grounds that a more democratic system of 
government ' does not yet suit the Fij ian taste ' ,  a point also stressed by Ratu Sukuna, who thought his 
people were ' easily led astray by glowing statements and fine promises ' ,  ' a  sentimental people intensely 
loyal to those who have won their trust' . 1 6 Ratu George Tuisawau thought Ragg's suggestion of 
universal franchise for the Fij ian people ' open to abuse and corruption because there is nothing to 
prevent undesirable members of my race from standing for election and, when they succeed, playing 
fast and loose with Fij ian pol itics to the detriment of my race ' .  Chiefs were the natural leaders, and it 
was un-Fij ian lo trust critical decisions to commoners. The revamping of the Fij ian Administration had 
shored up the traditional order, and chiefs would hardly agree to its dilution. Chiefly opposition would 
remain strong and unwavering, but the next decade would witness the emergence of dissent among 
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commoners and others not of the Fij ian establ ishment, aspiring to a greater say in managing their 
affairs. 
lbe fear of Indo-Fij ian domination also influenced Fij ian thinking. The rapid increase in the Inda-Fij ian 
population, now for the first time exceeding their own, raised doubts about their place in the land of 
their forefathers, and al l the promises of protection the British government had made over the years. 
'Ibe sugar strike of 1943 and the Inda-Fij ian war effort, or lack of it, were fresh in Fij ian minds. Fij ian 
leaders echoed the European view that any constitutional reform would open the way for a common 
roll. As Ratu Edward Cakobau put it in 1 945, 'The only thing that can stop it [common roll] would be 
to hold on to our present constitution. The Fij ians have every confidence in the Crown and we look to 
the Europeans, whom we have always supported, to ponder and not to give way too easily to democratic 
ideals that are unsu ited to a country containing three major races who differ in language, cul ture and 
rel igion ; these races will never combine to unite as one people' . Fij ian opinion found its fullest 
expression in resolutions passed by the Fij ian Affairs Board expressing alarm at the ' inroads now being 
made by the Indians of the Colony into the Fij ian l ife ' ,  the influence they were exerting on the 
' everyday l i fe of the Fij ians ' ,  and their dominance in the economic life of the colony. The Board asked 
the Colonial Office to protect Fij ians from Inda-Fijian domination and to ' adopt a firm attitude towards 
the Ind ians in order that the interests of the Fij ian race remain pre-eminent in the Colony '  . 1 7 For good 
measure, the chiefs asked the Colonial Office to forward the resolution to B uckingham Palace. 
Inda-Fijian leaders supported the principle of constitutional reform moved by Europeans, but rejected 
the extraneous material Ragg and others often adduced in support of their argument. 18 AD Patel 
reaffirmed that the Indo-Fij ian community did not question the paramountcy of Fijian interests, nor the 
view that ' the righl'> and privileges of the minorities ought not to be and must not be an iota less than 
the rights and privileges enjoyed by the majority' .  Nonetheless, minority communities had ' also to 
appreciate and realise the fact that the you cannot expect or hope for privileges and rights in excess of 
those enjoyed by the majority ' .  He argued for abolition of the official majority and the introduction of 
universal franchise. Common roll, he argued, as he had argued since the late 1 920s and as he would 
do throughout his l ife, was the only way forward, the only way 'a common denominator of pol itical 
outlook will be developed ' .  But he also agreed that a common roll could  not be introduced unless 
everyone agreed. Patel expressed views widely shared in the Inda-Fij ian community, but there were 
important pockets with in it which disagreed, and often sided with the opponents of change. The most 
vocal were the Musl ims. 
Muslims came to Fij i  as indentured immigrants, and experienced the same challenges and hardships 
as other Indo-Fij ians. 1 9  Relations between them and Hindus were cordial and cooperative during 
indenture, but tensions developed as the Inda-Fij ian community began to develop and diversify, and 
as different religious and cultural groups searched for a separate and distinct identity. In 1926, the Fij i 
Muslim League was formed as the umbrella organisation of all (but in practice mainly Sunni) Muslims. 
In the 1 930s, with explicit support from, indeed at the instigation of, Governor Fletcher, who was 
determined to break the Inda-Fij ian demand for a common roll, the Muslims demanded separate 
communal representation. The Musl im v iew was, and in some quarters remains, that they were a 
separate ethnic community, distinct from Hindus in culture, language, rel igion and history. The 
Colonial Office and the Government of India both opposed this demand as divisive and contrary to 
official pol icy, but in practice one of the two Indo-Fijian nominated members in the Legislative Council 
after 1937 was always a Muslim.20 Musl ims, who numbered about 20,000 (eight percent of the total 
population) in the late 1940s, supported nomination only so long as there was no separate Muslim seat, 
but their preference was for a fully elective  system once their claim was recognised. The Inda-Fij ian 
members of the Legislative Council opposed the Muslim demand for reasons that have become familiar. 
Separate representation for Muslims would compound divisions in an already severely divided society. 
Muslims were not an ethnic but a religious group. The social and economic interests of the Hindus and 
Muslims were essentially identical. Muslims could be elected from Inda-Fij ian rolls provided they stood 
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as Inda-Fij ians and not as Muslim separatists. However, Muslim separatists sometimes received 
unexpected, if sel f-serving, support from non-Muslim quarters. Among them was Hugh Ragg. But 
when AD Patel put him on the spot by proposing that Muslims have the same number of seats as other 
communities, including Europeans, who after all numbered only 5 ,000, Ragg changed tune and voted 
against the very idea he had supported a few hours before. 
But the Muslim demand, at least as represented by a section of the Fij i Muslim League - not all wanted 
separate seats, then or now - would not go away. Muslim leaders continued to make representations 
to the colonial government and even to the Colonial Office throughout the 1950s and the 1 960s. In 
1 95 1 , to gain their support against the nomination system, Vishnu Deo told the visiting Secretary of 
State John Dugdale that he would agree to a s ingle seat for Muslims to be elected by themselves. The 
colonial government was taken aback by Deo ' s  support for an idea he had opposed so strenuously, but 
the Muslim representative AR Sahu Khan, leader of the Muslim Association, overplayed h is hand and 
demanded not only separate but equal representation.21 That prospect was always unrealistic. Some in 
the Colonial Office were sympathetic to the Muslim plea, if only to divide the Inda-Fij ians further and 
weaken their common roll cause, but Governor Garvey opposed further fragmentation. If Musl ims 
received separate representation, he told the Colonial Office, that should be done through informal 
arrangements, rather than constitutional entrenchment. In Garvey' s  view, ' if political representation 
were to be based on rel igious and cul tural grounds the constitution of the Legislative Council would 
become unworkably fragmented ' .  This was an argument that the Colonial Office accepted .  Garvey 
argued that apart from Muslims themselves, ' there is no support for separate Muslim representation, 
and I do not recommend that their repeated requests should be acceded to. The Inda-Fij ians wish them 
to identify themselves as Indo-Fij ians, and the Indian Association has informed me that if the number 
of elected seats were increased a working arrangement would be come to whereby one seat would be 
reserved to Muslim candidates ' .22 By the end of the 1950s, the prospect of separate representation had 
dimmed, but the issue would continue to be raised at all conferences and enquiries. 
Lack of consensus about the pace and direction of change suited the government perfectly, placing it 
in the happy position of not having to take a stand or propose in itiatives on a contentious issue. 
Privately, though, its views were divided. Among many, there was sympathy for the Fij ian position and 
a marked lack of it for the Inda-Fij ians. As Governor Freestone told the Colonial Office in 1 949, ' even 
after a studied attempt to be initially neutral one finds one's ire rising when [the Inda-Fij ians] start 
pull ing strings in India, UNO [United Nations Organisation] and the rest to gain their ends whereas the 
poor "dumb" Fij ian just places his trust wholly in the British officer and abides his judgement. Add to 
th is the extreme l ikeableness of the Fij ian and the d ifficulty of getting to know the Indian and it is 
obvious that only by a calculated effort can our efforts remain neutral . '23 The government never did 
real ise that its own record in dealing with the Indo-Fij ians might be a reason why that community 
sought support outside the colony. The Fij ians had the Deed of Cession and the Europeans their 
supporters in Austral ia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The Indo-Fij ian community had no 
option but to turn to India - because of India's opposition the indenture system was abolished, India had 
been instrumental in obtain ing the franchise for Indo-Fij ians in the 1920s, India had blocked Fletcher's 
plans in the 1930s to fragment the Indo-Fij ian community and abolish elections altogether. 
Unfortunately for the Inda-Fij ians, India cared less and less about overseas Indians after it became 
independent in 1 947. 
There was an ' Indian problem' ,  many colonial administrators agreed, but as Governor Grantham told 
the Colon ial Office in 1946, ' apart from the relative growth in population, i t  might be better termed the 
Fij ian problem, since it is rather a question of raising the Fij ian so that he is able  to hold his own with 
the Indian in the modern world, than of hold ing back the Indian so that he does not outstrip the more 
easy-going Fij ian . '24 Fij ian interests should be protected, the Commissioner of Labour had told the 
Legislative Council in 1 946, but the Fijians had ' reciprocal obligations to the other races in this Colony 
to recognise their economic and political aspirations and to facil itate their attainment ' .  The Europeans 
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and Indo-Fij ian had made their contribution to the Colony ' and they are entitled to be admitted into full 
membership of the Colonial family ' .  To those who harped on division and distinctions, the 
Commissioner said: 'The interests of the three races are not as so many independent threads, but strands 
which are interwoven into one economic fabric; and each strand is essential to the strength of the 
whole'  .25 To those who invoked the real and imagined British promises to the Fij ian people, he replied: 
11ze obligation of the Government to the Fijians can be stated comprehensively in a few 
sentences: we must preserve all that is good of their culture, but not outworn customs and 
ways of life; we must give them the opportunities and the means to expand that culture; we 
must protect them ji·om exploitation and disease; and othe1wise so govern and lead these 
people as ultimately to achieve their full integration into the political and economic life of a 
composite society comprising all the races of the Colony. 
Such overarching, inclusive v isions were rare. 
In the Colonial Office, opinion was similarly divided. On one side were those who urged caution and 
sympathy for the Fij ian position . .TB Sidebotham was adamant that any attempt by Europeans and Indo­
Fij ians to force the pace of change should be ' firmly resisted ' ,  otherwise 'we are not fulfil ling our 
duties as guardians ' .  Removing the official majority would place Fij ians at the mercy of Europeans and 
Indo-Fijians 'who would undoubtedly use the resulting situation for their own ends ' .  And any change 
which disturbed the traditional social structure - elections, for example - would be ' the greatest 
disservice that we could do the Fij ians ' ,  because they would become the 'plaything of political parties 
of other races ' .26 S ir Charles .Jefferies disagreed. The status quo could not continue indefinitely; 
electoral representation had to bear some resemblance to the size of the different communities : 
We cannot hope to lzold indefinitely or perhaps for ve1y long, the position that an official 
autocracy is necessmy because the Fijian community is backward. We have to face the fact 
that the FUians are only half the population of the Colony. Tlze other half consists mainly of 
Indians, with a not negligible minority of whites. We, as trustees, have a special obligation to 
protect the interests of the Fijian race, but it is obvious that the ultimate goal must be a 
constitution based on a FUian citizenship which shall include persons of all races who have 
made their home in the Colony.21 
Times and contexts have changed, but the fundamental issues remain: claim of paramountcy by some 
and parity by others, the preconditions for full Fij ian citizenship for different communities, the rights 
of indigenous versus immigrant communities in the governance of the country, and the role  and place 
of traditional institutions and values in the modern democratic arena. 
In the 1950s, official sluggishness began to yield .  The main reason was the appointment of S ir Ronald 
Garvey as governor. Garvey was an independent-minded, self-confident, experienced Pacific hand, 
having served in the Solomon Islands as Resident Commissioner. Unlike h is predecessors, Garvey kept 
regular contact with the main political actors in the Colony. He was close to Sukuna, the preeminent 
Fijian leader, as well as to AD Patel and Vishnu Dea, Sukuna 's  counterparts among Inda-Fij ians. The 
European establishment distrusted him. From his conversations and observations, Garvey was 
convinced of the need for change : ' slow, but fairly steady, progress is being made [towards common 
citizenship ] .  Both colour and social barriers are being broken down and the desirabil ity and, indeed, 
inevitabil ity of unity is taking shape. It is a policy which I constantly preach myself and it is having its 
imperceptible effect throughout the whole community. ' 28 In 1954, Garvey asked the Council of Chiefs 
to consider d irectly electing three of their five representatives to the Legislative Council to give Fij ians 
experience of elections. He told the chiefs that the ' chiefly system on which so much depends should 
march with the times and should not ignore - for too long - the modern trend of democracy ' .  To those 
who invoked the Deed of Cession in support of gradualism and permanent paramountcy of Fij ian 
interests, Garvey responded with characteristic, though unprecedented, bluntness. This is what he said 
in his Cession Day message in 1957: 
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Surely the intention of this Deed, acknowledged and accepted by chiefs who were parties to 
it, was that FUi should be developed so as to take a significant place in the affairs of the world 
but that, in the process, the rights and interests of the FUian people should be respected. To 
read into the Deed more than that, to suggest for instance, that the rights and interests of the 
F(iians should predominate over everything else, does no service either to the FUian people 
or to their country. The view, for the Fijians, would mean complete protection and no self­
respecting individual race wants that because, ultimately, it means that those subject to it will 
end up as museum pieces. 17ze Indians are equally eligible to have their interests respected. 
By their work and ente1prise, the Indians in FUi have made a great contribution to the 
development and prosperity of their country, and to the welfare of its people. They are an 
essential part of the community and it is unrealistic to suppose that they are are not or to 
imagine that the position of FUians in the world today would benefit by their absence.29 
Af'ter four years of listening and reflection, Garvey approached the Colonial Office in 1956 with fresh 
proposals . 30 His ul timate goal was a common Fij ian citizenship, he said, but he acknowledged that 
racial parity among the three main communities would have to be retained, along with separate 
(communal) representation ' for an indefinite period ' .  l ie had changed his mind about retaining the 
official majority in the Legislative Council. The main reason for an official majority was to protect 
certain important interests, such as the interests of the Fij ian community. In practice, though, he had 
never found it necessary to use the official majority. ' I  do not think there is any danger in the 
Government being defeated if the official majority were removed, always provided the Governor were 
invested with reserved powers, and I consider that a healthier atmosphere would be created if it went. ' 
Garvey also wanted to abol ish nomination. That would be a very popular move. ' Whatever may be said 
about nominated members they are always regarded as Government yes-men, even though they 
frequently are among Government's more trenchant critics, and this taint vitiates them in the public eye. 
The choice of them becomes more and more difficult, and their value just as difficult to assess, and l ittle 
- if anything - would be lost if the system were discontinued. ' He was echoing his predecessor 
Freestone who had told the Colonial Office in 1949 that he ' attached l ittle value or importance to 
maintaining the principle of nominated members, and should shed no tears if the nominated seats . . .  
were thrown open for election ' .3 1  Garvey also recommended that the number o f  elected Europeans and 
Indo-Fij ians be increased from three to five, the former j ustified by the s ize of Suva's European 
population, and the latter because of the large increase in the Indo-Fij ian population. As for the Fij ians, 
Garvey wanted the Council of Chiefs '  desire to elect all five of i ts representatives recognised. The 
Fij ians were not yet ready for direct election, but his suggestion was a move in the right d irection. 
Perhaps his most radical proposal was a ' Multi-Racial Bench ' of four members, one each from the three 
main racial groups and one to represent ' other races '  such as the Chinese and other Pacific island 
groups, al l elected from a colony-wide constituency on a common roll ' whose votes will be 
proportionately weighted to maintain equality of racial influence on the election ' .  lb is was the first time 
that such a proposal had been made by a governor. Garvey was not supported by his closest advisors, 
who argued that a multiracial bench would be opposed by Europeans and Fij ians ' as the thin edge of 
the wedge driving to a common roll ' ,  paving the way for reforms far too radical for the colony to bear. 
They also argued that candidates not elected by their own racial group would be regarded as puppets 
of the groups whose votes elected them. Garvey was aware of the dangers but undaunted, saying that 
' if we are aiming at a growth of a consciousness of Fij ian citizenship over-riding differences of race 
and rel igion, I think it has considerable merit' . Maintaining the status qua was no solution. 
Garvey ' s  proposal was widely discussed by the old colonial hands - the back room boys, Garvey called 
them deris ively - at the Colonial Office who raised all the tired old arguments about the need for 
Whitehall to 'keep a firm grip of the initiative ' ,  and act 'just in advance of pressure, but only just' .32 
The racial factor had to be taken into account. ' It is true that constitutional advance does not wait upon 
a country-wide demand, but the circumstances of Fiji are rather special and to go too fast would . . .  play 
into the hands of the Indians. ' ' If there is no pressure for a change, we should be the last to stimulate 
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it ' ,  advised one .  Perhaps Garvey was actuated by the desire to end his term of office by ' some 
significant advance ' .  The Secretary of State repl ied on 20 March 1956 :  
It seems to us to be ve1'y unwise to do anything to encourage i t  [constitutional reform] to grow 
more quickly unless we have some fairly clear idea where we are going. In some respects Fiji 
is a ve1y dijjicult proposition jiwn the point of view of constitutional advance. We are all, ve1y 
naturally, inclined to think of such advance in terms of British institutions, leading in the 
direction of an elected assembly, universal adult sujjrage, the party system, the vesting of 
executive power in unojjlcial Ministers and so forth. Yet we are teaming by experience 
elsewhere that the traditional British pattern, however suitable for places of ascertain size, is 
difficult to work out in small territories, even where there is a homogenous and relatively well 
advanced population; it is still more difficult to apply in such a place as F(ji, where race 
means more than party, and where a dilemma is created by the numerical preponderance of 
the Indians on the one hand and out obligation to the F�jians on the other. It may well be that 
wlzat we ought to aim at in Fiji is some form of constitution which dijj"ers considerably from 
tlze traditional pattern. In this connection you may like to look at the enclosed document about 
another of our problem places - Mauritius - not because the ideas which are being tried out 
there are necessarily all applicable . . .  but as an illustration of the fact that new ways are being 
sought to establish forms of democracy and of representative institutions in places where the 
conditions favourable to the 'Westminster model ' do not exist. 
Caution and circumspection was the Colonial Office advice. The official majority should remain, not 
because it was desirable in itself, but to avoid pressure for further changes, ' to retain the initiative and 
to forestall even less desirable developments ' ,  and to dilute the intensity of competition for political 
power by the different communities. The appointment of a constitutional commissioner, as Garvey 
suggested, was also declined. Garvey and his advisors were the ones best placed to assess the situation 
on the ground. In any case, it was ' an illusion to suppose that any Commissioner strange to the country 
could be expected to produce, out of the blue, a solution for the very peculiar problem of Fiji ' .  It would 
be better to encourage the communities to work together in Local Government, before tackling the 
larger constitutional questions at the central level. That was where any innovation should begin. 
Garvey was disappointed but not surprised.33 'The fears of the floodgates were, in truth, groundless, he 
said. In taking the initiative, he was ' not playing with a scorpion ' s  tail ' .  His modest proposals would 
have resulted in ' some quickening of interest in a direction where we are failing to make progress even 
though we are far better equ ipped than many who have raced ahead of us ' . If Fij i were to wait for 
integration to take place at the local government level, before proceeding to any constitutional change, 
'we shall have to wait too long for progress in that direction ' .  When recommending the appointment 
of a commissioner to advise on constitutional matters, Garvey was not thinking of anyone entirely 
unfamil iar with Fij i .  l ie had in mind S ir Arthur Richards, now Lord Milverton, a widely respected 
former governor, who had engineered, with Ratu Sukuna's assistance, the creation of the Native Lands 
Trust Board . 
Three years after Garvey ' s  proposal, another debate took place. The motion, for the first time since 
1 929, was moved by an Inda-Fij ian member, James Madhavan, calling again for reduction of the 
official majority and the end of nomination.34 The European and Inda-Fij ian members made their 
predictable responses, but more interesting was the contribution of the Fij ian members . They belonged 
to a new generation, well educated and articulate, unlike their predecessors whose contributions in 
debate were hampered by poor English and unfamiliarity with western ways and western systems of 
government. Among them was Semesa S ikivou, an independent-minded commoner and a highly 
effective debater. He made it clear that he was speaking on his own behalf and not as a representative 
of his people. l ie  was not opposed to all change. Fijian people would not l ike to be ' entirely separated '  
from the United Kingdom, but time was coming when people would have to learn to accept more 
responsibil ity for managing their own affairs. If they refused to do so, they could hardly turn around 
and criticise the colonial Government for being dictatorial . lle would be more forthright in demanding 
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more change, not less, were it not for the fact that one of the ' chief reasons for many people 's  
opposition to this motion is  the fear of domination ' .  He meant Inda-Fij ian domination. S till, he 
favoured an unofficial majority and direct election of the Fij ian members . He also supported the 
enfranchisement of women. Sikivou 's colleague, Ravuama Vunivalu, perhaps the ablest Fij ian of his 
generation, explained that though he would oppose the motion, he was not against extending the 
franchise to the Fij ian people. The Fij ian was ' more than ready to exercise his vote ' ,  but instead of 
electing all the five Fijian seats directly, he would l ike three of them to be elected and two nominated. 
Like many other Fij ians and Europeans, he feared that Madhavan 's  motion represented a ' thin end of 
the wedge ' ,  a step that would lead ' probably before we are prepared for it, to the common electoral roll 
or proportional representation ' .  Vunivalu l iked the idea of an unofficial majority, but thought it 
premature because the Fij ian people were not prepared for it. 
The three chiefs in the Council were cautious. Ratu Penaia Ganilau agreed that some constitutional 
reform was desirable, but he would rather let the colonial government take the lead. He would favour 
giving the Fij ians the vote if some practical d ifficulties could be overcome, such as allowing Fij ian civil 
servants to stand for elections without resigning from the service as there were few Fij ians outside the 
civil service who had the experience and the education to represent their people. Ratu George Cakobau, 
Vunivalu of Bau, traditionally and symbolically the most important Fij ian leader, could see no reason 
for change. Not surprisingly, he invoked the Deed of Cession. Constitutional change along the l ines 
suggested 'would mean that the Fijian race would be completely divorced from the clauses of the Deed 
of Cession and would be placed on the same footing as other alien races in this Colony ' .  Nor did he 
' favour any mention of N'rican policy [of gradual experiment in reform] being brought into Fij i ' .  
Ratu Mara opposed the motion because, for him, i t  presaged the common roll, a form o f  election fo r  
which Fij i  was simply not ready: 
11re races in this Colony are different; religions in this Colony are different; the economy of 
the different races in this colony are different; the social behaviour of various races in the 
Colony are different; their views on the position of women in public are diflerent, and because 
of their differing economic standards they have different social standards and because they 
have dijjerent social standards their social thoughts are different. 
The precondition for constitutional reform, for Mara, was a common platform, a common standard . By  
that logic, any constitutional reform was virtually impossible. Having an  unofficial majority would not 
' put more money into the hands of the Fij ian ' ,  nor would it provide better protection of fundamental 
Fij ian interests. But one aspect of the motion that he did agree with was that all unofficial members of 
the Council, including Fij ians, should be elected. On the question of an unofficial majority, Mara 
thought the time was not right. I le had a point: ' What would happen if the financial policy of the 
unofficial party falls down? Must we then resign, go to the country and ask the present official party 
to carry on? It is confusing. We have no party politics and until we have party pol itics, we cannot 
presume to carry the burden of financial and political power all in one hand and for that reason I do not 
think we are ready to take this advance and have Unofficial Majority. ' 
The motion was lost on voice vote, but it had become clear that the door on reform had not been shut 
permanently. There were vocal expressions of dissent, but also a will ingness to entertain the prospect 
of selective change. Fij i  of the late 1 950s was a very different place than it had been at the beginning 
of the decade. It had witnessed a series of lightning strikes in the mid-1950s, culminating in the 
December 1959 riots in the streets of Suva which left the colonial establishment and European business 
houses in Suva deeply shaken. A strike in the sugar industry was in prospect, after a peaceful interlude 
of nearly two decades. The population was increasing and becoming better informed about events in 
Fij i  and abroad, thanks to the thriving newspaper industry and the advent of radio. Fij ian soldiers were 
returning after four years of service in the Malayan j ungles. Two major enquiries or rather commissions 
of enquiry were underway, one by OI IK Spate into the economic problems of the Fijian people and the 
other into the natural resources and population trends in the colony.35 In view of these changes, and 
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decolonisation elsewhere in the Empire, constitutional questions could no longer be postponed. 
In his address to the Budget session in November 1960, the new Governor, S ir Kenneth Maddocks, 
tested the waters by suggesting in general terms the need for reform, hoping that the next election (in 
1963) might take place under new Letters Patent. The aim was to give more responsibility to unofficial 
members 'without making any radical alteration in the composition of the Legislative Council ' ,  but 
moving towards the ministerial system of government. 
Constitutional reform was to proceed in two stages. The first would involve the introduction of the 
Member System.36 Under this system, unofficial members of the Executive Council would be inv ited 
to undertake supervisory function over a number of departments, contribute to policy formulation and 
execution, and observe the principle of collective, cabinet-type responsibility. They would introduce 
Bills emanating from their departments in the Legislative Council and oversee their passage through 
it. They would act l ike ministers, but without executive power. If they could not support a decision on 
major policy matters, they would have to resign. The new Legislative Council would consist of 23 
memhers, 1 1  unofficial, 8 official and 4 unofficial Government members, but the official members 
would not, as prev iously, be required to take their seat in the Council . The Member system, the 
government hoped, would provide the necessary ' training in responsibility which is essential to a full 
ministerial system' .  It would also enable the civil service to gain experience in the new system. The 
second stage would be the introduction of the ministerial system with full executive responsibil ity. The 
members of the Executive Council would be chosen by the governor from the elected members of the 
Legislative Council. 
The government' s proposals were debated in the April 1961 sitt ing,37 the motion introduced by the 
Acting Colonial Secretary. His tone is almost pleading, begging European and Fij ian members to have 
an open mind on reform. For the first time, the government was taking the lead, somewhat along the 
lines Garvey had envisaged in the mid-1 950s. The government pleaded with the unofficial members 
of the Legislative Council to look towards the future, ' to try and establ ish for ourselves a long term 
objective' .  The winds of decolonisation were moving closer to the Pacific. Samoa was on the verge of 
independence and Fij i could ill afford to be indifferent. 'I know it would be nice to consider Fij i in a 
vacuum and isolated and do as we wish, but unfortunately we cannot' , the Acting Colonial Secretary 
told the Legislative Council . 
We are part of the world and there are forces moving which, whether we like it or not - and 
I know many of us do not like it - are going to have a profound influence on us and on our 
future. We need to consider these forces; what they are and what steps are necessary to meet 
and mould them to our ends. We want to do it in our own unhurried time. We do not want to 
wait till the forces are built up against us and we have to do things as a matter of urgency. Let 
us th ink ahead, see what is coming, be ready for it and do all that we have to do in our own 
time, and by own choosing . . .  Do not let us forget the forces outside. It is no good forgetting 
them; they are there and they are real. 
"Ibere is little doubt that the government had in mind the pressure from the United Nations, particularly 
its Committee on Decolonisation, a pressure that would mount throughout the 1960s. 
Then the Colonial Secretary turned to those who always tried to cl inch the no-change argument by 
saying that the advocates of change were a minority, and that the majority of the people were satisfied 
with the status quo. This is what the Burns Commission itself had said, but the government thought 
otherwise. Again, the Colonial Secretary is worth quoting . 
. . .  almost eve1ything starts with a minority. Minorities have a way of growing, and when 
minorities have a popular idea any Government which ignores such a minority does so at its 
peril. A minority can be likened to a small stream. It is there, something quite small and water 
is soft. It can be used for many purposes. If you dam the stream the waters build up behind the 
dam so you build a bigger dam, but one day you cannot go on and the burst comes. We do not 
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want a burst here. What we want is to look together into the future and be sure that this stream 
of ideas, this minority perhaps, this thing called democracy is not dammed up or held back, 
but is guided to our pwpose. We want no burst dam. 
I le adduced the usual arguments for change: the devolution of responsibil ity to the colonies was official 
British policy. It was a powerful performance. 
J\s was to be expected, the Indo-Fij ian members supported the motion while Europeans opposed it. 
What mattered more now than ever before was what Fij ians thought. Fij ian opinion was not as solidly 
against change as in the past, nor was it unanimous. J\lthough the majority opposed the motion, they 
d id so for quite different reasons. Among those who remained unconvinced of the government's policy 
was Ratu Mara, the ascendant Fij ian pol itical leader and successor to Ratu Sukuna. The government's 
motion was ill -conceived and ill -timed, he said, because it ignored the spirit and implications of the 
Deed of Cession and the special place of the Fij ian people in their own country. The chiefs had ceded 
Fij i  ' to be part and parcel of the United Kingdom' ,  in the way that the Channel Islands and the Isle of 
Man were integral parts of the UK. That special relationship was recognised in the fact that the Queen 
was always referred to as Radi ni Viti kei Peretania, the Queen of Fij i and of Great Britain. This 
innovative and expedient - and ultimately unsustainable - point would be raised again and again as the 
momentum towards self government increased. 
Mara urged caution and gradualism. The Fij ian people had just accepted that three of their five 
representatives in the Legislative Council should be elected through secret ballot. Would it not be better 
for the government to see how these changes worked before embarking on more reform. Constitutional 
development should follow, not precede, social and economic integration. Ratu Penaia Ganilau agreed: 
no constitution would work unless 'we have a common background of accepted principles ' .  And he 
castigated the government for taking the lead on the question without consulting the people. Ratu 
Edward Cakobau concurred that the usage and ownership of native land should be safeguarded before 
the Fij ian people would consider constitutional reform. Ravuama Vunivalu spoke for all Fij ians when 
he said that the Fij ian people would accept constitutional change if , but only if, Whitehall would give 
them unequivocal assurance that their interests would always remain paramount and that as the 
indigenous people, they would have majority representation in both the Executive and the Legislative 
Councils. The Fij ian people needed a practical demonstration of the principle that Fij ian interests 
should be paramount. 
Semesa S ikivou supported the motion although he, too, broadly shared the anxieties of his fellow 
Fij ian members. Fij ians were opposed to constitutional change because they distrusted the Inda-Fij ian 
community, that is the fear of Indo-Fij ian dominance. But that was not sufficient reason to fear change. 
Change was inevitable, and it was no use postponing changes for another day. S ikivou suggested a 
constitu tional convention, which would include leaders not presently in the Legislative Council, ' to 
d iscuss the proposed changes on the grounds of common interest, common belief, common aim and 
to see if we can get some unanimity over some fundamental questions ' .  That way, the peoples ' views 
would be properly represented. To Sikivou, it was clear that ' we cannot go on as we are if we are going 
to have a F�j i  w ith a bright future ' .  
The government l istened politely, knowing that it had no alternative but to take the lead, though without 
embarrassing the Fij ian members who opposed the motion. Instead of calling for a division, it withdrew 
the motion, with the concurrence of the leaders of all three main ethnic groups. It attempted to allay the 
fears of Fij ian leaders, without compromising the principles of constitutional reform. Ratu Mara 's  point 
about comparabil ity with the Isle of Man was rej ected. The two island groups had completely d ifferent 
h istories and unique relationships with the imperial power. The government denied that its proposals 
detracted from the promises of the Deed of Cession, and assured the Fij ian leaders that it would 
entrench provisions regarding the native ownership of land as well as others that touched on customary 
matters . To the argument that social and economic integration should precede political reform, the 
government argued that ' Unity does not have to grow from the bottom. In fact, when there are present 
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communities speaking different languages, having different rel igions, living mostly in a different 
economy and having different customs ' ,  unity ' can spread downwards ' .  The government was not doing 
anything that the British Government itself had not adopted as official pol icy. The Colonial Secretary 
reminded the Legislative Council that as early as 1943, the United Kingdom had pledged itself ' to 
guide Colonial people along the road to self-government within the British Empire ' ,  adding that ' It is 
no part of our policy to confer political advances which are unjustified by circumstances or to grant self­
government to those who are not yet trained in its use ' .  For the Colonial Office, the latter qual ification 
had reached the end of its l ife. 
In any case, Maddocks advised the Colonial Office in October 1961  to accept his recommendations for 
changes along the lines indicated in the memorandum to the Legislative Council earl ier in the year.38 
Fij i  should proceed to the Membership system notwithstanding the nearly unanimous Fij ian and 
European opposition. That opposition, the governor told London, was caused partly by the events of 
1 960 which had seen a devastating strike in the sugar industry and riots in the streets of Suva, an 
attitude which he predicted would pass with time, especially 'when it is more generally understood that 
the Governor with h is reserve powers can protect legitimate Fij ian interests ' .  Members would continue 
to be elected from communal rolls, the idea of even l imited introduction of common roll suggested by 
some of the Indo-Fij ian members (and by Garvey in the mid- 1950s) being rejected out of hand. The 
principle of parity would be maintained. 
In 1963, Fij i  got new Letters Patent which provided a bigger Legislative Council, consisting of 19 
official and 18 unofficial members. Each of the three main communities had six members, four elected 
from communal rol ls and two nominated by the governor. Universal adult franchise was introduced. 
Property qual ifications for voters and candidates were abolished, and for the first time the ballot box 
reached the Fij ian people. And not least, for the first time incipient political parties and ad hoe groups 
emerged to contest the election. These changes might appear small, but they were significant. Fij i  was 
on its way to more internal self government, with the Membership System introduced early in 1964, 
and the ministerial system in 1966. The issue after 1963 was not if self-government and independence 
would come, but the terms and conditions upon which they would be acceptable to its various ethnic 
communities. 
There would be posturing and asserting entrenched positions, accusations of betrayal of solemn 
promises, predictions of d ire consequences and blood baths, but the big picture was clear: the status 
quo would have to go. 'lbe Fij ian position was defined in the now famous Wakaya Letter of 17 January, 
1 963,39 encapsulating the views expressed in earl ier years: acknowledgement of the letter and spirit of 
the Deed of Cession - the paramountcy of Fij ian interests - including the entrenchment of Fij ian rights 
and interests in the ownership and leasing of land, the declaration of Fij i as a Christian state and the 
pre-eminent role of the Fij ian Affairs Board and the Great Council of Chiefs in Fij ian affairs. The Indo­
Fij ian community would remind the government of the promises of equal rights it and the Imperial 
government had made (for example in Sal isbury's Despatch promising equal rights of Indian settlers), 
and would seek pol itical change on the basis of parity and common roll .  And the Europeans would 
make their case for their special privileged place in the Fij ian sun on account of their vast contribution 
to the development of Fij i . The main task for Fiji's political l eaders, the colonial government and the 
Colonial Office after 1963 would be to negotiate a constitutional reconciliation of the competing claims 
of paramountcy, parity and privilege within the framework of a democratic polity. But that is another 
story. 
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Who Made Western Samoa Independent? 
Ben Featun a ' i  Liua'ana (ANU) 
Western Samoa became an independent nation in 1 962. And every year s ince then, Samoans 
remember with pride their independence, hoisting their national flag, singing their unique national 
anthem, and zealously attending commemorative church services. In fact, Samoans would agree 
that God alone should he glorified for giving Western Samoa independence, and the national motto, 
Fa'al'ae I le Atua Samoa (Samoa founded on God), bear witness to this conviction. Unfortunately, 
religious convictions sometimes disguise people ' s  true feel ings and opinions when the question of 
'Who made Samoa Independent? ' is raised outs ide a rel igious environment. When this happen, God 
takes a back seat: personal arrogance and family self-esteem surface to claim the honour. 
When missionary enterprises opened up Samoa to religious instruction, 1 traders, merchants, 
plantations owners, thrill seekers and prospectors followed closely in their wake. Europeans had no 
cause to disrupt the unorthodox politics of the Samoan people as they were left alone to pursue their 
dreams. The missions had no quarrel with Samoan politics either, as long as missionary works were 
promoted and the missions were free from political d isruptions. But European manipulation and 
Samoan enthusiasm and aspirations, fuelled by European greed, soon destroyed any kind of political 
harmony the Samoans may have tried to achieve through their political system. By the mid 1860s, 
Samoan differences over matai titles, and stubborn attitudes towards monarchical government, led 
to conllict and hostil ity. Europeans retaliated with threats of warships and long periods of exile for 
defiant Samoan matai, if Samoans failed to compromise on the formation of a workable central 
government. 
In the 1870s, Steinberger set up a central government that was agreeable to all Samoan factions, as 
well as satisfying European demands .  However, Steinberger's personal ambitions and aspirations, 
together with j ealousy and non-supportive attitudes of consuls and missions, soon destroyed any 
hope of a peaceful and workable central government.2 With Steinberger' s  failure, the Samoan 
leaders, Malietoa Laupepa, Tamasese Titimaea, and Mata 'afa Iosefo, exploited their various 
friendships with Germany, Britain, and America, in order to gain Samoan leadership for any 
government the Europeans saw fit to implement. Many attempts to implement a central government 
failed due to a constant fallout between Samoan leaders and their European allies. Whenever a new 
government came into being, Samoans would take up the challenge energetically to enhance their 
own status and authority, to the irritation of the Europeans. The repercussions were usually fatal 
for the Samoans, with Europeans seizing the opportunity to condemn Samoans for their lack of 
discipl ine and incompetence, and finding the perfect excuse to interfere in Samoan affairs.3 
In 1899 Germany, Britain and America, without consulting the Samoan people, decided the future 
of Samoa. Everyone wanted Samoa for either political or economic reasons, but no one wanted 
Samoa as a keepsake. America only wanted a small p iece for a harbour and reluctantly took over 
the protection of the Samoa islands to the east. Britain, whom the Samoans had always respected 
and shown great loyalty to, effortlessly handed over Western Samoa to the Germans in return for 
several Melanesian islands. Samoans were shocked, and felt betrayed by this careless disregard.4 
The German Administration, under Wilhelm Solf, quickly implemented policies which promoted 
German society and culture, including the compulsory use of the German language and singing the 
German anthem in schools. Solf also honoured Mata' afa Iosefo with the title A/ii Sili (Highest or 
Greater Matai), which gave Mata 'afa a status and influence among h is peers, but made h im very 
much a puppet for Solf.5 
Under Germany, there were many dissatisfied matai, especially the influential Tumua ma Pule 
faction, who continued to rebel against German rule in an effort to regain their traditional authority 
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and status. For instance, Namulau 'ulu Lauaki influenced and promoted the Mau a Pule i n  1909 
which led to many matai being exiled to the Mariana Islands.6 Namulau 'ulu 's  efforts failed because 
Solf had offered plenty of incentives to Mata ' afa Iosefo and other matai to ensure that every law and 
ordinance was carried out with great efficiency and loyalty. Mata 'afa h imself declared that Tumua 
ma Pule was a thing of the past and personally acknowledged Germany's  sovereign authority over 
Western Samoa.7 Solf also ensured that those loyal to the Administration were publicly rewarded, 
not only in monetary terms but with favours and gifts in the name of the Kaiser. Such astute actions 
stirred Samoan loyalty more deeply. 
The abol ition of the Alii Sili title after the death of Mata'afa Iosefo in 19 12, not only lessened the 
au thority and status of the matai but also reaffirmed Germany' s claim as sole ruler and power in 
Western Samoa, which 'shall be a government into eternity. ' The German Administration, in order 
to keep influential matai loyal , created and bestowed upon Malietoa Tanumafili I and Tupua 
Tamasese Meaole I the position of Fautua (Advisers), which according to Malama Meleisea 'was 
the beginning of the formal recognition of the tama a 'aiga ' (sons of the families).8 But these 
positions carried l imited prestige and little authority. Many matai became disheartened as they 
began to realise that Western Samoa would never re-establish a traditional government, nor achieve 
self-government, under Germany. 
The London Missionary Society (LMS) and the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society (WMMS), 
trusted advisers and promoters of Samoan affairs, decreased in influence as fewer missionaries 
arrived from Britain and Australia. The Samoan pastors, especially those of the LMS, became more 
involved in the administration of their own church. They savoured the prestige, authority and power 
that came with increased responsibility. It was about this time that the Samoan (LMS) Church toyed 
with the idea of self-government. But after been given the opportunity to fulfil their wish the 
Church leaders opted to conserve the status quo, because they were not prepared for the task. What 
the church had wanted was full administration of church affairs, with the LMS taking a passive 
supervisory role - an escape hatch in case things went wrong.9 
With the advent of World War One, Samoans welcomed the opportunity to contemplate their future. 
The departure of the German Administration gave the matai, especially the Tama 'aiga and Tumua 
ma Pule, the chance to revive their customs and traditions, including the strengthening of their matai 
authority and power. The war ended in 19 18, and the United Nations entrusted New Zealand with 
the administration of Western Samoa. Samoans felt strongly against the proposal and asked that 
Western Samoa be administered by Britain instead. As Samoan opinions mattered very l ittle, New 
Zealand took the opportunity to increase its status among the nations of the world .  
New Zealand 's  inexperience as a colonial administrator rekindled and excited Samoan pol itical 
ambitions, which had been dormant and threatening to lapse into obscurity. The influenza epidemic 
in 19 18,  and some very insensitive public relation efforts, together with a selfish and superior 
attitude among officials, contributed immensely to the rej ection of New Zealand, and to growing 
Samoan opinions that New Zealand was weak, and did not possess the same authority as the German 
Administration. 10 Samoans opposed many laws and ordinances, and New Zealand turned to 
banishments and removal of titles, just as the Germans had done, to alleviate these problems. 
Samoans reacted differently and more strongly against New Zealand.  The implementation of taxes 
and the take over of many business enterprises once in the hands of local merchants, traders, and 
planters, not only further alienated New Zealand from the Samoans, but also from their European 
and half  caste supporters . 1 1  
Samoan pressure and New Zealand mismanagement eventually led to the Mau movement in  1926. 
lbe movement at first was confined to a few dejected half castes and Europeans seeking economic 
independence and control, and a few matai seeking political recognition and status. But the 
movement quickly grew as many Samoans joined, whether or not they understood the aims of the 
Mau, as New Zealand 's  incompetence (at times exaggerated by dissatisfied Europeans and half 
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castes), became deeply implanted in the emotionally charged and impressionable minds of the 
Samoans. The movement exploded into a large scale political rebellion and, more important, 
triggered nationalistic sentiments (to the point of dying for one ' s  matai), which had not surfaced 
since the late nineteenth century.  The movement was taken to dangerous new heights with the 
killing of several Samoans, including Tamasese Lealofi I, during a peaceful, but political ly charged 
gathering in Apia, on 28 December, 1 929. 12 
The Mau gained strength as Samoans, half castes, Europeans, and even Chinese,13 supported 
Samoan appeals to end New Zealand rule, and to grant self-government. Western Samoa's political 
problems gained sympathetic responses from people in Austral ia, Britain, America, and New 
Zealand. The Mau also challenged New Zealand ' s  rule by setting up a rival government, with many 
supporters will ing to go to prison in defiance of New Zealand policies. World War Two d iffused 
the possibility of a physical confrontation. After the war, in 1945, New Zealand was more receptive 
to Western Samoa' s  wish for self-government, due to a new mandate proposed by the United 
Nations. The mandate gave New Zealand the opportunity to restore some prestige. More important, 
the mandate provided New Zealand with the best solution on how to rel inquish Western Samoa, and 
free New Zealand of an unwanted burden and pol itical embarrassment, without being seen to be 
forced out by Samoan res istance. 
In May 1961 ,  a plebiscite under universal suffrage was held to canvass opinion on a newly drafted 
constitution, and whether to concede to Western Samoa becoming an independent nation. At first, 
the Samoan political leaders strongly rejected the idea of universal suffrage in favour of matai voters 
only. Two reasons may be put forth for the rejection. First, the Samoan leaders felt that apart from 
the matai, Samoans did not fully grasp the essence of the constitution and the importance of 
independence. Second, and most important, the Samoan political leaders, and matai, may have felt 
that a plebiscite under universal suffrage undermined the matais ' status and role as sole 
representative and speakers for their families. The plebiscite was a sign of disrespect and a 
challenge to the matais ' honour. But  the leaders reluctantly accepted the proposal when the issue 
threatened to block independence negotiations. Samoans voted in favour after some persuasive 
campaigning by the Samoan leaders. J .  W. Davidson recorded that: 
Tupua Tamasese and Fiame and other leaders delivered broadcast addresses, in which 
they not only stated the case for the constitution and for the independence but also 
suggested that casting a negative vote would be an act of treachery. 14 
The positive result gave many Samoans the impression that there was overwhelming support for 
independence and for the constitution. But with 20% voting against the constitution, and 30% 
voting against independence, and taking into consideration Davidson ' s  comment that voters were 
coerced by the political leaders and matai, doubt arises as to whether the majority of Samoans truly 
wanted independence in the form in which they received i t .  Questions also arise as to whether 
genuine opinions were suppressed due to intimidation, and the manipulative influence of the matai 
on their 'aiga (families) . 
In the mid-1850s, Samoans wanted to manage their own affairs, but with a strong desire for Britain 
to act as protector, adviser, financier, and generally a ' father' to the people. This desire never 
changed under German and New Zealand Administrations. When preparations were made to carry 
out the terms of the United Nations mandate, Davidson pointed out that the Samoans worked hard 
for self-government. Not until the question of what kind of relationship New Zealand and Samoa 
should advocate after Samoa became self-governing, according to Davidson, was the word 
independence mentioned for the first time in place of 'self government' . Davidson saw this change 
of terminology as 'more accurately descriptive of the intentions of the Samoan and New Zealand 
governments ' ,  and he was correct. 15 New Zealand, the United Nations, and even Davidson, did not 
distinguished between self-government and independence, because either the former is synonymous 
with the latter, or the former usually culminates in the latter. But Samoans had a very d ifferent 
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understanding of the terms. The fact that Davidson mentioned a positive reaction to the change of 
terminology by the Samoan leaders suggests that the Samoans had a very different agenda regarding 
their future. Furthermore, the manipulative circumstances of the plebiscite suggest that many 
Samoans silently wanted something other than a fully independent state. Nevertheless, the 
asp irations of both countries were realised with much emotion and forgiveness, and, for many 
Samoans, with rel ief. 16 
Conclusion : 
Today, the debate continues on whether Western Samoa should, or should not, have become 
independent. Even more contentious is the question of 'Who Made Samoa Independent? ' - a 
question which has recently triggered passion among supporters of traditional Samoan politics. In 
a speech to the Samoan government on behalf of protesters over the Value Added Goods and 
Service Tax, Tu iatua Tupua Tamasese Efi highlighted this passion when he referred to the sacrifice 
of Tumua ma Pule, and to the spilt blood of Samoan leaders, as the forces behind Samoa's 
freedom. 1 7. It is not surprising that T.T.T. Efi speaks of the Mau passionately. More than any other 
person, he should be allowed to be boastful ,  and should be forgiven if he lays claim to the honour 
of being a descendant of those whom he, and others, consider to be the principal actors in Western 
Samoa' s independence. His forefathers, the l ikes of Taisi O.F. Nelson, Tupua Tamasese Lealofi 
I, and Tupua Tamasese Lealofi II, were not only advisers, leaders, and financial backers of the Mau, 
but were also involved in the negotiations for Western Samoa's independence. 
Recently, Tumua ma Pule have called for Western Samoa to return to traditional pol itics and 
customs, adding fuel to the debate. But the attempt to revive old Samoan political ideologies, which 
had been dominant during the height of the Mau movement, and personified by Tama 'aiga and 
Tumua ma Pule themselves, has not received the total support of Tama 'aiga and Tumua ma Pule 
members . 1 8  The prospect of a neo-Mau movement coming into immediate prominence is, for the 
meantime, postponed. However, the majority of Samoans are content, at least for the moment, to 
recognised the Mau as being responsible for Western Samoa' s  independence; a belief that has 
further in flated the ego of many individuals and their families, to the resentment of others. 
Was the Mau really responsible for Western Samoa' s  independence? The Mau did give Samoans 
something, but not independence. The Second World War suspended political ambitions as 
Samoans, under American mil itary rule, focused all their energy on war preparations. After the war, 
Mau adherents had already returned to their villages, and with the United Nations issuing a mandate 
to prepare Samoa for self-government, the pol itical leadership was entrusted to a few political 
leaders. The Mau movement was no longer a physical threat, and power and authority were no 
longer in the hands of the Mau, who had earlier sought self government and British protection. The 
Mau had aroused nationalist sentiments among Samoans to support a call for self-government, but 
after 1945 the Mau had lost its vigour and only provided a springboard for the more ambitious 
leaders to fulfil independence. 19 
The question which needs to be asked is: 'If the Mau was not responsible for making Samoa 
independent, then who was? '  To begin with, there is a need to detach ourselves from the narrow 
interpretations which promoted and gave the honour to individuals, family groups, or a particular 
organisation. For Western Samoa, no matter how bad its relationships with its colonial masters, 
especially with New Zealand, independence could not have been achieved without the influence and 
cooperation of internal and external forces. One of two important external factors was the United 
Nations who gave the mandate to New Zealand to prepare Samoa for self-government and 
independence, and prov ided a committee with experienced in independence negotiations to work 
closely with the Samoans. Second, the role of New Zealand was crucial, especially the contribution 
of a sympathetic Labour government, and the overwhelming support of the New Zealand people 
who rallied and pushed for Western Samoa's independence in order to make up for New Zealand 's  
past deficiencies.20 Many have advanced the notion that the swiftness of Western Samoa's 
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independence was due mainly to United Nations efforts, while others have cited New Zealand ' s  
prompt desire to get rid of  Western Samoa, and Samoans ' own thirst for  independence. This debate 
will continue for a long time, but the fact remains that without the full cooperation of these external 
pressures with Samoan ideologies, historians would be tell ing a very different story. 
'!be are many internal factors. Two in particular stand out as key factors. First, the influence of the 
Samoan (LMS) Church, which was also seeking independence from the LMS, and second, 
Tama ' aiga and Tumua ma Pule succeeded in suppressing their selfish traditional political rivalry 
in favour of a trouble-free path to independence. 
The Samoan (LMS) Church leaders had earlier turned down the chance to administer their own 
church affairs, due to inexperience. However, after the 1918 influenza epidemic, which killed many 
of the older and experienced church leaders, the young inexperienced Samoans who took over the 
leadership, called for an independent church. By 1926, at the height of the Mau movement, ill­
feeling between Samoan church leaders and LMS missionaries ripened, forcing the Samoan (LMS) 
Church to renew its call for self-government. During this time, pastors and church members became 
deeply involved in the Mau, helping to promote Samoan national ism and self-government. The 
Samoan (LMS) Church promoted Mau proclamations within church meetings and gatherings, 
changing the image of the church from a Samoan (LMS) Church into a Samoan Mau church.21 
After 1 945, Mau activities decreased while the Samoan Church continued to keep in touch with 
independence negotiations through many church members in government. 'Ibese included deacons, 
lay preachers, and stewards of the church, w ho held important positions in government; one of 
whom was Mata 'afa Faumuina Fiame Mulinuu II, who became the first Prime Minister of the 
independence state in 1962. The Samoan (LMS) Church became independent in the same year, and 
with changes in the constitution, it changed its name to Ekalesia Fa'apotopotoga Kerisiano I Samoa 
(Congregational Christian Church in Samoa) .  Mata ' afa, in later years, also held the post of 
Ta ' ita 'ifono (Chairmanship) of the Ekalesia Fa ' apotopotoga Kerisiano Samoa. 22 
"lbe second important internal factor, which also involved Mata ' afa Faumuina Fiame Mulinuu II, 
was over the procedures regarding the selection of the first Head of State. Four Tama 'aiga, 
Malictoa Tanumafil i II, Tupua Tamasese Meaole, Tuimaleal i ' ifano S i ' u, and Mata ' afa Faumuina 
Fiame Mulinuu II, had the credentials for the post. The independence Working Committee, after 
much division among il'> members, proposed that the first Head of State be selected from the holders 
of the Mal ietoa and Tupua Tamasese titles. Tuimaleal i ' ifano and Mata' afa supporters in the 
Working Committee expressed some reservations over the proposal as they 
spoke movingly and courageously, avowing the love of each family for its Tama '  aiga but 
accepting a higher duty to peace and to the nation, and leaving it to the people to find an 
appropriate place for [Mata 'afa and Tuimaleali 'ifanoj when self-government had been 
attained. "23 
' 
The Working Committee voted on the proposal and while it was carried, eight members who 
supported Mata'afa abstained. When the Tama 'aiga were informed of the Working Committee ' s  
decision, Mata'afa spoke out strongly, dissatisfied a t  the failure o f  the Working Committee to find 
places for himself and Tuimaleali ' ifano in the Head of State proposal. Mata' afa pointed out that 
he and his family would ' refrain from taking part in the future affairs of the State. '24 This statement 
was a declaration of war on the other Tama 'aiga, and the Samoans on the Working Committee, who 
should have taken a hint from the earlier comments of Tuimaleal i ' ifano and Mata 'afa supporters. 
'lbrough Samoan customs and diplomacy, the Working Committee begged Mata 'afa not to destroy 
the hope of the people. The Tama 'aiga and Tumua ma Pule factions also pleaded with Mata 'afa 
to accept graciously. Mata'afa reluctantly withdrew his claim, on condition that his family be 
considered in future negotiations.25 
Mata'afa's decision was interpreted by many as a sign of weakness, and an indication that Mata' afa 
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himself, and the title Mata' afa, were no longer influential. However, Mata 'afa may have been 
pressured by his family into taking a passive stance as the atmosphere was geared towards 
independence. Mata' afa did not want to be labelled a traitor, and certainly not to be blamed for 
holding up, or even destroying Samoans' hope for an independent state. Mata'afa's attitude gained 
him much respect among the Tama 'aiga and Tumua ma Pule. This respect was highl ighted in the 
confidence placed upon Mata' afa later when he was elected Prime Minister, at the very young age 
of 38. Perhaps, in being chosen, Mata 'afa received the overdue apology he deserved for being left 
out of the Head of State calculations, and being finally acknowledge as a great leader by his peers, 
and a reward for humil ity, and allowing Samoan ' s  the joy of celebrating independence free from 
traditional political conflicts . 
In summary, Western Samoa's independence was made possible through many external and internal 
factors . The Samoan (LMS) Church and the Mau played major roles, providing avenues for 
national ist expressions, and providing the only available support, at a time when Tama 'aiga and 
Tumua ma Pule needed it. The mandate after the second world war lessened the effect of the Mau 
movement, as an influential group of political leaders took over the struggle. The Mau was no 
longer important because the United Nations and New Zealand provided an avenue for self­
govcrnment under a new mandate. The plebiscite under universal suffrage almost destroyed 
independence negotiations but the influence of Tama 'aiga and Tumua ma Pule averted negative 
consequences. Finally, the swift settlement regarding the Tama ' aiga contlict over the Head of State 
nominations not only prevented a return to traditional rivalries, but indirectly initiated a process 
towards forther diminishing Tama 'aiga and Tumua ma Pule influence. The increasing debate over 
'Who Made Samoa Independent' in recent years provides a clear indication of this point. The 
election of parl iamentary members under universal suffrage in 1995 further reduced the influence 
of the matais in politics. So, 'Who Made Samoa Independent? ' I s imply say: Tama 'aiga and 
Tumua ma Pule, are high on the list. But, over the years, Tama 'aiga and Tumua ma Pule have lost 
much of their power and authority as Samoans, not the matais, take control of Western Samoa's  
political future. Western Samoan politics, a mixture of traditions and western ideologies, has lost 
its un iqueness as political power shifts from Tama ' aiga, Tumua ma Pule, and matai dominance, to 
the people themselves through the influence of Western political ideologies; universal suffrage being 
the latest factor. If th is trend continues to eliminate prejudice, then the question of 'Who Made 
Samoa Independence? ' would no longer matter because Samoans would have truly reached full 
independence - power to the people. 
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From the New Hebrides to Vanuatu 
David Ambrose, ANU 
Whatever the evils of colonisation, at independence most colonised people inherited a functional 
social and economic infrastructure in the form of roads, schools, ports and airstrips, hospitals and 
health clinics, a public administration, a pol ice and j ustice system, to enumerate only some of the 
more obvious features of colonial regimes. Their degree of development may have varied with the 
colonising power, the duration of its occupation and the number of its nationals resident in the 
colony, the promotion and protection of whose interests often conditioned the strength of 
metropolitan commitment to the future of a possession. The appropriateness of the imported norms 
and values and the compatibility of the structures and systems imposed on indigenous communities 
are, of course, other matters. 
'!he tragedy of Vanuatu ' s ' colonial ' h istory is that in an era of colonisation throughout the Pacific 
it was not properly ' colonised ' by any one colonial power, but fell under the condominium sway of 
the imperial rivalry of both Britain and France. To the British and French governments, their 
agreement to joint administration and not to seek to establish any exclusive or predominant 
in11uence must have seemed an act of enlightened forbearance. For Vanuatu, however, the 
agreement precluded the development of an extensive and unified infrastructure as each side 
maintained a watching brief over the activities of the other to ensure no surreptitious attempt to 
erode its interests or pre -emptively to advance its own. This punctil ious observance of exact 
balance was typified, comically, by the precision with which the Union Jack and the Tricolour were 
simultaneously raised and lowered in a ceremony repeated twice every day. 1 
The legacy of that decision has been, almost without qualification, disastrous for the country and 
its preparation for sovereignty. It was early seen as such by indigenous champions of independence: 
The condominium system was the most out-dated and confused form of government that 
mankind has ever established on earth. It did not fulfil the requirements of a developing 
cowllty like the New Hebrides . . . .  the condominium government was more of an obstacle 
to the economic and political 'development'  of the New Hebrides than an agent for the 
preparation of New lfebrideans to become rulers of their own country . . . .  there were in 
fact three governments trying to govern the place, the French colonial administration, the 
British colonial administration and the Joint administration.2 
The absurdities and the divisiveness inherent in this system led to its characterization as 
' pandemonium', the antithesis of good order and government. At its worst, it created and later 
bequeathed to the new nation an inheritance of two sets of laws, two police forces, two education 
systems, two administrations at central and d istrict levels and two post offices, a s ituation 
exacerbated by the super-imposed Joint administration whose Gilbert and Sull ivanesque epitome 
was the Joint Court, presided over by a Spanish judge who ' could not speak English, barely 
understood French, knew no Melanesian, was bewildered by p idgin and was as deaf as a post ' .  3 As 
Grace Mera Malisa poignantly noted, ' If it  weren ' t  my country and my people I would consider it 
the greatest farce the South Pacific scene has to offer the rest of the world .  This farce is our 
tragedy. ' 4 This hybrid administration, which may represent the most egregious sport of colonial 
governance, was aggravated by major differences between Britain and France towards their interests 
and responsibil ities in the New Hebrides. 
In the late 19th century, the British government, responding reluctantly to the precations of the 
Protestant Churches in Australia which feared the alienation of agricultural land by French planters 
and the steady inroads of the Catholic missions, assumed some policing duties with France under 
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the Joint Naval Commission of 1887. Britain ' s  unwill ingness to contest an exclusive rule in the 
New Hebrides with France and its ultimate acquiescence in the Protocols of 19 14, establishing the 
condominium, mirrored the wish of the British Treasury to contain its financial commitments to the 
barest minimum. Hence Britain 's  investment in the New Hebrides was from the outset shallow and 
its disposition to divest itself of responsibilities was, as the 20th century rolled on, consonant with 
the movement towards independence for its colonies which gathered pace after World War II .  
The interests of France were, however, more strongly entrenched through the large land  holdings 
of settlers, notably John Higginson ' s  Compagnie Caledonienne des Nouvelles Hebrides (CCNH), 
and the incorporation of French ' colon ies ' as territories of the French state. From the 1 960s, 
moreover, independence for the New Hebrides came increasingly to be considered in the l ight of 
its impact on continued French presence in New Caledonia and French Polynesia. De Gaulle ' s  
strategic pol icy and France ' s  nuclear test program thus became obstacles to independence for  the 
New Hebrides because of a feared ' domino' effect.5 De Gaulle ' s  attitude to decolonisation for the 
New Hebrides became the cardinal policy guidance for the French Residency in Port Vila, although 
strict belief in i t  as a means to ensure their longer-term objectives seems to have varied between 
individual French Resident Commissioners . In a confidential report to the French government in 
1969, the Resident Commissioner, M. Mouradian, was quite explicit about his mission :  
French Policy 
A - Government Policy - This is clear. My instructions received from General de Gaulle, 
were: "we are staying ". 
B - Fre!lch Residency 's Policy - This is simply the application of this order.6 
Only two years later, Commissioner Langlois, evinced far less confidence: 
Although the demonstration held for about two hours by just a few dozen natives was 
absolutely calm, its impact on the Europeans was gripping. Unable to believe that natives 
could adopt an attitude that had not been dictated to them, the European population 
pinlled this fear down to the activity of the British Residency, the Presbyterian Mission, 
the Anglicans, etc . . . . 
Certaill Europeans, . . .  thi!lk that it is time to organize you!lg Melanesians into political 
groupillgs would which permit the inevitable evolution of their behaviour to be guided . . . .  
I fear that they delude themselves with il/usiolls and I rather believe that these political 
regroupings which will certainly take place will be undertaken by the natives themselves, 
as soo!l as a small thinkillg elite will have been formed. All we hope for is that this elite 
will be Francophon e, train ed in our own way of thinking.7 
His use of the royal 'we '  and his faintly despairing ' hope '  certainly did not represent official 
DOMTOM policy nor the expectations of the several thousand French settlers whose large land­
hold ings and their increasing sub-div ision for sale to expatriates was the immediate cause of the 
public demonstration (more properly a peaceful ' s it-in ' )  referred to above by M. Langlois. 
Indigenous Political Opposition 
The one, perhaps the only, unmixed blessing to come out of the contested decade of ' decolonisation ' 
in the New Hebrides was the gradual emergence during the 1970s of a new political culture firmly  
rooted in  mass organisation and the populist cause of national independence. Party-based politics 
in Vanuatu has been characteristic of the period s ince independence in 1980 and has d istinguished 
the practice of parl iamentary government there from most of its Melanesian neighbours . Recent 
years may suggest that this is now unravell ing and that Vanuatu is reverting to a more normal type, 
in which individuals exploit short-term opportunities for personal or narrow constituency advantage 
with no sense of national interest or of the responsibilities of public office. It may be so, but I am 
not yet despairing of the resilience of the party system there. Despite the internal schisms that have 
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riven it since 1988, and more especially since 1991 ,  the Vanua ' aku Party has managed to retain 
much of its grass-roots party structure and commitment to principle and party pol icy. If politics 
degenerates further into individual opportunism, people may revert to a party that stands for and by 
something. If too the reconcil iation between Fr Lini 's National United Party and Donald  Kalpokas 
and the Vanua' aku Party (VP) holds, it should tend to consolidate a bloc of popular and 
parl iamentary support sufficient to begin to marginalise the present leverage of indiv idual MPs 
ready to hawk their allegiances to the h ighest bidders .  
The first organised opposition to European exploitation of alienated land arose on the island of 
Espiritu Santo in the 1960s as planters began to move away from their coastal plantations to open 
up tracts of interior ' dark bush ' for cattle grazing. Custom owners of the land denied that any title 
could have been acquired to such land as it was inconceivable that permanent al ienation could ever 
have been agreed. Their objections gave rise on Santo to the rural custom movement Nagriamel, led 
by the colourful Jimmy Steven, which initiated the first tentative moves internationally in the 
direction of independence for the New Hebrides, more to achieve local goals than from any sense 
of a national cause. Similar problems and frustrations elsewhere, especially on Malekula and Efate, 
served to raise ni-Vanuatu awareness of their own powerlessness to influence decisions over their 
most basic inheritance ' land ' .  Political power, it was soon realised, was the essential pre-requis ite 
to being able even to participate in determining their own future for themselves. 
A chronology of the 70s is a record of the growth of political parties whose platforms were to greater 
or lesser degrees either for retention of the status quo or in favour of independence - though the 
concerted demand for independence grew incrementally out of initial demands for a voice in the 
decision-making processes of the condominium government and an impatience with the denial of 
what was felt to be adequate consultation on issues affecting indigenous people. The first and most 
important event was the formation in June 1971 of the New Hebrides Cultural Association by 
Donald Kalpokas, Fr Walter Lini and Fr John Bani which soon after transformed itself into the New 
Hebrides National Party (NHNP). The Association commenced publ ication of a newspaper New 
Hebrides View Points ' to raise awareness among the Melanesian population of issues affecting the 
development of their country, in particular the l arge-scale alienation of land and the present 
government set-up "which provides l ittle hope of getting things done in the interests of the New 
Ilebrideans" ' .  8 
At the end of the same year and in reaction to the NHNP, a new largely francophone party, the 
Union de la Population des Nouvelles Hebrides (UPNH), was formed with support principally from 
European plantation owners and commercial interests. It failed to attract much support among 
Melanesians because its lack of genuine concern for ni-Vanuatu interests was quickly apparent. 
If the return to the New Hebrides in 1970/71 from overseas studies by Lini, Bani and Kalpokas was 
crucial to the founding of the NHNP, the return in 1973174 of Barak Sope and Kalkot Matas 
Kelekele was critical to the party 's transformation into an effective national organization with a 
defined political agenda. Sope had commented in 1 973 that ' the party had no definite policies for 
the achievement of its objectives ' and recognised that this arose mainly from a lack of organization 
and human resources dedicated to the cause.9 He saw that land was a unifying issue which could 
assist in mobil is ing popular support: 
'For the New Hebrides land is also a tool that can help to bridge the educated-uneducated and the 
urban-rural gaps ' . 1 0 Accordingly the Party decided at its Congress in Jan 1974 to centralize its 
operations in Pt Vila, elected Fr Lini as a full-time President (on leave from the Anglican Church), 
Barak Sope as Secretary and Kalkot as full-time information officer and publicist. 
The Churches too began to intervene pol itically and in 1973 the Presbyterian Assembly passed a 
resolution endorsing progress towards independence. Within a few months, Fr Lini petitioned the 
UN Committee of 24 cal ling for independence by 1977. 
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J\s a party the UPNH was effectively supplanted by the Union des Communautes des Nouvelles 
Hebrides (UCNI I) in 1974 along the l inguistic divide between French and English speakers . 
J\lthough several prominent ni-Vanuatu francophones had been invited to attend the NPNH 
Congress two weeks earl ier, two were elected Vice-President and Secretary of the new party. A 
third, Vincent Boulekone, attributed his preference for UCNH to the language divide: 'The National 
Party was born on the English side and it therefore influenced the Anglophones. The Francophone 
Melanesians were not interested in this, and didn ' t  understand too well why (it) had been born ' . 1 1  
A second francophone party the Mouvement A utonomiste des Nouvelles Hebrides (MANll) 
emerged in Jan 1974 which while it also represented francophone colon interests felt itself remote 
from the dominance of Pt Vila and nursed the germs of a separatist sentiment, already inchoate in 
the th inking of the Nagriamel movement, into political consciousness by espousal of a move towards 
' au tonomous status ' for different regional units .  On Santo,  it quickly al lied itself with Nagriamel 
which gave it grass-root Melanesian support, in an alliance which may be seen to have buttressed 
secessionist inclinations which erupted in violence on the eve of Vanuatu ' s  independence in 1980. 
By the end of 1 974, both Britain and France agreed that a graduated transition to independence must 
be undertaken with the first step to be elections to a Representative Assembly in Nov 1 975 . The 
elections returned 55% of the Melanesian vote to the NP and 17 of the 29 universal suffrage seats 
contested. 12 D isputed returns and by-elections delayed the first sitting until November 1976 and after 
a tied vote in February 1977 the newly renamed Vanua'aku Party decided to boycott the Assembly 
for good as totally unrepresentative. As a result, the administering powers d issolved the Assembly 
and, ignoring VP demands for democratic elections and majority rule, proceeded with elections on 
29 Nov 1977 for another Representative Assembly. A new Assembly was declared elected on 28 
Nov without a vote, after a sharing arrangement had been worked out between the other parties. 1 3 
Immediately a VP People 's  Provisional Government took control of much of the country preventing 
entry to the British and French authorities through their control of most airstrips and landing places . 
Movement into and within many islands was not possible without PPG permits. The VP suspended 
the PPG in May 78 after agreement had been reached with the administering powers and other 
parties leading to the formation of a government of National Unity in December 78. The council 
of Ministers appointed a Constitutional Planning Committee which comprised representatives from 
all pol itical parties, chiefs, churches and women. Its decisions were to be made by consensus and 
the Constitution it proposed was accepted by the French and British in September 1979. Elections 
were set down for November. 
'!be results of those elections stunned the French and the francophones - the size of the VP majority, 
with 26 out of 39 seats and 62% of the vote on a 92% turn-out14, was large enough to allow the 
Anglophone majority unilaterally to amend the constitution. As it had not yet agreed to a date for 
independence, France sought to unpick some of the agreements during negotiations over the issue 
and the question of aid. It was not until only one month before independence that France finally 
agreed to the date of 30th July. 
Secession 
Santo ' s  rebel l ion on the eve of independence and its decisive suppression, with assistance from 
PNG 's  Kumal force, by the new Lini government may have been reported with amusement as the 
' coconut war' but it posed a serious threat to Vanuatu 's sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
Certainly that was believed by the leading members of the government. Lini wrote in ' B eyond 
Pandemonium' ,  
17ie government and people of the New Hebrides have seen the French supporting and 
encouraging the rebels on Santo and Tanna. They have supplied weapons and ammwzition 
and received support from the rebels in retum.15 
5 1  
Inspector-General Robert told the meeting that he did not care if civil war broke out in the 
NII . . . .  M.Dijoud appeared on TV and radio . . .  and encouraged French nationals and 
'colons ' to continue their activities against the legally elected government . . .  
As a consequence, a s  Jupp obseived i n  1982, French resistance produced the very outcome they 
most feared - 'one party domination by the Anglophone Protestants '. 16 
On the positive s ide, the struggle for independence created a national political party organisation 
and, in reaction, other parties arose in opposition to its agenda. The struggle also engendered some 
sense of nationhood in an archipelago where topography, language and custom militated against 
such a notion . It early gave Vanuatu an international profile through the UN Decolonisation 
Committee and a foreign policy based on membership of the NAM. It gave Vanuatu an independent 
' identity ' from the outset. It is perhaps wrong to say ' gave ' ,  for very l ittle was given; rather they 
won for themselves those things . On the negative side the l ist is heavy. For a poor country to 
assume responsibil ity for education, health and other seivices is a major challenge, even when 
preparation has been long and smooth.  But to support two systems is beyond capabilities. 
From Vanuatu 's history of dual administration flowed, especial ly from its d ivided education and 
unequal employment in rival systems, but reinforced by religious affiliation, the most profound and 
intractable schism - the divide between the anglophone majority and a large francophone minority. 
Despite the almost universal use of Bislama, the problem persists . Carlot-Korman, after winning 
government in 1991 ,  saw it as not only an opportunity but also a responsibil ity to redress the 
discrimination and disadvantages he and the francophone community felt they had endured under 
a decade of anglophone rule. The taste for power, driven now as much by the desire to prevent its 
exercise by a rival as by any commitment to a program, together with the vagaries of unstable 
coal ition government have begun to undermine that legacy of policy coherence and party discipline 
that Vanuatu won for itsel f through a nationalist struggle for independence. 
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No wantem kap man : 
Decolonisation and rebel lion in the New Hebrides, 1 957-1980. 
Michael Morgan, Sydney University 
After 74 years of Condominium rule the New Hebrides emerged into the community of states as 
Vanuatu on 30 July 1 980. Yet at independence, the country was in the throes of a rebellion. In 
January 1980, secessionists in the southern and northern regions of the archipelago had declared 
independent federations, refusing to submit to the authority of the Vanua'aku Pati which had been 
swept to power in the November 1979 elections. Although the secession in the southern regions had 
been suppressed in the month before independence, the northern rebels, constituted mainly by the 
Nagriamel movement and backed by French settlers, members of the French administration and the 
Phoenix Foundation, continued to hold power. Unable, or unwilling, to l imit disintegrating law and 
order, the colonial administrations of the United Kingdom and France could only preside over the 
chaos . 
After independence the VP administration, freed from the shackles of the bifurcated Condominium, 
qu ickly reasserted its authority. With the help of the Papua New Guinean Kumul Force, the 
remaining secessionists were suppressed and the leaders of the rebell ion arrested. The human costs 
of the revolt were minimal : only two rebels had been killed and a handful wounded, some quite 
seriously. Many of the survivors were to face harsh conditions in Vanuatu's ill-equipped j ails or at 
the hands of police. 1 In the aftermath, almost a thousand people were detained, over one-hundred, 
includ ing the French Resident Commissioner, were designated persona non grata, and Jimmy Moli 
Stevens, leader of the Nagriamel movement was sentenced to fourteen and a half  years 
imprisonment. 2 
The role played by members of the French colonial administration in the rebell ion, and the 
perception that the metropol itan French government was either sympathetic or actively involved, 
initiated a downturn in relations between France and Vanuatu which were not to recover properly 
for over ten years. More serious for the harmony of the new state was the continuing air of distrust 
concerning Francophone niVanuatu.3 Many leaders of the rebellion were prominent Francophones, 
such as Jean Marie Leye and Aime Malere, and perceptions of their attempts to delay or derail 
independence pervaded Vanuatu pol itics for some time. The new state had emerged intact, but only 
just. In the words of one observer, it was a ' sorely troubled run-up to freedom' . 4  
Because of  these factors the rebell ion has often been understood as the resul t of  ' outside influences 
who use Melanesian people in order to promote their own interests and achieve their own aims '5 • 
Thus, fearful of  a national ist and progressive Vanua'aku Pati administration, French settlers and 
colon ial officials manipulated indigenous movements with the intention of resisting decolonisation 
in Santo and other parts of the New Hebrides. The Phoenix Foundation, intent on establishing a 
laissez faire paradise based on right-wing l ibertarian principles was also interested in separating 
Santo from the rest of the New Hebrides (although its actual role in the rebellion was l imited). The 
situation was compounded by an 
inept Condominium system of government which allowed such a situation to develop but was 
too paralysed by its in-built restrictions to do anything effective to resolve it . . . 6 
Considering the activities of these ' outside influences ' and the vacillation of the metropol itan powers 
in the face of disintegrating order, such an interpretation has considerable salience. However, it accepts, 
fait accompli, that many n iVanuatu were either incapable of acting in their own self-perceived interests 
or were more interested in remaining French than n iVanuatu. Moreover, by emphasising the activities 
of the French administration, French settlers and Francophone rebels, the political scene in Vanuatu 
53 
is  conveniently demarcated into Anglophone (good, decolonisers) and Francophone (bad, pro-colonial) 
camps. The real ity was rarely so s imple. Many of those who participated in the rebellion had previously 
opposed the French government and the activities of French settlers and were not necessarily 
Francophones nor even Francophiles. 
While the balkanisation of the New Hebrides was demonstrably the intention of the metis, members of 
the French admin istration and the Phoenix Foundation, l ittle insight has been offered into why 
thousands of niVanuatu took part. To suggest that they could be incited into secession by a handful of 
expatriates seems condescending. S ixteen years later, it is  necessary to reassess the rebell ion and by 
impl ication the nature of resistance to decolonisation. 
Wiswe'! Indigenou s responses to the devolution of power. 
Neither driven from the islands by advancing armies nor initially challenged by an indigenous 
intel l igents ia, the United Kingdom and France did not begin to devolve power in the New Hebrides 
until the late 1950s. Due to the presence of two colonial powers, one declining and one determined not 
to do so, decolonis ing the New Hebrides was unavoidably problematic. Yet despite the differences 
between Britain and France, one of the most important, and frequently overlooked, divisions was in the 
reaction to constitutional reform from islanders themselves. 
In 1957 the Condominium administration legislated to provide both an advisory body and system of 
local councils7• While the formation of an advisory council for territory-wide discussion was relatively 
easy, grass-roots reform had to contend with New Hebridean reservations about the nature of 
government and the specifics of island d ivisions. The Native Local Administration Joint Regulation 
in September 1957 provided the basis for the establishment of local councils to provide infrastructure 
for law and order, water supplies and sanitation.8 Although funded by the treasury of the Condominium, 
local councils were mainly supported by the British administration .  Debilitated by a d isparate 
population, poor communication infrastructure, l imited funding, poor training and Condominium 
ambivalence, the local council system was never to properly take hold before independence. Despite 
continued calls from the New Hebridean members in AdCo, local councils were not made mandatory 
and were never provided with the ability to raise independent capital .9 At its zenith, the local council 
system accounted for less than half of the islands. In addition to the barriers of geography and 
administrative support, there is evidence to suggest that French District Agents advocated rejection of 
the councils to Francophone niVanuatu , as they were not compl imentary with the French model of 
communes based on common language and ethnic ties. 10 However, islanders had ample reasons to reject 
infrastructural reform. 
The colonial period had installed the central authority of the Joint Administration onto the autonomous 
villages of the New Hebrides. 1 1  However, while power radiated from Port Vila, it was rarely felt in 
many islands. Apart from infrequent visits from government officials, survey teams and missionaries, 
communities were mostly ignored by the Joint Administration. When agents of the Joint Administration 
had concerned themselves with island affairs, it had often been to ' collect l icence money or to cart 
wrong-doers off to prison' . 12 Furthermore, a bifurcated colonial administration in which the two halves 
were often operating in competition rather than cooperation, left many islanders afraid of being caught 
between the hammer of the French and the anvil of the British .  The localisation of government 
therefore was greeted with understandable trepidation by many New Hebrideans, mindful at once of 
the punitive relationship that they had had with the Joint Administration and wishing to avoid 
involvement in the operation of all government. In many instances, islanders made l ittle differentiation 
between the French and British s ides of the administration, simply perceiving the ' kapman ' 
(government) in negative terms. 1 3 Contiguous with such negative perceptions, local councils were 
thought to undermine the authority of chiefs and b ig-men. 14 It is to the detriment of the Joint 
Administration, and especially the British half, that the role of local councils was never properly 
outlined to island communities. Nevertheless, even had this happened, it is doubtful that all islanders 
would have accepted local councils. The traditional consensus model of leadership in which an issue 
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was argued until al l parties were in agreement was still preferred in many quarters. 15 A system which 
necessitated election by ballot or nomination and which met in private was inappropriate because one 
person, it was thought, could not speak for another, especially behind closed doors. The successful 
implementation of local councils required a s ignificant alteration of New Hebridean attitudes to 
government. 
Adoption of local councils was often dictated by specific island rivalries. The formation of an island 
council in Tanna in 1968 was derailed by the long-stand ing feud between the Presbyterian church and 
the ' cargo-cultist' and pagan villages. 16 The Jon Frum movement had consistently opposed government 
encroachment onto its territory, guarding its boundaries with quasi-military border patrols and refusing 
the services of government cl inics and schools.17 The main impetus for the council had come from Iolu 
Abbil ,  a Presbyterian member of AdCo, and meetings were to be held on the grounds of the 
Presbyterian mission headquarters . To Jon Frum adherents, it was largely perceived that the 
Presbyterian Church was the agent of their repression. The island council therefore compounded two 
bugbears : government and the repression of kastom (at least the cargo-cultist perceptions of it). 
While local councils were generally more accepted in Anglophone and Protestant communities, it was 
not necessarily the case that only Francophone communities opposed them. When the idea of local 
councils was introduced to Ambae in 1961 ,  the most disinclined community was that of the Church of 
Christ based in Ndui Ndui, West Ambac. In the eastern section, councils found support in the 
Melanesian Mission and Apostolic communities, as well as in Catholic villages (al though not all were 
to remain involved). 1 8  Not only was the Church of Christ community considered Anglophone, but in 
1959, two years before the introduction of the Local Council issue, it had spearheaded moves to stop 
the establishment of a French school on the island. 19 The machinations of the French District Agent in 
th is respect were also perceived as undue government interference. Ambae was recognised for the 
efficient operation of its local councils . However, the refusal of the Church of Christ to participate, 
when compared with the successes of those who had accepted the rod blong kapman (government 
way), constituted a considerable loss of face for the big-men of Ndui Ndui.20 It was not always the case 
that the differences between Britain and France over decolonisation were necessarily transposed into 
an essential clash between Anglophone and Francophone n iVanuatu. 
Poor administrative support, conflicting colonial policies, reservations as to the scope and functions of 
the local councils and a divided community created unease and incomprehension. It was assumed that 
islanders should recognise pol itical advance when it was offered, and graciously accept it. However, 
th is was not the case and considering the negative perception of the government, that was 
understandable. The Condominium's assurance that the reforms were 'warmly welcomed by the people 
of the New Hebrides ' ,  was only partly true.21 
No wantem ka pman The Nagriamel alternative. 
In the early 1960s British subject J immy Stevens and local big-man Tari Paul Buluk formed the 
Nagriamcl movement in Santo to protest the encroachment of the Societe Fran<;;aise des Nouvelles 
Hebrides onto the dak bus (dark bush - al ienated, but unused land).22 Although initially protesting a 
specific example of land al ienation, Nagriamel quickly grew into a movement spanning the northern 
islands of Espiritu Santo, Ambae, Pentecost, Maewo, Malekula, Malo, Paama and Ambrym. In 1 968, 
Europeans constituted only three percent of the population, yet they held title to thirty-six percent of 
all land in the islands, and fifty percent of all exploited land.23 A group advocating the return of dak bus 
therefore had considerable common ground with grassroots New Hebrideans. 
Nagriamel benefited from broad disenchantment with the Condominium. Islanders looking for an 
alternative to the two-headed administration were drawn to the unity provided by the new movement. 
As a New I lebridean member of Ad Co paraphrased it, a common belief was that islanders ' could not 
serve two masters, therefore [they] prefer Nagriamel .. . '24 
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Part of Nagriamel's appeal was that it was an indigenous movement and islanders could identify with 
it more than they could the Joint Administration, or even the Advisory Council .25 Nagriamel's 
popularity threatened the au thority of the Condominium in the northern islands and its actions became 
increasingly anti-government. Representatives also toured the northern islands advocating withdrawal 
from local councils.26 Tanafo village, the movement headquarters, became an anti-government 
commune. Nagriamel opposed al l Joint Administration encroachment in its territories. Border patrols 
were in itiated in Tanafo and access to Nagriamel lands in other areas was l imited to those possessing 
a 'passport' .27 Field workers for 1971 Geological S urvey in Santo, Ambae and Epi were hindered or 
stopped by Nagriamel supporters and survey marker pegs removed.28 
The movement reached its apogee in the early 1970s. Drawn together under the Nagriamel banner were 
niVanuatu from the Santo hinterland (the mama! or nekid pipol - naked people), adherents of the 
Church of Christ from Ambae, Cathol ics from Port Olry and Matantas in Santo, Santo Presbyterians 
(who were later break away from Nagriamel to form Natuitanno) and many other islanders disenchanted 
with the Condominium. Nagriamel's syncretism was apparent in the increasingly complex symbols of 
al legiance that Stevens used - a mixture of traditional rites and Christian practice. 29 Jimmy Stevens 
claimed fifteen thousand Melanesian adherents.30 Although this number is hard to verify, Nagriamel 
presented a significant challenge in the northern islands. 
The apparent success of Nagriamel, and the tenuous position of the local councils, led the New 
I lcbridean members of Advisory Council to push for greater emphasis upon local government. In 1970, 
at an extraordinary session, a motion sponsored by the representative for South Efate, George Kalkoa, 
and receiving support from ten of the other eleven New Hebridean members, sponsored a motion 
calling on the Joint Administration to give more support to the local councils.31 It was also unanimously 
agreed to make all effort.<> to l imit the influence of Nagriamel.32 Despite such measures, Nagriamel 
remained a force in New l lebridean pol itics for another ten years . 
Tru kastom mo gammon. 
Kastom and politics. 
In response to an upsurge in pol itical activ ism in the early seventies, the governments of the United 
Kingdom and France continued to devolve power. Beginning with a National Representative Assembly 
in 1975 and culm inating in free and open elections in 1979, the last five years of Condominium rule 
were marked by the rapid devolution of power and heightened tensions. Although the period was 
marked by rival ry between the colonial powers, it was the clash between New Hebrideans - physical 
and doctrinaire - that were the most heated .  
By the early 1970s, conditions were ripe for an explosion of political activity .  As extensive land 
speculation by American property developers renewed concern about land al ienation, a new political 
force emerged.33 The New Hebrides Cultural Society, formed in 1971,  sought to revive culture and 
advance the interests of New Ilebrideans.34 Its first action was to organise demonstrations against the 
latest round of land speculation, and received sufficient support to transform itself into the New 
Hebrides National Party. Its platform was based on the return of customary land, unity, development, 
decentral isation and ul timately, independence. Like Nagriamel, the National Party also offered an 
alternative to the divisiveness of the Condominium administration, but whereas Nagriamel rejected all 
forms of government, the National Party merely rejected government 's current form. 
Within three years of the formation of the National Party, two urban Francophone parties had emerged. 
1be first was the Mouvement Autonomiste des Nouvelles Hebrides (MANH) in Santo formed in 1973, 
which drew its support from French settlers and Francophone New Hebrideans. Its platform was 
explicitly Santo-oriented, seeking autonomy for the island to protect its commercial interests from Vila. 
lbe second was the Union des Communautes de Nouvelles Hebrides (UCNII) formed in Port Vila in 
1974. The platform of UCNH was less specific than that of MANH, but it also drew significant support 
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from urban French and Francophone New Hebrideans. Both were vilified by the National Party as 
parties of the ' foreign planter community ' and pro-colonial.35 
Although it seemed that the lands pol icies of the Nagriamel movement and the National Party, both of 
which called for the return of al ienated land, would draw the two groups together, Nagriamel al lied 
itself with MJ\.NII. It seemed anomalous that a group which had begun in protest at the al ienation of 
dak bus by French commercial interests would ally itself with a party which drew considerable support 
from these groups, but Stevens was adamant that Nagriamel should maintain its anti-government stance. 
As he later stated, 
the feeling was that most of their (National Party) members were Local Council members. 
Nagriamel is against government and therefore against Local Councils, and so we are against 
the National Party. We didn 't want to get pulled back into government.36 
The alliance between MANI I  and Nagriamel facilitated an increasing political role for Stevens. 
Although it seemed contrary to his avowed anti-government ethic, h is participation in pol itics was 
admissible as it allowed him to voice his concerns to a wider audience. Nevertheless, he maintained that 
pol itics and government were to be kept out of Tanafo completely. 37 The alliance between MANH and 
Nagriamel, and a similar alliance between the UCNII  and Tanna's kastom groups, provided the urban 
Francophone parties with grass-roots support that they could otherwise not mobilise. 
The smooth transition to self-government faltered after the 1975 elections. Dissatisfied with the slow 
rate of reform, the National Party boycotted most sittings of the National Representative Assembly, and 
eventually removed itself from the government sanctioned process altogether, forming the People's 
Provisional Government in 1977. The action sparked rioting in Vila and Tanna, and imposed a siege 
mental ity on the islands which was not to lift until after 1980.38 While it  was true that on a national 
level there was a division of power between the National Assembly/Joint Administration and the 
People's Provisional Government, in two significant areas power was divided between kastom groups 
and the PPG39. Santo and Ambae were d ivided between Nagriamel and Vanua'aku Pati communities .40 
In Tanna the fortification was between Jon Frum/Kapiel villages and Vanua'aku Pati v illages.41 Beneath 
the con fl icts on a national level, island divisions were still being played out by followers of the 
' government way' and those who rejected it. 
The mobil isation of the pol itical parties required the cooptation of indigenous symbols to cement voter 
support. Kastom42 was an obvious counterpoint to the injustices of the Condominium regime and rooted 
politics to the islands, rather than to the Residencies. Kastom, and the ability to impose of acceptable 
interpretation of it, was the major point of the pol itical l egitimacy in New Hebrides politics. Heated 
arguments had arisen between New I lebrideans as to tru kastom (the real thing) and gammon 
(rubbish) .43 To Nagriamel, Jon Frum and Kapiel, kastom was an implicit political structure. It entailed 
the construction of regional au tonomy as part of kastom and placed l ittle credence in the concept of the 
nation-state . At the village level power rested in the village big-men and chiefs and it was they who had 
the power to make decisions about, for example, independence.44 To the Vanua'aku Pati kastom was 
a common trad ition through which islanders could feel a common bond.  Although it had invariably 
been altered by many factors, not least Christianity, it was a force for national unity growing from pride 
in the diversity and wealth of the islands' traditions45• 
The delineation between the two groups was clear. While heavily laden with references to kastom, the 
political discourse of the Vanua'aku Pati also involved concepts such as emancipation,  the endemic 
inequality of colonial ism and exploitation46• They looked beyond the boundaries of 'v illage ' and 
' island ' ,  championed the concept of the nation-state. Nagriamel, Jon Frum and Kapiel preferred the 
insularity of individual communities and the maintenance of a system of autonomous v il lages, loosely 
collected in a federation .  
Both interpretations were ultimately reconstructed versions of kastom, and could hardly be otherwise. 
57 
There was the obvious influence of consistent outside forces on the islands and subsequently on kastom. 
"Ibe idea of island autonomy, whilst allowing more kastom-oriented activities in the villages, was itself 
a construction. While there was no concept of a unified New Hebrides, there was also l ittle concept of 
unified islands. Regional autonomy, especially in Santo and Tanna, was particularly attractive to the 
kastom adherents because in the microcosm of island relations, Vanua'aku could not claim a clear 
majority (which it could demonstrably do on a national level). Therefore, if those two islands could be 
granted more powers of sel f-determination, the anti-Vanua'aku forces could l ive  out their collective 
existences without the fear of having government imposed on them. 
The November 1979 elections - the first open elections contested by all the parties - resulted in a 
resounding victory for Vanua'aku, claiming 26 of the 39 seats in the assembly, and winning slim 
majorities in both regional council elections in Santo and Tanna. The loss of the island councils marked 
the turn ing point from which rebellion was almost unavoidable. The regional councils were the last 
ch ance of maintaining even lim ited au tonomy for the Federal Pati, and especially the Nagriamel 
movement and the Tannese kastom villages, and the last chance of avoiding the Vanua'aku Pati's vision 
of an independent state. As charges of fraud ricocheted across the islands, all but three of the Vanua'aku 
Pati's opponents boycotted the assembly. The remaining opposition members, the three Francophone 
niVanuatu with university education, constituted a vocal, but outnumbered opposition. 
On 1 January 1980 the flags of the TAFEA and Vemarana Federations were raised. The structure of 
the rebel federation was, in the words of Jean Marie Leye, 
closely tied up with custom . . . . .  the 1 914 Protocol was never signed by our custom chiefs. We 
must go back to the way things were before the whites came. We will be ji·ee again by 
respecting our custom . . . . . .  We will recognise . . .  neither the political structure nor tlze social 
structure (of the Vanua 'aku Pati government) . . . . 47 
It measured the gulf between the rebel New llebrideans and the Vanua'aku government. Tb.e VP sought 
to impose a unity on the islands, and drag the New Hebrides into nationhood. It had never opposed 
'government' in substance, merely the form: that is the Condominium administration. The rebel leaders, 
especially Nagriamel in the northern islands and Jon Frum in the south, placed l ittle credence in the 
notion of the nation-state, preferring the insularity of individual communities and the maintenance of 
au tonomous villages, loosely coll ected in a federation. The place of such a system in the 1980s was 
unclear. 
Once freed from the crippled Condominium administration, the Lini administration was able to reassert 
its authority. With the help of Papua New Guinea troops the Santo revolt was suppressed in a little over 
two weeks, with little resistance and no sign of foreign intervention on the part of the rebels.48 Although 
the Phoenix Foundation was often cited as a main exponent of secession, by the late seventies its role 
was limited to the provision of coins and passports for the doomed Nagriamel federation.49 In the end 
it was merely a ' peanut-gallery ' hoping for a favourable outcome. The role of the French settlers and 
colonial administrators was more visible. 
Conclusion 
The Santo rebell ion, and its forceful suppression, were the tragic consequences of decolonisation. 
While the intentions of the Phoenix Foundation and the French settlers were indeed to derail 
independence, the objectives of Nagriamel and the cargo-cultists of Tanna were less sinister. The major 
niVanuatu parties were formed in response to the fact that the colonial period had brought very few 
benefits to the islands. Vanua'aku sought to redress the imbalance through gaining control of the 
apparatuses of government and bringing development and unity. However, for the rebels of the TAFEA 
and Vemarana Federations, Father Walter Lini and the Vanua'aku administration merely represented 
the latest manifestation of something that they had rej ected completely: intrusive government. 
Nagriamel was originally an issue based movement, protesting a specific case of land al ienation. Yet 
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the conditions in the Condominium and the difficult process of instituting local government in the 
sixties, pushed many islanders, Protestant and Cathol ic, Christian and animist into the Nagriamel fold, 
and facil itated il'> growth into an alternative non-government. In essence, the rebellion had been fought 
to maintain a system of autonomous vil lages, controlled through consensus in the (reformulated) 
trad itional manner. The world-view of Nagriamel, and that of its n iVanuatu all ies, was never as 
sophisticated as the educated nationalists of the Vanua'aku Pati, and was intellectually ill-equipped to 
comprehend the potential for exploitation at the hands of either the metis or the Phoenix Foundation. 
However, the case remains that it was these forces which allowed Nagriamel to act without the 
entanglements of intrusive government. 
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Prospects for New Caledonia:  The Challenge of Ou vea 
David Small,  University of Canterbury 
The New Caledonia Background (Dorothy Shineberg, ANU) 
New Caledon ia (Territoire de la Nouvelle Caledonie) is a French overseas territory, 1 ,200km east of 
Austral ia. It includes the island of New Caledonia with the capital, Noumea; the Loyalty Islands; the Belep 
Islands and the Isle of Pines. These islands form more than 99% of the land mass of about 1 9,000 km2. 
J\lthough New Caledonia has only about 150,000 inhabitants, it has acquired significance as an outpost of 
European sovereignty in a largely decolonised region. 
The Grande Terre contains about 90% of the population. Rugged mountain ranges divide the island into 
an east 'coast' which often descends precipitously to the sea, and a west 'coast' which slopes more gradually 
and contains much undulating land. Serpentine rock forms a continuous plateau over most of the southern 
th ird of the island, and continues along the west coast as a series of massifs. These rocks have weathered 
to form the terre rouge soils which overlay extensive nickel, chrome and cobalt ores. In the north-east, an 
outcrop of gneiss forms a mountain range which includes the highest mountain, Mt Panie (1628 m). 
Numerous streams descend from the mountain chain to the lagoon. The climate is subtropical with a 
year-round rain fall which is higher on the east coast (up to 2m annually) than on the west. The Loyalty 
Islands comprise three main islands, Ouvea, Lifou, Mare, and many small islands. Loyalties form more 
than 10% of the total land mass and nearly 10% of the population l ive there. These islands are raised coral 
plateaux, and surface water is lacking because of the porous rock. Geograph ical isolation, contrasting soils 
and a wide altitudinal range has produced a rich flora. There are no endemic malarial mosquitoes. 
Melanesians settled the territory over 3,000 years ago and, except for rare Polynesian voyagers, were 
probably cut off from outside contact until the late 18th century. Captain Cook landed at Balade on the east 
coast, which he named New Caledonia, in 1774, and was followed in 1793 by the French navigator, 
D'Entrecasteaux. Regular contact with Europeans began in 184 1  when sandalwood traders from Australia 
introduced islanders to iron. The arrival of a protestant mission from the London Missionary Society in the 
Loyalty Islands in 1 84 1  and that of a Marist mission, set up at Balade with the aid of the French navy in 
1843, marked the beginning of the protestant and catholic churches in the territory. France took possession 
of most of present day New Caledonia in 1853, with the aim of reserving the territory as a possible penal 
colony. French sovereignty over the Loyal ty Islands was not declared until 1 864. 
The Melanesian population probably declined rapidly in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, 
Melanes ians numbers were fairly stable until 1 939, but doubled in the next 40 years . Migration is 
important in determining non-Melanesian numbers. The birth-rate is higher among Melanesians and 
Wallisians than among others, but infant mortality is high among Melanesians and l ife expectancy relatively 
low (male 59.3; female, 64.4). From the time of settlement until 1917, Melanesian uprisings were common 
and constantly feared by the authorities and settlers. The insurrection of 1856-9 near Noumea, as well as 
that of 1878 which extended along the west coast from Bouloupari to Poya, seriously endangered French 
occupation. Grievances centred around the confiscation of Melanesian lands, the foraging of settlers' cattle 
on their food gardens and, in 19 17, the head tax. The repression of the first uprising established the pattern 
of French conquest: systematic destruction of v il lages and crops to bring the population to heel, the use 
of indigenous aux il iaries to fight their battles, the demand for unconditional surrender and the punishment 
of  insurgents by deportation or execution and further confiscations. By 1860 French authority had been 
establ ished over the southern third of the mainland and in the next decade policies were developed for 
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disposing o f  indigenous land, regrouping tribes and appointing tribal chiefs to represent the administration. 
By 1900, large areas of land had been al ienated and the inhabitants relegated to reserves. Forced labour, 
limitations on travel, and curfews became the basis of a system of administrative law codified in 1887 as 
the indigenat (Native Regulations). In 1 899 a head tax was levied on Melanesian men to oblige them to 
work for settlers and the government and, l ike the indigenat, remained in force until 1946. 
Although the prime concern of the early colonial administration was the control of about 23,000 convicts 
landed between 1864 and 1897, the attraction of free settlers and the provision of cheap labour were also 
preoccupations. Between 1864 and 1939, some 60,000 indentured labourers were imported to construct 
public works, to work on plantations, ships, wharves and mines and in commerce and domestic service. 
These included ni-Vanuatu and Solomon Islanders ( 1865-1920), Vietnamese (1891-1939), Indonesians 
(1 896-1939) and Japanese (1892- 1921) .  Only a few remained after their contracts and, although few 
ex-convicts left the territory, not many established families. New Caledonia was also the unlikely home of 
4000 pol itical exiles of the 1 871  Paris Commune, but few of the survivors stayed after being amnestied. 
The free white settlers came at first largely from members of the administration and armed forces, from 
Austral ia and New Zealand, and former sugar planters from Reunion. There were two later waves of free 
settlers in the 1890s and 1920s, encouraged to establish coffee and cotton, but by 1936 there were only 
15 ,000 European residents by comparison with 29,000 Melanesians. After World War 2, the European 
population gradually increased by migration, hut the main influx of white and Polynesian settlers occurred 
during the nickel boom of 1 965-72, making Melanesians for the first time a minority. 
About two-thirds of the population live in Noumea, which has the facil ities of a French provincial city. 
About four-fifths of people of migrant origin, including Europeans, Polynesians and Asians, live there as 
against a quarter of the Melanesians. About three-quarters of Melanesians l ive outside Noumea in small, 
dispersed vil lages with few modern facil ities, engaged chiefly in subsistence agriculture, based on yam, 
taro, sweet potato and banana. In the Loyalty Islands, the Isle of Pines, the Beleps, on the east coast and 
in the mountain ranges of the mainland the population is almost entirely Melanesian. 
Melanesians and Europeans form 43% and 37% respectively of the population and sustain distinct ways 
of l ife, 'kanak' and 'caldoche', to one of which people of mixed descent tend to ascribe. Kanak identity is 
based on clan membership, a network of family all iances and specific land rights. The caldoche way of life 
is fully integrated into a money economy. The Polynesian minority comprises Wal l is and Futuna Islanders 
(9%) and Tahitians (4%). Descendants of Indonesian and Vietnamese migrant workers form 4% and 2% 
respectively of the population and are now essentially an urban group. 
About thirty Melanesian languages are spoken, most Melanesians being proficient in more than one. The 
Catholic church claims two-thirds of the population, including almost all European, Wallisian and 
Vietnamese and half the Melanesian and Tahitian minorities. Two protestant churches, the Evangelical 
Church of New Caledonia and the Loyalties (Eglise Evangelique) and the Free Evangelical Church (Eglise 
Libre), cater for one-fifth of the population. Their members are almost entirely Melanesian. The protestant 
churches are completely indigenised and attentive to the social and political aspirations of Melanesians. The 
Catholic Church is indigenised only to a small extent and tends to remain aloof from social problems, hut 
stresses the importance of dialogue. 
The territory is typical of overseas French territories in having a highly dependent economy and a large 
tertiary sector. Exports, which consist almost entirely of partly refined nickel and nickel ore, cover about 
half the cost of imports. Half the territory's trade is with France. A quarter of its exports go to Japan hut 
trade with Pacific neighbours is minor. The trade deficit is made up by funds from France, chiefly grants 
to the territorial budget and expenditures for health, education and the mil itary and security forces, which 
accounts for about one-third of the gross domestic product. The administration, commerce and transport 
and services sectors contribu te three-quarters of the GDP. 
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J\lthough per capita GDP is one of the highest in the South Pacific, distribution is poor, Melanesian 
household revenues being on average only about a quarter of that of European households. The distribution 
of land on the mainland is very uneven. J\lthough 35,000 Melanesians l ive by cultivating the land, 
two-thirds of the land is in the hands of European famil ies, of whom only 1000 derive income from farming 
and barely 100 are engaged full-time in agriculture. Few Melanesians own businesses, are employed as 
executives or tradesmen or are members of the professions, areas of traditional European dominance. 
Among the official unemployed, they are twice as numerous as Europeans, a figure which neglects the 
many 'h idden' unemployed who have returned to their villages . 
The weathering of serpentine rock provides the territory with 40% of the world's known deposits of nickel 
ore, as well as chrome, cobalt, iron and magnesium. The export of nickel ore, which has been mined since 
1 875, and of partly refined nickel from the Societe Le Nickel foundry near Noumea, is subject to 
fluctuation. I lydroelcctric power from Yate provides nearly half of the territory's energy. 
Mining has caused enormous problems of soil erosion and stream pollution and has done little to improve 
rural l iving conditions. Local agricul tural products meet barely half the territory's needs. Commercial 
agriculture has not succeeded in spite of efforts to establish sugar cane, cotton, rice, coffee and copra. Cattle 
raising, however, has persisted since European settlement. The production of coffee and copra was kept 
going after the World War 2 chiefly by Melanesians, diversifying into the money economy, but little is now 
exported. Tourism is an industry of potential importance. Good roads ring the mainland and the larger 
islands and traverse the central mountain range. There are excellent facil ities for international and internal 
sea and air travel. 
The terri tory is fu lly integrated into the French Republ ic, is subject to its laws and sends parliamentary 
representatives to Paris. As an oversea<> territory, however, special legislation is required to introduce laws 
for the government of the territory and in areas such as education, health and labour laws. Powers such as 
defence, internal security, immigration, justice, telecommunications and secondary and tertiary education 
are retained by the national government and administered by the French High Commissioner. The 
admin istration of territorial powers, covering health, social security and internal transport and industry, 
infrastructure, etc. , are shared by the High Commissioner and locally elected representatives. 
Health and educational facil ities of a high standard are in principle available to all ,  but are of a higher 
standard in Noumea. The school system closely follows the syllabus of schools in France, and the progress 
of students of non-European origin tends to be slower than for children of French origin. Although all 
attend school, few non-Europeans gain higher qual ifications.  
Since the beginning of French settlement political debate among the white settlers has revolved around the 
rights of res idents to administer their own affairs without endangering the flow of French financial aid. 
Between 1 885 and 1956 a locally elected general council advised the governor and voted a local budget. 
Melanesians did not gain voting rights until 1 953 .  They then formed a coalition with Europeans to bring 
the party, L'Union Catedonienne, to power on a ticket of full self-government in local affairs. Progress 
towards self-government was made in 1957 when a Territorial Assembly was created with powers to elect 
an execu tive to admin ister the territory, under the presidency of a High Commissioner. In the 1 970s the 
Union Caledonienne became an increasingly Melanesian party as Europeans deserted it. In 1 979 the Union 
Caledonienne, now converted to the cause of independence, formed an Independence Front in coalition 
with several minority Melanesian parties . The French Social ist Government of 1981 took many steps to 
stem the pol itical polarisation, including the granting of complete self-government in territorial affairs in 
the Lemoine Statute of 1984. The statute was rejected by the Independence Front which reconstituted itself 
as the Kanak Socialist Liberation Front (FLNKS) and boycotted the elections held in that year. In the weeks 
following the election the FLNKS used roadblocks to take control of most of the territory outside Noumea. 
Peace was gradually restored as the Government proposed to grant the Melanesians independence in 
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association with France under which French citizens would retain residential and other rights. The 
European community, with the strong support of non-Melanesian ethnic groups v igorously rejected this 
proposal . 
In 1985 the French Government transferred most of the self-government powers to four regional councils. 
In elections in September 1985, the FLNKS won a majority of seats in all regions except Noumea which 
was won by the settler party, the Rassemblement pour la Caledonie dans la Republique (RPCR) . In 1986, 
the new Gaullist government of Jacques Chirac held a referendum. This referendum was boycotted by the 
FLNKS and produced a large majority for continued ties with France. It was followed by a new statute for 
self-government which altered the regional boundaries to l imit FLNKS successes to the principal 
concentrations of Melanesians in the Loyalty Islands and the East Coast. The FLNKS has demonstrated 
its ability to direct the votes of the great mass of Melanesian voters . The future of the territory is fraught 
with difficulty as the lack of consensus among pol itical circles in France is paralleled by the increasing 
polarisation along ethnic lines within the territory. 
* 
In the early 1 980s Ouvea was the setting for a film called 'The Closest Island to Paradise ' .  In the mid-80s, 
the yacht used by the French commandos who blew up the Rainbow Warrior carried its name. In the late-
80s, it was the scene of the bloodiest operation by a European army in the Pacific since World War Two. 
Today, the island of Ouvea is fast developing a reputation as the cannabis capital of the Pacific. Two-metre 
high hedges can be found as features in carefully tended gardens around people's houses. In the v illage of 
St Joseph, a healthy specimen thrives in a sunny, well-drained plot between the street counter of the local 
shop and the ancient logs that surround the courtyard of the high chief Nekelo. It is so widely consumed 
that after every rain, stray seeds germinate where they fal l  - in people's lawns, driveways or gardens - and 
often become sturdy plants before they attract their first human eye. 
In the rest of this French territory, cannabis is as illegal as in France. Possession of a single joint leads to 
arrest and a criminal conv iction. But on Ouvea the s ituation is so out of hand that the authorities merely 
hope to contain it by searching the bags of passengers arriving from Ouvea at Noumea airport. ' It could 
be cleaned up very quickly ' ,  insists the head of the Ouvea Gendarmerie, 'but I 'd need another whole 
platoon of gendarmes over here, and nobody wants that. ' New Caledonia's peace accord, which is eight 
years into its ten-year timetable, has always been at its most brittle in Ouvea. The gendarmes and their 
political masters in Noumea and in Paris are left with only two possible approaches - heavy-handed or easy­
going. They are choosing the latter. 
Memories of a Massacre 
Ouvea has the reputation, even among Kanak people, of being relaxed. There is, for example, no sign of 
any organised attempt to real ise the cash value of the island's cannabis. It's j ust there - l ike the fish, the 
coconut crabs and the beautiful scenery - and nobody seems to view it, as they do in other places, as money 
growing on trees. But its people have much that they are proud of. Among independentists ,  there is pride 
in Ouvea having been the first local body to elect a pro-independence mayor, Malaki Kapoa in 1977. Ouvea 
is also home to the only remaining part of the Kanak Popular School movement which thrives in the 
northern tribe of Gossannah. Models of development are emerging from this area which are independent, 
sustainable and community-based. And everyone from Ouvea knows that in 1 969 the first Kanak to pass 
his baccalaureat (the qual ification for tertiary study) was Boniface Ounou from Ouvea. 
However, the people of Ouvea will forever be haunted by the memories of 5 May 1988. In an action widely 
condemned as a cynical election stunt, the then Prime Minister and Presidential hopeful, Jacques Chirac, 
rejected a negotiated settlement to a hostage crisis on Ouvea and sent France's el ite 1 1  th Shock un it on an 
operation that left 19 Kanaks dead, at least five of whom were killed after they had surrendered. Dozens 
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of other innocent civilians were tortured during the two-week siege of the island during which all transport, 
telecommunication, rad io and telev ision l inks were cut. 
Within weeks, the newly elected Socialist Party government of Michel Rocard had brokered a deal between 
the leaders of the main pro-independence grouping. the Kanak Social ist National Liberation Front (FLNKS) 
and the largest right-wing party, Rally for Caledonia in the Republic (RPCR). The Matignon Accords, as 
they became known, set out a ten year plan for economic development and 'rebalancing', culminating on 
a referendum on independence in 1 998.  
The Accords were praised around the world for bringing peace to a context that was on the brink of all-out 
civil wear. However, they also generated considerable dissent and disillusion in the ranks of the Kanak 
independence movement, not least because they were signed without consultation with the movement and 
offered far less than iLc; agreed minimum demands. In Ouvea, reaction was particularly hostile. Despite their 
su ffering, nobody from Ouvea was invited to the talks . And part of the trade-off for an amnesty was that 
the events surrounding the massacre would not be fully investigated. 
When the Accords were put to the vote in a referendum in November 1 988, the French Government, the 
FLNKS and the RPCR all urged people to support the agreement and no pol itical party campaigned for a 
boycott. However, even though the FLNKS stressed the .Accords' promise of the release of Ouvea's 
political prisoners, Ouvea record an abstention rate of over 54 per cent of registered voters, the highest in 
the territory, with a further six percent voting No. 1 A number of the wives of prisoners did not vote and, 
on their eventual release, several of the prisoners expressed anger at having been used to settle an accord 
that they were not consulted about and did not agree with. 
This unresolved tension formed the background to the tragic events of May 1 989.  During a ceremony to 
mark the first anniversary of the Ouvea massacre, just metres from the graves of the 19 victims and in front 
of hundreds of people from al l over the territory, Djubelly Wea, a long-time leader of the independence 
movement in Ouvea, shot and killed Jean-Marie Tj ibaou and Yeiwene Yeiwene, the President and Vice-­
President of the FLNKS, and was then gunned down by Tj ibaou's bodyguards.  Wea went down in history 
as a crazed and heartless killer. Ouvea was condemned. 
Condemned and Excluded 
For the French au thorities, Ouvea has still not paid a high enough price for kill ing four gendarmes in 1988. 
Asked today about any problem on the island, Gendarme Charassier explains it in all seriousness as a case 
of divine retribution for the deaths of his predecessors . And for some within the independence movement 
who have spent the last seven years naming buildings, boats and sporting events after Tj ibaou and Yeiwene, 
Ouvea has still not paid a h igh enough price for producing their killer. 
In the initial years after s igning the Accords, French authorities subjected Ouvea to a concerted pol icy of 
isolation and deprivation of resources on the grounds that not all the weapons seized from the gendarmerie 
in 1988 had been retrieved. At the end of 1989, a large stock of arms was surrendered which might have 
improved th ings. However, by that time, conspiracy theories about Djubelly Wea's so-called network of 
accompl ices had been manufactured by French intell igence agents and were being spread with uncritical 
enthusiasm by many people including leading figures within the FLNKS.2 The ensu ing witch hunts took 
their tol l  on many indiv iduals and groups and were also generalised by some to include anyone from Ouvea. 
These tensions were also played out within Ouvea where the Caledonian Union (UC), a member party of 
the FLNKS wh ich favours the Accords, monopolised control over the allocation of French government 
money when it eventually became available, and of paid employment in the bureaucracy. 
For m any on Ouvea, the Accords have brought nothing at all. For those who were active in the 
independence movement, there is a high level of anger at seeing a handful of people, including a number 
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who were uninvolved in the movement, sitting in the provincial offices receiving salaries or driving cars 
owned by the provinces or getting financial handouts - all from the blood of the 19  people killed in the 
cave. Ouvea is not the only part of the territory where Kanak people feel shut out of the deal between the 
French Socialist Government, the settler business community and what many consider an unaccountable 
Kanak pol itical elite. However, the sense of bitterness and betrayal is probably at its most acute there and 
has given rise to some developments that might otherwise appear quite b izarre. 
In the 1 995 prov incial elections, for example, .Tasia Ihmel ing, one of the independence activists who had 
been taken prisoner after the attack on the cave, stood on the list of the anti-independence RPCR party. He 
was not elected and now, by some reports, has abandoned pol itics and joined a fundamentalist religious 
sect. Equal ly telling was the formation of a political group called ' Ouvea, the Excluded Ones ' .  It is led by 
prominent independence activ ists including a survivor of the 1988 massacre, Hilaire Dianou, whose 
brother, J\lphonse, led the operation in THC cave and was the one most conclusively proven to have been 
executed by the mil itary after h is arrest. The decision by 'Ouvea, the Excluded Ones ' to organise a 
campaign last year to support the presidential campaign of Jacques Chirac was widely recognised not as 
a serious attempt at influence but as a gesture of contempt for the way the island has been treated by the 
signatories to the Matignon Accords. 
Development Potential 
Ouvea is a 40 kilometre Jong atoll, the northern-most of the Loyalty Islands which lie east of mainland New 
Caledonia. It had been targeted by sandalwood hunters and Pacific ' 'blackbirders ' ,  whose activities were 
cited by France as grounds for annexation in 1865, twelve years after it claimed sovereignty over the 
mainland. Ouvea's Kanak population is made up of two language groups :  Iaai, the original Melanesian 
inhabitants; and Paga Ouvea, descendants of pre-colonial migrants from Wallis Island (the indigenous name 
for which is Ouvea) and other part.<> of Polynesia. The latest census records a population of 3,540, less than 
2% of whom are non-Kanak. i\ high birth-rate combined with migration to the island from other parts of 
New Caledonia saw Ouvea's population increase by 28% s ince the census six years earl ier. 
Not that there's any industry to attract people to or even retain them. There is copra, and there have been 
improvements in this sector with almost all product being processed locally in the new oil plant. However, 
it is stil l very hard work for returns that are low (less than 100 francs or US$ 1 per hour) and sporadic. 
There is no commercial fishing, although the island has the best fishery in the territory. It is free of la 
gratte (' the scratch '), an unpleasant s ickness that comes from eating fish from many other parts of New 
Caledonia. And it sports a lagoon which, from French Government surveys, could sustain annual harvests 
of many thousands of tonnes. It is also home to abundant land crabs, including the coconut crab (an 
endangered species in many parts of the Pacific) which can weigh four kilos and eats only coconuts which 
it breaks with its huge claw. 
Then there is tourism. International guide books have long placed Ouvea at the top of their 'must-sees ' in 
New Caledonia. Club Med has been trying for years to negotiate a site and market the tourist attractions : 
the spectacular cliffs of Lekine; deep blue water holes in Hanawa; the Moul i bridge which serves as a 
viewing platform for a natural aquarium of all kinds of sea life; the bagyine, a beautiful and unusual parrot 
found only in Ouvea; the stunning l imestone caves of Houloup whose depths have never been fully 
explored; and the pristine white-sand beach that runs the length of the island. 
However, the locals have made their feel ings clear about foreign-owned tourism. In the late 1970s, the 
Relais de Fayaoue which was the only large-scale tourist resort on the island was burnt to the ground by 
locals who were upset that virtually no benefits were going to the islanders. When the complex was rebuilt 
bigger and better in 1983, it was again destroyed within a couple of months of its grand opening. Today, 
the Relais de Faynoue is home only to a few goats, its ruins standing as a monument to Ouvea's resistance 
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to outside control .  
The island's current tourist industry consists of a few small-scale family enterprises. The islanders have a 
very relaxed attitude to their holidaying visitors . As one French tourist remarked : 'They don't mind if you 
come here, but they don't mind if you don't either. ' They do mind hearing so many tourists say that they 
were advised before leaving France to avoid Ouvea. Locals are quick to point out that, although there are 
occasional skirmishes with the gendarmes, they have no history of attacking tourists . In fact, tourists often 
comment on how easily they are befriended and brought along to local events . Even young conscripts 
fin ishing their military service are well-received, although the army does try to deter them from visiting the 
island by prov iding a free return ticket to Lifou or Mare but not Ouvea. As in so many other places, 
tourism in Ouvea comes at a price, for example, the effects of package tours of large groups of Japanese. 
Their day excursions three or four times each week benefit only two local operators but clog the planes for 
everyone. Locals wanting to travel to or from Noumea are now regularly finding that 43 out of 46 seats on 
the plane have been block booked months in advance for Japanese tourists .  
The net  result of th is sort of ' development'  is that, although there has been an increase in the amount of 
money coming into Ouvea, i t  i s  distributed very unequal ly and, in the perception of many, unfairly. The 
competition for paid employment and the lack of transparency in allocating these positions generates 
tensions such as the recent occupation of the airport at Houloup by the people from that tribe who insisted 
that their employment needs should be recognised. 
The growth of inequalities damages the fabric of society in Ouvea. Burglaries which had been rare are now 
becoming commonplace. Services which used to be offered freely in the knowledge that they would be 
reciprocated at some s tage by someone else, such as a ride to the post office or the loan of a mower. now 
command a price. As long as a large sector of society remains in severe poverty, show-piece developments 
l ike the new desalination plant will not address the real needs of the people. A common refrain about  the 
plant is that it is 'good for the people who can afford to buy the water from it ' .  These effects of 
' development '  are every bit as damaging as the hand-out mentality about which so many Kanak people 
have expressed fears .3 
The I m pact of the Matignon Accords  
As has been pointed out by a leading FLNKS figure, Raphael Mapou, the overall effect of the type of 
development promoted under the Matignon Accords is  that, rather than preparing the territory's economy 
for independence, it is locking it into a position of dependence. This, he argues, will l eave the country with 
shrinking options for economic development. 
I lowever, in the name of economic real ism, Kanak people are still being exhorted to follow this path. The 
UC has opted for development based on a market economy, as its president, Francois Burck, told the party's 
1 99 1  congress : 
We are conji·onted by a market economy. 'Wizen we say independence we place our country in a 
zone where there are rules. If we say no to the market economy, with what do we replace it? And 
if we say yes to the market economy, this assumes constraints.4 
Already, the ' constraints ' of this model of development are seen to promote a wide range of policies, some 
of which have serious pol itical implications. Immigration, for example, which was promoted by France in 
the 1 970s as an expressly political strategy, is now being promoted as a necessity for the fulfilment of the 
development aims of the Matignon Accords.  Call ing for more immigration from Europe of 'people who 
work well to teach people who don't know how to work' ,  the RPCR president, Jacques Lafleur, declared: 
' New Caledonia needs to increase its population to achieve economic growth . . .  This is a universal economic 
principle, not a trap to anyone. ' 5  
67 
Inl1uential people in the UC, including Leopold Joredie and Burck, have long indicated their readiness to 
abandon completely the agreed goal of Kanak social ist independence and any alternative development 
models which might be pursued within it. Burck knew that this would be opposed, not only within the 
FLNKS hut also hy his own party: 
If we (UC) announce tomorrow that we no longer support Kanak socialist independence there will 
be war, because no-one will agree. Our work is to bring people to be realistic, we have to be 
honest with them. For us it is not a question of Kanak independence, but of what sort of 
independence and is it possible. 6 
As part of this process, Burck even began talking about the dangers of the 1998 referendum refocusing 
attention hack on the choice: independence, yes or no? Rather, he argued, it should enable a continuation 
of the process that was begun by the Accords and serve as a 'ratification of this consensus'. 7• In the same 
vein he decl ared that his understanding of independence had 'evolved and is no longer taken as meaning 
a break with France but rather a partnership'8 
However, in April 1 996, FLNKS negotiators were s tunned to be told by the RPR Prime Minister, Alain 
.Juppe, that full independence would not be an option in the 1998 referendum and that the best they could  
hope for would be internal autonomy, a position rejected by most Kanak people twenty years earlier. This 
led to an FLNKS walk-out  of the talks in Paris . The FLNKS now favours the option of becoming an 
' associated state ' but, as its president. Rock Wamytan, made clear after the break-down of the talks, this 
s tatus presupposes a prior step of New Caledonia becoming an independent state.9 In response to these 
developmenl'>, a faction within the UC (led by Bernard Lepeu, Damien Yeiwene and Charl ie Pidjot) 
succeeded in having the party remove Joredie, Wamytan and Burck from its negotiating team, declaring 
that ' the chapter for a consensus solution has come to an end ' . 1 0 
Who is Win nin� the Bet? 
From the ou tset, Rocard was candid about the aim of  the Accords. He considered that they provided the 
framework for what he described as 'a veritable economic and cultural decolonisation without any change 
in (French) sovereignty ' .. Rocard bel ieved that at the end of ten years, Kanak people who had wanted 
independence would have come to an appreciation of the benefits of remaining a French territory. 'My 
dearest hope' he declared 'is that in 1998 the people of New Caledonia will choose to remain a part of 
France' . 1 1 •  
For his part, 'I:j ibaou bel ieved that with an unfavourable rapport de force h e  had to make a deal and h e  got 
what he believed was the best one possible in the circumstances. He also bel ieved that New Caledonian 
society was not ready for independence and needed time and the right conditions to construct it. He spoke 
of the Matignon Accords ac; a bet and was confident that, by 1998, the independence movement could win 
the referendum having convinced significant numbers of their opponents of the advantages of 
independence. 1 2 •  
'Ibe president of the Loyalty Islands Province and founder of the modern independence movement, Nidoish 
Naisseline, makes a similar point now, even though his party, Kanak Social ist Liberation (LKS) has 
formally withdrawn from the Matignon Accords. ' If the RPCR is not for independence, maybe it's our fault 
because we have not proven that independence is a gain. At the moment, we in the LKS say that the idea 
of independence is completely tarnished ' . 1 3 However, as one activist commented at the 1 992 FLNKS 
congress, 'We need to be careful that we do not make such a concerted effort to attract opponents of 
independence that we lose our own supporters. ' 
Th is sentiment is rel1ected in the more ' mobil is ing ' tone coming to the fore from elements within the 
FLNKS and its constituent parties. 14 However, people aspiring to provide the independence movement with 
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a more invigorated and m ilitant leadership need to be aware that, if  the degree of disillusion evident on 
Ouvea is any indication, it will take more than rhetoric to remobil ise the independence movement. 
On Ouvea, many people who had been very active in the independence movement now pay much less 
attention to what they perceive as the latest magouil/e (underhand pol itical deal) in Paris or Noumea than 
lo the football prospects of Christian Karembeu . 15 They remain committed to the idea of independence, but 
given their experience of the Matignon Accords, they fear what it might actually look l ike. People from 
Ouvea, who ten years ago were prepared to die for independence, are now far from sure that they will even 
cast a vote for it. 
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Reflections on Political Murder: 
New Caledonia 19841 
Bronwen Douglas, ANU 
At about 8.30p.m. on 5 December 1984 Lucien Kouhia nearly died. He was lucky. Bleeding profusely 
from numerous buckshot wounds, he staggered more than ten kilometres to sound the alarm about an 
ambush which killed ten of his fellow tribespeople. S ixteen men in two l ight trucks had been returning 
to their village of Tiendanite, in the upper Hienghene valley of north-eastern New Caledonia, from a 
local meeting of the FLNKS (Front de Liberation nationale kanak et socialiste - Kanak Socialist 
National Liberation Front). lb.ere they had been informed by Jean-Marie Tj ibaou, also from Tiendanite, 
leader of the FLNKS, President of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Kanaky and mayor 
of Hienghene, that the FLNKS had decided to moderate its recent anticolonial, pro-independence 
campaign of armed blockade and occupation. The campaign had followed a Kanak boycott of 
Territorial Assembly elections on 18 November, but now the FLNKS was to enter negotiations with 
the French Social ist Government on a strategy and timetable for independence. In return, seventeen 
FLNKS militants were to be released from custody. 
As the trucks rolled around a curve on the dirt road which winds beside the Hienghene river, they were 
brought to a sudden, shocking halt. A large coconut palm had been felled across the road below the 
house of Maurice Mitride, a part-French settler whose family had l ived in the district for a century or 
more. At th is point the road is overlooked by a fairly steep hill and is separated from the river by an 
open, gently sloping grassy bank about fifty metres wide. There is virtually no cover; from the vantage 
point of the hill it makes a perfect s ite for an ambush. As the leading vehicle skidded to a stop it 
exploded, apparently dynamited, and the other truck cannoned into it. In the glare of spotl ights and 
leaping flames from the burning truck, a murderous fusillade began, fired by expert hunters using high­
powered shotguns and rifles. Several men died instantly. Apparently determined to leave no witnesses, 
the attackers moved down to the killing ground to fin ish off the wounded. Lucien's uncle, Pascal 
Kouhia, with a bullet-hole the size of a fist in his right thigh, and Joseph Pei, struck in the foot, 
managed to rol l into the river beneath a clump of bamboo. They remained submerged, their noses above 
the surface while spotl ights swept the river and their attackers fired at anything moving in the water. 
Eventually Pascal and .Joseph swam across the river and crawled more than a kilometre to the nearest 
v illage. Lucien, badly wounded, sneaked away and set out for Hienghene v il lage, while  two others, 
more or less unhurt, hid until it was safe to escape on foot to Tiendanite. The dead and the dying, left 
for dead, remained . 
Alerted by Lucien, the French military doctor based at Hienghene made one ambulance trip to the scene 
of the ambush during the night and returned with two wounded and the wife of Mitride's settler 
neighbour, Henri Garnier, who claimed that her house had been burned in an FLNKS attack. In passing, 
however, the doctor noted that the Garnier house was intact. He dared not make another trip . The few 
men remaining at Tiendanite were also unable to reach their comrades because of the gunmen, but they 
kept an eye on the latter's movements. Gendarmes at Hienghene refused to leave  the village until the 
arrival next morning of heavily armed reinforcements. It was nearly midday on 6 December before 
medical attention reached the remaining v ictims. It was too late. During that lonely night some men 
died from blood loss and shock; one was still alive and able to testify, but died shortly afterwards .  
During much of 6 December mil itary helicopters performed a shuttle service, initially evacuating 
frightened settlers from llienghene, and eventually carrying dead and wounded to morgue and hospital 
in Noumfa Two of the dead, including the chief of the Tiendanite tribe,2 were brothers of Jean-Marie 
'lj ibaou. 'lj ibaou, however, refused to countenance violent reprisals by the FLNKS and announced that 
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he would not allow his personal loss to divert him from his commitment to defuse the crisis which had 
paralysed the territory since 18 November. 
Survivors claimed that between 15 and 18 people participated in the ambush, all local settlers . Several 
left soon afterwards for Noumea, but seven men, including Mitride and several members of the Lapetite 
fam ily, took to the bush . Portions of both the Mitride and Lapetite properties were subject to land 
claims by Tiendanite clans. After several days at large, these men surrendered and were charged. Before 
leaving the vicinity of the ambush they set fire to Garnier's house, to encourage the fiction that they had 
merely defended their properties against an FLNKS attack. While passing up the Hienghene valley they 
also fired Jean-Marie Tj ibaou's house. The Noumea media, notable for their pro-settler bias, would have 
liked to believe the sel f-defence story, but on-s ite evidence of the brutally systematic, the accounts of 
survivors and the doctor's report about the untouched state of the Garnier house made it obvious, even 
to the most prejudiced commentators, that 'there had been an ambush . . .  l ibations in common had 
preceded the fusillade'.3 
In Noumea, however, bastion of colonial occupation and opposition to Kanak independence, Mitride 
and the Lapetites assumed the status of v ictims or even heroes, and a committee was formed to fund 
their defence and support.4 Little mention was made of the plight of Kanak victims or of a tribe which 
had lost half its adult men; there was reference rather to the terrible provocation which settlers had 
endured from the FLNKS, justifying their fears. It was argued that such fears had produced an extreme, 
but understandable response, given the intolerable laxity of French authorities in refusing to crush the 
FLNKS campaign and restore law and order.5 
In a press conference the Public Prosecutor stressed the careful preparation and ruthless execution of 
the ambush . l ie attributed it, however, to 'metis [people of mixed descent] and even one Melanesian' .6 
At a stroke, he dismissed the aspect of racial conflict by implying that the whole thing was almost intra­
ethnic, between Melanesians; real white men would not act like that, whatever the provocation. The l ine 
was eagerly adopted by the local newspaper: ' it was a confrontation not of "white settl ers" and 
Melanesians, but of metis (some of whom have Bienghene blood) and activ ists of the FLNKS'.7 This 
in terpretation ignored the cul tural and pol itical self-identification of such people as European (many 
settler families in the bush are of mixed descent, not necessarily Melanesian - Mitride is part­
Reunionese) and their legal status :  they were subj ect to French common law only, and not to the 
separate colonial legal system of Melanesian custom; they also held individual land rights under the 
regis of the colonial state, rather than communal rights on the basis of custom. 
I low might the episode be interpreted? It speaks to wider issues and contexts in which it was 
embedded, while they, reciprocally, cast light upon i t. The episode exempl ified the wildly d ivergent 
ways in which Kanaks and settlers, whatever their ethnic origins, construct and experience reality. Key 
elements in th is spasm of settler violence were long-term apprehension about the relentless and 
effective demands by Kanaks for restitution of clan lands; hatred of the FLNKS and shock and 
confusion at its capacity to destabilise and control rural areas; a sense of desertion and betrayal by 
French authorities in Noumea and Paris. More generally, the episode contrasted the selective, 
controlled, intensely psychological - and all too convincing - v iolence of the FLNKS strategy with the 
readiness of at least some settlers to employ large and powerful arsenals with extreme brutal ity. 
Contrast the awesome self-control of Tj ibaou and the FLNKS after the Hienghene atrocity with the 
m indless rampage of destruction which paralysed Noumea on 1 1 -12  January 1985, following the 
shooting of a settler youth by agents unknown.8 
Both sides, inevitably, were convinced of their moral and historical legitimacy, but the settler leaders 
were far more intransigent and unresponsive than the Kanak. The settler world-view was reinforced 
by the relentless bias of the Noumea-based media and right-wing politicians both Territorial (including 
some Melanesians) and metropolitan. All insisted on the fiction that the FLNKS was a small, 
unrepresentative extremist minority, which manipulated the cowed, passive, pro-French Melanesian 
majority through force and intimidation and was itself subj ect to s in ister outside intluences.9 Even if 
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it were taken for granted that local newspaper and broadcast reports were always radically distorted, 
as d id FLNKS supporters, it was impossible to construct more plausible versions of events without 
access lo participants and eyewitnesses. I did have such access in the Tiendanite affair, but people 
normally had to choose either to believe or d isbelieve the media as a matter of principle. With such a 
narrow and distorted information base, rumour and wild exaggeration inevitably flourished. This 
applied especially to Europeans, most of whom l ived insulated in the artificially French context of 
Noumea and who, as the dominant ethnic group, had rarely needed to develop sensitivity to or 
understanding of Melanesian culture, motivations and aspirations. The latter were far less dependent 
for information on the printed and broadcast word and perforce had a fairly shrewd grasp of what made 
their oppressors tick; they, too, however, had their stereotypes of the other, sharpened by envy and 
resentment insp ired in historical experience as have-nots, marginalised in their own land. 
The increas ingly ambiguous position of French security forces was illustrated by the January 1985 
kill ing by gendarme sharpshooters of the FLNKS leader, Eloi Machoro, and his deputy; by an assault 
by gardes mobiles on FLNKS villagers at Thio in an episode involving blatant provocation by extreme 
right-wing elements from Noumea; by an escalating campaign of expropriation of FLNKS arms and 
arrest of Kanak activ ists, while settler arsenals were left untouched. This ambivalence was 
foreshadowed in the I lienghene affair : the tardiness of official efforts to succour the wounded 
contrasted sharply with their haste to evacuate nervous settlers and with the overwhelming military 
presence, protecting settler properties as well as mourners, during the funeral of the Tiendanite victims. 
From one perspective, the men ambushed were rank and file FLNKS members belonging to a small, 
ins ignificant, poverty-stricken tribe. In another sense, they had considerable political and symbolic 
significance : they were relatives and friends of Jean-Marie Tj ibaou, whose tribe Tiendanite was. His 
stoicism enhanced h is prestige and credibil ity and altered attitudes to the FLNKS, in Paris if not 
Noumea. Colonisation of the I lienghene valley was marked by violence and racial tension. Hienghene 
became a keystone of the Kanak drive to re-create a sense of cultural integrity, to reclaim lost clan lands 
and to gain pol itical independence. The customary high chief of the interior d istrict of which Tiendanite 
is part was one of the most respected customary supporters of the independence movement; he was 
married to a sister of one of the ambush victims. 
In the past, the single-minded determination of colonial administrations and settlers to crush Melanesian 
opposition eventually carried the day. But in every previous colonial war, a key element in French 
victory was indigenous political fragmentation and the readiness of some clans to fight as allies of the 
French for parochial reasons and against local enemies . In the indigenous world, there was no virtue 
in continuing a struggle when human and material costs seemed l ikely to be too high. Shifting all iances, 
negotiation, compromise, compensation and peace-making were as integral to fighting as armed clashes. 
By the mid 1980s, though not all Melanesians concurred with the strategy and methods of the FLNKS, 
local political fragmentation was far less marked. Furthermore, the indigenous logic which made 
surrender the only sensible policy in face of the implacable European repression was less convincing. 
Many young people, d ispossessed, unemployed, lacking skills or training, or unable to penetrate 
colonial structures of domination and socio-economic control, were no longer satisfied or constrained 
by the compensations and discipline of customary values and social contexts . The tragedy was that 
things had come to a point where both local sides in this classic French colonial confrontation felt they 
had their backs to the wall .  Between them, in uneasy, ambiguous neutral ity, was the French Socialist 
Government and the potentially overwhelming power of the security forces. Writing in 1985, I 
expressed concern that, should the FLNKS program of psychological pressure and selective activ ism 
prove insufficient, as seemed l ikely, or should anything happen to Tjibaou, who combined political 
astu teness with profound commitment to a customary ideology, there was no reason to believe that 
Kanaks would be unwilling to engage in a sustained campaign to achieve their ends by whatever means 
and whatever the costs .  
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Postscri pt 1 997 
The French judicial system eventually served the seven admitted killers wel l :  after nearly three years 
of tortuous procedures, during which they almost escaped prosecution altogether, a mostly white, 
entirely non-indigenous jury acquitted them of premeditated ambush, on the grounds of legitimate self­
defence. The decision outraged Kanaks, and the victims' families appealed to the European Court of 
Human Rights for a retrial. Six months later, w ith the Territory embroiled in virtual civil war - as 
recalled in David Small's paper - a more summary j ustice overtook one of the seven, who was shot and 
killed, apparently by Kanaks. 1 0 Small's paper testifies chillingly that if the forebodings of my conclusion 
were not fulfilled to the letter, neither were they misplaced. What has happened in New Caledonia in 
th e 1990s attests to the inadequacy of b inary models of colonised reactions which cast violence and 
non-violence as polar opposites and privilege the former as more courageous and romantic. Violence 
and non-violence are more aptly identified as reiterated, intertwined motifs in Kanak agency and 
experience in colonial contexts : they are two s ides of a strategic coin which may have other possible 
faces . 
1 .  This i s  a slight ly amended version o f  an article published i n  Arena (70 [ 1 985) :21 -6). M y  narrative is 
based on conversations during and after the victims' funeral with Vianney Tjibaou, who escaped the massacre, 
and other men of the t ribe of Tiendanite, plus lengthy discussions with survivors in Noumea. See also Nouvelles 
caledon iennes, 7 December 1 984; an account by Helen Fraser and Damien Murphy in the Melbourne Age, 10 
December 1 984, based on an  interview with Vianney Tjibaou; Lionel Duroy, Hienghene, le desespoit 
caledonien, Paris 1 988 .  For recent polit ical background and the aims and strategies of t he FLNKS see Miriam 
Dornoy, Politics in New Caledon ia, Sydney, 1 984; Helen Fraser, Your Flag's Blocking Our Sun, ABC, Sydney, 
1 990; Jean-Marie Tj ibaou, La presence kanak, (ed . Alban Bensa and Eric Wittersheim, P aris, 1 996 .  
2. Tribe' is  used in its technical New Caledonian sense, to mean a unit in a colonial administrative 
hierarchy: a ' t ribe', tribu, occupies a 'reserve' within a 'district' . 
3. Public Prosecutor, press conference, Nouvelles caledoniennes, 1 1  December 1 984 
4. NouFelles caledoniennes, 15, 21 December 1 984. 
5 .  E.g. ,  interview with M. Mit ride ,  Nouvelles caledoniennes, 1 1  December 1 984; press conference of 
Maitre Chatenay, l awyer for the defendants, Nouvelles caledoniennes, 22 December 1 984 
6 .  Nouvelles caledoniennes, 1 1  December 1 984 . 
7. Nouvelles caledoniennes, 10,  22 December 1 984. 
8. Nouvelles caledoniennes, 1 2- 13 ,  14 J anuary 1 985 . 
9. Nouvelles caledoniennes, 24 November, 9 December 1 984, 1 2-13 J anuary 1 985; interview with M.  
David , Herald (Melbourne), 30 January 1 9 85 
10 .  Pacific Islands Monthly, June 1 988, 1 3 .  
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Decolonisation : the H ighest Form of Imperial ism 
G len n Petersen , Baruch College, City University of New York 
Three years ago I described striking contradictions between the United States and Micronesian 
positions regarding Micronesian independence: Micronesians were justified in proclaiming their 
independence, but the US had no equivalent right to speak of acknowledging Micronesians' 
independence, given its unwillingness to revise the Compacts of Free Association that impart to 
relations with Micronesians a status less than treaty arrangements between sovereign nation-states . 1 
I now propose an altered contention : in the ' logic' of imperial geopol itical expansionism, 
decolonisation tends to be no more than a stage in the processes of influence, acquisition, 
transformation, and withdrawal that constitute the imperial paradigm. Questions about the 
substance and character of Micronesian independence, then, are too narrow. The larger issue is 
whether decolonisation impl ies a real d iminution of the imperial web or merely further movement 
along trajectories of domestic ambivalence about the imperial idea itself and a range of attempts at 
reducing the costs of managing an empire. 
America's post-war presence in Micronesia should be viewed as an outcome of several historical 
and geopol itical trajectories, one of which, the Cold War, looms so large that it obscures the others. 
S ince the Cold War, the American capacity to examine coherently the situation of island groups in 
Micronesia, has attenuated to a new low. I hope to set the Cold War aside and examine the US 
position in Micronesia in light of longer-term patterns : the history of colonial and imperial 
expansion in general, the history of American expansion in particular, and Micronesians' own 
readings of world history. 
Colonialism and imperial ism are outcomes of competing social, cultural, economic, and political 
factors that promote not only expansion and dominion but efficiency and compassion, and 
decolonisation is thus an expectable - if not invariable - outcome, a sign not of an empire's retreat 
but of vital ity. I attempt to inject material into a conversation from which it has been sadly lacking. 
Im perialism as a very old phenomenon 
Pol itical scientists, historians (and fellow-travelling social scientists) have debated the origins and 
causes of imperial ism as if it were a unique and definable process with its sources in the fifteenth 
century and its zenith in the late Victorian age. Nothing could be further from the truth. Territorial 
expansion has been a fundamental aspect of human behav iour since the Paleolithic. Colonies, 
incorporation of indigenous populations, and extension of integrative administrative practices 
played a key role in the development of many early states, and operated even where there were no 
central ized states. We find records of these sorts of expansionism in many parts of Asia, Africa, 
Europe and the Mediterranean, Meso-America, and South America. 
The notion that the 'world system' is an essentially modern entity is a part of this outlook. As Abu­
Lughod, Blaut, and Frank and Gills, among others, have demonstrated,2 the rise of the West appears 
as an historical rupture - a development without precedent - only in the West. In most cases of 
expansion a variety of interactions, influences, and domination have mingled. If we trace 
intellectual traditions so important to Western humanist and political thought, we recall that 
classical Greece flourished as an expanding, colonial civil isation. These practices were, of course, 
hardly limited to Europeans. The Arab domain was, for example, founded by means of 'desert 
power' in the way that modern empires were forged via sea power. These same Arab regimes were 
in time replaced by Mongols and Turks and Crusaders before the Portuguese and French and British 
empires appeared. The British Isles themselves were colonised by Celts, as well as Romans, 
Germans, Scandinavians, and Norman French. English occupation of Wales, Scotland, and Ireland 
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presaged imperial expansion into what may be cal led the British far abroad. Indeed, much of 
Enl ightenment interest in classical Hellenism stemmed from a desire to learn from Greek imperial 
precedents .  In the later eighteenth century this topic ' received special attention owing to the 
conflict between Britain and her American colonies. Many pamphlets were written both in French 
and Engl ish with the aim of finding justification in the practices of the ancients' .3 
The d isintegration of em pires 
Rather than m arshall historical examples, I employ a model of imperial disintegration developed in 
D.W. Meinig ' s  classic The Shaping ofAmerica.4 His model is especial ly relevant here because he 
generates it via the disintegration of the British Empire in the 13 North American colonies, which 
reproduced the process in the course of their westward expansion. 
An imperial state, in Meinig's formulation, comprises a capital, a core, and a ' domain'. There are 
three basic sorts of imperial territories outside the domestic realm: areas of conquered people under 
d irect rule; areas colonised by settlers from the conquering state; and marginal areas under various 
forms of indirect rule ('protectorates'). In these territories there are capitals and hinterlands, 
m irroring in some degree relations between the capital and core at home, and often marginal areas 
under some degree of influence. What Meinig calls a ' trunk line' links the metropolitan and 
colonial capitals, transporting the influences and agents that establish and maintain relations of 
dominance and subordination . In order to promote efficient administration, the metropole seeks a 
degree of uniformity, or at least conformity, in institutions, values, language etc. ,  as the standards of 
the empire. At the same time conquered peoples struggle to preserve their cultural integrity and 
political autonomy as best they can. There are significant d ifferences in the degrees to which 
individuals and communities seek or resist change, and the imperial power encourages those more 
inclined to pursue change to serve as its agents; increasingly strong l inks between the metropole and 
colony are forged by colonial subjects engaged in accul turation. Tension between ass imilationists 
and autonomists is likely to increase as their interests d iverge. Because empires rely upon force as 
their u l timate sanction, and therefore need to appear strong, force is appl ied to confront and control 
these rising tensions. These sanctions in turn threaten those committed to challenging the 
metropolitan power, and they in turn promote identity politics and sol idarity movements in order to 
unify and mobil ise the provincial population in effective resistance. 
Meinig points to three main sources of imperial collapse: revolts at the periphery; internal collapse 
of a weakened centre; and dismemberment following defeat by a rival empire. As consequences of 
the cycles of resistance, empires tend to come apart at the seams: subordinate peoples have forged 
many positive ties to their territorial capitals, as the points of l inkage with the imperial centre, and 
many sorts of local identities as modes of resistance; together these foreshadowings of integration 
lead to formation of successor states. In any mature empire, Meinig emphasizes, revolt is most 
l ikely to be in itiated by those who are most acquainted with the imperial system, those who have 
accul turated to some degree, who recognise the possibil ities for transformation, and who can 
mobilise local populations. Resistance to imperialism thus begets nationalism; leaders who have 
been schooled in the promotion and administration of empire turn these skills to its d ismemberment. 
For these reasons, revolts are l ikely to begin in provincial capitals and spread to hinterlands : the 
most critical points in imperial systems are, then, the provincial termini of the imperial trunk l ines. 
The longer the trunk l ine the more difficult it is for the centre to enforce its rule, and revolts are 
prone to increase in frequency or intensity. In time the provincial cul ture comes to be seen as the 
standard and imperial influences as corrupting. Out of this sequence there forms a new axis and an 
emerging successor state which, given the opportunity, is in position to begin anew the formation of 
centre, core and domain and the processes of expansion. 
Three immediate lessons can be gleaned from this model . One is the sense of repetitive motion that 
imperial relations impart. Empires do not randomly evolve and disappear, but the processes that 
promote the rendering of one give impetus to the expansion of another. Decolonisation has the 
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potential, then, to beget colonialism; it is a stage in an imperial sequence, not a culmination. 
Second, there are l ikely to be highly competent and effective forces in the colonies themselves 
promoting continued integration with the metropole; they frequently seek to preserve the empire. 
Th ird is an appreciation of the mixed motives and interests out of which is spawned a pattern that 
becomes clear only in hindsight. The interests and actions of governments, commercial sectors, and 
missionary organisations, to name only those salient in the present context, lead to both cooperation 
and opposition, assimilation and nativism, and many other clashes of countervailing tendencies. 
Empires can be both self-perpetuating and self-destructive s imultaneously. This paradox underlies 
the history of American expansionism. 
Historicising American colonialism 
Bernard Bailyn demonstrated in The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution5 that much of 
what North America's rebel colonists claimed to be doing was reasserting their rights to govern 
themselves as freeborn Englishmen - they explicitly construed their movement as conservative, and 
drew upon trad ition to support their cause. It is easy to grasp Meinig's sense of the ways in which 
provincial knowledge of the colonial centre's mores can be used to assert not merely equality with 
the metropole, but moral superiority on the metropole's own terms. The severing of d irect 
administrative ties is pursued and rationalised on the grounds that the colonial population can do 
traditional things at least as well as the home population.  
The French and Indian War (1756-63) was, among other things, about who would control 
expansion west from the thirteen American colonies . Draper argues that the American Revolution 
came about as a consequence of the British victory in that prior struggle: with the French presence 
no longer an issue, the British sought to close off the west, attempting to halt expansion and 
preclude further confl icts with Native Americans.6 The intense interest of the colonists in 
expansion drove much of the new republic's policy. Sales and exploitation of western lands were 
expected to finance much of the new country's debt servicing. Under the Articles of Confederation 
(wh ich united the former colonies between the outbreak of the Revolution and ratification of the 
Constitu tion), a series of land ordinances regulating the Ohio River Valley and adjacent areas were 
promulgated, culminating in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. These measures were put into 
effect before the United States came into existence; yet they established fundamental policies -
colon ial practices - that would guide all future American expansion. American colonial policy, 
then, is a product of the Americans' own colonial h istory as much as a consequence of the situations 
that evolved during the nineteenth-century expansiont. 
The Northwest Ordinance and the new colonies 
As Peter Onuf explains, the U.S.  Congress was merely following British precedent 'when it 
construed itself as the sovereign and then set about establishing and chartering "colonies" in the 
western lands. These new entities would have to recapitulate their predecessors' colonial history in 
order to become their equals  in the new union. '7 As they looked west, however, the Americans 
confronted the same problems that had prompted the British to resist further expansion. 
Ambivalence marked the American outlook. Many feared that continued movement into the west 
would destroy the union; George Washington thought it would promote disunion, a premonition 
that characterised much later opposition to expansion. The new government wanted to raise 
revenues and avoid costs, but soon recognized that industrious settlers would enter the area only  if it 
was effectively governed. As they convinced themselves that they had to impose congressional 
controls in the Northwest Territory, leaders in  Congress sought to ensure that these lands would not 
be under its perpetual authority, even as they worked to guarantee congressional control over the 
population requirements that would eventually permit transition to statehood. Their solution was 
explicitly ' colonial ' :  the United States would establ ish colonies administered by the national 
government but which would in time become self-governing, equal partners in the union. The 
notion of ' territories' that were distinctly not ' states' had been evolved. Territories were proffered 
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the right to eventual statehood, but this status was deemed irrelevant for initial settlement; local 
autonomy and democracy were seen as threats to the good order that was necessary to entice 
settlers. 
No sooner was settlement underway, however, than the pioneers began l evelling charges of 
colonialism against the national government, consciously employing the rhetoric of the Revolution. 
In demanding an end to the 'colonial yoke', various settlers claimed that their status was one of 
bondage, vassalage, and even slavery. They l ikened the rule of the American federal government to 
a 'British & princely' imposition, 'better suited', as one of them wrote in 1801, 'for an English or 
Spanish colony than for citizens of the United States . '  
In defense of  his pol icies, the governor of this Northwest ' colony' called attention to its ' infant 
situation' . Because of their pol itical incompetency, the residents of the Northwest Territory were, 
he said, ' subjects', not ' true American citizens', l ikening the Northwest Ordinance to the old royal 
charters issued to the original colonies . In time, attainment of statehood would redeem their 
' temporary colonial condition' . Meantime, however, they must pass through stages of development, 
evolving gradually toward political maturity. 
Onuf emphasises ' the often contradictory character of the principles on which the American 
territorial system was founded'. The conflict l ay between the rights the new states claimed and the 
au thority of Congress - the constitutional limits of national authority were, he suggests, 
'unresolvable', grounded as they were in 'confl icting interests and contradictory principles' . Indeed, 
use of the term 'colony' exemplified the 'chronic ambivalence' of the territories toward the national 
government. These relations were full of ' ambiguities and contradictions . . . .  rooted in the 
fundamental dilemma of territorial constitutional ism: how could the territories, as political 
com munities, claim " rights " if Congress was sovereign and its authority unlimited?' .  This 
' conceptual muddle' laid down the template for the rest of American colonial history. The 
fundamental contradictions, strange as it may seem, 
provided eloquent testimony to the nearly universal support for the constitutional ideal that 
had guided the American territorial system since its founding. Territories would not be 
held in pe1petual dependency but could look forward to statehood and membership in the 
union. 8 
The Land Ordinance of 1785 and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 ultimately proved ' a  blueprint 
for future communities'. 
This American ideal, embedded in a struggle to decide whether power would be located with a 
sovereign people in the territories or with a sovereign congress, was never resolved. American 
citizens in the territories were capable of acquiring sovereignty from congress only after they 
acknowledged congress's authority to bestow statehood. As long as these colonies were populated 
by American citizens upon whom congress could count to participate in the national political 
community in predictable, partisan ways, congress was willing to make this transfer of authority. 
But when the US expanded into Mexico and the far west, and then into the Caribbean and Pacific, 
problems arose: how could brown-skinned, Spanish or Austronesian speaking peoples ever be 
expected to mature out of pol itical infancy through the stages of development into maturity? This 
d il emma, not the question of territorial authority itself, would shape American colonial expansion, 
and explain the course of American decolonisation .  
The Northwest Ordinance appl ied historical l essons to a developing problem on the frontier, and 
establ ished a pattern for all American expansion. I t  provided Americans with a new way to 
conceptualise expansion :  first would come settlement and then development, and only afterwards 
would an autonomous pol itical status be achieved. 
77 
Manifest Destiny: from the old Northwest to the n ew Far West 
Americans have almost always hailed themselves as anti-colonialists, citing their own struggles for 
independence as their charter. But in puzzling out the problem of how to move westward into lands 
still occupied by Native Americans and therefore deemed threatening, the US simply stood on 
precedent: it recapitulated its own colonial experience, expl icitly creating colonies that would have 
to l ive up to mandated expectations in order to receive the same rights of self-government as the 
original thirteen. Later, when the US occupied areas where there resided people who had their own 
historical, cultural, and pol itical precedents, this strategy would prove to have unforeseen 
impl ications. Moreover, the US would turn a blind eye to its colonial heritage, enabl ing itself to 
deny that any of its territorial acquisitions were colonies. Because the US had, by its own account, 
no colonies, it did not need to - indeed, could not - decolonise. The roots of American 
decolon isation l ie in its own experiences as colonies and its recycling of that inheritance to extend 
across the continent. 
Critical to westward movement was Indian removal .  Early American theories of expansion 
depended upon vast tracts available to settlers whose investment in improvements would ensure 
relative equal ity among all Americans .  This was Thomas Jefferson's notion of an ' empire of 
l iberty' : class distinctions and tensions that afflicted Old World societies could  be avoided in the 
New World as long as there was free l and to support yeoman farmers. But most proponents of 
expansion, having seen the destruction of Native American populations along the eastern seaboard, 
could foresee no place in these schemes for the native inhabitants of the west. Anglo-American 
prosperity would not be nearly as inclusive as it conceived itself to be, and the concept of 'Manifest 
Destiny' was, among other things, a means of rationalising this disastrous policy. 'Destinarian' 
thought drew upon a wide range of beliefs to trumpet a moral basis for ethnic cleansing. It became 
increas ingly important to the westward course of empire as it approached independent Mexico. 
Indians, it seemed, could be removed, but what about Mexican peasants? 
Intense argument accompanied the war in Mexico. The war did not  erupt suddenly; it was a 
consequence of a series of movements that gradually incorporated the Louisiana Territory, the 
Floridas and Texas, and entailed nearly continual speculation about the advantages and possibil ities 
of absorbing Caribbean islands. Opposition to the war was as clearly articulated as agitation in its 
favour. Two aspects of the debate are sal ient here. First, much opposition to the war and 
acqu isition of Mexican territory turned on the question of whether the land could be absorbed 
withou t incorporating its inhabitants. Precisely because previous westward expansion had 
deliberately destroyed or removed (and in its rhetoric ignored) the Native American populations and 
there was l ittle of what we now call multiculturalism, there was considerable d isagreement about 
whether Mexicans were capable of earning citizenship. 
John Calhoun, a long-serving senator, argued that the US had never considered including anyone 
within the union but ' Caucasians', so that it would be a fatal error to allow Mexicans and Mexican 
Indians to become the political equals of whites. These people, Calhoun insisted, were not even the 
equals of the native Cherokee and Choctaw whom the US had already driven into exile. None but 
the most advanced people were capable of maintaining free government. Calhoun's perspective was 
widely shared; it represents one of the most - perhaps the most - carefully and forcefully articulated 
arguments in opposition to American expansion throughout the nineteenth century.9 
While asserting that the U.S.  was not in quest of new territories, President Polk did reserve the right 
to acqu ire California as indemnification. John O'Sullivan, who coined the ' Manifest Destiny' 
phrase and is regarded as its chief spokesman, expounded in 1845, before the war, upon ' things this 
nation will never do. It will never be the forcible subjector of other countries; i t  wil l  never despoil 
surrounding territories . . . .  ' Then he immediately changed his tune, arguing in May 1846, shortly 
after the onset of war, that the US had been forced by Mexican outrages to waste ' l ife and treasure' 
there : how would it reclaim that treasure? California would in time become American anyway, and 
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it was only meet that ' We therefore insist upon the immediate acquisition of Califomia'; the 
expansionist press echoed his sentiment. But these same editors then realized that California ports 
would be of l i ttle use without easy overland access, and thus O'Sullivan soon proposed that all of 
northern Mexico be annexed in order to provide a direct route. Even as opponents of the war were 
levelling charges that penetration of Mexico was indeed intended as a war of conquest, O'Sull ivan 
would insist, in July, that 'Noth ing upon earth, or above or below earth, can be farther from the 
genius and principles of this Republ ic than the acquisition of territory by military conquest. ' The 
overwhelm ing contradiction in these points was resolved by a widely shared assumption that the 
Mexican people would eagerly seek to become part of the US. Even Walt Whitman opined that the 
Mexicans 'won't need a long coaxing to join the United States' . 10 
At the same time critics marshalled opposition to the War. William Henry Channing, a preacher 
and editor who had attacked America's ' savage robberies of the Indians', levelled his sights during 
the war at the aim of ' the leaders and instigators of this infamous business, to extend the "area of 
freedom" to the shores of Cal ifornia by robbing Mexico of another large mass of her territory [in 
addition to Texas] ' .  Theodore Parker, a colleague of Ralph Waldo Emerson, described the war as 
' mean and wicked', the logical progression of the ' history of the Anglo-Saxon, [which] for the last 
three hundred years, has been one of continual aggression, invasion, and extermination'. The war's 
proponents countered by hailing the conquest's humanitarian character. Stephanson draws 
attention, for example, to the American Whig Review, which supported the ' morally correct 
purchase of Alta Cal ifornia in the name of humanity'. 1 1 
There was continual counterpoint between advocates and opponents of expansion, contesting the 
same moral ground. Some bel ieved a continental (or ' large') policy of expansion to the Pacific (and 
even to the Arctic and Panama) served not only American interests but was indeed its ' destiny', 
mandated by its moral ly superior place in the world's scheme of things. Others (usually drawing on 
variants of the ' small republ ic' argument) believed it was neither in the country's material nor 
spiritual interests to do so. Will iam Seward, who served as Secretary of State, embodied some of 
these contradictions. Singing the praises of commercial expansion, he spoke of establishing ' the 
ul timate empire of the ocean' and pushed for a pol icy of attraction rather than subjugation . ' Since 
he was convinced that the decisive area of future commercial competition lay in Asia, the 
acqu isition of I lawai' i made sense, as did the projection of an isthmian canal and, less obviously, 
the purchase of J\laska. ' Yet he was equally capable of criticising a 'growing passion for territorial 
aggrandizement' because it led to 'gross disregard for justice and humanity'. 12 
Arguments about the humanitarian virtues of expansion appeared to lead the way during the next 
major burst of acquisitiveness, when the Spanish-American War came to a head in 1898. President 
McKinley ignored Spanish attempts to settle  on largely American terms, when he determined that 
he was facing ' an immensely popular war because it was experienced as a humanitarian effort'. And 
Theodore Roosevelt's ideal of an American empire as the triumph of civil ization required that 
' "waste spaces " . . .  be used in the interest of humanity'. 1 3  
The coupling of 'waste spaces' or as most thinkers from Jefferson to Frederick Jackson Turner 
phrased it, 'open land', with humanitarian motives seems to capture much of the dynamic of 
American expansion from the arrival of the first British colonists until at least the American 
occupation of Micronesia. Perry Miller's seminal account of the Pilgrim settlements draws its title, 
Errand into the Wilderness, from the sermon of a puritan divine and explores the import of both 
terms: the wilderness the Europeans take the new world to be and their self-appointed task of 
redeeming it. At every stage of westward movement the same arguments are mobil ised. The 
territory before them is under- or inadequately used and its inhabitants can only be made to use it 
properly if they are transformed into clones of Euro-Americans .  The principle debate has been 
whether they are capable of being so transformed or should be shouldered aside. Expansion into 
the trans-Appalachian frontier, the Spanish and French border lands, and, ultimately into the 
Caribbean and Pacific has consistently been organized around these themes and debates . 14 
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The international humanitarianism of missionary activity has always played an eminent role in 
American l ife. The American Board of Commissioners for the Foreign Missions sent its people to 
many Native American populations in the south and west as well as to Hawai'i and Micronesia, and 
many parts of Asia. According to Stephanson, 'Christian missionaries were the one consistently 
" expansionist" feature of American foreign relations after the Civil War; there were boundaries to 
be crossed and spaces to be conquered. '  Moreover, the more d istant acquisitions 'were populated 
by large numbers of people not easily imagined as future Americans . . . .  A class ification had to be 
found for nearly perpetual inferiority, and thus the delicate subject of colonial ism was raised'. 1 5  It 
was at this juncture that Kipling was moved to counsel America to take up the 'White Man's 
Burden'. 
Into the Pacific 
The US moved into the Pacific as part of a course of action it had found successful for generations. 
Americans had been pursuing the China trade from before independence, and the government had 
sent expeditions to the West Coast and the insular Pacific repeatedly. By the Guano /\et, Congress 
had asserted an American right to claim islands as it saw fit and to back up these claims with 
military force. 1 6  I lawai'i had been eyed as port and colony for much of the nineteenth century, and 
when American missions there were well-establ ished it was they who pushed forward into 
Micronesia. By the 1 890s, along with propounding the Open Door policy (to assure American 
commerce equal access to China via a laissez faire internationalism), came well-developed designs 
on Manila's harbour as a way station providing access to all East Asia. 
Theodore Roosevel t, as Assistant Navy Secretary, had Admiral Dewey steaming for Manila even 
before the US had decided to declare war on Spain over Cuba. He was acting on the strategic d icta 
of his friend and mentor, J\lfred Thayer Mahan (America's greatest geopolitician and theorist of sea 
power), who was clear about the need for American outposts, and colonies to provision and support 
them, in every region where commerce would require American control of the seas. After the 
capture of Manila, Mahan and Roosevelt, among a host of others, were insistent upon acqu iring all 
the Philippines; Whitelaw Reid, a member of the U.S .  commission sent to Europe to negotiate the 
settlement with Spain, wrote excitedly of this new outpost ' directly in front of the Chinese 
Colossus, on a great territory of our own. '  The US, he exclaimed, now commands ' the ocean that 
according to the old prediction, is to bear the bulk of the world's commerce in the twentieth 
century' . 1 7 Yet prominent anti-imperialists such as Carl Schurz, former senator, Interior Secretary, 
and editor, would continue to insist that annexation of populated territories abroad could  not be 
made consonant with American values : ' the United States, in order to preserve its basic nature, 
could not take in territories as dominions but only as full members to be; but if one did bring such 
al ien spaces and populations in as full members, the essential character of the country would change 
anyway. '  Others marshalled arguments opposing any move to annex the Philippines, including 
observations that they would prove strategically more costly  than any benefits they might render, 
that the US had 'no bureaucratic machinery to deal with colonial peoples', and that 'Americans had 
a very bad record taking care of wards domestically, as evidenced by blacks and Indians'. 1 8  These 
would prove to be tell ing, even prescient, observations. 
J\s it turned out, the Philippines, l ike Cuba, were occupied long enough for the US to put into place 
institutions guaranteeing American suzerainty without social or political integration. A more 
press ing question in the current context is why only Guam was acqu ired along with the Phil ippines, 
when inclusion of all the Marianas and Carolines was being called for in the American press and 
was certainly among the prerogatives the US considered. 19 
Decolonisation in Micronesia has progressed as a consequence of these arguments, but 
decolonisation is merely a solution to the problem of reconciling tensions so that all American 
interests - strategic, commercial and humanitarian - are equally served: those peoples who cannot be 
fu lly assimilated must be set free, but precisely because they are deemed incapable of being 
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assim ilated they are incapable of coherently  governing themselves. They may be granted manifest 
or cosmetic au tonomy, but as with government under the Pratt Amendment, which transferred 
government to the Cubans, autonomy was only possible as long as there were constitutional 
safeguards preventing it from being acted upon if such acts in any way adversely confronted 
American interests or policies . As Jamaica Kincaid points out, the American nation-state continues 
to profit from its excurs ions into and appropriations of other people's lands and resources, no matter 
what domestic protesl<; are levelled against them.20 
Acqu iring Micronesia 
Earl Pomeroy's Pacific Outpost is the most convincing account of the factors and events leading to 
the decision not to acquire the rest of the Marianas and the Carolines (the remainder of Spain's 
western Pacific territories) when it annexed the Philippines and Guam. As he points out, the issue 
of principle interest to the American public and its political leadership during the peace settlement 
of 1 898 'was not whether the Marianas and Carol ines should be annexed as well as the Philippines, 
but rather which, if any, of the Philippines themselves'.21 For coaling and cable stations, naval 
leaders contemplated various of the Carol ines and Marianas, especially Guam. Commander 
Stockton, who had spent time in Micronesia, described the Marianas as ' stepping stones . . . .  five days 
easy steaming from all ports of Japan, Korea, Shanghai and Hong Kong'.22 Commander Bradford, 
whom the navy detailed to Paris to advise the American peace commission, explained to them that 
the Carol ines would be especially dangerous in unfriendly hands. The Naval War Board concluded, 
however, that a station in Guam would suffice, 'for naval stations, being points for attack and 
defense, should not he multiplied beyond the strictly necessary'.23 Others have attributed this retreat 
to Mahan's ' fear of overcommitment'.24 While the subsequent German occupation of Micronesia 
was immediately described as ' an intentional, deliberate menace to the United States', Mahan 
himself responded in 1904 that he ' refused a suggestion to use my supposed influence against 
[German] acquis ition of the Carolines, etc. ; but [now] her ambitions threaten us as well as Great 
Britain'.25 Mahan had consistently seen the problem of reconciling the imperative of concentrating 
one's forces with the necess ity of maintaining overseas stations :  he came to believe he had erred in 
deciding that annexation would stretch American naval forces too thinly. As a consequence, 
Theodore Roosevelt would describe the American position in the Philippines as the country's 
Achilles Heel, too far forward and cut off from Hawai' i by foreign occupied territory, to be properly 
dcfensible .26 
Nonetheless, there were significant demands for annexation of the rest of Micronesia, from 
politicians and missionaries, which Pomeroy describes as having had at least as much impact as 
naval interests. One influential editorial of June 1898 pronounced it ' our imperative duty to tum 
the Spaniards out of the Carol ine Islands and to restore and guarantee the happy conditions which 
had been produced by many years of noble American effort before the Spaniards laid their bl ighting 
hand upon that island group. '  Senator Henry Cabot Lodge informed the navy that because the 
Carol ines and Marianas were dependencies of the Philippines, American claims to them were as 
good as its claims to the Phil ippines themselves .27 
In the end, Germany was allowed to purchase control over the Carolines and al l of the Marianas 
except Guam. In 1914  the Japanese occupied Micronesia. Again the American navy agitated for 
transfer of Micronesia to the US and again it was be denied. The War and Navy Departments' 
General Board had already begun developing plans for moving across Micronesia into the 
Phil ipp ines in case of hostilities with Japan. After much debate and wrangling, the General Board 
recommended in 19 18  that the U.S .  acquire all Micronesia.28 It appears, however, that President 
Woodrow Wilson was too eager to get the Japanese into the League of Nations, and out of 
Shantung and S iberia, to expend diplomatic capital trying to get them out of Micronesia as well. It 
has also been suggested that pursu it of the Micronesian islands would have made it more difficult 
for Wilson to achieve the early American withdrawal he hoped to engineer in the Phil ippines .29 
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The US military had been planning a response to a hypothetical Japanese invasion of the 
Phil ippines from the beginning of the century. A number of naval thinkers had been describing the 
Marshalls and Carol ines as 's tepping-stones' for an invasion of the western Pacific - specifically 
Guam, the Philippines, and Japan - from at least 1 9 15 .30 In his ' coming war' novel of 1925, The 
Great Pacific War, the British naval correspondent Hector Bywater spelled out in extraordinary 
detail how, after the Japanese had taken Guam and the Philippines using their positions in 
Micronesia, the US moved through Micronesia island by island. He cited Yap as the key to 
American advance on Guam and Japan. By 1 926 the American navy had already mapped its 
primary strategy for recapturing Guam from Japan, a ' Step by Step Route' from Pearl Harbour that 
included ' capture, occupation, and use of the Marshalls, Carolines, and possibly Marianas, Yap, and 
Pelews' . It was, Honan writes, ' a  plan that could have been l ifted directly from the pages of The 
Great Pacific War'. Unfortunately, Admiral Yamamoto was in the same year 'proposing the 
strategy for Japan that he had read about in Bywater.3 1 
It is in this context that the mil itary's insistence upon seizing Micronesia permanently must be 
comprehended. As Pomeroy put it, ' In 1919, as in 1 939, it seemed to many that it was twenty years 
too late ' . 32 Although historians have demonstrated that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour was 
less of a surprise than it was represented, 'Pearl Harbour' provoked enormous recrimination both 
within the mil itary and between the mil itary and Congress . 
Guam and the Phil ippines had been left virtually unfortified and fell immediately. The Micronesian 
islands were nearly universally understood to have provided the Japanese with a superhighway to 
these target<> .  Having twice failed to obtain these 's tepping stones', and hav ing suffered the 
ignominy of il<> 1 941  losses as a consequence, the US military was not be denied a third time. 
'Never again ! ', cried Senator Thomas Hart. Hart wrote, ' Our failure to acquire the Carol ine, 
Marshall, and Marianas Islands at the same time we shouldered the responsibility for the 
Philippines amounted to one of the most costly politico-mil itary mistakes that any nation has ever 
made'. 33 ' Remember Pearl Harbor! '  has been the guiding principle of America in Micronesia for 
five decades . 
The major American buildup in Micronesia peaked during the war, as the reconquest of Guam was 
followed by invasions of the Ryukyus and the Philippines. A New York Times reporter in Guam in 
1944 filed his observation that 'We are not build ing this for today, we are building it for the future. ' 
Perhaps more significant was the transformation of ' the popular estimate of its value, and of the 
values of its neighbours in Micronesia and adjacent groups'.34 Pomeroy cites pages of commentary 
from every sector of American leadership in the mid-1940s regarding the imperative of retaining 
Micronesia. Admiral Ernest King, commanding officer of the Navy, captures this outlook. 
These atolls, these island lzarbors will have been paid for by the sacrifice of American 
blood . . . .  
Failure to  maintain these bases essential for our own defense raises the fundamental 
question - how long can the United States afford to continue a cycle of fighting and 
winning and giving away, only to fight and build and win and give away again ? 35 
Any l ingering doubts about Micronesia's strategic significance had been erased. Even if they would 
not all be developed as bases, the importance of strategic denial was now establ ished. James 
Forrestal, who was Navy Secretary and then the first U.S .  Defense Secretary, explained in the New 
York Times (24 September 1946) ' S ingle island positions cannot be considered strong bases. 
Selected islands can, however, together with Guam, form a far-reaching, mutually supporting base 
network, although each alone would fall far short of being an impregnable bastion'. 
Any but a summary account of the struggles among US military and diplomatic establishments to 
determine the status of Micronesia would be too long for my pmposes. The ground has been 
covered by a number of scholars, and will undoubtedly be tilled again. Roger Louis's Empire at 
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Bay detai ls the byzantine contest between the Navy and State Departments that flowed from 
Roosevelt's des ire to see European colonial empires dismantled. Despite bas ic agreement with his 
m ilitary strategists, Roosevelt, who personally formulated and conducted much foreign policy, 
seems to have remained insistent that the US would only administer the islands via a United Nations 
trust; he reiterated this commitment the day before his death, and the degree of his resolve 
apparently convinced Harry Truman lo refuse outright annexation. 
The conclusions of Lou is and Lester Foltos are largely  congruent. The dispute between State and 
Def ense was primarily over the form of the American regime in Micronesia, rather than its nature. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff had established a 'blue zone' marking a perimeter perceived vital to the 
d irect dcfense of the U.S. , running from Alaska and Hawai'i to the Philippines. ' In its center was 
the keystone of the proposed base system - the Marshal l, Marianas, and Caroline island groups that 
Japan held under mandate. '36 Permanent control was deemed necessary to restore America's 
geographic isolation, perceived to have been grossly violated at Pearl Harbor. Moreover, units 
based in th is western Pacific preserve would also serve as ' an umbrella to shield Japan's tremendous 
military potential from any would-be aggressor' . 
Confron ted with the State Department's opposition to annexation, the Joint Chiefs denied that this 
course ran counter to any supposed tradition of anti-imperialism. 'They believed', rather, that ' it 
was in keeping with America 's  noble and beneficent foreign policy tradition. '  While European 
imperial ism derived from selfish economic interests ,  they explained, 'American motives were pure'. 
Indeed the Joint Chiefs argued that State's position was 'cynical', given that it would provide the 
U .S .  with all the attributes of sovereignty over the Micronesians while denying them any of its 
rights or benefits .37 In his study of the navy's public relations efforts, Vincent Davis describes the 
aggressive tactics of its Office of Public Relations, which provided materials for speeches, articles, 
and congressional testimony, noting the recurring use of key phrases and arguments.38 Truman 
obl iged his subordinates to continue working toward some sort of agreement. The State 
Department eventually achieved a format more or less acceptable to both sides. 'Under the revised 
terms the United States, as administering authority, would have v irtually unlimited powers over the 
trusteeships. The State Department added an insurance clause to guarantee the permanent control 
the JCS ins isted on. ' As a consequence, 
American possession of the keystone to the JCS Pacific strategy was assured. The price 
had been high. During the war the administration had quietly dropped plans to use 
trusteeship to end colonialism. Now it had all but eliminated hope that the residents of the 
trusteeships could use trusteeship to win independence. 39 
This conclusion runs somewhat contrary to that of Louis, who maintains that despite the costs to 
Micronesians, American commitment to decolonisation ultimately triumphed over British resistance 
via implementation of the UN trusteeship program.40 In the end, budget cuts reduced American 
requirements in Micronesia to denial , contingency basing rights, and the military's steadfast  refusal 
to countenance negotiations that could lead to anything that might remotely be termed 
' independence' for Micronesia.41 
Decolon isation 
In 'Decolonisation and Beyond', Barrie Macdonald drew attention to the constitutional options open 
to and employed by Pacific nation-states, noting that degrees of constitutional independence do not 
correlate closely with economic, political, and strategic autonomy. Independence has, nevertheless, 
symbolic importance and the quest for it can play a crucial role even when i t  is not ach ieved.42 
Because the Pacific island states have proved so dependent upon aid, and state institutions channel 
that aid, there has been considerable emphasis on maintaining the territorial integrity that underl ies 
these states . Indeed, he argues, ' fear of losing aid in the uncertain world of independence helped to 
generate support for less-than-independent constitutions' .  Moreover, whatever their former colonial 
relations, all the South Pacific countries remain in some sense ' firmly under the United States 
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nuclear umbrella' . Limitations over foreign affairs and defence, received in turn for security in 
economic matters, 'are no less real for countries which have moved to sovereign independence than 
for those which have not' .  Micronesia's decolonisation history is in most matters little different than 
that of the rest of the insular Pacific. 
Nevertheless, Micronesia's strategic value remained crucial in Macdonald's opm1on, and was 
enhanced by changes in the American position on Okinawa and affected by possible modifications 
in the status of US bases in the Phil ippines . He deemed it ' almost inevitable' that the US would 
' take a much tougher stance in negotiations over political status compacts in regard to strategic 
denial and access to land of potential mil itary importance' . 
It appears to many observers that the old Micronesian Trust Territory has evolved into four fully 
real ised pol ities, three independent and one an integral part (if not member) of the United States. 
The US government as well as the Micronesian governments refer to Palau, the Federated States of 
M icronesia, and the Marshalls as independent. The consensus seems to agree with Boneparth and 
Wilkinson that 'with UN membership, legal questions about the sovereignty and independence of 
the [ three J countries were essential ly overcome. ' In their perspective, the only significant question 
remaining is the possibil ity of 'profound and economically adverse consequences for the islands' as 
a result of decl ining U.S .  strategic interests in the area, which have 'changed dramatical ly' although 
they have not van ished. 'American strategists consider the possibility that some power could in 
years to come develop hostile intentions and threaten U.S.  interests in the region' .43 
The State Department's Pacific islands desk officer, Edward Michal , has tried to establish the legal 
roots for the new Micronesian states' independence, al though his explication does offer several 
caveats .  Michal explains that the US prohibits Micronesian participation in the South Pacific 
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. The FSM, he explains, is unlikely to challenge this US position 
'because an American rebuff - which could not be kept quiet - would impair its claim to political 
independence'.44 The Micronesian republ ics are free to claim they are independent only so long as 
they do not attempt to act independently. 
But in a more day-to-day context, the key portion of the compacts lies not so much in the mutual 
security annexes as in Section 3 12, which specifies that the freely associated states ' shall refrain 
from actions which the Government of the United States determines, after appropriate consultation 
with those Governments,  to be incompatible with its au thority and responsibility for security and 
defense matters'. I have argued that Micronesians had every right to declare their independence, but 
that the US should refrain from such proclamations unless and until it agrees to rewrite the 
compacts so that some of the more onerous controls are modified enough to resemble something 
more like the independence the Micronesians were claiming.45 
Into the fu tu re 
I argue that the importance of the Micronesian islands in US strategic thinking will increase after 
the Cold War, contrary to the conclusions of Gary Smith,46 who explains that Micronesia was - is -
not nearly so cri t ical to the American mil itary as either the military or politicians have represented. 
Describing the decolon isation of Micronesia as a failure rooted in ' the exaggeration of Micronesia's 
strategic importance to the United States, and the dominance of the mil itary in decolonisation policy 
making', he disputes the widely shared assumption ' that the strategic value of Micronesia was, and 
is, an absolu te, a strategic imperative which has forced non-mil itary objectives into a distant second 
place . '  The US, he argues, did not see Micronesia as an area of strategic import until after the 
.Japanese had occupied it: ' assumptions about the strategic significance of Micronesia arose directly 
from the experience of Japanese aggression in the Second World War'. 
However, the American presence is by no means solely a consequence of World War Two. From 
well before its founding, the U.S.  was committed to westward expansion . The navy had long-
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standing designs on the Carol ines and Marianas and it was the navy's earlier failure to acquire the 
islands that provoked near-unanimous insistence upon acquiring them in perpetuity after the war 
with .Japan . While it appears that the strategic trusteeship was intended to accomplish the same 
goals as annexation, it was in fact entirely in keeping with an equally well-establ ished precept of 
American expansionist policy: that populations who were not of essentially Anglo-American stock 
could not be integrated into the union and that, in order to preserve the republic's character they 
should not be absorbed. The relevant questions are how the decolonisation of Micronesia 
demonstrates the broader pattern of American imperial practices, and what the close of the Cold 
War era will mean for US-Micronesian relations.  
Geopol itics 
In order to meld American expans ionist drives with strategic policy in the western Pacific, it is 
necessary to recal l some of the key elements of geopolitics. Mahan believed that the US could only 
be strong as long as it was a major trading nation and that it could establish and preserve this role 
only by projecting sea power. This required a chain of bases to support the fleet, and colonies to 
support the bases. Mahan's vision and recommendations coincided almost exactly with a long 
expansion in American naval strength and reach, which was only briefly sided-tracked after the 
Washington Naval Conference of 1 923. During this same period Harold Mackinder responded to 
Mahan with h is visions of world geopol itics, which portrayed the world in terms of a 'Heartland ' 
(largely coterminous with Russia) and an area that would be called the ' Rimland', the 'crush zone', 
or ' shatterbelt' - the province of sea power.47 
N . .J .  Spykman in his influential The Geography of the Peace believed Mackinder was wrong in 
asserting that control of the Heartland conferred a capacity to control the world;  it should be, he 
wrote, ' Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia'.48 This control had to be maintained through a 
combination of sea and air power, and air power required bases. Power struggles in the Eastern 
hemisphere would always concern relations between the Heartland and Rimland and would be 
influenced by maritime pressure on the littoral . ' If  Western Powers are to retain any influence at all 
in the region, they will have to establish island bases for their power. ' These 'bases will probably be 
sufficient to counterbalance any future attempt of China to dominate the Far East completely. '  
Accordingly, the region of most immediate concern for the US is the 'contact area between the 
l ittoral of Eurasia and the string of marginal seas which surrounds it' .  
11zere is no geopolitical area in the world that has been more profoundly affected by the 
development of air power tlzan tlzis one of the marginal seas. No longer is sea power 
ef]ective without air power, and aircraft has little strength if based on small, widely­
separated areas. f In East Asia the prima1y threat to the balance of power has in the past 
come from] the nation which has been in posit to control the sea access to the mainland 
Ii ttoral, but the U.S. has never had a really effective base for her power. If we are seriously 
interested in maintaining the security of the Orient, and for our own safety we are forced to 
be, we must secure additional naval and air bases on the same terms by which we acquired 
them in the translatlantic zone. 11ze augmentation of A laska with bases on some of the 
mandated islands and the re-establishment of our military power in the Philippines would 
be a minimum arrangement.49 
O'Sull ivan maintains that what Mahan proposed as American naval strategy is almost precisely 
what the US then set out to accomplish. Spykman reintroduced Mahan's thought after a brief hiatus 
and proposed the geopol itical strategy that underpinned the policy of containment.50 American 
strategic pol icy makers and planners since then ' have driven themselves into a frenzy of effort 
trying to plug all possible holes in the Rimland d ike'.51 
American Im perial ism after the Cold War 
These sentiments characterise the Cold War outlook, but the strategic worldview that underlies 
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them is far older, has great continuity, and is l ikely to persist. Present-day US interests in 's tabil ity' 
in the Western Pacific have at last begun to realise some of the commercial dreams that have driven 
America's expansion since the earl iest days of the republic. Trade across the northern Pacific is 
undeniably increasing. Transport costs and the need to control sea lanes in order to project power 
ashore will assure the continuing pursuit of control of these seas .52 And where land bases on 
foreign soil are patently provocative, aircraft carriers can be effective without the same degree of 
insult. 
l low have the events and trends of the past ten years compared with Barrie Macdonald's outlook? 
Confusion about American colonial ism stands in  the way of any clear evaluation of where 
Micronesia is today, and where it is l ikely to be headed in its relations with the US. Americans 
have general ly denied a history of colonial activ ity and are thus somewhat ideologically - if not 
pragmatical ly - confused by the processes of decolonisation. Many American h istorians have 
argued over whether, as Richard Hofstadter put i t, the US was surprised to find itself imperial in 
1 898, or that this ' accidental empire' was the product of a continuous pragmatic effort.53 
Nevertheless Martin Glassner argues that ' in a real sense the United States acquired two separate 
empires consecutively: one continental and the other (with one exception) insular. ' He observes that 
' the empire of the United States was acquired enthusiastically but administered absentmindedly. ' 
Th is ' second American empire' differs from other overseas colonial empires in that ' it is never 
official ly (and rarely unofficially) called an empire. Nor are the individual units ever referred to as 
colon ies because the United States is ambivalent at best and perhaps even embarrassed at hav ing a 
colonial empire.' Few American citizens have been or are now aware of the empire.54 
Kiste observes that Americans' myths about their own country 'have obscured their understanding 
of their nation 's  role in both the Pacific and the larger world. ' Americans ' firmly believe' that the 
U.S .  has not been a colonial power, and this 'American inabil ity to see itself as a colonial power 
had significant consequences'.55 Kiste's observation is rather mild in the face of the assertion of 
'America's unique and Jong-standing anti-colonial heritage dramatised in its own revolutionary 
birth ' ,  which presents ' the obvious paradox of itself becoming the colonial master of overseas 
possess ions. '  The US 'heritage of both conscious and subconscious anti-colonial ism . . .  has plagued 
both the American government and its citizens in their attitudes toward control over non-contiguous 
lands and peoples . ' As a consequence, American hegemony must be unquestionably temporary and 
American dominion ' must be made to appear as un-colonial as possible', and it is thus that 
' Micronesia, in the American official psyche, has never been a colony'.56 In the aftermath of World 
War Two, John Useem, working in the ethnographic study of Micronesia, wrote of US inexperience 
in 'govern ing al ien cultures' .57 But as early as 1 944, Laura Thompson, an anthropologist who had 
worked on Guam before the war, dismissed this notion. She developed her point that the US had 
Jong been a colon ial power and a rather incompetent one at that.58 No amount of insight seems 
likely to change most Americans' minds. America appears imperial j ust about everywhere but at 
home. 
The US recently deployed two carrier d iv is ions into the Formosa S traits as a signal of continuing 
commitment in the area. There appears l i ttle l ikelihood of rapprochement between the two Chinas, 
and independence for Taiwan would only fan separatist fires in Tibet, Mongolia, Sinkiang, 
Manchuria, and other areas of less than complete Han domination. Wrangl ing between China and 
Southeast Asian states over the Spratly and Paracel archipelagoes, and between Japan and the two 
Chinas over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, are merely the tip of undersea mountains - sites where the 
possibil ity of petroleum deposits have exacerbated boundary disputes that have been contested, in 
some cases, for a millennium. Japan and Russia remain at odds over the Kurile chain. Agitation for 
an American pullout from Okinawa shows no signs of subsiding, while the US insists that Okinawa 
plays a critical role in promoting stability. The reversion of Hong Kong to China may well result in 
disturbances that draw outs ide attention. With the award of the 1 996 Nobel Peace Prize to East 
Timorese activists, Indonesia's presence there will undoubtedly come under closer scrutiny. The 
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Rimland dike is fissured with cracks that the US intends to keep under close observation. 
I do not suggest that the US is l ikely to push for the construction of bases in most of Micronesia. 
But  Kwajalein, though portrayed as the terminal point of American ballistic missile testing that 
originates in Californ ia, stands as a forward defense position of considerable importance. Far more 
significant, however, is the geograph ical relationship of the Federated S tates of Micronesia to Guam 
and the Northern Marianas Commonwealth, both (apparently permanent) American possessions. 
The FSM straddles the Marianas, with the line of atolls l inking Yap and Chuuk crossing a T due 
south of Guam. And Belau occupies a large piece of ocean along the route from Indonesia to Japan. 
Although Belau's Compact of Free Association runs until the middle of the next century, the FSM 
and Marshal ls compacts end in 2001 .  All three republics now assert their complete independence, 
but we must ask if the US bel ieves that these islands have truly achieved a status d ifferent from that 
of the old Trust Territory. Of course the US acknowledges their right to self-government and 
participation in international organisations. · But precisely because the US does not bel ieve that 
these islands were ever colonies, neither does it consider them decolonised. The same 
psychological ' denial' mechanisms regarding its role as a colonising power now keep it from 
acknowledging its continued hold - not merely leverage - over Micronesia. 
The US has always tried lo explain to itself that its expansionist activities have been humanitarian. 
Today, interventionism is almost entirely cast as humanitarian, and its most open disputes with 
China, for instance, are formulated as issues of human rights. Throughout its occupation of 
Micronesia the US see-sawed between admitting that its concerns were primarily related to its own 
m il itary security, and claiming that its presence was mainly to uplift and develop the Micronesians; 
Americans have problems admitting to ambivalence and ambigu ity in their pol itical realm. Yet this 
is prcisely what will resurface in Micronesia. As tensions in the Far East become increasingly 
fractious, the US will fall back on its humanitarian identity and reassert (not re-establish) its 
hegemony in Micronesia. In doing so it will be following an old pattern. 
As an outgrowth of both American pushes for expansion, and opposition to it, over several 
centu ries, the US evolved a highly rational ised, and seemingly successful, means of using 
decolonisation as a means of achieving the highest stage of imperial ism. It is not alone. The 
process, common to most situations, has been ably described by Harry Magdoff. 
The end of colonialism by no means signifies the end of imperialism. The explanation of 
this seeming paradox is that colonialism, considered as the direct application of militmy 
and political force was essential to reshape the social and economic institutions of many of 
the dependent countries to the needs of the metropolitan centers. Once this reshaping had 
been accomplished economic forces . . .  were by themselves sufficient to perpetuate and 
indeed intensify the relationship of dominance and exploitation between mother count1y 
and colony. In these circumstances the colony could be granted formal political 
independence without changing anything essential, and without interfering too seriously 
with the interests which had originally led to the conquest of the colony.59 
Macdonald puts forward essential ly the same premise for the Pacific: 
Decolonization meets the expectations of both the colonized and the United Nations while 
serving the continued interests of the colonial powers. 
While independence may seem a break with the colonial past, the continuities are rather 
more important because they establish the framework for future developments. 60 
And it is in th is sense that we understand Yash Ghai's observation that constitutions transfer 
authority to a local elite who have been so well-schooled in colonial forms and values that 
independence, 'far from marking the end of colonial ism, can be v iewed as its culmination, 
record ing and consol idating the final v ictory of the westernised, Christianised, urbanised elites, in 
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control of the formal structured states'.61 
Concl usion 
The philosopher Leibn iz, in the employ of the Duke of Hanover, who was struggling to maintain h is 
claim to sovereignty in the wake of the Peace of Westphal ia, set out to determine the status of rulers 
who were ' subjects' of the Emperor. 'Could one be "sovereign" and " subject" at the same time?' 
Leibniz establ ished that ' sovereignty' could be distinguished from 'majesty'. The majesty of the 
emperor over the empire's members drew upon a number of j uristictions that conferred the right to 
obed ience and fealty, but it was not sovereignty, which could only be establ ished by force of arms.62 
In Ilerz's words, ' the transition to modern compartmentalised sovereignties was neither easy, nor 
straight, nor short. Modern sovereignty arose out of the triangular struggle among emperors and 
popes, popes and kings, and kings and emperors' . Sovereignty for today's ex-colonies arises out of a 
similar struggle: among the metropolitan powers, the colonies, and the United Nations. Once 
achieved, it does not exist apart from the struggles that produced it. Sovereignty for smaller states, 
at least, exists only so long as it is pursued, demanded, and doubted. 
I pretend to no new insight. I simply demonstrate that the US has since its beginnings had an 
active, well-thought-out, and h ighly successful colonial policy. It evolved in response to the 
dynamics of American social, pol itical and economic institutions, domestic opposition to them, 
frontier circumstances, and struggles of local populations to retain control over their l ives and lands. 
American occupation of Micronesia was in no way novel - it came about as a consequence of a 
long-term interest in acquiring and protecting markets in the western Pacific. 'Decolonisation'  of 
Micronesia has also been a part of this pattern; it perhaps renders American use of the territory more 
palatable to Americans, to Micronesians, and to the world community, but it is of no less value, and 
indeed is probably of more value to American self-esteem, than the more formal colonial rule  the 
US exercised - and denied - during its trusteeship .  
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The U S  Com m onwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands:  
A Paradox o f  ' Independent' Dependency 
Robert Statham, University of Guam 
I do not expect the Union to be dissolved; I do not expect the house to fall; but I do expect it will 
cease to be divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other. 
Abraham Lincoln 
Benign neglect as well as distance have concealed the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands 
from general view, but there is l ittle question that relations between the Western Pacific entity and the 
US government are severely strained. At the close of the cold-war, when the US should be basking in 
the light of successes internationally, the nation's policy in the CNMI (and the US Territories generally) 
stands in symbolic dissonance. Indeed, anti-federalism directed at the Federal government in the Pacific 
has reached a sustained point, while local problems such as allegations of labour abuse against foreign 
and minority workers, preferential and/or discriminatory property rights policy, as well as immigration 
and minimum wage controversies embarrass the US. This has resulted in the US moving to step up 
Federal presence and regulation in the islands, with the Commonwealth's leaders demanding greater 
autonomy. 
This paper examines the political and governmental relationship between the US and the CNMI in 
terms of constitutional principles, and the theory and practice of American federalism. US territorial 
relations and agreements in the Pacific and elsewhere have produced a profoundly complicated and 
perplexing image of inconsistency, coupled with apparent misunderstanding of both constitutionalism 
and federalism . The Commonweal th agreement reached w ith the CNMI is particularly fraught with 
contradictory language which is in large part responsible for the present tensions and difficulties. The 
island entity is pol itically and economically dependent on the US, but in authentic ' anti-federal ' form, 
consistently emphasises the desire for independence while remaining in that dependency. This 
d istressing state of affairs is characteristic of US territorial relations generally. Illuminating the 
relationship between the US and the Northern Mariana Islands may therefore serve as a precursor to 
the resolution of political struggles in the Western Pacific and the development and refinement of 
consistent and clear US territorial pol icy over all .  
U S  Adm inistration of the Trust Territory o f  the Pacific Islands. 
Sufficient time has elapsed for the memory of the American involvement in the Pacific arena of the 
Second World war to fade. The structure of world affairs appears to be in transition, and the bi-polar 
nature of  the cold-war international system is increasingly eroding. 1 However, the Allies '  triumph in 
the Second World War and subsequent American global involvement v is-a-vis the Soviet Union is of 
critical importance in understanding the politics of Micronesia. The islands and atolls have been subject 
to foreign discovery and control since the s ixteenth century, first by the Spanish followed by the 
Germans, the Japanese, and up to the present the Americans. Of particular bearing is the initial 
reluctance of the US to become extensively involved in international politics in any permanent fashion, 
only to be  obl igated by events in the twentieth century to play a major role in world affairs. In the 
Western Pacific, following Pearl Harbor, the US initiated a large-scale mil itary campaign to l iberate 
the islands from .Japanese occupation. The effort eventually led to American administration of the Trust 
Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI). The new Trust Territory was turned over to the US Navy on July 
19, 1947, at which time the United States was confronted with a new and unfamil iar experience of 
governing a distant ocean region that had been devastated by assault. 
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The US ,  a s  Administrator of  the TIPI, addressed the problems associated with re-building the 
communities from the ground up, including ' transportation, education, farming, fishing, banking, public 
util ities, and postal services ' .2 The Americans also divided the region into six districts : Pohnpei, Truk, 
Yap (now the Federated States of Micronesia), the Northern Mariana Islands, Marshalls, and Palau ; and 
instituted local governments which were democratic in form. 
US involvement derived from a massive military confrontation and America' s  national interests in the 
region were in this way based largely upon military/strategic considerations associated with the Cold 
War and a nuclear age.3 Intrigu ingly, following centuries of external domination, the interests of the 
island Territories were mainly rooted in the desire for self-assertion, cultural protection, and pol itical 
independence - al l to be achieved through economic, military and pol itical assistance. While the US 
and the Trust Territories mutually benefited from the association, a more pronounced divergence of 
their objectives (along with the role of the United Nations) marks a basic point of tension pol itically 
as there was a need to clarify the status of the Territories. 
"Ibe Trusteeship Agreement requ ired the US to promote the development of the inhabitants of the TIPI 
toward ' self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the 
Trust Territory and its peoples and the freely elected expressed wishes of the people concerned. '4 
While the TTPI viewed this relationship as one which would provide temporary assistance toward 
greater autonomy, the US considered its administrative effort to be directed at including the territories 
as an in tegral part of the nation, leading toward ' self' or ' local ' government within the American 
political system. The disparity was grounded in a basic conflict between the United Nations principles 
of Trusteeship and US principles of constitutional, federal democracy. 
This d ivergence of purposes was instrumentally addressed through a new and unique pol itical status 
called FAS (Freely Associated State) which would allow for vicarious association between the US and 
a Territory based upon four fundamental principles:  
1) That Sovereignty in Micronesia resides in the people of Micronesia; 
2) That the people of Micronesia possess the right to self-determination and may therefore choose 
independence or self-government in free association with any nation(s); 
3) "Ibat the people of Micronesia have the right to adopt their own constitution, and to amend, change 
or revoke any constitution or government plan at any time; and 
4) That free-association should be in the form of a revocable compact, terminable unilaterally by either 
party.5 
FAS status allows for the interests of the Territories and the US to be met through a temporary all iance 
based on a confederal model, a relationship which is closer to that of two separate countries tied by an 
arrangement of convenience, but which are unrelated constitutionally. FAS stipulations of local 
sovereignty, local right to self-determination, local right to revoke any constitution, and right to revoke 
any compact with any nation without mutual agreement all clearly indicate the unconstitutional nature 
of such a poli tical status (meaning that an FAS compact in no way suggests pol itical unification of a 
Territory and the US). 
The Trust Territories cannot be cons idered as an integration (the drawing of political boundaries 
notwithstanding) since the peoples of the region are culturally, ethnically, linguistically and 
geographically d iverse. In fact, ' of all the problems facing Micronesia, the achievement of unity is the 
greatest' .6 This profound divers ity militates against nationalism of any kind. FAS status in this way 
prov ides for the Trust Territories to maintain local distinctions. 
lbe US, through FAS agreements, obtains important military and strategic access in exchange for cash 
payments and the maintenance of defence responsibilities. What is important is the instrumental nature 
of the association. Directly, FAS status recommends that a Territory is politically ' independent' while 
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remaining dependent economically and in terms of defence. The following points distinguish FAS 
status from other traditional status forms: 
1 )  unilateral ability of  FAS to end the relationship; 
2) the lack of U.S .  citizenship of the FAS residents ; 
3) the capacity of the FAS to engage in world affairs as an international sovereign ; 
4) the capacity of the FAS to have a distinct and separate fiscal/monetary system.7 
A Compact of  Free-Association is fundamentally rooted in the protection of local autonomy, and 
contains stipulations which preclude pol itical unification between the two entities within the American 
constitutional system. While the nature of FAS is contractual and confederal, unification in the US 
system must be constitutional and federal . Whereas an FAS has the unilateral abil ity to end a political 
relationsh ip, secession in the US has no precedent (the Civil War being one example). While FAS 
residents do not possess US citizenship, within the US, citizenship and the governmental protection of 
the rights and responsibil ities of such is of primary importance. Finally, the capacity to engage in 
diplomacy and maintain a distinct monetary and fiscal systems which an FAS possesses is 
constitutionally reserved to the federal government in the US. 
The Establishment of a U S  Com m onwealth 
The Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau closely followed U.N. principles 
rather than US experience in selecting Compacts of ' Free-Association ' with the US. Only one district 
sought a form of pol itical status aimed at closer association with the US. The Northern Mariana Islands 
negotiated a separate agreement to create a Commonwealth . Unlike the peoples of the other districts, 
in February 1961 a United Nations Visiting Mission reported that the people of the NMI had an almost 
unanimous desire for US citizenship.8 Following a favourable referendum in the territory and passage 
as federal law by the US Congress, on 15 February 1975, a Commonwealth agreement establ ishing a 
political unification and granting US citizenship was successfully reached. 
The Covenant is, however, both unclear and contradictory. The Covenant Agreement contains language 
inconsistent with US constitutional law and principles as well as the theory and practice of American 
federal ism .  The Agreement states that the people of the Northern Marianas, by establishing a 
Commonwealth, 'were exercising their sovereign inalienable right of self-determination '  ,9 and that their 
desire for political union with the US would be fulfilled. Section 101  of the Covenant which outl ines 
the political relationship between the two entities states that upon termination of the U.N. Trusteeship 
Agreement, the NMI would become ' a  self-governing Commonwealth in political union with and under 
the sovereignly of the United States of America. n o  
Two initial points should be made. First, the Covenant appears to represent an unmistakable  act of 
self-determination and popular sovereignty by the people of the Northern Marianas . Second, this act 
is quasi-constitutive in so far as it is grounded in the formal establishment of ' union ' with the US. With 
respect to the former, in both theory and established practice once a people have formally engaged their 
sovereign right of sel f-determination, ' no res idual right remains within any group within it or cutting 
across its frontiers ' . 1 1  Regarding the latter, since the Covenant specifies that the Commonwealth will 
be ' in political union with and under the sovereignty of' the United States ' ,  the people of the NMI, 
presumably at the point of establishing their Commonwealth, became one self-governing entity among 
many including the several States of the Union. 12 Moreover, upon unifying with the US, the people of 
the Northern Marianas constituted themselves as one with the people of the US through acceptance of 
American citizenship, and constituted themselves institutionally through the establishment of a 
Commonwealth which was joined with the United States government and Constitution. 
Yet questions remain. Was the Agreement legitimate? Were the people of the NMI fully cognizant of 
the meaning and purpose of the Covenant? Were the people of the United States made fully aware, and 
d id they participate directly  in the process? Finally, can US citizenship be rightfully granted and 
93 
pol itical ' union ' establ ished absent ' S tatehood '  in constitutional terms? 
To constitu te, in the poli tical sense, means to make one out of many. The motto E pluribus unum 
suggests ' the making of one people out of many persons, as well as the making of one country out of 
many colon ies ' . 13 When the people of the NMI petitioned separately for US citizenship and closer 
association with the US and were granted that citizenship, they constitu ted themselves with the people 
of the US. Once citizenship is obtained, the term ' the people'  means the people of the United States 
or the 'American ' people. Citizenship is in this way a constitutive act which makes the people of the 
NMI part of one larger society through mutual trust. 14 However, if US citizenship is to be taken 
seriously, must it not be granted and accepted in a constitutionally legitimate fashion? 
While the Commonwealth Agreement grants citizenship to all persons born in the Northern Marianas 
which includes ' all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States ' , at issue is whether, and 
to what extent, the US Constitution applies in the Commonwealth. If US citizenship is to be 
meaningful, associated rights and responsibilities of citizenship must be constitutionally protected and 
upheld by the rule of law. Indeed, the main purpose of constitutional government is to secure both the 
public good and private rights. 1 5  This points to a question of critical importance - does the 
Commonwealth Agreement fulfill these objectives? US citizenship has been established for individuals 
in the CNMI, but can such citizenship be taken seriously if the Agreement and its provisions are 
constitu tional ly deficient? 
The Constitutionality of the NMI-US Com monwealth 
To understand whether or not, and to what degree, the Commonwealth Agreement upholds 
constitutional principles and objectives, i t  is necessary to examine the assertions on which it is based. 
Careful examination of the Covenant reveals a number of complex inconsistencies which derive from 
conflicting intentions of the two entities. lbese contradictions are, in all l ikel ihood, the direct result of 
producing an agreement which combines and blurs opposing and even paradoxical political goals. 
'Ifie CNMI was in itial ly a Trust Territory and not a Territory of the US (unlike Guam, which became 
a US Territory after being acquired from Spain in 1898). The objectives of the Trust Territories, which 
were supported by the United Nations, are incompatible w ith constitutional ism in failing to recognize 
US sovereignty, retain ing the right to self-determination for the Micronesian peoples, and by reserving 
the right of each of the Trust Territories to unilaterally terminate association with any nation or 
nations . 1 6  These goals were, not surpris ingly, implicitly pursued by the NMI in Commonwealth 
negotiations. 'Ib is resulted in an Agreement which reflects an incompatible mixture of 1TPI goals with 
US constitu tional requirements . 
'Ifie Trust Territory objectives appear to closely outl ine the properties of a form of political association 
called 'federacy' .  FAS (Freely-Associated State) status, which was offered to the other Trust Territories 
through Compacts of Free Association, is a form of federacy. Federacy denotes a kind of political 
relationship between a small polity which is freely, not constitutional ly, joined with a larger country. 
Federacy permits smal l communities to maintain their cultural identity through separate political 
organisation while receiving economic, political, and military assistance from a more powerful nation.17 
The Chamorro people of the Northern Mariana Islands approached negotiations with the desire to form 
an agreement which would retain as much local autonomy and distinction as possible in an effort to 
preserve the indigenous cul ture and ethnic identity, but which would also provide the benefits of 
citizenship and association with the US. Both parties therefore contemplated that the Northern 
Marianas' form of self-government would be more expansive than that enjoyed by States . The inherent 
irony of th is approach is the basic fragil ity of the NMI on the one hand (dominated by foreign powers 
for centuries), and the provision of greater local autonomy and power with major economic, financial 
and military assistance on the other. While the NMI was a dependent micro-state in nearly every sense, 
the Covenant was intended to make the Islands more ' independent' politically than the various States 
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of the Union. 1 8  
These objectives were achieved by inserting specific language into the Agreement which would reserve 
powers for the local entity not prov ided for in the US Constitution.  For example Section 102 asserts 
the supremacy of the Covenant in terms of the governmental relationship vis a v is the United States. 
The clause, in effect, serves to ' elevate the Covenant above al l other sources of lawmaking and, to the 
extent enumerated, above all other applicable provisions of the United States Constitution. '  While 
Section 10 1 expressly states that the Commonwealth is ' in political union with and under the 
sovereignty of the United States of J\merica' ,  Section 102 maintains that the Covenant (not the US 
Constitution) would govern NMI-US relations. Section 105 specifies that ' in order to respect the right 
of self-government guaranteed by the Covenant' certain portions of US constitutional authority would 
be limited (Articles I, II, Ill, and Sections 501 and 805 ' may be modified only with consent of both the 
US Government and the Government of the CNMI ') .  This language incorporates the doctrine of 
' mutual consent' placing the US and the NMI in relative symmetry with each other, which is the 
purpose of FAS status and federacy. 
The Covenant creates a fonn of political status which is unknown in constitutional tenns. This is related 
in part to the fact that the formal constitutional d istribution of power and arrangement of institutional 
structures in the US is 'federal ' .  Federal ism distributes power ' between constituent state governments 
and the government of the union in tenns of shared "powers " '  . 19 In the US, federal ism was implemented 
primarily to remedy the weaknesses of the conf ederal structure of the Articles of Confederation by 
creating a more perfect union as well as ' a  form of pol itical organization particularly suited to l inking 
d istinctive and separate communities into a s ingle pol itical system. ' The NMI Commonwealth 
Covenant, conversely, produces a quasi-confederal relationship between the US and the island entity 
by way of the Covenant Supremacy and Mutual Consent clauses. 
The basic difference between confederation and federation is grounded in the political unit(s) which 
each recogn ise, emphasise and preserve. In confederation, the constituent states are the only pol itical 
units that are parties in the association, whereas in federation, the constituent states are joined by 
individual citizens as parties to the arrangement. The US Constitution was expressly intended to protect 
and pursue what cons tituent states and factious groups either cannot or do not: the private rights of 
individual citizens, and the public good.20 In federation, ' the goal of creating a political union involves 
pol itical integration which extends throughout  the entire society. This is accomplished via formal 
constitutional arrangement and the citizenship of individuals is based upon enduring, cohesive, and 
unifying principles such as equal ity before the law and the protection of basic human rights. ' 
The Commonwealth Agreement provides for a contradictory mixture of confederation and federation. 
First, while the Covenant places the NMI in pol itical union with and under the sovereignty of the 
United States (as opposed to free association), it also places l imitations and conditions upon the Federal 
Government which are unconstitutional. The Agreement establishes a union between the US and the 
NMI Commonwealth where no constitutional authority exists for such an establishment. Only ' States ' 
can be legitimately placed in political union within the US constitutional system. 
The ' republ ican ' scheme of representation which the Constitu tion provides for requires the democratic 
selection of elected representatives at the state and national l evels of government: the people rule 
indirectly by choosing leaders to engage in public policy decision-making at both levels. The 
Constitu tion demands that the citizenry be fully represented in each sphere. At the national level 
representation is based upon a variety of criteria such as population in state electoral districts (the House 
of Representatives), statehood (the Senate), a numerical combination of the two (the Electoral College), 
and Executive-Legislative coordination (the selection and confirmation of Supreme Court Justices). The 
Constitution provides for s imilar institutional and representative schemes at the state level of 
government. 
In order for US citizens to be properly represented in the Federal Constitutional system, they must 
res ide in one of the fifty states where the Constitution is fully applicable. The Covenant between the 
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NMI and the US establ ishes a Commonweal th, not a State, and fails to provide the individual citizens 
necessary representation locally and nationally. The CNMI Senate is based upon equal representation 
for the islands of Rota, Tinian, and Saipan and not upon proportional representation and the 
equal-population principle. 
"Ibis equal representation scheme based upon islands and not indiv idual voters conflicts directly with 
the 14th and 15th Amendments of the US Constitu tion since the population of Saipan is six times 
greater than the other two combined.21 Furthermore, the CNMI has no formal representation at the 
national level. Section 901 of the Covenant states that the NMI Constitution or laws may provide for 
either the appointment or election of a ' non-voting' Resident Representative to the United States whose 
term in office will be determined by local law. The Resident Representative is, according to the 
Agreement, entitled to official recognition by all departments and agencies of the Government of the 
US. NMI representation at the national level is therefore non-existent in the Legislative, Executive, and 
Judicial branches of government and the role of the Resident Representative is constitutionally 
undefined. 
The Commonwealth Agreement provides US citizenship for all individuals who reside within the 
boundaries of the NMI, but effectively denies them adequate representation and proper constitutional 
protection. The granting and acceptance of US citizenship establ ishes a union between the people of 
the NMI and the people of the United States. The political arrangement, however, does not provide for 
the representation and protection of the rights of that citizenship. US citizenship requires that the rights 
of individual citizens are protected, and necessitates the operation of federal ism so that citizens can 
participate directly in the political system at all levels. The Covenant disallows such participation and 
is based upon the preservation of local autonomy and relative political independence from the US. This 
produces a pol itical relationship which is more confederal than federal in which : 
the sense of common citizenship is remote and more appropriately compared to the sense of 
common identity of nonparticipant subjects of empire or trans-national religious, economic 
or language groups.22 
Even though US citizenship is provided by the Covenant, it is incomplete. The document 's formal 
inconsistencies produce dissonance rooted in group interests over and above indiv idual citizens and 
society as a whole. 
Property Rights in the CNMI 
The Covenant to establish a US Commonwealth contains prov1s1ons which are not only 
extra-constitu tional, but which are in direct conflict with the Constitution in both law and principle. For 
example, Section 805 of the Agreement places restrictions on the acquisition of land based upon a racial 
category. The document stipulates that: 
in view of the importance of ownership of land for the culture and traditions of the people of 
the Northern Mariana Islands . . .  permanent and long-term interests in real property are 
restricted to persons ofNorthem Mariana Islands descent. 
In fact, the CNMI Supreme Court decided in the Ferreira v. Mafnas case (1992) upholding Article XII 
of the CNMI Constitution which legally prescribes that only persons of 'Northern Marinas descent' can 
purchase land in the archipelago. 
Th is local law ' creates two separate and unequal classes of US citizens ' in violation of both the 5 th 
Amendment and the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution.23 While James Madison clearly stated 
in Federal ist #10 that the ' protection of the diversity of faculties of men, from which the rights or 
property originate is the first object of government' ,  Article XII of the CNMI Constitution favours one 
group (people of Northern Marianas descent) above all others. The US Constitution requires that 
constituent-state governments equally protect the property rights of all citizens, ' not just the property 
rights of a select class of people ' .  24 Article XII is in this way a legal ' group ' -based preference which 
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precludes equal protection before the law for citizens who do not fit the description of the advantaged 
group.25 It ' runs counter to the idea that each person l iving in a community has equal rights, freedom, 
and protection ' under the Agreement that binds them.26 
There is l i ttle question that the restriction of the possession of property to the indigenous Chamorro 
people is intended to preserve and protect the local culture. Restricting land ownership ' acknowledges 
that loss of land results in disruption of a people's sense of identity' .27 Nevertheless, such restrictions 
conflict with the concept of equal rights for all .  US citizens who live in the Northern Marianas who are 
excluded by Article XII are denied the ability to cultivate and preserve their identity. Legislation which 
legally discriminates in favour of a collective indigenous cultural and ethnic identity in this way violates 
the principle of equal ity which is essential to the preservation of j ustice in a society which is comprised 
of a variety of sub-cultures which must be viewed equally before the law.  
The US federal system addresses ethnicity as  a distinct element of  numerous elements which are 
encompassed as parts of a larger societal whole. Ethnic groups in the US typically ' do not have a 
"homeland" within the borders of the nation ' ,  and are ' fairly rapidly assimilated to the national political 
culture, and the national culture in other respects too ' ,  while retaining certain aspects of respective 
sub-cultures .28 Neither of these characteristics fully apply in the CNMI. Largely as a result of distance 
and isolation, the Chamorro people maintain a concentration which constitutes a majority. As well, the 
Northern Mariana Islands are the homeland of the Chamorro people, which places them in  a category 
similar to that of the Native i\rnerican Indians. The basic issue concerning property rights is the tension 
between preserving the identity of the Chamorro people on one hand, while protecting the constitutional 
rights of non-ind igenous US residents on the other. When publ ic policy ' attaches rights in public law 
lo membership in some groups, this reacts back on others ' .  
Labour Rights and Min imum Wage Pol icy i n  the CNMI 
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the Commonwealth Covenant is Article V which stipulates 
which prov isions of the US Constitution apply. Section 503 states that US immigration and 
natural ization laws as well as minimum wages are inapplicable and will only apply to the 
Commonwealth upon the mutual consent of both the CNMI and the United States (Covenant, Article 
5). 
Local control of immigration and minimum wage legislation has led to very unfortunate circumstances.  
Reports of civil rights abuses have surfaced, el iciting regional and international expressions of outrage 
necessitating US Federal inqu iries and increased Federal presence and regulation.29 Repeated reports 
of ' rape, forced prostitution, coerced confinement and other abuses of alien workers ' have brought to 
the forefront ' fundamental issues of justice and fairness for migrant workers ' ,  raising serious questions 
regarding both US domestic and foreign policy. The vast majority of those who migrate to the Northern 
Marianas to work are Fil ip inos (in 199 1 alone, the Northern Marianas hired 10,424 workers from the 
Phil ippines).30 Most labour abuse problems arise between Filipino labourers and NMI employers. 
Persistent allegations of mistreatment of Filipino migrant workers has brought a lawmaker to rate the 
CNMI as one of ' the most abusive places in the world to work' . And while the majority of abuse cases 
involve domestic maids, n ight club workers, and construction labourers, approximately 200 Filipino 
teachers recently filed su it against the Commonwealth and prevailed, asserting a pattern of racial 
discrimination with respect to salary l evels.31 
While the Commonwealth Agreement specifically excludes the application of certain aspects of the US 
Constitution in an effort to preserve the ' culture and traditions' of the indigenous Chamorro people, it 
fails to prov ide adequate protection for minorities, both foreign and national . 
Application of the US Con stitution 
Much debate has surrounded issues of federal ism, particularly in terms of the extent and l imitation of 
national power in the US Constitutional system. Recent research suggests that what is of primary 
concern is not power as an end, but iL<> mode of operation. More directly, reference to the writings of 
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James Madison indicates that the best guide to understanding the pol itical philosophy of the 
Constitution is to focus on constitutional principles primarily, addressing the d istribution of power 
subsequently. While the Constitution gave supremacy to the ' union ' as a cure for the formal defects of 
the Articles of Confederation (namely that the confederal form of the Articles was excessively State 
oriented, and, therefore, could not provide a sufficient remedy for the problem of factions); 
far ji·om being a 'nationalist by instinct ', Madison was a republican, driven by his frustration 
with the J\rticles of Confederation to strengthen tlze federal government, but only in a manner 
consistent with his core principles. 32 (emphasis added) 
It can be provisionally assumed that from Madison's perspective, the main purpose of the Constitution 
was the preservation of l iberty, public and private.33 The institution of the rule of a supreme law (the 
Constitu tion), the republ ican scheme of representation, the separation of powers, and the incorporation 
of checks and balances (auxiliary precautions) as well as the federal principle were all evidently 
directed toward this purpose. One of Madison's core principles to be fulfilled by the Constitution is the 
protection of public and personal liberties and this appears to provide a guide toward comprehending 
the proper power relations between distinct departments of government in the system.34 
The contradictory nature of the CNMI Covenant in essence derives from a pragmatic pol itical 
agreement which emphasises the distribution of power between the two entities at the expense of 
constitutional principles. By not providing for the clear and full application of the Constitution (or the 
complete exclusion of it through a compact of free-association), pol itical interest(s) are not 
appropriately connected with basic constitutional rights.35 The people of the CNMI do not have proper 
formal representation at the national or State levels of government (the Commonwealth, not being a 
state, is not specifically accounted for constitutionally), the republ ican and federal principles are 
inoperative and a limitation of  both national and local authority is absent. This problem raises a point 
of critical importance: proper and adequate formal representation l imits national power constitutionally. 
The exclusion of portions of the US Consti tution results in both national and local governments 
instrumentally and selectively choosing when and if the Constitution (the rule of law) appl ies . This is 
a prescription for tyranny (rule of interested will) of all varieties which the Constitution was expressly 
meant to prevent. Madison's analysis is instructive: Different interests necessarily exist in different 
classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority wil l  be 
insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil : by creating a will in the community 
independent of the majority - that is, of the society itself; or by comprehending in the society so many 
separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole 
improbable, if not impracticable.36 The US Constitution was largely (although not solely) intended to 
block State (local) encroachments on minorities by creating a will in society generally (a national 
majority) which would be ' explicitly committed to public and personal l iberty ' thereby functioning as 
a check upon factious forces .37 The operative check against tyrannical national majorities is provided 
by the extension of territory which creates a multiplicity of distinct interests which are unlikely to 
converge at the expense of private rights. 'The Commonwealth Agreement does not effectively provide 
for the preservation of publ ic and private liberty which the Constitution requires and in this way 
actually works against the interests of all parties concerned. 
The Northern Marianas were ill-advised in seeking Commonwealth Status (Puerto Rico 
notwithstanding) as its constitutional clarity within the US governmental framework is both practically 
and theoretically suspect. Moreover, Commonwealth status cannot and never could achieve the 
obj ectives of independence or self-government. The NMI would have been on more sol id ground in 
seeking either Freely-Associated State status which would have provided military/strategic and 
econom ic support by way of a legally b inding and time-bound Compact without citizensh ip and 
constitutional appl ication, or Statehood (alone or in combination with Guam, other Pacific entities, or 
another State), however unlikely, which would have provided all the benefits mentioned above, but 
with citizenship as well as full constitutional appl ication and appropriate representation. The present 
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arrangement suggests that the CNMI is neither independent or self-governing - yet, in a certain sense, 
both. Put differently, the Covenant places the NMI in political association with the US in a way that 
is mean ingful, only to the extent that that meaning refers to contradictory ambiguity. The 
Commonweal th Agreement is the product of an attempt to pragmatically reconcile conflicting goals 
through the establ ishment of a political status which is incapable of creating such a reconcil iation. 
Conclusion 
The United States is a rather new and developing country, engaged in a social, economic, and pol itical 
experiment in ' sel f-government' . One condition which has been indispensable for its growth and 
success is the extension of the nation's territory. Not only is there s trength in numbers combined 
(union), there is a su fficient check against majoritarian faction which is not well controlled for in 
smaller republ ics. Madison noted that ' the larger the society, provided it l ie within a practical sphere, 
the more duly capable it will be of self-government. ' 38 He considered an extended republic to be 
essential for justice and the public good. However, the degree of territorial extension was intended to 
be qual ified and limited to a ' practical sphere ' .  The obvious question which follows concerns the 
determination of what that practical sphere of territory is in a constitutional republic. It may be assumed 
that territorial over-extension could potentially produce an excessive diversity of interests thereby 
compromising the public good. 
In as much as extension of territory must be rooted in constitutional principles and the appropriate 
appl ication of federal ism, Madison stated that ' the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great 
extent by a jud icious modification and mixture of the federal principle ' .39 The purpose of territorial 
extension is in th is way inextricably connected with the purposes of consti lutionalism. If the extension 
of the nation's territory is properly guided by the Constitution, then it is necessary for the Constitution 
lo stale how, and upon what specific criteria such extension can and should occur. The Constitution, 
however, in Article. IV, Section 3, states that 1) ' New States may be admitted by the Congress ' into 
the Union, and 2) ' that the Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and 
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States ' .40 
The Constitution certainly provides for the admission of new States to the Union. It also recommends 
congress ional regulation and control of US territory and property. Yet the issue of acquisition or 
admission of territory is unclear. While the Northwest Ordinance (1787) established a pattern for the 
acqu isition of territory under the Articles of Confederation, the US Constitution remains vague in th is 
regard. Furthermore, even the power the Northwest Ordinance granted the Federal government 'was 
not conceived as unlim ited, as in  due course territories were to become States in the Federal union. '4 1  
Since the Constitution makes a distinction between a territory and a State, can the United States 
rightfully possess or acquire territory and property which is not in the form of a State? 
This lack of constitutional clarity is conceivably the primary source of friction in US territorial relations. 
Madison, in the Federalist, was particularly skeptical of drawing Federal government power too 
loosely. l ie was critical of the Continental Congress regarding the acquisition and management of the 
Western territory of the American mainland:  
Congress have undertaken to do more: they have proceeded to form new States, to erect 
temporary governments to appoint officers for them, and to prescribe the conditions in which 
such States slzall be admitted into the Confederacy. All this has been done; and done without 
the least co/or of constitutional authority.42 (emphasis added) 
Madison points to the abuses of power by the national government in the extension of territory, which 
derive from the gulf between the powers expected by the government and those it actually possessed, 
lead ing to usurpation and despotism.43 He conceded that the acquisition of the Western territory was 
in the publ ic interest but maintained that the danger resulting from a government which does not 
possess regular powers commensurate to its objects is great.44 
Where the Constitution is excessively ambiguous, such incertitude can lead to the kinds of tyrannical 
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activ ity the institution was intended to prevent. The Territorial Clause (Article IV, Section. 3) is 
sufficiently vague to invite the extra-constitutional use of Congressional power. The Covenant to 
establ ish a Commonwealth is a poignant example of Federal government over-extension. The United 
States (via the Congress) has erected a government which is not constitutionally provided for. And, 
while the US has taken the position that as a result of the Covenant, the Territorial Clause appl ies to 
the Commonwealth, that clause specifies that only new ' States ' can be admitted to the Union, and l imits 
Congressional authority to the control of US territory and property.45 Having granted US citizenship 
lo the people of the NMI, can it be asserted that the people ( individual citizens) of the Commonwealth 
are US property? Directly, docs the Congress possess the constitutional authority to confer US 
citizenship upon a population which does not res ide in a State of the Union? If so, in what sense can 
the interests of those citizens be connected with the constitutional rights of the place?46 
When Congress passes a law which is suspected of being unconstitutional, the Supreme Court is 
obl iged lo exercise its power of judicial review. The NMI-US Commonwealth Agreement is in need 
of such rev iew.47 Should the Covenant be found unconstitutional, it will be the responsibility of 
Congress to elucidate the wording of the ' territorial clause' by way of amendment. The people of the 
Northern Marianas will then need to be offered a form of political status which is theoretically and 
practically congruent with either the US Constitution (through self-government in S tatehood), or 
genuine independence of some kind . lbis clarification should be based on the understanding that with 
respect to US territories and citizens in those territories, the Constitution must either apply in full, or 
not at al l . .  
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Nauru : Decolonised , Recolonising, but Never a Colony 
Nancy J. Pollock, Victoria University, Wellington 
Decolonisation is a special ised term with narrow as well as broader connotations. We can consider 
seven aspects before we turn to Nauru : 
1 .  Decolonisation is used to refer to the breaking of ties of control by an outside power over an 
indigenous society. As several contributors to this Workshop have mentioned, that break can be 
imposed by the colonial power, or demanded and achieved by the people. Nauru is an example of such 
local demand, but in their case it was to remove United Nations Trusteeship control. 
2. Decolon isation implies moves towards autonomy. But it depends on who is viewing that autonomy 
and from what vantage point. In small island states, autonomy may mean freedom to choose their aid 
donor, and thus a new form of dependency. That may become Nauru's choice. 
3. Taking a World Systems approach with people as active agents interpreting the hegemonic system, 
decolonisation marks a new political phase. For a small nation that phase is marked by new relations 
with larger powers, as well as new relations with other small nations, such as the development of ISIS . 
4. With decolonisation the status of economic transactions may not change (i .e . the sale of phosphate 
mined on Nauru), but the pol itical control of those transactions is at stake. 
5. Decolonisation frequently brings a new identity. A new cultural system emerges from the remnants 
of the impact of colonialism. But that need not mean that a total ly Western capital ist value system is 
taken on. 
6. For some authors decolonisation refers to a return to a former status, if that is ever possible. 
I lobsbawm's idea of 'reclaiming the h istoric past' is an advance on that 'return', but with the colonial 
past built into the emerging pol itical identity. 
7. Decolonisation can be taken as reaction or revolution in the aftermath of an imposed ideology. 
Nauru was never colonised, I argue, because the people never submitted to a colonial power. Indeed, 
they spent the 60 years when they were 'occupied ' by outside powers resisting any attempt to colonise 
them. If we take colonisation as ' the implanting of settlements on distant territories ' ,  almost always as 
a consequence of imperial ism, 1 then Nauru was not an outpost for officials from European powers. 
Indeed even in such a small population Europeans never amounted to more than five per cent.2 
Rather, I am concerned to show that Nauruans were exposed to a heavy dose of British imperial ism, 
that is ' the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropol itan centre rul ing a d istant 
territory ' .3 That Britain delegated, or was strongly  urged into delegating that 'rule' to Australia, is part 
of the issue to be clarified. Nauru ans spent the time from the N auruan Agreement in 1919  in which they 
were not even consulted, asserting their rights to both a greater say in their own affairs, and a greater 
proportion of the profits from phosphate extracted from their land. Thus decolonisation moves were 
contemporaneous with the process of British imperial ism. 
Paradoxically this strong pattern of resistance, particularly to the Australian version of imperialism, is 
confounded with an acceptance by Nauruans of the ideological principles which stem from British 
imperial ism. They were plunged into a system of capital ism and trade, together with administrative 
structures that supported those principles through education, heal th and rel igion. 
Thus I argue that what appears to be a conflict of interests for Nauruans allowed them to assert their 
own cultural stamp on their history. Their rejection/acceptance paradox can best be viewed through 
three aspects of their h istory. First, they used the new ideology and system to build and assert their 
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pol itical voice for au tonomy, and thereby to gain mastery of their own l ives, even in the 1 920s; they 
learned th is at the behest of their masters. Second, after Independence they needed assistance with their 
position in the world market economy. 'Half an island and some cash'  was not enough to provide for 
future generations. It follows, third, that they have asserted their s trong commitment to their heritage 
by setting in place a program of Rehabil itation of their island after mining, which is l ikely to be a useful 
model for other communities in their post-colonial mining endeavours to be carried out on their own 
terms. 
Seeking Autonomy 
Nauru was never strictly speaking a colony. Germany referred to its position in Nauru (after 1888) and 
elsewhere as 'protectorates' rather than colonies.4 When these protectorates were reallocated in 19 19, 
Nauru was one of many societies placed under a League of Nations C class mandate. Britain accepted 
responsibility for that Mandate, at the insistence of Australia, and delegated the requirement ' to exercise 
whatever powers it possessed solely for the benefit and advancement of the mandated territories ' 5  to 
Austral ia. 
The Nauru Agreement of 1919 established the terms by which that mandate status would be exercised. 
It set up the administrative structure, but alongside that, it created a Board of Commissioners appointed 
by each of the member governments, namely Britain, Austral ia and New Zealand. They were 
empowered to hold title to the phosphate deposits, and to sell or supply that phosphate only to 
themselves. Weeramantry argues that that Agreement violated the terms of the Class C Mandate. 
Nauruans were not party to that Agreement. 
They soon appreciated that they had been left out of rul ing their own nation, so they agitated for a 
greater share in phosphate profits and greater control of their own affairs as early as 1 921 .  This resulted 
in the formation of a Council of Chiefs in 1927, an Australian idea based on imperial models, but not 
formerly a part of Nauman social structure. This Council gradually grew in influence, under the 
leadership of Timothy Detudamo, and provided a v ital channel for Nauman dissatisfactions w ith 
administrative policies and phosphate extraction matters . It became the negotiating body by which 
Nauruans were able to assert their claims for greater shares of the profits - these rose from two pence 
in 1922 to seventeen shill ings and s ixpence in 1966. 
The Council of Chiefs was democratised by Nauruans themselves in 195 1  when it was replaced by the 
Nauru Local Government Council. In this move, Nauruans were possibly ahead of their imperial 
mentors. This new body of elected representatives of the fourteen districts continued as a major channel 
of representation for dissatisfactions with the system of administration. Some of the major concerns 
were their inabil ity to influence, or to have a say in the administration of their own people. Housing and 
health facil ities were renovated for the phosphate workers before Nauman needs were addressed. They 
were treated as ignorant, poorly educated, lacking in political skills, and thus  unfit to govern 
themselves. Yet Detudamo, and Hamer de Roburt who succeeded him within the NLGC structure in 
1 956, proved highly significant figures in formulating Nauru's case for independence. 
Nauru became a Trust Territory after World War II, with Australia regaining administrative control 
after Japanese occupation. Still the British Phosphate Commissioners ran the mining operation, 
expanding the plant, and exporting greater amounts of phosphate to themselves at favourable rates. 
The Nauru Local Government Council used the United Nations Visiting Missions which were assigned 
every five years to assess the status of the Trust Territories around the world. In 1956 Hamer de Roburt 
raised the matters of Nauman autonomy, their housing, and their future status once mining was 
completed, w ith the Visiting Mission. His papers to that body clarified Nauman demands for the 
present and the future.  It became clear to Visiting Missions, which were composed of non-western 
delegates, that Austral ia was not abiding by the premises of the Trust Territory agreement to look after 
the welfare of those people entrusted to them. Rather the Mission quickly understood that Australia had 
a conl1ict of interest as Administrator, and a mining operator and purchaser of phosphate. 
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Successive Visiting Miss ions upheld Nauruans' concerns for autonomy, resulting in Independence in 
1 968. Nauruans' attempts to gain control of their own affairs including the phosphate mine were 
achieved. At a price. Nauruan will asserted that political independence include control of the phosphate 
mine, so that the profi ts could accrue to the people for their future. BPC, and Australia in particular, 
were opposed lo sell ing the mine, as they wanted to maintain access to cheap phosphate. But Nauman 
will prevailed. They bought the mine for $21 million. Thus they achieved control, and complete 
decolonisation. 
However, though decolonisation had been achieved, in the sense that Nauruans were now in complete 
control of their own affairs, yet imperial ist ideology (implanted along with mining and mandate 
administration) l ingered. Its influence is still there, as Nauman wealth is the subject of much 
speculation by the western media, even more so today. Nauruans are capital ists in the sense that they 
bought the mine and run it in the form of the Nauru Phosphate Corporation . And they have invested 
the profits, and suffered in the 1987 crash .  
Half an Island a n d  some Cash 
The issue of what to do with N auruans once their island was mined out should have been a concern of 
both the mining consortium and the administering trustee. It was recognised clearly by Nauruans in the 
1 930s; and in the 1 940s a Rehabil itation Fund was established, but it had only a meagre $599,325 in 
1 968 .  Some twenty years later this Fund stood at $214 million, according to the Nauru Phosphate 
Royalties Trust which manages this and several other funds on Nauruans' behalf. Weeramantry argues 
that the ' meagre sum . . .  demonstrates the ind ifference of the partner governments to the rehabilitation 
aspect of their obl igalions ' .  6 
Austral ian administrators had a fixed idea that they would move N auruans off their island, and continue 
to mine the island unfettered .  They used the model of the Banabans who had been moved off Ocean 
Island in 1 946 once phosphate was nearing its end, and resettled them on Rabi in the Fij i group.  
Nternalive sites for relocating Nauru ans were suggested, and duly considered. Hamer de Roburt led 
his peoples' representatives lo examine carefully and evaluate the potential of islands such as Curtis off 
the coast of Austral ia. NI such sites were rejected on two grounds. Nauruans would not be autonomous 
on these islands; they would be sharing the land with Aborigines, and would be tied to Australian 
citizenship ever after. Second,  they would give up their island heritage and all it meant to them, 
including the phosphate which still had a h igh export value. Half the island remained to be mined. 
Thus Nauruans became adamant that they wanted to remain on Nauru whether or not mining finished. 
But in order to do so they recognised that their island needed to be made habitable. And that would 
require outside assistance. 
J\ Commission of Enquiry into the Worked out Phosphate lands of Nauru was established in 1986 by 
the Government of Nauru, with an Austral ian international lawyer as chief advisor. Its task was to 
examine in depth the question of ' the government or organisation who should accept responsibil ity for 
rehabil itating the areas of phosphate land  worked out in the periods covered by the German 
administration, the League of Nations Mandate, the Japanese occupation and the United Nations Trust, 
and The cost and feasibil ity of any proposed rehabil itation ' . 7  
This enquiry raised many concerns relating to the procedures and operations of 'colonisation' of Nauru . 
The findings, in 1 6  volumes, established the case that Nauru had not been colonised, that imperialism 
had been self-serv ing in the interests of the British Phosphate Commissioners, and that Austral ia had 
administered Nauru not within the protocols of a Trust Territory. These findings were summarised by 
the Chairman of the Commission of Enquiry.8 As an international lawyer, Weeramantry addressed 
poinL<; of law. l ie found that ' the natural resources of Nauru were the inviolable heritage of the Nauruan 
people, [and that] the principle of permanent sovereignty meant that neither title to the phosphate nor 
the right to exploit it could have been given away by the German government or acquired by the British 
Phosphate Commissioners in the manner claimed by the BPC and the partner governments on their 
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behalf' . 9  
Environmental damage was proven, but mitigated by attempts to redress some of the concerns and the 
finding that there was no deliberate intent to cause continuing and unredressed damage. But the trustee 
nations were under a duty to hand back the trust territory in at least as good a state as that in which they 
received it. On these bases a claim for compensation against the former British Phosphate 
Commissioners was established by the Nauru government in the Austral ian courts .  The case was 
dismissed by the Austral ian government, so Nauru government took the case to the International Court 
of Justice in the Hague, where a case was found to be answered. It was settled out of court by Australia 
in 1993 with the establ ishment of  a fund of $ 121  mil l ion for Rehabilitation of those lands mined by 
BPC before the mine was sold to Nauru in 1970. 
Nauruans were faced with the task of turning a sea of untraversible pinnacles into a usable l and area. 
Th is is a major engineering feat requ iring a number of interlocking structural decisions. A joint 
Nauru/Austral ia Rehabil itation project was formulated in 1994 with Terms of Reference to provide the 
Nauru government with several options for restructuring and rebuilding their landscape. The costings 
were to be feas ibl e in terms of the $214 million in the Rehabil itation fund, together with the $ 121 
million settlement by Austral ia. 
The Nauru government insisted on making these recommendations their own, rather than rubber­
stamping them. 'Ibey underwent 15 months of close consideration. Nauruans had learned their lessons 
at the feet of their imperial masters. 
Facing the Futu re 
Nauru faces recolonisation in the sense that the help of engineers and other structural special ists will 
be needed to reconstruct the landscape. But it is clear that any outside assistance will be received by 
Nauruans reasserting those ideologies in Nauruan terms. 
Repairing the damaged island and restoring it to its usefulness has been formulated under the Nauruan 
vision of Recreating the Garden of Eden. In the mid-1800s those Europeans who wrote about Nauru 
described it as a green and lush island, so it is that status that N auruans dream of recreating after mining 
finishes . Today that reflection of western ideology has taken on particular Nauruan meanings . 
The recommendations of the Nauru/Austral ia Rehabil itation Commission now lie before a Nauru 
Rehabilitation Committee. (That Committee was establ ished on paper in 1995, but it could not meet 
until the nation's financial status became clear. ) A new President elected in November 1995 devoted 
six months to establ ishing how much money remains in the Nauru Phosphate Royalty trust funds, and 
how much is available for Rehabilitation .  A figure was agreed by Parliament in May 1996, allowing 
the Committee to hold its first meeting in July 1996 with the then President, Lagumot Harris, in the 
chair. 
Reconstructing an island landscape from a basel ine of coral has few precedents. Most mines are s ituated 
in an environment where the mine s ite can be set aside, as people carry on their l ives elsewhere. Not 
so on Nauru, where the task is to create a living environment for both human and other species. But that 
requires money. How should that money be spent. Do the best imperialist policies offer solutions to the 
damage they have created? 
Advice - some good, some not so good and some mischievous and harmful, has guided Nauruans. 
Their period of Trusteeship has led them to be h ighly sceptical of outside advice, yet they have not 
enough inside expertise to cope with the complex situation.  
Decolonisation has left an after-taste for Nauruans, only some of it palatable. Decolonisation has meant 
reinterpreting imperial ist ideology. Nauru has lost its island environment, and thus its people wish to 
recreate a basis for their future. That basis must be both physical, as well as cultural , and economically 
viable. 
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Nauru got rid of its imperial intruders in 1968. But at the same time i t  chose to, or had no other option 
than to reevaluate capital ism, the work ethic and other ideologies to suit their own peoples' 
circumstances . They have asserted their own stamp on the present, taking from those ideologies, and 
making them pecul iarly Nauruan. They wish to do things their own way. They seek advice but then 
interpret that advice to meet Nauruan thinking. 
The financial consequences indicate they are at a cl iff edge. They will probably require aid, but deplore 
the possibil ity, yet look to Austral ia and New Zealand for that aid. Nauruans have always been 
concerned to maintain a d istinct identity. They are not as far as we can tell closely related to other 
popu lations in the Pacific. These h istorical features have underl ined their uniqueness, of language, 
matriliny, and their hill ing as wealthy, plus the court case. Yet Nauru is very small ,  geographically and 
demographically. Without their land they cannot return to any former status. They foresee their island 
as rehabilitated to recapture the Garden of Eden that once was . Such a vision has been a graphic 
reminder of what the task of Rehabilitation offers for the future. 
This small island state is joining its Pacific Island neighbours in seeking to establish new ties 
world-wide. Its closest ties have been forged to fall a small islands bloc in the central Pacific, consisting 
of Nauru, Marshall Islands, Kiribati, Tuvalu. The Pres ident spoke of the strength of this concept of 
Small Isl ands States when he addressed the Barbados conference on the issue. 
So decolonisation (in the broad sense) means finding sympathetic helpers. That implies loss of 
au tonomy (which Nauruans guard fiercely) and a possible recolonisation by those who can help return 
prosperity. To recreate the Garden of Eden is based on imperialist, Christian principles, but its outcome 
will be pecu l iarly Nauruan . 
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In Albert Maori Kiki's reminiscences, first published in 1968, he recalled an incident that happened on 
what he said was his ' first real job' as tea boy in the d istrict office at Kerema. He was instructed that 
one object was a cup and that it sat on another called a saucer, and he was not to spill tea into the 
saucer. One day he did, 'and the white officer picked up the tea and threw the boil ing hot tea onto my 
bare chest'. 1 Other personal narratives written on the eve of self-government have stories of sl ights and 
humil iations. There is an implication that the world of careless, petty privilege was about to end. In his 
autobiography Somare says that when he was asked why as a public servant he pers isted in h is 
involvement in pol itics he replied, ' Because there is injustice in this country'.2 
A generation later Malum Nalu looked back on his childhood of 1971-2, those same years of innocent 
optimism and white privilege. The son of a school inspector, Nalu went to l ive with h is family at 
Sohano on Buka Passage. l ie said that on the aircraft, then run by Ansett and TAJ\, the ' kids' enjoyed 
the fl ight 
as it was service with a smile by the hostesses with plenty to eat (a far cry from Air Niugini 
today), and the pilots allowed us little ones one-at-a-time into the cockpit . . .  Salzano, of course, 
was where the expatriate colonials had their homes, and naturally {note that casual 
'naturally} we befriended the little white boys and girls, and the island children . . . .  my sister 
Alison often spent the weekend at Banis Plantation with her Australian school friend, whose 
father ran this property on the northern tip of the now-troubled island. 11zose were the 
colonial days, and naturally, ef}iciency was the word. 
Public Servants were well-dressed and worked with zeal (unlike today), we had fresh milk and 
mail delivered to our doorsteps, a tractor picked up rubbish every morning, and there were 
reliable electricity, telephone, and water services. 
Malum Nalu wrote of treasuring his memories and the family photographs that stimulated his recall of 
a ' seemingly-utopian childhood'.3 
In a generation, the popular recall of Austral ian colonialism has been shifting from the supremacy and 
sl ights of mastas to nostalgia for days of equality, freedom and efficiency. Both judgments - privileged 
exploitation and benign efficiency - are now common. Thousands of anecdotes support either 
assessment, and those selected are determined by what the writer wants to praise, denigrate or justify 
in the present. In the post-colonial state of Papua New Guinea, particularly among that s ixty per cent 
of the population who have no memory of Australian rule,4 there may be no common judgment of the 
colonial past, a marked contrast with those states created out of conflict with the colonial power (such 
as Indonesia) or whose economic growth as independent states seem to confirm their suppression as 
colonies (such as Korea) . 
These variable or absent judgments about the colonial past do not apply to individuals. Somare is 
consistently praised as the father of the nation. Dianne Mcinnes in her booklet summarising his life 
says : 'At a Pangu Pati convention rally in 1971 ,  he said i t  was his aim to bring Papua New Guinea to 
Independence. It took h im just four years to achieve his aim. '5 What is often omitted is that Somare's 
main opponents were other Papua New Guineans. In his autobiography he saw himself going into 
pol itics to correct the policies that so often neglected and belittled Papua New Guineans,6 and in h is 
account of h is first term in the House of Assembly he gave many instances where he and other members 
of Pangu tried to change Australian policies, but he made it clear that when he came to power in 1972 
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h is main task was to persuade other Papua New Guineans to accept Pangu policies. He even concedes : 
' l  was constantly accused of making a secret deal with the Austral ians on a date for self-government 
and imposing th is on the people' . 7  lie does not dwell on this radical transformation in his relationship 
with the colonial power: from opponent to ally. But the careless have written as though those who 
provoked his pol itical consciousness and became his formal opponents from 1968 to 1971 continued 
to be his opposition to 16 September 1975 . 
Within Austral ia there is uncertainty whether the pushing of Papua New Guinea towards nationhood 
was the act of villain or hero. The judgment depends more on who is being praised or blamed, and less 
on what was actually done. Soon after Andrew Peacock announced his retirement from parl iament in 
1994, Don Greenlees in the Australian wrote: 
After three decades in .federal parliament and two tilts at the prime minister 's office, in 1 984 
and 1 990, what memmy might Andrew Peacock cherish the most? 
Papua New Guinean independence. 
ln 1 9 72, as the 33-year-old minister for external territories, Peacock cajoled the McMahon 
government, h is own hidebound department and some reluctant PNG leaders to speed the 
move to self government and independence for the former Australian colony. 
Now facing retirement, Peacock remembers the success of this hectic diplomacy . . . .  
It is a jimdamental part of wlzat Peacock sees as his place in history . . . .  But as a monumen t  
to his political career, few people would dispute his claim to it. 
In PNG, Peacock is a revered figure. lie has made 54 visits to the countly during his years 
in polities . . . . 8 
Peacock was quoted making the confident s tatement: ' I  know what I d id in Papua New Guinea was 
h istoric'.9 
Peter Ryan first went to Papua New Guinea as a young soldier, and he has written a fine reminiscence 
full  of insight and compassion for those Papua New Guineans who fought with him, listened to him 
sceptically, or sided with the .Japanese. I le has visited Papua New Guinea frequently since the war, 
written articles and a book, was general editor of the Encyclopaedia of Papua New Guinea published 
in 1972, and was director of Melbourne University Press when it produced significant Papua New 
Guinea monographs. 1 0 In the 1995 Latham Lecture he said, 
11zat PNG should become independent in 1 975 seems to have been largely his [Whitlam 's] 
personal's decision. Unabashed by what happened since, he has been reported as claiming: 
'ft was I, comrade, who liberated Papua New Guinea. ' 
. . .  11zere is ground for thinking that the Chief Minister (Michael Somare) implored Whit/am 
to delay. But independence, willy nilly, was imposed with a paternalism equal to that of any 
old-style unreconstructed colonialist . . . .  
Australians, deeply and bitterly, and for years to come, will go on paying the cost of a 
ji·ivolous prime minister's unwisdom. So will the oppressed and exploited people of Papua 
New Guinea . 1 1  
Ryan was making a considered statement of assertions he had made as  forcefully before. 12 
J\s in Papua New Guinea, the contradictory Austral ian judgments exist side by side. But in Australia 
the judgmcnts are more obviously mutually exclusive: they presume different actors as well as different 
evaluations of the actions and their consequences. If Whitlam was responsible then Peacock was not; 
and vice versa. Strangely, no one has wondered why in 1972 when all three held s ignificant positions 
(Somare was Chief Minister, Peacock Minister for External Territories and Whitlam Leader of the 
Opposition) they did not abandon their lonely roles and combine forces. Far from coming together, they 
109 
are presented as though they did not notice each other. 
In th is confusion of praise and blame, much can be learnt from going back to the debates of the time, 
finding out what were the issues being contested, fixing when and where decisions were made, and 
trying to gauge who had the most influence over policy. 
In his account of his thirteen year ministry of Papua New Guinea (published by Peter Ryan) Paul 
I lasluck said that he 'had always seen quite clearly that the end of all we were doing was self­
government and independence for Papua and New Guinea' . 13 But that was not the impression he gave 
when he was minister. At the end of his time in office the stated aim of the Australian government for 
both Papua and New Guinea was ' to bring the people as quickly as possible to the stage where they will 
be able to manage their own affairs and decide their political future as a people'. 14 In 1 958 in carefully 
chosen words Ilasluck pointed out that Australia's commitment to the United Nation's was for ' self­
government or independence', not necessarily independence, and even the progress towards self­
government was hedged with qualifications . 15 At another point Hasluck spoke of Papua New Guinea 
at some time seeking 'a measure of independence' and of there being a future ' interdependence' 
between Austral ia and Papua New Guinea. In one of his longest contemplations about Papua New 
Guinea becoming a seventh state he said : 
I do not think that we can foresee the day when Papua and New Guinea will become a member 
of the A ustralian Commonwealth on exactly the same terms and in exactly the same 
constitutional relation as the six States of the Federation. There is no reason whatsoever why 
they shout d not enter into ref ation with the Commonwealth on terms to be negotiated directly 
between the Commonwealth and Papua and New Guinea at the time when Papua and New 
Guinea can speak as one people. By that time I fully anticipate that the Australian Federation 
will itself have changed considerabfy.16 
Not long before he ceased to be Minister for Territories Hasluck twice answered questions in the House 
of Representatives on whether Papua New Guinea would become a state. Both times he explained that 
the pol itically conscious minority of Papua New Guinea wanted to remain in close association with 
Austral ia after sel f-government, and the most acceptable arrangement to them seemed to be one of 
statehood. When he answered the second question Hasluck added that statehood would be a matter to 
be considered by the 'Government and the people of Austral ia, as well as by the people of Papua and 
New Guinea' at the time of negotiations . 1 7 In his memoir published just after Papua New Guinea 
became independent Hasluck claimed that he thought statehood was 'quite unrealistic'. Perhaps he did, 
but again that was not what he said at the time. He left open the option of statehood, or some other 
arrangement with a mutated Commonwealth. 
When Charles Barnes become Minister for External Territories in 1963 he continued Hasluck's pol icy 
of  apparently leaving choices and timing to Papua New Guineans. But in 1966 he was forced into 
greater precision by the Select Committee on Constitutional Development of the House of Assembly, 
chaired by .John Guise. Barnes had informal talks with the Committee early in 1966 and the Committee 
came to Canberra in April to find out what ' range of special relationships' were available. 1 8  Cabinet 
chose not to set a specific aim, but it decided to discourage any thought of Papua New Guinea join ing 
the Commonwealth on the same terms as the existing states. 19 Although the Austral ia government's 
failure to be dogmatic and Barnes' own preference for ' an eventual close association' allowed advocates 
of the seventh state to retain some hope, a critical decision had been made.20 
When Barnes reported his talks with the Select Committee to the Australian parl iament he continued 
to refer to ' self-determination', and to assert that any decision on a future association should  be left to 
the government of the time. But he d id announce that the two territories of Papua and New Guinea 
would be treated as constitutional equals.2 1  The changed emphases in Australian policy were more 
obvious when Lord Casey as Governor-General outlined the policy of the new John Gorton government 
early in 1968: Papua and New Guinea were to become a self-governing country, and while  a ' special 
relationship' might be worked out in the future, the development of Papua and New Guinea as a seventh 
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state was 'fraught with difficulties'.22 In several speeches Barnes now began to stress that constitutional 
change ' could not divorced from economic development' and that economic development was a ' long 
hard road' .23 
On 6 .July 1970 John Gorton, prime minister of Australia, gave an after d inner speech at Port Moresby's 
Papua Hotel, the Top Pub. In an image used repeatedly on his tour Gorton said that Papua and New 
Gu inea were on the road to self-government, and now further s ignificant steps were to be taken .  The 
Administrator's Executive Council, the embryon ic cabinet made up of officials and a majority of elected 
members, was given increased powers and it was to have a spokesman in the House of Assembly. In 
effect this was a move towards responsible government. Nominally more important was handing 
Ministerial Members in the Bouse of Assembly authority over particular subjects includ ing primary and 
secondary education, health, tourism,  cooperatives, posts and telegraphs, and revenue raised in the 
Territory. Gorton stated that the Austral ian government would not exercise its power of veto over these 
matters . Bad those Papua New Guineans who were then Ministerial Members been confident and 
straining for the chance to their implement own pol icies, there might have been an immediate rush 
down the road to self-government.24 In fact those holding office (Angmai B ilas, ' Roy' Ashton, Matthias 
ToLiman, S inake Giregire, Tei Ahal , Tore Lokoloko, and Toua Kapena) either favoured a slowing of 
the rate of change or they lacked the education, pol icies and political support to push for change. The 
non-official members of the Administrator's Executive Council elected as their spokesman Tom Leahy 
who could claim to have nearly a hundred of his relatives in country, but he was born in Australia and 
was seen to be all ied to white settlers and conservative New Guineans.25 The structure had been altered, 
but radical changes in the practice of politics and the direction of policies were not expected and did 
not follow. 'Ille announcement stirred few fears and few ambitions. The Prime Minister and Mrs Gorton 
left the d iners at the Papua Hotel for a reception at Government House without much sense that this had 
been a significant moment in the histories of one nation and a potential nation; but at least the official 
program did not say - as it did for the airport reception - that they would be met by Mr and Mrs David 
I lay in ' Position l ' .26 
When Austral ian policy changed again in 1971 it appeared - as it did in 1 966 - to be in response to the 
Select Committee on Constitutional Development of the House of Assembly. The need to inform the 
Committee of what the Austral ian government thought desirable and to amend the Papua and New 
Gu inea Act to give legislative real ity to the Select Committee's recommendations kept forcing the 
Austral ian government to make public, and perhaps to decide, its own preferences.27 In April 1971 
Barnes, now a Minister in Will iam McMahon's government, told the House of Representatives that the 
Territory was ' to be geared to preparing the country for internal self-government during the l ife of the 
next House of Assembly ( 1972-1976)'.28 He justified the changes on the grounds that the country should 
be able to move 'with least possible amount of administrative d isruption' to self-government when the 
House of Assembly chose to do so. Barnes now spoke of ' encouraging progress towards self­
government'. l ie said if after the 1972 elections a 'cohesive group of Ministers emerges, with the 
backing of  the House . . .  ' the Commonwealth would in practice regard this group as constituting a 
government, and would negotiate w ith this group for the further step by step handing over of power 
until there was formal recognition of full  internal self-government.29 Barnes accepted the Select 
Committee's words that a 'proximate timetable' of change to self-government was now in place. 
Later in 1971 when introducing amendments to the Papua New Guinea Act, Barnes confirmed that the 
Australian government had prepared a 'programme for movement to full self government in the period 
1972-1976'. The execution of the changes would take into account opinion in the Bouse of Assembly 
after the 1 972 elections and the 'pol icies of the political leaders who then emerge'.30 
By the end of 1971 the Austral ian government had taken several significant decisions. In the five years 
after 1966 the choices open to Papua New Guineans had been sharply reduced: Papua and New Guinea 
would not become a state of Australia, all parts of Papua New Guinea would be treated equally and all 
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were on the same constitutional track, and real powers over health, education and other departments 
had been handed to the House of Assembly in 1 971 .  As Barnes said in November 1971 ,  ' the country' 
was 'practically self-governing'. For the future, Austral ian government had said that if a 'cohesive 
group' emerged from the 1972 elections it would be recognised as a 'government' , and in any case all 
the institutional steps would be taken so that the country was ready for full internal self-government. 
Where in the past the Australian government had said that it waited for Papua New Guineans to tell it 
what they wanted now it declared that it was ' encouraging' them to be self-governing.31 The old pol icy 
of ' self-determination' had almost disappeared. Papua New Guineans could still determine the timing 
of self-government. Yet even on the question of when they were told that all the legislative and 
institu tional changes would be made - the only question open was at what time Papua New Guineans 
would choose to use the powers transferred to them. And there was still in the mind of Barnes, but 
perhaps not of other members of the government, ' economic and political relationships' to be negotiated 
between Austral ia and a self-governing Papua New Guinea But by the end of 1971 Barnes was joining 
' independence or self-government' as if they were indissoluble partners.32 Gorton had written privately 
to Barnes tell ing him to quicken the pace towards independence, and by early 1971 David Hay, 
Secretary of the Department of External Territories, was advising that the critical issue for Austral ia 
was to define its national interests against an independent Papua New Guinea: it was not a matter of 
working out a particular political relationship with a self-governing Papua New Guinea.33 Perhaps, then, 
it is Charles Barnes or John Gorton or William McMahon who should be praised or blamed for the 
transfer of power to Papua New Guinea. 
In February 1972 Andrew Peacock became Minister for External Territories. He was thirty-two years 
of age, energetic, ambitious and with a capacity to establ ish easy communication with a variety of 
people. On the day of his swearing in, he flew to Port Moresby, the first of about twenty-one flights that 
he made to Papua New Guinea as Min ister.34 lie brought a new openness and urgency to political 
change, but  there were no road blocks to clear or major decisions to take. The second House of 
Assembly had ended its deliberations in November 1 971 ,  and the counting of votes for the new House 
did not begin until March 1 972. As it was not clear who was going to have power in the new House 
until the first divisions were forced on 20 April 1 972, Peacock had no elected Papua New Guinean 
office holders with whom he might confer. It was May before the new Administrator's Executive 
Council met. Even after Somare's National Coalition government had set its course there were few 
major decis ions for Peacock to take. In August he agreed that there should be Papua New Guinean 
spokesmen for the police and the army in the House of Assembly, he introduced a minor change to the 
Papua New Guinea Act to allow Somare to increase his ministry to more than 17,35 and he made a 
statement accepting the motion of the House of Assembly on 5 September 1972 that Papua New Guinea 
should have internal self-government on 1 December 1 973 or as soon as possible thereafter.36 Before 
self-government, Peacock told the House, the Austral ian government would further amend the Papua 
New Guinea Act to invest the Papua New Guinea government with the necessary legal authority. But 
Peacock lost office with the defeat of the McMahon government in the December elections, and those 
transfers of power were shepherded through the House by his Labor successor. When Peacock made 
statements about encouraging self-government, and about welcoming target dates but not imposing 
them, he brought an urgency and enthusiasm to the task. And in cutting out qual ifications about the 
need for economic and social change, and in assuming a direct transition from self-government to 
independence, he removed the diversions that had been capturing the debate. But Peacock had not been 
an initiator of a major change or the manager of a shift in the direction of pol icy. 
By the time that Whitlam came to power at the end of 1972 the timetable for self-government was in 
place, the target and process had been accepted in both Canberra and Port Moresby, many of the formal 
legislative steps had been taken, and both Barnes and Peacock had spoken about Papua New Guinea 
already having de facto self-government. Before he became Prime Minister Whitlam had made several 
visits to Papua New Guinea, and at Goroka in 1965 he had predicted that Austral ia might have only 
another five years in the Territory.37 In debates on Papua New Guinea in the House of Representatives 
he did not speak as often as some other Labor members, but his were the most distinctive and dramatic 
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interventions. In 1 966 when Barnes was saying that Australia ' has no desire to press constitutional 
changes upon the people of the Territory which they do not want',38 that they were free to remain a 
Territory liJr as long as they chose,39 and that there was a ' range of special relationships' that might one 
day tie Papua New Guinea to Australia40 Whitlam began his speech with the direct statement: 'We 
should aim to make the Papua and New Guinea Act . . .  the constitution of an independent republic of 
New Gu inea within, we hope, the Commonwealth of Nations'.41 Later he denounced the 1968 changes 
to the Papua and New Gu inea Act as carrying 'gradualism to the point of imperceptibil ity' and he 
countered arguments that economic development must precede political change and that only a minority 
of Papua New Gu ineans favoured independence: 
11ze Minister will protest, as lze always does when the question of independence for New 
Guinea is raised, that the inhabitants of the Territ01y should decide for themselves, that they 
fear independence. 111e Minister 's exploitation of a reluctance which he himself and his 
immediate predecessors have fostered sedulously is a tactic which reflects little credit upon 
him. We must try to overcome this reluctance. It is devious and dishonest to ny to hold New 
Guineans responsible for developmental shortcomings which in fact are our own. 42 
Whitlam was almost alone in the House in talking of independence rather than self-determination or 
self-government, and he was almost alone in saying that Australia should set independence as the end 
of pol icy before the majority of Papua New Guineans had asked for it .  Other members of the Labor 
Party who visited Papua New Guinea and were sympathetic to the aspirations of Papua New Guineans, 
such as Kim Beazley and Gordon Bryant, were in fact closer to Barnes than they were to Whitlam. 
When Whitlam went to Papua New Guinea in December-January of 1969-70 and January 1971  some 
people where outraged by his comments, but it is unclear whether they were taken by surprise or they 
enjoyed savouring an outrage that they fully expected.43 In a statement issued in Port Moresby on 12 
January 1970 Whitlam said that 'The fact of independence is not negotiable' . Even on the question of 
the timing of independence there was l ittle ' negotiabil ity' . The Austral ian government's obligations to 
the United Nations, to protect its reputation and relations with other nations, and to act in the best 
interests of the people of Austral ia meant that independence was a decision for Austral ia: 
Therefore it is either misleading or meaningless to assert that the decision for independence 
is one for the people of New Guinea alone. The form of independence is certainly for them to 
decide for themselves. 11ze fact of independence has already been decided. 44 
The real problems of Papua New Guinea such as the economy, the fragmentation, and lack of 
education, were, he said, not unique to Papua New Guinea: they were more likely to be debated and 
solved by Papua New Guineans than colonial rule. What was unique to Papua New Guinea was that 
' alone among significant populations its people make no final decisions on any matter affecting their 
welfare' . If Labor won the election at the end of 1972 then Papua New Guinea, Whitlam announced, 
would be given ' home rule' as soon as the arrangements could be made. By home rule he meant that 
Papua New Guineans would control everything except foreign affairs and defence. 
Whitlam's speech was in sharp contrast with the sorts of speeches so normally made by eminent 
Austral ians in Papua New Guinea. B illy Hughes, Robert Menzies, Paul Hasluck and Charles Barnes 
had used variations on the assurance: ' So long as you need our help you can depend on us to give it. 
So long as you want us to stay you can depend upon us not to desert you'.45 But the speech and the 
political program it outl ined was not in sharp contrast with the thinking of many in the Australian 
cabinet and the admin istration .46 The effect of Whitlam's speeches was to focus attention on Papua 
New Guinea, provoke Gorton to act according to his own perception of events rather than tolerate the 
gradualism of Barnes, and provide the Australian government with the threat that preparations for self­
government had to be made or the Labor Party would thrust power on the unready. The changes 
announced by Gorton in Port Moresby in July, confirmed by Barnes at the end of 1 970, and extended 
by h im in 197 1  enabled the Liberal -Country Party Government to do most of what Whitlam had 
advocated, earl ier than he had wanted, while denouncing his insensitive extravagance and claiming to 
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act at the pace set by the House of Assembly. 
When Peacock announced on 10 October 1972 that the changes for self-government would be in place 
by 1 December 1 973, Whitlam responded: 
I take this immediate opportunity to say that the Labor Party supports and endorses the 
statement made by the Minister . . . . I would like to express also what I believe is a general view 
that the Minister has done our country a service in the comradeship and co-operation which 
he has achieved with the Government of Papua New Guinea. 
By October 1 972 the Government and Opposition had returned to the bipartisan policy that had marked 
nearly all of Austral ian ru le in Papua New Guinea. The flurry from late 1 969 had been brief and 
rhetorical rather than a significant division. Whitlam and Peacock may not be recognised as all ies by 
history, but they knew they were in 1972. 
In the debates in the House of Assembly leading to Barnes saying that he would recognise a coherent 
group as a virtual government, few Papua New Guineans spoke about the form that their new 
government should take or what policies it should pursue. The talk remained fixed on whether all parts 
of Papua New Guinea would have the same future, and when Papua New Guinea should have self­
government. The Papuans were most persistent in probing for some hint that they might be able to 
preserve a separate status. Papuan leaders in Austral ia interrogated officials and when Australian 
politicians vis ited Papua they were often asked if Papuans had any rights to enter Austral ia, or whether 
they could apply for Austral ian citizenship.47 Bert Counsel, an Austral ian representing the vast Papuan 
regional electorate of Western and Gulf, persuaded the House to request the Australian government not 
to alter the status of Papua without the approval of the Papuan people. Momei Pangial , member for 
Mendi in the Southern Highlands, proposed a motion that the Commonwealth government visit Papua 
' to learn of their concern at first hand' .  The House passed the motion, for members were strangely 
sympathetic to the aspirations of those who would damage the unity of the state that was soon to be 
created . But the Commonwealth decl ined to send a special delegation to talk to Papuans .48 The 
determination of the Papuans to stress their separateness was so strong, it is no wonder that it has 
continued to influence people's perceptions of their identities and interests after independence. 
The calls for slowing the pace were often made by those who wanted to emphasise how close they were 
to uncontacted village life. Andagari Wabiria from Koroba in the Southern Highlands admitted that he 
deliberately appeared before the Select Committee wearing tapa cloth and brandishing a spear. He went 
on to tell the House that his people wanted schools and cash crops, they needed Austral ians to stay in 
the country to help them, he had been told that people in other newly independent countries were 
having trouble, and he simply wanted all the talk of self-government and independence to stop. 
When the 1 972 House of Assembly first met, many members still had the same regional and 
conservative concerns .  In the House's early role in the making of the nation of Papua New Guinea 
Michael Somare was central in three significant events .  First, he put together a coalition government 
when it was known that he campaigned on a policy of immediate home-rule. This was believed to have 
minority support in the electorates, and Somare and his Pangu supporters had consistently suffered 
crush ing defeats in the old House. Towards the end of 1972 Les Johnson wrote to the Minister: ' the 
Coal ition could not hold together for any length of time with any other leader'.49 Second, he introduced 
the motion in June requesting that the changes necessary for internal self-government be in place by 
1 December 1973 or as soon as possible thereafter. He argued his case effectively and vigorously, and 
the motion was accepted in September 1972. Within the range of times available, Somare had helped 
determine the timing of the formal declaration of self-government. Third, he introduced the motion to 
set up the Constitutional Planning Committee. The terms of reference said that this was to be the 
constitution for a 'united Papua New Guinea' and it was to be written 'with a v iew to eventual 
independence'. In those three actions in 1972 a Papua New Guinea government was formed with the 
capacity and will to use the powers transferred to it, the date for full internal self-government was fixed, 
and the transition of a united Papua New Guinea to independence had been affirmed. There would be 
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no ' range of special relationships' - just negotiations between two independent nations. 
Gough Whitlam became Prime Minister at the end of 1 972 after all these decisions had been taken. It 
was the task of Somare, Whitlam, and his Minister for External Territories, Will iam Morrison, to keep 
to the established timetable. That was not easy, but from late 1 972 they were taking no new radical 
decisions. When Morrison made a statement on the constitutional development of Papua New Guinea 
in May 1 973 he ' reaffirmed the agreement reached by the previous government with the Papua New 
Gu inea Government on the timing of self-government' . 50 Peacock began his response with the 
statement: 
Both the contellt of the speech by the Millister for External Territories (Mr Morrison) a!ld the 
material co1Ztained in the instruments tabled in the Parliamenta1y Libra1y by the Millister are 
substantially material agreed to by the previous govemment.51 
Later, in August Morrison introduced the 'h istoric' legislation to provide formal self-government, 52 and 
Peacock again followed with the claim: 
We are, in fact, enacting decisions which were, ill the maill, takell by the Govemmellt of Papua 
New Guinea in c01�ju1Zction with the previous Liberal-Coulltry Party Govemment.53 
On the timing of self-government Australians were as publ icly bipartisan as they had been on pol icies 
in the 1 930s and 1 950s. 
Government and opposition were not, however, as one on independence. As Minister, Peacock had 
spoken of Papua New Guinea 'moving rapidly to self-government and independence', but he had given 
no specific date for independence.54 On taking office the Labor Government was more precise: it said 
that ' in the closest consultation' with Papua New Guinea independence would be secured within the 
life of the current parl iament.55 Early in 1 973 Morrison thought ' Independence wil l  flow on from self­
government' and would take place in 1974.56 Peacock argued that the date should be primarily be a 
matter for Papua New Guinea, and other members of the opposition said more strongly that the 
government was wrong to force the pace.57 They even claimed that the Australian government was 
likely to make a unilateral declaration of independence - cutting loose an unready and unwilling Papua 
New Gu inea.58 Although early in 1 974 Somare announced that Papua New Guinea should become 
independent on 1 December, he was also keen to assert that the date should be decided by Papua New 
Guinea, but the House of Assembly, the accepted voice of Papua New Guinea, was not easy to 
persuade.59 Both Somare and Morrison accepted the qual ification that independence would not take 
place until Papua New Guinea's ' home grown' constitution was debated and in place. That helped 
Somare placate some of the most cautious conservatives and confident nationalists. In the event it was 
the determination of the members of the Constitutional Planning Committee to complete their long and 
detailed document that forced delay. 60 After accepting successive postponements, Somare in June 1975 
introduced the motion setting 16  September as independence day. It was passed quickly and easily.6 1 
While the course of events was being determined in Papua New Guinea the differences between 
government and opposition declined. In the House of Representatives Morrison presented an 
unacknowledged quote: 
The self governing period is a difficult one for both Papua New Guinea and A ustralia. While 
Australia understandably wishes to end its responsibility for a people now finding their own 
ji1ture in their own way the Papua New Gui1Zea Government is equally keen to finish with the 
fhtstrations of a self governing period and stand as an idelltity in its own right in world 
af]airs.62 
Peacock interjected, 'Those are my words'. They were not; they were Somare's. But the interjection had 
demonstrated the extent to which Somare, Peacock and Morrison by then favoured the same policy and 
even the same choice of words. 
When the Austral ians debated the final changes to the Papua New Guinea bill in August 1 975 speakers 
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were more concerned with h istory than with the immediate legislation before the house, or even with 
the fact that th is was the culmination of Australian responsibil ity for the administration of two 
territories. Whitlam referred to the pledges that he had given on behalf of the Labor Party and the 
Austral ian people five and six years earl ier. 63 Morrison recalled the pol icies of Eddie Ward in the 
immediate postwar, and skipped over the intervening thirty years. 64 But Peacock said that the ' reality' 
was that ' the really effective steps towards self government and independence were taken in 1970'.65 
l ie went on to praise Gorton and Barnes before making a claim for h is own contribution. In his 
speeches, he said, he had ' constantly reiterated the positive goal of independence', and he had taken part 
in the first ' government to government' talks on the transfer of powers. Like Whitlam, he obtained the 
indulgence of the House to incorporate into Hansard a speech that he made in 1 972 on future relations 
between Austral ia and Papua New Guinea.66 As the Australians came together again at the end, they 
d iv ided on history . 
In apportion ing praise and blame, I have kept to the pol iticians and to public statements of policy. 
Inevitably th is has in part ignored the contributions of public servants such as Les Johnson and David 
I lay. But if the focus is l imited in th is way then the major publ ic decisions were made by Gorton and 
Barnes. Whitlam was certainly influential, but it was as leader of the opposition when his intervention 
helped provoke Gorton to act, and provided him with arguments to persuade h is reluctant colleagues 
and conservative Papua New Guineans. Peacock was effective at implementing the new program 
announced by Gorton and Barnes. In Papua New Guinea Somare was able to form a coherent group 
with the confidence of the house, convince cautious members that they could and should be self­
governing in less than eighteen months, and that the next step should be taken quickly and it would take 
them to complete independence. Whitlam has been blamed for th ings he did not do, Peacock praised 
for determining what in fact he briefly managed, Somare has been praised for dragging reluctant 
Austral ians to independence when he was sometimes trailing their plans, but he was certainly important 
in leading Papua New Guineans to self-government and independence. 
In crude summary: Wh itlam said first and often that i t  should be done, he wanted to do it, he gave a 
justification to others who wanted to do it, he was there when it was done, but he did not do it. Peacock 
was enthusiastic and efficient about it, and he directed a critical part of i t, but he did not do it either. 
Barnes d id not want to do it, he did not want anyone else to do it, but he announced the policy that 
made sure it would happen. Gorton may not have thought much about it, but when it came to his 
attention he said to get on with it, and took several decisions that were important in making sure i t  did 
happen. Michael Somare wanted it, he persuaded some other Papua New Guineans to want it or to let 
it happen, he helped decide when it would happen, and that once started it would be complete. 
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Nugget, Pike, et al .  The Role o f  the Reserve Bank o f  Australia 
in Papua New Guinea ' s  Decolonisation 
R . .J. May (Political and Social Change, ANU) 
Much of the literature on decolonisation suffers from a tendency to portray the colonial power as monol ithic 
and its motives as simple. This propensity tends to vary directly w ith commentators ' distance from the 
process. Increasingly, I read references to decolonisation in Papua New Guinea which describe events that, 
as someone involved, I have difficulty recognising. (From 1957 to 1972 I was employed by the 
Commonwealth - Reserve Bank, in the Research Department and from 1970 as senior economist in the 
PNG Department. In 1 972 I left the Bank to become field director of the ANU's New Guinea Research 
Unit but was appointed to the board of the Bank of PNG in 1973.) In virtually all decolonisations different 
actors hold a range of positions, from opposing independence to being in its vanguard. There were Papua 
New Guineans who resisted the transition, as well as those who promoted it, and colonial officials who 
sought to hasten it, as well as those who sought delay: among both were people whose position changed. 
This paper recal ls one aspect of PNG 's  decolonisation :  the transfer of control over the banking and 
monetary system. It focuses on the role of the Reserve Bank of Australia. The Bank's interest in PNG began 
early, on the initiative of its governor from 1949 to 1968, Dr H.C. ( ' Nugget' )  Coombs - a man in the 
vanguard of much that has been good in Austral ian life. Coombs recruited Dr P .W.E.Curtin to carry 
forward the Bank 's  work in PNG; and the Bank' s  PNG Department, under Curtin and M.J. Phil l ips, 
pursued a strategy which sometimes met resistance from the Austral ian government, the Administration 
and even the Bank itsel f. 
In the begin ning 
Coombs records that during the Second World War the Department of Post-War Reconstruction (of which 
he became director-general in 1943) gave thought to issues of regional planning, including plans for the 
development of PNG. 
As Director-General of Post-War Reconstruction I had been involved in the planning of 
the transition in Papua-New Guinea from militmy Government to civil administration, 
and in the measures to rehabilitate those residents of the Territories adversely affected 
by the war and to promote the economic and social reconstruction generally. 
By 1946 these gave prim my emphasis to the development and welfare of the indige11ous 
inlzabitants1 
This 'primary emphasis ' was expressed in 1945 by External Territories Minister Eddie Ward : 
17zis government  is not satisfied that sufj"icient interest had been taken in the Territories 
prior to the Japanese invasion, or that adequate funds had been provided for their 
development and the advanceme11t of the native i11habitants . . . .  
In fillure the basis for the economy of the territory will be  native and European industry 
with the limit of no11-native expansion determined by the welfare of the natives generally2 
I do not know what influence Coombs may have had on this statement, but there is certainly some 
coincidence in the views recorded by Coombs and Ward.3 
In 1949 Coombs became governor of the Commonwealth Bank of Austral ia4 and 'brought to the banking 
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problems of the Territories some famil iarity with their economic and social contexts ' .  At that time, PNG 
was an extension of the Austral ian banking system; initially two commercial banks operated there : the 
Commonwealth Banking Corporation and the Bank of New South Wales; in the 1950s they were joined 
by the Austral ian and New Zealand Bank and the National Bank of Australasia. All four were 
overwhelmingly directed towards the ' expatriate ' sector and the Administration, though the Commonwealth 
Savings Bank made early efforts to mobilise sav ings.5 Any attempt to extend banking would have been 
hampered by the Transactions With Natives Ordinance, which (until 1963) rendered transactions in excess 
of $ 100 'unlawful and void as against a native ' .  Monetary pol icy also applied uniformly across PNG and 
Austral ia. 
In 1 953 a New Gu inea Committee was set up within the Commonwealth Bank. It was to ensure that funds 
deposited in 'New Guinea' were ' reasonably employed ' in the interests of ' New Guinea itself' ; to consider 
what action the Bank could take to promote village cooperatives; and to oversee Jong-term educational and 
training to enable ' natives ' to participate in the Banks ' administration. The same year a working committee 
of ANU (Spate, Belshaw and Swan) was commissioned ' to investigate the economic structure of the 
Territory with a view to suggesting gaps in knowledge which it is most essential to fill and lines of advance 
which hold most prospect of producing positive results ' .6 Again, I do not know whether Coombs played 
a part in in itiating this study (his relations with ANU were close) but an economist from the Bank (Don 
McKenna) was attached to the working committee in Canberra for several months, acting as general l iaison 
officer between the committee and the Department of Territories and doing much of the committee's 
statistical work - and (presumably) keeping Coombs informed. Although the working committee suggested 
that it had ' found little to say which has not been said before' , its report provided an important critique of 
past policies and its discussion of future prospects and proposals for a ' native-oriented polity '  and ' native-
based production ' anticipated many later developments .7 Coombs recalls that the report 'criticized all the 
banks for the failure to support New Guinea development, particularly the native agriculture upon which 
they bel ieved the development should be based '8 and says that following the report ' . . .  the Commonwealth 
Bank carried out studies of the native economy to test how far the existing state of knowledge and 
experience of the money economy provided scope for lending ' ,  and that a ' modest beginning' was made 
to employ and train indigenous staff. 9 
In 1959  the Bank commiss ioned a study of ' the use of money and the need for credit by the indigenous 
people ' ,  to inform its efforts at developing a financial system appropriate to changing economic and social 
conditions. The study, carried out by J .R.  Thomas, an economist with the Bank, and Sydney University 
anthropologist Dawn Ryan,10 made a number of recommendations for financial education and development, 
including the recommendation that the Bank consider the establishment of credit unions. 
In the same year, the central banking functions of the Commonwealth Bank were transferred to the new 
Reserve Bank, which began operations in 1960. In August the Bank opened a branch in Port Moresby. Its 
first report (Reserve Bank of Australia, Report and Financial Statements) [hereafter RBA Report] 1960) 
noted that the central bank ' has for some years taken a special interest' in PNG and that a Port Moresby 
branch 'will enable it to carry out its central banking functions in the Territory and to keep informed of 
problems that face banks in this changing environment ' .  
The Reserve Ban k in PNG 
The Bank 's role in financial and economic policy making 
Initially, the Bank's  central banking functions were largely confined to acting as banker to the 
Commonwealth government and the Administration, distributing notes and coin, assisting the Department 
of Territories and the Administration with loan raising, and maintaining a stock registry; but as political 
and economic development accelerated, the Bank's  role increased. The 1964 report stated: 
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In addition [to providing 'the normal range of central banking services'], research activities in 
relation to the economic and financial development of the Territory have been expanded and, in 
association with the Administration and the trading banks, the Bank has been actively engaged 
in encouraging the development of a financial and banking structure suited to the particular needs 
of the Territory. 
In November 1 958 Coombs appointed, as senior research economist (international affairs) in the Bank's 
Research Department, Dr P. W.E. ( ' Pike ' )  Curtin. Curtin, a fellow Western Austral ian, had worked with 
Coombs in Post-War Reconstruction and had been director of the Colombo Plan Bureau in Sri Lanka, and 
chairman of the Commonwealth Public Service Board. He was an unorthodox economist of Fabian 
persuasion. Curtin provided the nucleus of what in 1965 became the Bank's  PNG Div is ion. 
Towards the end of 1960 a meeting of the Bank's  internal Central Banking Advisory Committee (CBAC) 
considered a paper on the Bank' s activities in relation to PNG, drafted by Curtin .  On the basis of this, 
CBJ\C concluded that the Bank should explore the scope for possible action through : edcuation and 
training of natives in finance and commerce; employment and training of native staff; financing of 
promising developmental projects; and collection and publ ication of basic statistical and economic data. 
It was also resolved to l iaise with CSIRO and other relevant research teams and to continue financing 
research projects through the Rural Credits Development Fund. 1 1  Responsibility for planning of studies 
and courses of action was given to a CBAC subcommittee, the TPNG Committee, headed by one of the 
Bank's advisers, AW. Elvery; the work was to be done primarily within the Bank's  Research Department, 
includ ing that Department' s Rural Liaison Service, under Curtin. 
Shortly afterwards Curtin visited PNG, accompanied by John Phillips12 from the Bank' s Rural Liaison 
Service and Eric Fleming from the Bank's Bonds and Stock Administration. On their return, a further paper 
was presented to CBJ\C, which recommended that credit unions be established; that a meeting of banks 
and the Department of Territories plan joint advertising and promotion of savings ( ' thrift' ) ;  that a liaison 
officer be appointed for PNG; and that the Bank make clear its feeling ' that there should be a forward move 
in lending to ind igenes . '  On the last point, CBAC thought it l ikely 
to be some time before the volume of native borrowing would warrant consideration of 
a separate advance or credit policy for the Territory . . . .  However, as we are asking the 
banks to make special efforts in the Territory, the Committee feels that it should consider 
what would be involved in having policies differing from those required in Australia. 
It proposed a meeting with banks, at which 
. . .  we should tactfully suggest means of adapting the structure, staffing and policies . . . to 
meet the growing requirements of the indigenous people . . . .  It is important that the banks 
be persuaded that T.P.N. G. should be regarded as a separate entity rather than merely 
as an extension of Australia. 
A meeting was held with the banks early in 196 1 ,  but achieved little. 
Subsequently, the Bank announced a program of education in money, savings, banking and credit for Papua 
New Guineans, to be carried out in collaboration with the Department of Territories, the Administration 
and the banks in PNG, and Phillips was posted to Port Moresby, with the designation ' special duties, 
monetary development ' .  In 1962 Phillips 's  staff was increased and he was joined by a Papua New Guinean, 
Robin Kumaina, seconded from the Administration. 13 By then a booklet entitled Your Money, in Engl ish, 
Tokpisin and ' Pol ice Motu ' ,  had been distributed and other publications were in preparation. (By 1966 
100,000 copies of the English version of Your Money were in circulation.) The Bank's Port Moresby staff 
steadily grew in the early 1960s, with an increasing proportion of Papua New Guinean staff, and in 1964 
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work began on a new building (in the early 1970s the Reserve Bank building dominated the down town Port 
Moresby landscape) .  By the early 1960s the Reserve Bank had thus established a s ignificant presence and 
initiated local isation, had begun financial education, and was becoming increasingly involved in research 
into and monitoring the economy. 
In 1963 the Austral ian government requested the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IB H.D) to survey the PNG economy. The controversial 'World Bank Report' was presented the following 
year. Apart from observing that bank lending to indigenous borrowers was small and that ' Indigenous 
employment in banking, apart from the lowest levels is virtually non-existent' ,  and advising that a separate 
monetary system would not be advantageous, the Mission had l ittle to say about money and banking. 14 Its 
main recommendation was that, to mobilise credit to finance its economic development proposals, a 
Development Finance Company should be establ ished. (This was l ater done, in the form of the PNG 
Development Bank, and a Reserve Bank officer, John Beach, was seconded as deputy managing director.) 
Curtin provided one of the first public commentaries on the World Bank Report - concluding, cryptical ly, 
that ' no one with a sense of colonial realities can do other than agree, in the main, with the commendations 
of th is World Bank Mission ' 15 - and the Council on New Guinea Affairs, of which Curtin was a board 
member and sometime secretary, and to which the Reserve Bank provided funding, organised two seminars 
(in Melbourne and Goroka) to d iscuss it. At the Goroka seminar, attended by Gough Whitlam, Coombs 
presented a paper. In it, he endorsed the assumption ' that it is the Austral ian Government's intention . . .  to 
try to keep ahead of the demands of the local people ' in the transfer of political power, and expressed 
dissatisfaction with the World Bank Report 's  ' lack of precision in dealing with the task of stimulating 
indigenous enterprise ' ,  before going on to outline the work of the Reserve Bank in creating, developing and 
guiding an emerging financial system.1 6  
In 1 965, in accordance with a recommendation of the World Bank Report, the Australian government 
created the position of Economic Advisor to the PNG Administration, 1 7 and an Australian economist then 
with the Prime Minister' s Department, Bill McCasker, was posted to Port Moresby. In 1967 and 1968 
McCasker' s office produced two important documents, Economic Development of Papua and New Guinea 
and Programmes and Policies for tlze Economic Development of PNG, as a bas is for future economic 
pol icy direction. 'Ibey broadly followed the strategy proposed in the World Bank report, concentrating on 
areas of high economic potential and assuming a continuing major role for expatriate enterprise. The 
documents provoked a l ively debate, notably in successive issues of New Guinea. One of the first critiques 
came from Curtin, who argued that by adopting general economic development - as opposed to the 
development of the indigenous people and their economy - as the overriding policy objective, 
We are in danger of building an economy to which New Guinea society will be unable to 
adapt itself; and wlziclz tlze New Guinea statesmen of the future will be unable to control1 8 
In April 1964, at Coombs's request, a ' Plan of Work for TPNG '  was prepared, considering the activities 
the Bank was likely to become involved with ' over the next few years ' (the assumption was that the 
Territory would move towards self-government in this period), and appropriate administrative structures 
within the Bank. Among subjects addressed in this workplan and a series a CBAC memoranda were 
separate currency; possible expansion of the Bank' s  role as adviser to the Administration (which was seen 
as likely lo 'necess itate a major expansion in our research activities ' in Port Moresby and Sydney); and a 
separate monetary policy for PNG. Consideration of the last of these culminated in a policy decision in 
1966 that bank lending in PNG should no longer be subject to the Bank's  general lending pol icies, but 
should take account of needs and conditions in the Territory, 19 but without amendment to the Austral ian 
Banking Act. 
Administratively, the position of 'manager' for PNG had been created in 1963 (i .e . Curtin ' s  title changed) 
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and the next year responsibil ity for the TPNG Committee shifted from an adviser to the manager of 
Research Department; in 1965 the PNG Division came into being, and the Bank's operations became the 
responsibil ity of the Division. Also in 1963 a graduate research officer was appointed to the Port Moresby 
office.20 More importantly, as a result of a proposal first made within the Bank in 1 964, in 1966 an 
Advisory Committee on Central Banking (ACCENT) was establ ished for PNG. The advisory committee, 
which met two or three times a year to confer and advise on local banking and finance matters, comprised 
a senior Bank official from Sydney (the governor or his delegate), a representative of the Territory Treasury 
and nine permanent residents (initially five of whom were Papua New Guineans); it was serviced by the 
Bank' s research staff in Sydney and Port Moresby. The separation of lending policy and the creation of 
ACCENT were substantial moves towards a separate central bank. 
With a view to furthering its central banking role as banker to the Administration, in 1 965 the Bank also 
considered acqu iring a small portfolio of Administration securities (it was proposed to subscribe $250,000 
to the loan program in 1966/67). A proposal went to the Bank ' s  board for approval, but was opposed by 
Treasury in view of existing 'Commonwealth Government/Papua and New Guinea Administration financial 
arrangements ' ;  the board decided against the move. Five years later External Territories suggested to 
Treasury that the Bank give 'more positive'  support to the PNG loan program, following undersubscription 
of a loan to finance the first instalment of PNG's  equity in the Bougainville mine. (The Bank had provided 
short-term funding of $ 12.5 million . )  Treasury remained reluctant but the Bank provided capital funding 
to the PNG Development Bank and later acquired a small PNG security portfolio. 
From the mid 1 960s the Bank 's  work on and in PNG intensified. The Port Moresby office was given 
greater responsibil ity, and for the most part operated through the PNG Div is ion rather than dealing with 
indiv idual departments in the Bank. The Division reported half-yearly to the CBAC and annually to the 
Bank's board . From 1966-67 separate shadow accounts were kept for PNG operations (this had been 
proposed as early as 1963) and a TPNG Service staff classification system was introduced. From 1 969 
Savings and Loan Registry operations were separated from those of the Bank. Research activities were 
coord inated between Sydney and Port Moresby. In 1970 the PNG Div is ion was upgraded to a full 
department. 
Late in 1 968 a memorandum from Curtin argued that the time had come to look at a PNG banking 
ordinance, divorced from Austral ian legislation.2 1 Others argued, however, that separate legislation was not 
needed to give effect to the development of policies geared to PNG' s  needs, and Curtin ' s  initiative 
temporarily lapsed. A later memorandum from Curtin argued for exemption of trading banks ' business from 
the central bank ' s  statutory reserve deposit requirements and liquidity conventions, again without effect. 
Early in 1970 a major research project was initiated within the PNG Division to guide the Bank' s policy 
making in the run-up to self-government and independence.22 lbe project envisaged a study in four p arts, 
covering a review of past developments; an assessment of the present situation (including the relevance of 
Australian legislation and policy, and the adequacy of the financial system); an examination of prospective 
issues in future development; and an analysis of the implications for the Reserve Bank. Prospective issues 
were identified as : 
(a) Separate currency. 
(b) The role of a central bank. 
(c) The pattern of institutional development: 
( 1 )  Foreign entry. 
(2) Multi-purpose banks. 
(3) An indigenous bank. 
(4) The Development Bank. 
(5) Other specialist banks . 
(6) The future of the Sav ings and Loan movement. 
(d) The development of a market in financial assets. 
It was intended that staff in both Sydney and Port Moresby be involved. 
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The study was substantial ly complete when in July 1971 the Minister for External Territories proposed a 
Committee on Banking in PNG, comprising representatives from External Territories, Treasury, the 
Reserve Bank and the PNG Administration .  
Shortly before this, the Austral ian government had accepted the recommendation of the Select Committee 
(of the PNG I louse of Assembly) on Constitutional Development, that PNG should be prepared for internal 
self-government in the period 1972-76 . Banking was identified as an area in which ' suitable arrangements 
would need to be developed ' prior to self-government. The Committee '  s terms of reference directed it to 
make recommendations on the major elements of a framework appropriate to banking in PNG at self­
government and at independence; the lines along which the PNG banking system should be developed over 
the next few years ; and the nature and timing of the steps for setting up an appropriate banking system. 
Prospective currency arrangements were specifically excluded from the terms of reference. 
The committee, chaired by Gerry Gutman of External Territories, held its inaugural meeting in Canberra 
in September 1971 .  'The Bank' s representatives were J .B.  Wright (a former secretary of the Reserve Bank, 
then holding the title of adviser), .T .A. Kirkwood (of the Bank' s Banking Department), D.G. McKenna 
(who had recently joined the PNG Department, having previously been on secondment as deputy governor 
of the Bank Negara Malaysia), and the Bank ' s  deputy manager, Henry ToRobert. With the exception of 
ToRobert, these were men of essentially conservative disposition with little direct experience of PNG.23 
'!be senior Treasury representative, Harold Heinrich, revealed no empathy for developments in PNG.24 lbe 
first meeting was largely devoted to discussing possible extension of the terms of reference to include 
currency arrangements (the committee decided not to), and discussing publicity (it was agreed that low key 
publ icity of the Committee ' s existence was desirable and that banks operating in PNG should be 
approached for their views, but that ' no specific invitation would be extended to academics to express their 
views ' ). Three more meetings were held during 1971 ,  which considered a series of papers, mostly derived 
from the Reserve Bank' s research project and including (for the third meeting) a pro forma banking 
ordinance. 
By this time the des irability of local ising banking legislation had been underlined by an ' in principle'  
proposal from the Bank of New South Wales to register a subsidiary, to be called the First Papua and New 
Gu inea Bank Ltd, which would provide integrated trading and savings bank services. As early as 1963 the 
TPNG committee had suggested that banks operating in PNG be encouraged to transform their Territory 
branches into local subsidiary companies . In 1971 the PNG Department supported the idea of using the 
Bank of NSW's application as leverage to introduce a separate banking ordinance; but in the event the 
Bank of NSW was persuaded to hold off on its appl ication pending the report of the Banking Committee. 
J\lso, an informal application from the First National City Bank to open a branch in PNG - challenging the 
Austral ian pol icy of excluding 'foreign ' banks - was ' discouraged'  following discussion with Treasury, 
though the PNG Department expressed support for the FNCB's entry. 
The Banking Committee ' s  progress was, however, slow.  A note on the minutes of the fourth meeting 
(shortly before I left the Bank in January 1 972) made the comment: 
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It is disappointing, to say the least, to see that by December 1971 - the date initially set 
for completion of the draji prelimina1y report - the Committee has made so little progress 
towards a definition of issues, let alone a series of policy recommendations. The account 
of the fourth meeting reveals a lack of direction on major policy issues and the draft 
sum111a1y of recommendations is so trite as to be virtually usefuless, its only substantive 
content heing a negative one - that there is no necessity to do anything before self­
govemment. 
Such disappointment was heightened by the fact most of the substantive issues canvassed by the Banking 
Committee had been comprehensively addressed in the Reserve Bank before the Committee even met. 
J\n interim report was eventually presented in January 1972.25 It recommended that control of banking be 
transferred to local authorities ' as soon as practicable ' ;  that PNG should have its own central bank; and that 
the business of the Commonwealth Banking Corporation in PNG should be transformed into a PNG 
institution. However, the Committee did not expect ' any immediate demand for self-government' from the 
new House of Assembly to be elected in 1972, and proposed a timetable which extended into 1 974. 
Moreover the Committee commented that ' the ful l  implications of the legislative changes required to 
implement the transfer of banking powers . . .  have yet to be considered ' - although extensive documentation 
had been prepared in the Bank in 1 970 - and there were unresolved differences between External 
Territories, Treasury and the Bank as to the sequencing of transferring general banking powers, establishing 
a central bank, and granting full central banking powers. Indeed, in its response to the interim report 
External Territories argued that in recommending a central bank the report went further than the committee 
envisaged (suggesting that the term ' central monetary authority ' be used rather than ' central bank' , and 
that decisions about its nature and powers await discussion with the IMF). External Territories also stepped 
hack from the recommendation on the Commonwealth Banking Corporation, suggesting that its continued 
operation in PNG was still an option. 
The committee presented a number of arguments in favour of a separate central bank, but its 
recommendation was clearly influenced by consideration that ' an embryo central bank already exists ' and 
that training of Papua New Guinean staff and operation of a local Advisory Committee on Central Banking 
had been in itiated some time ago. 
From the early 1960s to the early 1970s, relations between those responsible for the Bank's PNG operations 
and the personnel of External Territories had been cordial, though not especially close. Curtin, Phillips and 
later myself had good relations with Gutman - who shared the Bank 's  generally progressive attitude to the 
pace of development in PNG; on the other hand, Curtin especially had little time, intellectually, for External 
Territories secretaries Warwick Smith ( 1960-1970) or Hay ( 1970- 1973), both of whom he saw as 
essentially conservative. Relations with Treasury, on the other hand, were never close and were sometimes 
antipathetic, reflecting in part a general ambivalence in relations between the Reserve Bank and Treasury, 
and in part the Treasury's apparent reluctance to embrace change in PNG. In contrast, by v irtue of its 
longstanding presence in Port Moresby, the Bank probably had closer working relations with the 
Administration, and later with Papua New Guineans, then either External Territories or Treasury. 
With the change of government which brought Whitlam to office in Australia, and the emergence of the 
Somare government in PNG, from 1972 the pace of change quickened and increasingly the initiative for 
change came not from Canberra or Sydney but from Port Moresby. In early 1972 a confidential 'Gearing­
Up Plan ' was prepared by officials in Port Moresby, listing activities to be carried out before self­
government (then expected in December 1 975); the l ist included a separate central bank and banking 
system . The establ ishment of a central bank and separate currency were identified as areas of potential 
conil ict between Austral ia and PNG.26 
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The Committee on Banking submitted its final report in December 1 972, and four months later the two 
governments announced agreement on future banking arrangements .  This included transfer of control of 
banks and financial institutions operating in PNG to local authorities; the establ ishment of a central bank 
based on the Port Moresby office of the Reserve Bank; the creation of a PNG Banking Corporation to take 
over the bulk of the business of the Commonwealth Banking Corporation; and the merging of trad ing and 
savings banking operations. A Central Banking Ordinance and a Banks and Financial Institutions 
Ordinance were passed by the House of Assembly in September 1972 and the Bank of PNG was launched 
the following month, with ToRobert as its first governor. At a launching ceremony Prime Minister Somare 
paid tribute to the Reserve Bank 's  ' foresight and planning ' .  
11ze savings and loan movement 
In 1 959 the 'lbomas-Ryan report had recommended the creation of credit unions as an appropriate means 
of drawing Papua New Guineans into the financial system. A follow-up survey by officers of the Bank in 
1960 ' found considerable interest and enthusiasm for the idea of credit unions, both in government circles 
and among such indigenous organisations as were contacted on the matter ' ,27 and in early 1961 Curtin and 
Phill ips, accompanied by Ell iott Elij ah of the Administration 's Cooperatives Registry, visited Fiji to 
examine experience with credit unions there before making a final commitment. A memorandum, written 
on their return, ' confirmed the view, already widely held, that the credit union type of activity had distinct 
possibilities as a primary train ing ground for the money economy' ,28 and recommended that the Bank assist 
in their establ ishment. There was support for the idea in the administration, specifically from the Co­
operatives Division; but since the latter Jacked the resources to set up credit unions the task was left to the 
Reserve Bank, with the expectation that the commercial banks would provide some support. 
Following a change in term inology, a Savings and Loan Societies Ordinance was passed in September 
1 96 1 .  In h is second-read ing speech the Territory treasurer, H.H.  Reeve, described the savings and loan 
societies as a ' type of "pre-banking" system' ,  intended to ' supplement' the banking system.29 It was 
intended that the societies should :  
1 .  l lelp to foster the habit of thrift among the people; 
2. Provide education for their members in the fields of finance generally and financial responsibil ity 
in particular; 
3 .  Enable the making of small loans for wise purposes which it would not be practicable for existing 
financial intermediaries to undertake; 
4. Play some part in fostering capital formation in the Territory; and, 
5 .  Place i n  the hands of members a valuable means of furthering their own development.30 
In its 1964 report (p .25) the Bank described savings and Joan societies as, 
. . .  in effect, small scale co-operative banks. Their main functions are to mobilize small savings and 
to provide credit in small amounts. At the same time, they enable the indigenous people to gain 
valuable training and practical experience in the running of financial enterprises. 
The following year, it referred to the savings and loan movement as ' a  sub-banking system designed to 
provide a stepping stone to the use of the established banking system and to an extent to supplement it ' .  
'lbe first savings and loan society was formed in  1962 and Papua New Guineans were recruited for  training 
in these operations. i\n officer of the Bank was appointed registrar of savings and loan societies and 
expatriate and indigenous staff were posted to Rabaul and Lae to encourage and assist in the development 
of societies and savings clubs. The commercial banks seconded several officers to the movement and 
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offices were established in Goroka, Mount Hagen and Kavieng. In June 1963 there were four savings and 
loan societies, with membership of 209 and funds of $6,256;  by June 1967 the number had grown to 1 89, 
with membership of over 10,000 and balances of $0.6 million. In 1966 a national Federation of Savings 
and Loan Societies was established, with funds from a levy on all society members, to provide some 
common services, includ ing insurance of members ' funds and the channell ing of funds between societies 
to enable a more efficient use of the members ' money. Also in 1966 a Gazelle League of Savings and Loan 
Societies was fanned, to provide advice, training, and audit facil ities to members, and organise a discount 
purchasing service. In 1969 the Gazelle League employed six staff - all indigenous (one being John 
Kapu tin) - and owned a building and vehicles. Another League was formed in the Eastern Highlands in 
1 967, on a more modest scale. (Among its directors were Hari Gotoha and Sosa Subi, two Gorokans 
referred to in Finney's Big-Men and Business. )31 
The history of the savings and loan movement has been recounted, atleast in part, elsewhere.32 The 
movement enjoyed rapid growth during the 1960s. Although the more successful societies were 
concentrated in Port Moresby and Rabaul - where better educated Papua New Guineans provided both a 
pool of relatively skilled manpower and source of income and demand for loans - adventurous young field 
officers enthusiastically set up savings clubs and societies throughout Morobe and the highlands (some of 
which cou ld not be relocated years later) . By the late 1960s, the movement was represented in fifteen of 
the eighteen districts. However, poor understanding of the functioning of societies and a chronic problem 
of non-repayment of loans had ' tended to undermine the societies' reputation and image among members ' ,  
and with only 4 1  per cent o f  members' funds invested i n  loans to members at June 1969, much o f  the effect 
of savings and loan activities was to transfer indigenous savings to the banks for on-lending to non­
indigenes. 33 These problems were only partially addressed in the early 1 970s. 
The development of the savings and loan movement represented an early and innovative initiative in trying 
to develop financial institutional arrangements appropriate to the needs of Papua New Guineans, when the 
commercial banks (with the minor exception of the Commonwealth Savings Bank) showed almost no 
interest in a Papua New Guinean clientele .34 In developing this cooperative credit system the Bank created 
a structure that was based fundamentally on the notion of self-help and was, at all levels, local ised to quite 
a high degree. 35 
Staff· development 
In its second annual report, in  1961 ,  the Reserve Bank noted that two Papua New Guineans had been sent 
by the Bank to Brisbane, to upgrade their secondary school qualifications. The following year another two 
were sent to Brisbane and one (Henry ToRobert) was enrolled in the Economics Faculty at Sydney 
University. In 1963 the Bank' s  report observed that indigenous officers were being trained to ' assume 
duties currently undertaken by Australians ' ,  and noted that six officers were undergoing further secondary 
training in Australia, including the first woman. Attempts to allocate further bursaries for study at Sydney 
Univers ity in 1 963 were unsuccessful, but a second Papua New Guinean (Nick Bokas) was enrolled in 
Economics the following year. ToRobert graduated in 1967 (becoming PNG 's  second graduate) and after 
attending central banking courses in Sri Lanka and Washington (at the IMF) returned as economic research 
officer in the Bank' s  Port Moresby branch, which was already being developed as an embryo central bank. 
With the establ ishment of UPNG in 1965, the Bank' s  1 967 report recorded that seven officers were 
undergoing further secondary training in Australia, five were attending tertiary institutions in PNG on Bank 
scholarships, and eighteen were taking correspondence courses. The same year the Bank announced the 
formation, in Port Moresby, of a Bankers ' College, a residential college which provided training courses 
for officers in the five banking institutions then operating in PNG. 
In addition to its own trainees, the Reserve Bank' s  PNG Division provided a point of contact for other 
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Papua New Guineans studying in Austral ia: both Bernard Narokobi (studying law at Sydney Univers ity) 
and Charles Lepani (Commerce at the University of New South Wales) spent vacations working in the 
Division, where they gained experience of central banking and economic analysis - and were able to discuss 
their university assignments with the Bank's research staff. John Kaputin (who was briefly employed with 
the Gazel le League of Savings and Loan Societies) was another occasional v isitor to the Bank's 
headquarters in Sydney. 
In 1964 the Reserve Bank had 20 officers in PNG, of whom 8 were Papua New Guinean; the following 
year, of a staff of 3 1 ,  13 were Papua New Guinean; by 1 967 the respective figures were 58 and 44. At a 
time when serious localisation had barely begun in the Administration, let alone in the private sector, and 
was virtually non-existent in the commercial banking sector,36 the Reserve Bank had thus achieved 76% 
localisation of staff and had put in place a substantial training program for its own staff and for the banking 
system generally. 
Moreover, in its Sydney head office, the Bank' s  PNG operations attracted the interest of some of the Bank's 
brighter young and middle-range staff, ensuring a l ively intellectual environment for the expanding Port 
Moresby office and especially for its emerging young graduate staff, who were encouraged to take part in 
public seminars and to publish.37 
'Ibis trend continued in the late 1960s and early 1970s, providing the nucleus for a well trained independent 
central bank. The first UPNG scholars graduated in 1970. By the early 1970s, however, it was clear that 
not all could become governor, and with the Administration and private sector making a belated effort to 
localise, many left the Bank for positions elsewhere. ToRobert remained, becoming manager in 1972 and 
the Bank of PNG's first governor the following year. Bokas also stayed, later becoming deputy governor. 
An incomplete l ist of those who left reveals just how much the Bank 's  far-sighted staff development 
initiatives contributed to PNG' s  post-independence leadership : it includes Paul Pora (who returned to the 
Western Highlands as a council clerk, subsequently becoming a prosperous businessman and prominent 
member of parliament), Sinai Brown (later secretary and premier of East New Britain), Tom Fox (sometime 
chairman of the PNG Investment Corporation), Pal iau Lucas (subsequently with the Central Planning 
Office and then Housing Commissioner, before returning to local politics in Manus), Elison Kaivovo (who 
became finance officer in the East New Britain provincial government), Eliakim To Bolton (subsequently 
a senior officer in the Department of Finance), Longas Solomon (seconded as finance officer in the East 
Sep ik provincial government and later PNG' s consul-general in Sydney) and Epel Tito (a savings and loan 
officer who was later Minister for Defence). 
When the Port Moresby office was transformed into the Bank of PNG in 1 973, 85% of its staff had been 
local ised including the entire female staff. 
The issue of separate cu rrency 
The question of whether PNG should have its own currency was raised in the Department of Territories 
as early as 1953. At that time the Reserve Bank opposed the idea, on the grounds that it was hard to 
imagine a PNG currency not fixed to the Austral ian dollar or supported by Austral ia, that it would be 
unlikely to yield worthwhile benefits to PNG, and that it would introduce confusion in trade, inconvenience 
to visitors, and additional work for banks and traders.38 Territories concurred. The issue was raised again 
nearby a decade later, first in the context of a forthcoming visit by an IBRD mission, and again in relation 
to the commencement of planning for decimal currency in Austral ia in 1966. On the latter occasion -
notwithstanding the opinion of the Reserve Bank' s manager in Port Moresby (Phillips), that if separate 
currency were l ikely to come within, say, ten years of 1966, its introduction with decimal isation would 
seem sensible39 - the prevailing v iew in the Bank, and the v iew passed on to the acting treasurer in Port 
Moresby, was that, 'we consider it better that the Territory should continue to use Austral ian currency' .40 
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The I B RD agreed, saying ' at this time a separate monetary system would not be to the economic advantage 
of the Territory ' .41 
In introducing legislation to implement decimal currency in 1964, the PNG Treasurer told the House of 
Assembly that, al though ' serious consideration' had been given to the introduction of a Territory currency, 
and al though ' It is elementary that working as we are towards the independence of the Territory . . .  a local 
currency will be introduced at some time or another' ,  the Administration believed that the interests of the 
Territory would be best served at that stage by the adoption of the new Austral ian decimal currency.42 
(Eight months previously the Minister for Territories had denied an ABC report that the Administration 
was considering a separate currency for PNG.) 
Over the next few years there was l i ttle reference to separate currency. Somare later said that in 1968 he 
had suggested that PNG should have its own currency, and ' hardly anyone took me seriously ' ;43 and in 
1 969 Curtin had supported separate currency at a Council on New Guinea Affairs Seminar.44 However, 
when in 1 970 the Reserve Bank embarked on a major study of the future of PNG ' s  monetary and banking 
system, possible future currency arrangements were on the research agenda. In October 1 910 a paper 
entitled ' Separate Currency - What is it All About? ' was presented to the Advisory Committee on Central 
Banking (ACCENT) in Port Moresby. Amongst other things it spel t out some of the advantages and 
disadvantages of integration into the Austral ian monetary system. Another ACCENT paper in June 1971 
d iscussed ' The Question of Currency Reserves in a Developing Country ' . In May 1971 a paper on 
' Separate Currency. A First Look at Questions of Implementation ' was discussed at a Reserve Bank staff 
seminar; it looked at alternative possible currency arrangements and what was needed to implement them. 
A copy of the paper was sent to External Territories. The same month a visiting UN mission recommended 
that, 
at a later stage the creation of a territorial currency, fully backed by the Australian dollar and 
ji-eely convertible into A ustralian currency, might be considered in order to facilitate the 
observation of monetwy transactions relating to the Territory. 
By this time, however, the issue had become a point of some contention. 
In April 1970, ANU Professor Heinz Arndt had addressed the Nuigini  Economic Society in Port Moresby 
on the subject of separate currency. Arndt argued, along the same l ines as the Reserve Bank's Port Moresby 
manager in 1 963, that national ist sentiment would demand a separate currency for an independent PNG 
and saw a strong case for its introduction well before independence, so that the step could  be taken in 
conditions of relative calm.45 Arndt' s view caused concern in the Administration, where it was believed 
that merely talking about the possibility of a separate currency could lead to an outflow of capital . The 
following month the Administration issued a press release (No. 661 ,  25 May 1970) which denied that any 
consideration was being given to a separate currency. (Similar denials were repeated in January 1 97 1  and 
October 1971 .)  "Ibe subject was raised again by academic economists at an ANZAAS conference in Port 
Moresby in August. About this time, also, the Reserve Bank' s PNG Department proposed to d iscuss the 
subject with Treasury and Territories but was informed that senior officials thought this inappropriate; 
instead, we arranged with Professor Arndt a seminar at the ANU, at which papers were presented by Arndt, 
Phillips, and Don Stammer. In August 197 1  I presented a further seminar on separate currency to the 
Nu igini Economic Society in Port Moresby, incurring the displeasure of the deputy administrator 
(Newman) and McCasker. What Newman and others failed to appreciate was that, apart from Newman ' 
s own statement in 1964, that ' it is elementary that . . .  a local currency will be introduced at some time' , 
the subject had been raised on several occasions, and discussed in the Bank' s Advisory Committee, and 
business people in PNG expected that such discussion should be taking place; when they denied that any 
consideration was being given, officials simply confirmed business people ' s  fears that a separate currency 
was to be introduced and that its effects must be bad (why else would the Administration deny that 
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consideration was being given to the subj ect when it was so obviously under discussion?) . 
For reasons that are not clear to me (but presumably had to do with the general paranoia about the subject), 
in July 1 970 Prime Minister Gorton had issued an edict that no study of currency should be undertaken 
without reference to him. When in 197 1 the interdepartmental Committee on Banking in PNG was 
convened, the subject of currency arrangements was specifically omitted from its terms of reference. At its 
inaugural meeting, however, External Territories Secretary David Hay suggested ' that the situation had 
changed considerably s ince then ' [July 1970] and that his minister would be prepared to seek the 
government's approval for a study of future currency arrangements if the committee thought that this was 
desirable or necessary. In fact, the Administrator had requested that the Committee's work be extended to 
embrace an examination of future currency arrangements, suggesting that the Administrator' s Executive 
Council would expect to be advised on the currency question.46 Under pressure from the senior Treasury 
representative (Heinrich), and with the concurrence of the Reserve Bank representatives, the Committee 
resolved not to widen its terms of reference; instead, it agreed that the Reserve Bank would prepare a paper 
setting out the policy options, to be considered by a working group comprising Treasury, Reserve Bank and 
External Territories officers.47 In a handwritten note of 30 September, following a phone conversation with 
Heinrich about how the issue was to be addressed, Curtin wrote, 
Mr Heinrich seems to be pemickety and ostrich-like about Currency. This question will 
not go away as a result of verbal quibblings. It's a question which, if ignored creates more 
troubles (and magnifies itself) than iffaced up to and at least ventilated. 
Correspondence between Curtin and PNG's treasurer, H.P. Ritchie, also reveal that by October 1971 PNG's 
treasurer, at least, had come to the view that ' the sooner PNG has its own currency . . . .  the better' .48 
In a letter to acting Treasurer McMahon (7 October 1971), Barnes accepted the Committee ' s decision, but 
expressed ' full agreement' with the Administrator' s  view and urged that the study be commenced at an 
early date. Two developments may have sharpened the minister's focus. First Gough Whitlam had asked, 
in the Austral ian parliament, whether the Committee on Banking was authorised to inquire into and report 
upon a separate currency for PNG. Second, in the context of rumours of an imminent Austral ian 
devaluation, primary producing interests in PNG had made representations to the minister pointing out that 
they would lose from such a real ignment and would seek compensation.49 In a letter worthy of Yes, 
Minister's Sir Humphrey Appleby, Treasurer Snedden responded: 'The question of currency is, as I feel 
sure you would agree, a delicate one with important political and psychological ramifications . . . .  For these 
reasons, I bel ieve that we should be careful not to seek to influence the wishes of the local people . . . .  ' 
Shortly after this the PNG House of Assembly passed a resolution urging the Australian government to 
restore the Australian dollar to its former parity with the US dollar, and the chairman of W.R. Carpenter 
Holdings Ltd. ,  at a company annual meeting in Port Moresby, observed that PNG was unable to counter 
international currency manipulation because it d id not have its own currency . Barnes again wrote to the 
Treasurer in early December observing that the government' s capacity to respond to questions about 
separate currency was l imited, 'because we have  del iberately refrained from studying the subject until 
recently ' ;  ' I  now regard the matter as urgent' , the minister wrote, and urged the Treasurer to extend the 
Committee's terms of reference. But Treasury maintained its opposition, and was supported by the Bank 's 
senior representative, Wright. 
Having finally had its role determined (it was to consider a paper, prepared by the Reserve Bank, to be 
cleared by Treasury, External Territories and the Bank, shown to the Administration, and then formally 
submitted to External Territories for submission to the Administrator), the currency working group met in 
Canberra in December 1 971 .  A substantial paper (' Currency Arrangements for PNG' ), based on the paper 
discussed at a seminar within the Reserve Bank in May 1971 ,  was considered . A diary note from the 
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meeting records that there was broad agreement on the contents of the paper, though Treasury wanted a 
comment on prospective profits from currency issue to be qualified ' to take account of the possibil ity that 
any profits from a note issue would be taken into account in the determination of the Commonwealth grant 
lo PNG' (an improbable possibil ity which in fact was never contemplated), and considered that comments 
on timing�0 were ' not appropriate ' .  It was agreed that a s impl ified version of the paper should be prepared 
for the Administrator, subject to the necessary departmental clearance, and another meeting was set for 
January 1972. In January, however, the Treasury representative failed to appear; on enquiry Ingevics and 
I were told that his supervisor (Heinrich) considered him ' too busy' to attend the meeting. 
I left the Bank soon after th is. In March I was told by former Bank colleagues that Treasury was attempting 
to either p idgeonhole or dilute the working group's paper, and was encountering l ittle resistance from the 
Bank' s  representatives on the Banking Committee. But as 1972 progressed, the action in respect of policy 
development for PNG shifted increas ingly from Canberra and Sydney to Port Moresby. In February 
national Pangu Pati president, Gavera Rea, was reported as saying that an independent PNG should have 
its own currency.5 1  In July ToRobert (who became manager of the Port Moresby branch in that month) 
complained that PNG was impotent to protect its interests against world currency movements while tied 
to the Austral ian dollar. 52 The same month, encouraged by Curtin, I submitted a paper examining 
alternative currency arrangements to New Guinea (May 1972), and at the request of Paul Ryan (secretary 
of the Chief Minister 's Department), prepared a simpl ified version of the paper for the Administrator's 
Executive Council (cabinet). 
In July 1973 Finance Minister Julius Chan announced that cabinet had decided that PNG should have its 
own currency as soon as practicable (but not before December 1974, and initially with Australian and PNG 
currencies in joint circulation). A Currency Working Group, chaired initially by Chan and later by 
ToRobert, was establ ished to coordinate planning for the currency. The new currency was introduced in 
April 1 975. In launching the kina and toea Prime Minister Somare said, ' to have our own national money 
has long been one of my dreams . . . .  It makes me very proud to see and receive this beautiful money ' . 53 
The Reserve Bank and d ecolon isation 
Due largely to the foresight of Coombs and the dedication of Curtin, the Reserve Bank became involved 
in PNG early and closely. It sought to assist in the development of a financial and banking system 
appropriate to PNG's needs, particularly through the savings and loan movement; it establ ished the 
foundations for an independent central bank; it was a p ioneer in training young Papua New Guineans for 
senior positions, and, for a while at least, it helped keep alive the d iscuss ion of a separate currency. 
Coombs, Curtin, Phill ips and others also promoted intellectual debate through their involvement in and the 
Bank' s  support of the Council on New Guinea Affairs and the Waigani Seminar. 
Frequently the Bank found itself pushing against an essential conservatism in Canberra (and sometimes in 
Port Moresby) . Ironically, as self-government drew near and the future of banking came under inter­
departmental review, representation of the Bank's views shifted largely from its PNG Department to other 
parts of the Bank, where attitudes were less progressive. But by 1972 the real action was not in Canbera 
or Sydney but in Port Moresby, where ToRobert and a staff of Papua New Guineans and committed 
expatriates carried forward the momentum of Coombs, Curtin and Phillips. ToRobert became probably the 
longest-serving senior appointment in independent PNG and the Bank of PNG a bastion of financial 
responsib il ity in an increasingly challenged financial system. That, perhaps, is the ultimate measure of the 
Bank 's  role. 
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Au stralian Com panies and the Challenge of Decolonisation: Bu rns Philp 
S cott Mac Will iam, Curtin University of Technology 
One of the least considered aspects of decolonisation in Papua New Guinea has been the nature and 
operations of firms, international and domestic, during this seminal moment. The subject was given 
popular as well as academic importance during and just after self-government and Independence, 
but there remains no re-assessment of the contending claims advanced at that time. 
S ince the claims were often made by protagonists in the political battles of that period, it is not 
surprising that the national ist character of the accounts was foremost. Thus, for instance, 
descriptions informed by the then-popular dependency position emphasised the relative 
powerlessness of the trans itional state when faced with the supposed superior capacities - including 
mobil ity - of major international, primarily Austral ian, firms. 1 The standard rebuttal of such a claim 
was to enumerate, in a counter-factual, formally logical manner, the deficiencies of such a 
description. Thus, concluded Garnaut of the most substantial dependencist account, that of 
Amarshi, Good and Mortimer: 'The facts of the Papua New Guinea experience, as distinct from the 
authors' concoction, are not consistent with the predictions of the (dependency) theory'.2 
Here, a generation later, Burns Philp is re-examined as one of the pre-eminent international firms 
then operating in PNG. With unrestricted access to the company records, a more substantial 
account should appear than that constructed during the tussles which surrounded decolonisation. 
However this is not an attempt empirically to re-examine previous accounts, either of the primarily 
dependencist version or those advanced by its critics . Instead the intention is to place companies at 
the centre of another description of the transition from colonial to post-colonial state. With this 
focus, it can be shown that uncertainty is warranted for the firm which was then the largest 
non-min ing conglomerate in PNG, as well as the largest private employer. (I expect that the same or 
similar points could be made about other major firms, including Steamships and WR Carpenters .)  
I have previously shown how, contrary to the earl ier establ ished view, Burns Philp responded to the 
prospect of self-government and compulsory land acquisition on its plantation operations.3 Internal 
reorganisation as well as revital ization and reduction of approximately 20,000 acres in company 
largeholdings took place. Productivity increases, by replanting and new planting of coconut palms 
and cocoa trees, plus cost-cutting measures at a time of substantial wage increases, were attained on 
many holdings .  Not until the mid- l 980s did Burns Philp sell its PNG largeholdings, as part of the 
major re-direction of the firm that continues to the present. 
It is now possible to show how the reformed direction given to the plantation operations was part 
and parcel of a much broader change in the company as an international entity .  This change had 
begun in the mid- 1960s, and coincided with the retirement of managing director James Burns and 
long-serving general manager Joseph Mitchell . The indeterminacy of pol itical outcomes in Papua 
New Gu inea assumed continuing importance at the very moment when the new management 
grappled with declining profitability for the whole firm, operating in Australia, the USA and the 
UK, as well as in the South Pacific. As returns from its massive investment portfolio declined, 
Burns Philp shipping operations faced heightened competition and cost pressures, including wage 
and working conditions demands from mil itant, self-confident Australian unions. An Austral ian 
network of stores in country towns, built up after World War II, became less profitable, prompting 
efforts to reorganise and sell these shops. In Papua New Guinea, where Burns Philp's merchandise 
operations had targeted primarily expatriate state employees and European settlers, the end of 
expansion and reduction in the number of positions filled by expatriates also forced reform upon 
company management. In Fij i  the firm was under competitive pressure, especially from Indian 
135 
traders . 
In short, a dangerous decl ine in profitability made it imperative that company management respond 
strategically to any and all conditions which heightened the uncertainty of accumulation. 
Consequently PNG conditions of the same period, while important for management calculations, 
were always assessed in conjunction with other threats, including the appearance in the late 1960s 
of British takeover special ist and asset-stripper Slater Walker on the Australian share market. Thus 
the very profitability of some PNG operations, especially the rapidly expanding motor vehicle sales 
section, made these activities important for the whole firm at a time when many other assets were 
under-performing. Similarly Burns Philp's immediate post-Independence expansion in PNG, 
including attempts to develop hotel and other tourism-related ventures, was made on the basis of 
international calculations of profitability, which always emphasised the uncertainty of accumulation 
in any particular territorial space. 
A sense of the uncertainty as well as the revitalisation of the firm's operations then being attempted 
was given in 1977, after PNG's Independence, by Burns Philp's group general manager, in evidence 
to the Australian Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. Mr P.C.Best stated: 
11iere has been an inference drawn over previous years that we were withdrawing from the 
islands. This is not so. We are continuing in our island operations but what we need to do 
is to accelerate the growth of our Australian activities which have been going backwards 
and not forwards. 4 
Indeed, as Best was well aware, the firm was at that moment engaged in substantial new 
investments in Fij i  and Papua New Guinea, as well as Australia in an increasingly anxious drive to 
transform operations. Transformation was necessary because the firm which had once been in the 
vanguard of Australian companies had become 'only average' in terms of the ratio of after-tax 
profits to shareholders' funds. 
The first part of the paper shows how, in the previous decade, the firm had reached a major turning 
point, with a new management attempting to revital ise one of Austral ia's oldest trading firms during 
a period when the long post-war boom came to an end. That is, contrary to the common assumption 
that Burns Philp faced the political circumstances of decolonization from a position of commercial 
strength , the firm was more vulnerable than it had ever been. An episode in the firm's Papua New 
Guinea operations is now examined to show the distance between the popular characterisation of 
Burns Philp and the view from 7 Bridge St. , Sydney, the head office of the group's parent company. 
The episode, used repeatedly by radical national ists to show Burns Philp's omnipotence and 
duplicity in the immediate pre-Independence period, was the sale of 26% of Burns Philp (New 
Guinea) to the newly established PNG Investment Corporation (PNGIC). Contrary to the 
establ ished vers ion, of a firm deftly manipulating circumstances to maximum advantage, it can now 
be shown how senior management in the PNG subsidiary as well as at head office were subject to 
circumstances beyond their control which threatened attempts to rebuild profitability .  The 
circumstances - including decolonisation - only heightened the uncertainty surrounding moves to 
reposition the firm as a corporate leader. 
Bu rns Phil p-from Flagship to Sin king Ship? 
By the early 1960s, while dividends still flowed to shareholders,  as they had done since World War 
II from the principal subsidiary companies and the main firm, the directions followed by an 'old 
guard' of senior managers no longer kept the firm in the ranks of Australia's most profitable 
companies. In particular, as yearly profits were increasingly turned into passive investments, Burns 
Philp drifted. With managing director James Burns in his eighties, and general manager Joseph 
Mitchell over ninety when he retired in 1966, the firm occupied an especially vulnerable niche in 
the Austral ian corporate structure. Although James Burns, Mitchell and another octogenarian 
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director retired almost simultaneously, even their replacements represented considerable continuity 
with the past of the 'merchant and shipowners' firm established to operate first in eastern Austral ia 
and then in the South Pacific eighty years earl ier. 
The sen ior management replacements, including the third generation of the founding Burns family, 
Chairman J .0.0.  Burns, had chafed at the stagnation and came to office determined to implement 
changes . However it was the 1968 appearance of British corporate raider Slater Walker on 
Austral ian share registers which really alerted Burns Philp's management to the urgency of their 
position. Far from being ' immune to take overs and asset-stripping raids because of the nature of its 
in terlocking ownership' as its critics claimed a decade later,5 at the end of the 1 960s Burns Philp's 
management had to engage in unprecedented defensive measures, some of which raised criticism in 
Australian corporate circles regarding their legal ity and propriety. One particular measure, a ' share 
swap'  with Mauri Bros and Thomson was inspired entirely by the threat which Slater Walker posed 
to both firms.6 That is, this particular inter-locking share exchange was constructed from a position 
of weakness, not strength . 
Over the next decade, the share portfol io was reduced substantially. These funds, as well as profits, 
and for the first time in the firm's history, major borrowings, were invested in takeovers and new 
ventures . Many of the acquired operations were in areas with l ittle connection to the firm's previous 
areas of operations, as senior management tried to 'p ick winners' in an increasingly volatile 
investment cl imate. It was in this period that the firm began the shift in strategic direction, from a 
primarily trading company to the international manufacturing conglomerate of the present. 
But in order to restrict the level of borrowings, needed for expansion, existing activities had to be 
made more profitable, even if over-all conditions made such efforts difficult. At the same time, 
management were aware that the political climate, in the South Pacific and Australia, was turning 
against them. (The firm later re-arranged operations in Fij i and the New Hebrides-Vanuatu, as well 
as PNG.) Redirection had to include a strategy for deal ing with political opposition, as well as 
decl ining profitability in areas of previous activi ty, and grasping new opportunities for investment. 
Plantation operations in PNG epitomised the mixture of political opposition and commercial 
difficulties. These were operated through subsidiaries of the Head Office and not BP(NG), with 
plantation inspection, appointments of managers and nearly all strategic decisions taken and 
implemented without direct reference to management in the latter firm. As probably the largest 
private landowner, with holdings throughout coastal and island PNG, the firm was well aware of the 
growing mil itancy of squatters and other indigenous demands for compulsory acquis ition. Indeed, 
during 1 973 and 1 974 BP devised a relatively sophisticated strategy for dealing with the threat to its 
plan tation ownership, trading undeveloped and less profitable land for a greater meassure of 
security on the better holdings where a re-investment programme gained considerable political 
kudos.7 
However this strategy was itself a negotiated, less than desired, outcome, a consequence of the 
failure of another preferred direction.  Indeed, the preferred direction bore a remarkable similarity to 
the post facto description of events constructed by Donaldosn and Turner, cited below, who 
understood Burns Philp's need for political support but not the barriers in the way of the firm 
obtain ing i ts in itial objectives. To understand the point, it is necessary to turn to the controversial 
purchase by the PNGIC of equ ity in Burns Philp(NG). 
Bu rns Phi l p  and the PNG In vestment Corporation ' s  Share Purchase 
In 1 978, Donaldson and Turner repeated what had become the standard description of Burns Philp 
(New Guinea)'s 1 972 sale of one eighth of its equity to the PNGIC, claiming: 
As tlzey had done in the blackbirding days, BPs had turned adversity to 
advantage . . .  insur[ingj themselves against expropriation, [finding] a buyer when business 
confidence in Papua New Guinea was low . . .  made the new buyer of 12.5% pay more for 
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the shares than they were really worth, and made more capital available for expansion 
within Australia. 8 
This claim first appeared four years earlier, in late September 1974 through a parliamentary 
question lo Chief Min ister Michael Somare, and in the University of Papua New Guinea student 
paper.9 The latter claimed, regard ing the PNGIC purchase of shares in BP(NG): 
The A ustralian capitalists are now leaving and they are making damn sure that they are 
going to take as much out of the country with them as they can. For a number of years they 
have been smuggling out the wealth of this country by cheating and deliberate 
no11 -disclosure of their activities, supplemented by blatant lies. . . .  What is even more 
sickeni11g, if we are to believe the rather convincing evidence unearthed by Mr Greg01y . . .  is 
that these firms are robbing this counl1y with the active connivance and support of the 
Government, or rather white wantoks in the Public Service who still hold all the positions 
of real power behind all the black flower pots. . .  The Investment Corporation is nothing 
more than a disinvestment coporation for expatriate businesses. 
Burns Philp management held an entirely different v iew, frequently describing the negotiating 
stance adopted by PNGIC, as well as Austral ian government and colonial officials, as 'blackmail ' .  A 
brief outl ine of the opening positions in negotiations as well as the final outcome makes it possible 
to shine a different l ight on the PNGIC equity purchase than has hitherto been presented. 
When discussions began between Burns Philp(NG) managing director Bert Goodsell and 
Investment Corporation officials in late 1971 - early 1972, the former was in regular contact with 
I IO Sydney about the direction to be pursued in negotiations. Senior management in both locations 
was in agreement about the strengths and weaknesses of the company's over-all position, although 
the 
PNG management was much more subject to moods of optimism and pessimism. As the HO 
General Manager M.' Dan ' O'Connor stated in a file letter to Chairman of Directors JOO B urns in 
February, 1 972, following a lengthy letter from Goodsel l :  
If we are vulnerable at all  in PNG, undoubtedly our main area of vulnerability lies in the 
plantations and I have always felt that a share placement [with the PNGIC], with the idea 
of givi11g the indigene a feeling of participation in a profitable local ente1prise, should 
encompass the plantation interests as well. He is less likely to tum a greedy eye on our 
valuable plantations if he realises that he has a vested interest in them (particularly if 
11atives are encouraged to accept positions as Plantation Managers) and I therefore like 
Mr Goodsell's idea of "bri11ging all our eggs into one basket " and selling the Plantation 
Companies to the New Guinea Company. 
Unfortunately for the firm there were substantial obstacles in the road of real ising such an objective. 
Apart from the fact that the principal threat to the plantations came from a certain category of 
indigenes, landless and landshort squatters, who were unlikely to be placated by the sale of equity in 
the plantations to the PNGIC, these obstacles arose in governing and not merely marginal pol itical 
circles in PNG and Australia. So substantial were the barriers that despite the best efforts of Burns 
Philp officials, the maximum they could ever obtain was the PNGIC taking a five year option-from 
1 973-to purchase the plantations, an option which was never exercised. The plantations were never 
transferred to BP(NG). 
The principal obstacles to BP attaining its initial objective were three. 
First, the PNGIC was as aware as Burns Philp of the uncertainty surrounding plantation operations 
but d id not see the matter in the same terms as company officials. However much squatters were 
' natives' to Burns Philp officials and the senior expatriate management of the PNGIC, they were a 
threat to many capital ist enterprises which depended upon largeholding ownership, regardless of the 
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race and nationality of the owners. PNGIC had no desire to buy into companies with substantial 
plantation interests, with one exception which can not be pursued here. 
Second, the Austral ian Government - and for the moment I can not be more precise than this - was 
opposed to the PNGIC investing in plantations, particularly util ising funds advanced by the 
Treasury. 
Finally, if the plantations were sold by BP to BP(NG), this would only exacerbate the problem 
which PNGIC was already having in trying to bring about a substantial equity purchase. Even 
without the plantations, valued by a firm of valuers at around $6 million but estimated by BP when 
reserves in plantation companies were included as around $ 10 million, BP(NG) was too big and 
costly a target for the fledgling PNGIC. Contrary to claims made at the time by critics, and repeated 
later by Donaldson and Turner (see above), the PNGIC could only offer considerably less than 
BP(NG) shares were valued at. Including plantations in the PNG firm would only make matters 
worse .  For the 1971172 year, BP(NG) accounts were expected to show a consol idated net profit of 
$2. 6 million, with shareholders' funds, after payment of an annual d ividend of $750,000, still 
amounting to paid up capital plus reserves and unappropriated profits of $20.75 million. That is, 
the target had to he reduced so the smaller enterprise could take a large enough 'bite' to make the 
equity transfer worthwhile, and include some PNGIC management control of BP(NG). 
It is the third obstacle which was most misunderstood by critics, and which also ensured that Burns 
Ph ilp's des ire for ' insurance' could only come at a hefty price. Making the PNGIC's 'bite' possible 
involved lengthy negotiations, which are not pursued here. In summary, the outcome required: 
(a) BP(NG) to reduce the price of shares to be purchased, from the $2 valuation per share placed on 
its shares in May 1972 by the Stamp Duties Commissioner in PNG, to $1 per share; 
(b) a transfer of $4million from revenue reserves of BP(NG) to BP HO by way of a special 
dividend, such sum to be lent back to BP(NG) as a loan to be repaid as funds became available; 
(c) BP(NG) declaring a further bonus of $3.5million, payable to BP HO, which 
would he utilised to purchase 3 .5 mill ion newly issued special $1  shares in BP(NG; (d)BP HO 
selling 1 .5 mill ion $ 1  shares in BP(NG) to the PNGIC, or 12.5% of the issued capital, with the 
possibility of a further 13 .5% being taken up in the near future; 
( d) the sale to PNGIC to be made possible by BP HO sell ing the 1 .5  million shares for $0.Smillion 
payable immediately, and the balance payable over three years ; (e) PNGIC to pay interest on the 
outstanding balance of the purchase price at 5 . 5% per annum, or a fixed interest rate when interest 
rates were cl imbing. 
In a June 23, 1972 telephone conversation on the outcome of negotiations between BP(NG) 
managing director Goodsell and BP general manager O'Connor, the former reported a conversation 
held recently with the (last) PNG Administrator which neatly summed up the company v iew of the 
result. Said Goodsell : 
As a matter of interest I had dinner with (Les) Johnson on Tuesday night . . . .  lie said ' We 
will be paying part of your sala1y shortly '  and I said 'Don 't kid yourself, we will be paying 
part of yours by the way the bargain has gone'. 
O'Connor's response to this report highlighted just how vulnerable the Sydney management was to 
criticism of the outcome in local financial circles, replying: ' I  believe there has been some talking 
regarding this in Sydney'. The company files show the thought which went into anticipating 
criticism at the joint BP-PNGIC press conference, held in Sydney on June 27, 1 972 to announce the 
deal, and further illustrate the sensitivity to charges that management had not satisfactorily 
represented shareholder interests in the negotiations.  
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Conclusion 
It should now be clear that earlier descriptions of the firm which tried to restore profitability and 
evade raiders in the late 1960s and early 1 970s are flawed, at least regarding its position in PNG 
during the transition to independence. In particular what has previously been described as a 
successful negotiation of the uncertainties of decolonization looked considerably different from 
with in the firm . The inabil ity to secure plantations against appropriation and acquistion through a 
share transfer to the Investment Corporation was only one register of how the firm's management 
saw the deal as less advantageous than they had initially hoped. 
The sceptic can of course say :  'Well, what else would one expect company officials to say ! '  
Certainly the conflicting v iews held by  company officials and  radical critics, past and present, are 
themselves hardly surpris ing. What is s ignificant is how decolonization in general in PNG, and the 
case of the PNGIC's equity purchase in particular, reflected a transformation in the firm as well as 
the conditions in which it operated. The politics of decolonisation included a reduction in the 
political power of the 'old' international trading firms, including Burns Philp, while the economics 
of the same moment meant a major transformation in the commercial operations of the company. 
Burns Ph ilp moved, in PNG and in Austral ia, from being a firm which had no long-term 
borrowings and operated on shareholders funds, reserves and profits to a condition of continuous 
indebtedness. The impl ications of this shift for its operations in PNG and elsewhere must wait for 
another time. 
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Mainland and Islands i n  the Decolonisation of Torres Strait Islanders 
Rose Elu, University of Hawai' i  
First I would l ike to thank ANU, and especially Professor Denoon, for giving me this opportunity to 
speak on Torres Strait Islanders in regard to Decolonisation. My talk will focus specifically on the 
pol itical struggle for self-determination and self management in the Torres Strait. The main question 
is : what constitutes colonisation in the case of Torres Strait, for the people and for me in particular? 
II ow and how far has there been decolonisation? 
I discuss: the existence of traditional political systems, 
non recognition of these pol itical systems, 
the introduction of the new political system, 
loss of pol itical power and control, and 
Torres Strait Islanders ' struggle to regain pol itical control. 
Before European contact, each of the islands was politically and economically independent. The people 
on each of the islands practised self determination and self management. Each island was autonomous 
and independent, each having their own political system, built around buway, totems and clans, heads 
of family, a clan/totem leader, and a buway (Kin-group) leader. They also had their own economic 
systems: self sufficiency was the goal , achieved by horticulture, hunting, gathering, fishing and trade 
and exchange. They had their own belief systems, involving ancestral spirits, totems, cultism/heroism, 
magic and sorcery and witchcraft. 
They were responsible for their own security and defence, for which purpose each community had its 
war chief and an army of warriors. They had their own laws, secular and spiritual; they had their own 
technology in their tools and weapons .  They had their own houses and canoes for sea transport. 
Each island was responsible for running its own affairs; and there was no common government or 
overarching political system to unite them. Instead, the communities were meshed by trade l inks and 
war all iances . Each island community was self-managed, and people on each island made their own 
decisions and determined their own future through their own pol itical system. 
In 1871 ,  however, with the backing of colonial governments in Austral ia, the London Missionary 
Society (LMS) moved in to the region, not only to convert the people to Christianity, but also to pacify 
or civil ise the islanders to make the job easier for the colonial government of Queensland to move in 
and take control of the islands. This was the first s ign of threat to the autonomy of each island, the 
tradition of pol itical independence, self management and self determination, their economic self­
sufficiency, and their power and control over their affairs. 
In 1 879 the colonial government of Queensland annexed all the islands and moved in to take control 
of them. In the process they introduced a quite new political system based on Western norms and 
procedures, appointed leading islanders as 'mamooses ' to represent the government locally, and created 
a system of native police. This intrusion involved the erosion of the islanders ' political independence. 
The trad itional pol itical system was either not recognised at all, or else ignored. Traditional leaders 
were removed from the exercise of power and control, which was central ised in order to regulate the 
affairs of the whole island group - a radical new concept for the islanders. 
Much later, the 'mamooses ' were replaced by appointed councillors, though some achieved this position 
through a form of local election. By this time however, European Government teachers were appointed 
to each island. These officials formally had total power and control over everything. They taught 
children and ran the schools, but they also administered the island, imposed and operated a curfew 
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system, and made decisions and gave orders over the whole field of law and order. This series of 
innovations meant that islanders were powerless. Therefore they were easily exploited, particularly in 
the area of wages. 
It seems that two significant changes have occurred in recent times. 
First has been a general move by Torres Strait Islanders to the South. This has been caused by the 
collapse of pearl ing in the early 1960's (which had been the export staple of the region from the late 
nineteenth century) . Meanwhile the population was increasing rapidly, and young men of working age 
were particularly attracted by the opening up of work opportunities for Islanders on the mainland. 
The second great change took place in the sphere of Commonwealth policy through the 1960s, but 
particularly after the election of the Whitlam Government in 1972. New policy priorities increased the 
opportunities open to Islanders, and reduced the old restrictions on them, in the Strait was well as on 
the mainland . This included education opportunities, and control of wage levels. The 1967 referendum, 
which led to the enfranchisement of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island people, also gave Islanders in 
the Strait a bit of leverage over the pol iticians. 
At this stage, Islanders were forced to change their l ife style. They were forced to adopt white values 
and enter into the cash economy. They were forced to make social and cultural changes in consequence. 
Many of these changes were enforced by the government' s cruel policies of 'protectionism' which 
subjected people to paternalist controls; the alternating policies of segregation and assimilation, and the 
integration of Island communities into the Australian mainstream. At the same time, and because of 
these policies, Islanders suffered enormous injustices in the specific forms of low wages, low standards 
of education, poor living conditions and consequent health problems, and sub-standard housing. Even 
though Islanders were aware of these injustices, they had no real political voice to do anything about 
their situation. 
The introduced political system under which they were operating, was carefully controlled by the 
government. Islanders who were appointed by the government as leaders (i .e . councillors) were afraid 
to speak out on these injustices, because they might lose their jobs. loose who did try to speak out were 
labelled rad icals and punished. 
The day that the government took power and control away from the islanders, is when the political 
struggle began, in order to regain self- management and self-determination. Even though the 
government had power and control over the islanders, they did not break the spirit of self determination. 
Throughout the colonial period, islanders continuously fought for better wages and conditions, better 
l iving standards, improved housing, more education and health facil ities, better transport, social 
benefits, and especially political control to run their own affairs . For example, in 1 936 Torres Strait 
Islanders working on boats demonstrated a real act of self determination by going on strike. It was a 
maritime strike and the biggest in the history of Torres S trait. The aims of the strike were islanders ' 
control of their own money, better wages and conditions, total control over their own affairs, and 
relaxation of the cruel rules on the islands, such as the curfew. 
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Decolonising Torres Strait :  a moderate p roposal for 2001 
Steve Mullins,  Central  Queensland University 
In December 1 992 a delegation from the Islands Co-ordinating Council (ICC), at the time the 
superior representative body in Torres Strait, met with Gareth Evans and Robert Tickner in 
Canberra to d iscuss a self-government proposal. They called for a form of association with 
Austral ia similar to that which existed with Norfolk Island. In the following year Getano Lui Jnr., 
Chair of the ICC, made a number of public statements about the aspirations of Torres Strait 
Islanders for self-government, most notably in his Boyer lecture, which made the point that there 
were a number of Austral ian territories with ' tailor-made' constitutions, and that there was ' no 
reason why a Torres Strait regional government could not be devised'. He described the suggestion 
as moderate, and thought that it would be appropriate if it could be achieved in the year 2001,  in 
time for the anniversary of the constitution. 1  
The idea that Torres Strait should be granted some form of political independence has been around 
for more than twenty years . It was first proposed by the Torres United Party (TUP), establ ished in 
1 976 by Torres Strait Islanders l iving in Townsville. In 1978 Carlemo Wacando, a founder of TUP, 
unsuccessfully brought a High Court action challenging the validity of Queensland's original 
annexation of the islands, and a number of appeals were made to the United Nations to have Torres 
Strait placed on the agenda of the Committee on Decolonisation. Although the Austral ian 
government was embarrassed by these appeals, especially in v iew of its stance in the United Nations 
on New Caledon ia, nothing eventuated and TUP fell silent in 1 98 1 .  
The independence issue resurfaced in 1987, this time advocated b y  George Mye, a senior member 
of the ICC and for many years Torres S trait's most prominent pol itical l eader. In June Mye cabled 
delegates to the South Pacific Forum meeting in Samoa, seeking support for Torres Strait 
independence. In the same year the issue received publicity when it was promoted during festivities 
to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the first meeting of Torres S trait Councillors . TUP was 
reactivated, its leaders Wacando and James Akee shifted their activities to Torres Strait proper, and 
an Independence Working Party was established at Thursday Island. The independence movement 
was now more broadly based. 
In 1989 attention was diverted by the creation of the Aboriginal and Torres S trait Islander 
Commission (ATSIC) . There were negotiations over the composition of the Torres Strait Regional 
Council, which rather than being elected in the same way as other ATSIC Regional Councils, came 
to be composed of members of the ICC, that is the elected Chairs of the 17 Island Councils. The 
ICC also argued successfully for an Office of Torres Strait Islander Affairs (OTSIA) and an 
appointed Torres Strait Islander Advisory Board (TSIAB) within ATSIC to look after the needs of 
the 20000 or so Torres Strait Islanders l iv ing outside the Torres S trait region, about 75 % of the 
population.  In June 1992 the Murray Island Land Case (the Mabo Case), which confirmed the 
continuing existence of Native Title on Murray (Mer), again inspired the independence movement, 
despite the High Court's rul ing that sovereignty remained with the Commonwealth. S ince then 
James Akce has declared secession twice: in September 1 993 and August 1995. 
This chapter considers recent moves towards self-government in Torres Strai t. It focuses on the 
prospects for the 2001 agenda, which despite widespread acceptance both local ly and at 
government level, received a setback when Paul Keating rej ected the idea in September 1 995 . The 
more ambitious independence movement is also examined, not only because it constitutes a political 
' flanking movement' which has kept the attention of the moderate leadership focussed on greater 
autonomy, but because despite the disgrace of its most prominent leader James Akee (now serving 
three years for the embezzlement of community funds), some of its policy positions strike a chord 
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with many Torres Strait Islanders. The paper also briefly examines the role in the de-colonising 
process of a new Torres Strait political institution, the Council of Elders . 
Three imperatives drive both the moderate and the more ambitious self-government agendas: the 
desire to assert a separate identity, not only separate from white Australia, but more significantly 
from Aboriginal Austral ia; the desire to preserve Ai/an Kastom; and the perceived need for 
economic independence, for Islanders to break the shackles of welfare colonial ism. These are the 
benefits that Torres Strait Islanders expected to flow from greater autonomy. Dissatisfaction with 
lagging economic development and a chronically depressed labour market, frustration over the 
workings of the 1985 Torres Strait Border Treaty, and a lack of influence over the allocation and 
prioritis ing of available resources, all find expression in the rhetoric of self-government. 
In the Strait itself the economic imperative has been decisive. Thirty years ago Jeremy Beckett 
noted that Islanders often expressed to h im their des ire for 'freedom'. Initially he took this s imply to 
mean that they wished to see the removal of the repressive Queensland administration and an end to 
discriminatory laws . However, on closer inquiry he found that much more was implied, and that the 
emphasis was principally economic. In the 1 950s Torres S trait Islanders wanted the things that 
other Austral ians took for granted, but were frustrated by what they perceived to be the obstructive 
pol icies of the administration . This frustration found expression in their notion of ' freedom'. 
Beckett concluded that for the Islanders 'freedom' did not mean 'a disengagement from Australian 
society, but rather a closer integration, without the mediation of administrators or missionaries' .2 
Obviously much has changed in thirty years, and closer integration with Austral ia is no longer the 
only avenue to prosperity. Many Torres Strait Islanders now agree with James Akee, that the 
legitimate aspirations of their people might be more effectively negotiated across an international 
boundary. 
James Akee's vision for Torres Strait has always been couched in terms of progress, economic 
development and breaking the grip of welfare colonialism. His supporters are well aware of his 
corporate and managerial approach. When he v is ited Thursday Island in November 1992 he 
declared that he was about 'private enterprise and hard work not hand outs with hardly any 
direction', and that he would ' move on projects that will make Torres Strait self-sufficient from any 
government funds' . 3 Perhaps it is ironic then, that the only s ignificant project secured by Akee's 
company, Torfish International, was the Community Development Employment Program (CDEP) 
contract with the Muralag Tribal Corporation which caused his downfall in 1 996. Nevertheless, it 
was while working on the CDEP contract that Akee orchestrated the first of his calls for secession, 
the September 1993 'Declaration of Sovereignty' . 
The ' Declaration of Sovereignty' document published in the local newspaper, the Torres News, is 
curious in several ways. Suffice to say that it bore the names of six men representing five island 
communities, and James Akee as Chair of the Torres United Party. The accompanying statement 
asserted that the group was in possession of a document signed by Queen Victoria proving that the 
original annexation of the Islands by Queensland was illegal . The document was never produced, 
but doubtless it related back to the 1978 case brought against Queensland by Carlemo Wacando, 
another signatory to the 'Declaration of Sovereignty'. The Torres United Party announced an 
interim government with James Akee as Prime Minister, and gave the Austral ian Government 21  
days to withdraw its people from the Strait.4 
As might be expected Akee's ' Declaration of Sovereignty' caused a stir in Torres Strait. Two of the 
most significant reactions were a notice in the following edition of the Torres News by the Erub 
Council of Elders (COE), and a public meeting at Anzac Park on Thursday Island on 7 October. 
The Erub Council of Elders (COE) repudiated the 'Declaration of Sovereignty' and emphasised that 
Erub COE member Dick Pilot, whose name appeared on the Declaration, had acted of his own 
vol ition and in no way represented the Erub COE or the community. Indeed, the notice claimed 
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that J\kee had m islead Pilot about the use of his name. It also repeated a public statement made by 
the Chair of the Erub Council that d iscussions about secession would only commence with James 
Akee after an amount of $2 mill ion was placed in each of the Mer (Murray) and Erub (Darnley) 
Council accounts, and $0.5 million in the Ugar (Stephen) account. It is fair to assume from this that 
J\kee had spoken to eastern Torres Strait Islander leaders about his plans, and they involved the 
backing of large-scale financial interests . The Erub COE notice ran for two weeks.5 
Debate about secession was vigorous throughout October, with letters to the Torres News both for 
and against. Carlemo Wacando, who had identified himself on the Declaration as an Elder Of 
Ugar, was forced to defend his community standing after it had been called into question by some 
residents.6 Wacando had been living on the mainland for many years. Then, on 7 October the 
meeting at J\nzac Park attracted more than 500 people, and proceedings were broadcast l ive across 
the Strait on popular TSIMJ\ Radio. Pastor Allan Mosby of the Reconciliation Council was master 
of ceremonies, and Getano Lui Jnr., George Mye, Dana Ober and James Akee were the main 
speakers . A telephone poll shortly after the event indicated that 48% of callers were in favour of 
the more moderate 2001 agenda, 18% supported Ak:ee and 34% were undecided.7 While firm 
conclusions should not be drawn from an informal straw poll, it does indicate that in late 1993 there 
was a reasonable level of support for secession, and the possibility that more might be won . 
However, by October 1993 the ICC and the Torres S trait Regional Council had negotiated a new 
Torres Strait Regional Au thority (TSRA) which promised greater autonomy within ATSIC. The 
prospect of the new TSRA, planned for July 1 994, and the fact that Getano Lui Jnr was able to 
produce at the meeting a letter from Pau l Keating received just the week before acknowledging that 
the Torres Strait Islander des ire for autonomy went beyond that which would be achieved by the 
creation of the TSRA, seemed to ease pressure for any immediate move on sovereignty.8 
Nevertheless, by the beginning of 1995 the TSRA's representative structure was being openly 
criticised, the way in which it allocated funds questioned, and there was a perception that 
commun ication with the island communities was poor. In this atmosphere James Akee launched 
from Cairns his second bid for secession in August 1995 . It was couched in the same rhetoric of 
economic development, th is time an Oil and Gas project for Mer (Murray) was part of the package. 
The bid was more circumscribed however, taking in only Mer, and was made in the name of a third 
part, the Mer Council of Elders, which appointed an Interim Government with Akee as Prime 
Minister.9 
The August 1995 Mer Interim Government caused considerable excitement in the southern press, 
but in Torres Strait things were more relaxed. There was a sense that Ak:ee's project was doomed, 
because by then it was common knowledge that he was in danger of prosecution. From at least the 
middle of 1994 rumours about h is embezzlement were circulating in Thursday Island, and in 
February 1 995 Mr Justice Drummond's recommendation that ATSIC should pursue the Muralag 
Aboriginal and Islander Corporation's missing funds was headlined in the Torres News. This time i t  
was essentially a Meriam issue. Mer (Murray) had gone its own way before, most notably when i t  
rej ected the Queensland Government's Deed of Grant In Trust scheme in 1986, and the Mabo 
Decision made it a special and uncertain legal case. J\kee acknowledged that the Mer Interim 
Government did not enjoy majority support in the Strait, but he defiantly stated that 'The Meriam 
are Zogo people and we will fight our own battles our way and against all adversity we will win'. 10 
When the legitimacy of the Mer Council of Elders was publicly called into question, Douglas Bon 
repl ied in a similarly pugnacious spirit: it was a legally incorporated institution, and legal action 
would be taken against anyone who made false statements against it. 1 1 
The TS RA response was measured. Getano Lui Jnr simply confirmed that the Mer Island Council 
was still in place and recognised by the S tate and Federal governments, and funding for services 
would continue to be provided through it. The TSRA did not recognise the Mer Interim 
Government, but would not interfere in the affairs of an individual island unless invited to do so by 
the Island Council . Many of those publicly opposed to Akee were concerned that Mer's 
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environment was under threat from his promised development projects, and Lui reassured them by 
making it plain that if  the promised oil drill ing operation went ahead there would be a strong 
protest. 1 2  Letters, mostly condemning the Mer Interim Government, continued to be published in 
the Torres News, but the situation was allowed to drift until Prime Minister Keating visited 
Thursday Island in September on his way to Papua New Guinea. 
J\ feature common to both the September 1993 and August 1995 bids was James Akee's use of the 
Councils of Elders as a source of legitimacy, so it is useful to consider this relatively recent 
innovation in Torres Strait governance. S ince colonial times on the outer islands, Island Councils 
have performed most local government functions, but the councils in their present form are a 
product of Queensland's Community Services (Torres Strait) Act 1 984. Councillors are now elected 
in the same way as other Queensland local councillors, and the Chairs of the 17 Councils so elected 
form the Island Co-ordinating Council (ICC), until 1994 the senior representative body in Torres 
Strait. The Torres Strait Regional Authority (TSRA) which came into being in July 1994 is a 
mod ification of the Torres S trait Regional Council, which had been in place since the creation of 
J\.TSlC in 1 989. The TSRA has greater autonomy within ATSIC than mainland Regional Councils, 
and as already mentioned, at the time of its inception was regarded as a trans itional step towards 
some form of provincial status in Torres Strait. The Councils of Elders have as yet no formal status 
within this government sanctioned representative structure. 
The first Council of Elders came into being on Mer, partly in response to the 1992 Mabo Decision, 
and under the auspices of the Mer Isles Administration, Torres Strait Islander Corporation. At the 
time of incorporation its objects were to maintain Meriam culture and heritage, land and sea rights, 
as well as to act as a centre to ' co-ordinate the materials of self-management/ self-determination/ 
self-sufficiency' . 13 It has a compl icated structure with members drawn from Elders of the eight 
' tribes' of Mer, people with knowledge of 'Meriam traditional law, culture, genealogy and kinship 
structu re' . 1 4  The collective cultural knowledge of the Mer Council of Elders helps provide the 
means to process the negotiations over land that Mabo has made inevitable. There are now many 
times more people  of Meriam descent than there were in pre-colonial times, and Mer is a rather 
small island with l imited available land. Those involved in mediation over land need to be familiar 
with A i/an kastom, and have a good knowledge of family histories. The common practice of island 
style adoption adds complexity to the authenticating of land claims in Torres Strait, as Eddie Mabo's 
own case shows. 1 5  J\.lthough there is a formula for how the Mer Council of Elders is composed, 
selection does not involve a formal electoral process. Each clan negotiates and nominates its own 
Elders . 
There now seem to be informal Councils of Elders on a number of islands. However, in November 
1993 the Erub community put to the Commonwealth and Queensland governments a detailed 
proposal for formally restructuring its community governance, which included a Council of Elders. 
The Erub proposal, foreshadowed by George Mye in a speech to his fellow ATSIC Commissioners, 
suggested a Council of Elders which would be a House of Custom and Review. It would 'provide 
advice and counsell ing, on request, to individuals and families on land and other custom issues and 
disputes', and ' review all by-laws passed by the Erub Community Council' in case they conflict with 
Erub ian custom. In this model new by-laws would need Council of Elders approval before being 
submitted for ministerial assent. The Council of Elders would consist of Erubian men and women 
over the age of 60, of sound mind, w isdom and experience. The proposal did not stipulate the 
number of Elders on the Council, or indicate how they would be selected. 1 6  
In the proposed Erub model, the Council of Elders is more than a bank of traditional cultural 
knowledge and a point of mediation over land, it is clearly also meant to check the authority and 
power of the elected Island Council . Mye explained the need for this in his speech to the ATSIC 
commissioners .  I le referred to the long-held desire of the Island communities to free themselves of 
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central ised control, represented in the past by the 'Protector's d ictatorial regime', and now by the 
bureaucracy that had grown up around the ICC. He complained about the lack of meaningful 
consultation and stressed that decision and policy making were still 'u tterly remote' from the island 
communities. Mye argued that the next step should be towards a regional structure which was a 
'voluntary federation of internally sovereign communities'. 1 7 The Council of Elders adds credibil ity 
to the idea of ' internally sovereign' communities because it promises a more self-contained pol itical 
system, a bi-camera! structure with checks and balances. It also serves as a check on those island 
councillors who some community members suspect of being too locked into the central system to 
appreciate that their principal loyalty should be to their home community. 
Al though the Councils of Elders are outside the state sanctioned structure, many Torres Strait 
Islanders recognise their legitimacy. They appear to be in harmony with notions of Ai/an Kastom, 
which Torres Strait Islanders argue should set the pattern for change. Some younger Islanders, 
members of the more educated bureaucratic eli te for instance, are privately sceptical, questioning 
whether in traditional Torres Strait society Elders exercised the kind of authority implied in the 
Erub proposal. In other words, this new institution raises questions about cultural authenticity and 
the politics of tradition which have been widely debated in other Melanesian contexts. 18 There are 
also those who are concerned that Councils of Elders might diminish rather than enhance the 
democratic process. However, the deep respect Torres Strait Islanders have for family Elders works 
against the public expression of these kinds of reservations. 
James Akee looked to Elders, and in the case of the Mer Interim Government to the Mer Council of 
Elders, for support and legitimation .  Having resided on the mainland for many years he understood, 
as Eddie Mabo had, 19 that to have a real chance of success he needed support from significant 
Islander families l iving in the Strait. Being outside the formal representative structures, members of 
Councils of Elders are not directly accountable to their communities and therefore can tend to be of 
independent m ind.  They thus also provide the means for disaffected community members to voice 
opposition to the elected Island Councillors .  Indeed some Elders have themselves been rejected in 
Island Council elections, and are therefore more or less in open opposition to the Council. The 
Island Councillors, on the other hand, have a stake in working within the system which provides 
their funds. It is not surprising then that James Akee could win the support of individual Elders, or 
that the Mer Council of Elders supported him. 
Keating was greeted at Thursday Island with the fanfare, hospitality and open friendliness generally 
extended to visiting dignitaries. As expected, in his speeches and public meetings with Islander 
leaders he dismissed Akee's claim for independence, but it took some time to sink in that he was 
also against any form of provincial status or free association. He s ignalled his government's 
read iness to consider separating the TSRA from ATSIC, but 2001 was off the agenda. 
The idea of some form of self-government by 2001 had been gathering support in Torres Strait, in 
Government, and in ATSIC ever s ince it was flagged by Getano Lui Jnr late in 1992. It had 
sustained those many Islanders, almost certainly the majority, who wanted greater political and 
economic autonomy, but who were not interested in severing completely from Australia as James 
Akee and TUP had proposed since the late 1970s. It had been crucial at the October 1 993 Anzac 
Park meeting.20 When the TSRA finally came into existence it was generally understood as a step 
on the way to more complete regional independence,21 and as late as March 1995 Lui was 
expressing his appreciation to ATSIC for its support on the issue, call ing for a Ministerial Task 
Force to advance the agenda.22 
For most of this time Lui was conferring mainly with Robert Tickner, the Minister for Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Affairs, who was favourably inclined towards some form of provincial 
status .  However, after the 1993 election Keating created the Office of Indigenous Affairs (OIA) 
within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet to provide an alternative source of pol icy 
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advice, a source less close to ATSIC, and OIA opposed the idea. ATSIC and OIA appear often to 
have been at odds. The explanation for OIA opposition, which proved decisive,23 was probably 
signalled by pol icy analyst W. Sanders in a 1994 discussion paper. Sanders suggested that ATSIC 
supported the shift from the Torres Strait Region Council to the TSRA, because it was in 
accordance with its own regional ism policy. The 1993 amendments to the ATSIC legislation 
reduced the number of Regional Councils, but delegated greater authority to the consol idated 
Councils. If the TS RA was deemed to be successful it might provide the precedent for other 
ATSIC regions to seek greater autonomy, and demonstrate to the government that this could result 
in the more appropriate and cost effective del ivery of services . However, Sanders felt that some in 
ATSIC might be wary of the TSRA proposal, because of the obvious long-term threat to ATSIC 
itself, that is that l ike the TS RA more autonomous Regional Councils might to seek to leave ATSIC 
altogether. 24 
The ind ications are, however, that in mid-1995 ATSIC was supportive of greater Torres Strait 
autonomy, and once it had conceded that the TSRA. should move outside ATSIC there was no 
reason for it not to support the Getano Lui Jnr's 2001 proposal. But, according to Tickner, the 
precedent that 2001 might set for other Regional Councils was enough for the OJA to oppose the 
idea. Although Keating referred in his speeches to the lack of a sustainable regional economy as the 
reason for his opposition to self-government, the question of precedent was upper-most in h is mind. 
What surprised Tickner was the way in which Torres S trait Islanders accepted this rebuff. In his 
opinion they conceded too easily. There was no argument, no public expression of anger or even 
disappointment, and insofar as Keating and OIA were concerned, that was the end of the matter. 
In August 1 996, however, the new Howard government referred the issue to the House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres S trait Islander Affairs, to hand down 
its recommendations in 1997. The Committee's terms of reference are specific. It is expected to 
determine whether the people of Torres Strait would benefit from a greater degree of autonomy, if 
granted what form that autonomy might take, and the impl ications of regional autonomy for Torres 
Strait Islanders l iv ing beyond the Strait. However, the committee has also been directed to take into 
account Torres Strait's status as an international border, the possible impl ications for the Torres 
Strait environment, and whether greater autonomy would set a precedent for other indigenous 
groups. In real ity, the committee has been asked to weigh the benefits of greater autonomy for 
Torres Strait Islanders, against the possible disadvantages for the Austral ian State. 
The TSRA submission to the Committee is representative of all the Torres Strait Islander 
submissions in arguing that greater autonomy will ensure the maintenance of Ai/an Kastom and the 
protection of the Torres Strait environment, and allow for the more effective co-ordination of 
resource allocation resulting in a better qual ity of life for Torres Strait Islanders.25 The Torres Strait 
Islander submissions also are unanimous that at the very least the TSRA should be made 
independent of ATSIC. After that there are a variety of suggested models and initiatives. The Mer 
Island Council goes further than most in proposing a Torres Strait Territory, if not for the whole of 
Torres Strait, then for the Eastern Islands, but only after thorough consultation.26 The Erub Island 
Council suggests that the process should start afresh, and that a new Torres Strait Commission be 
planned and developed by Torres Strait Islanders using the resources of the TSRA and the Office of 
Torres Strait Affairs.27 The Kaurareg Land Council, which has been at odds with the TSRA over the 
lack of Kaurareg representation on the Authority, recommends a pan-Torres Strait Council of Elders 
be established to act as an upper house for whatever the equivalent of the TSRA would be in the 
new order of things.28 
Rather than suggest a model for future greater autonomy, the TSRA has recommended that the 
Commonwealth establ ish a task force to examine the options, and to report in a year. Although all 
significant stakeholders would be represented on the task force, it would be chaired by the TSRA. 
This would allow TSRA significant influence over the shape of change, and to manage its 
introduction. It recommended that the Torres Shire Council immediately be given representation on 
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the TSRA, for the first time allowing the multicul tural residents of Thursday Island township a say 
in broader regional issues. It also recommended that the Office of Torres Strait Islander Affairs 
(OTSIA) in ATSIC be given block funds, that the Torres Strait Islander Advisory Board (TSIAB) 
be al lowed to allocate those funds, that the TSIAB be changed from an appointed to an elected 
body, and that the ATSIC commissioner for the Torres S trait Zone be retained as head of TSIAB.29 
A number of constituency factors complicate plans for greater Torres S trait Islander autonomy, but 
for the TS RA precisely how Torres Strait Islanders resident on the mainland should fit into plans is 
perhaps the most difficult question. As Sanders has pointed out, there has been a subtle shift in the 
rhetoric of self-government which indicates a growing emphasis on region rather than cultural 
identity as the focus of autonomy. For the past few years TS RA documents have referred to the 
'people of Torres Strait' rather than to 'Torres S trait Islanders' .30 This is partly to ensure that the 
multi-cultural population of Thursday Island does not become alienated in the de-colonisation 
process, but also because the Authority believes that the best chance for self-government will be if it 
is pursued as a regional issue. Lui has argued before the Standing Committee that the greatest need 
for improved facilities is in the homelands themselves.3 1 Torres S trait Islanders on the mainland 
enjoy far better access to services, and independent assessments bear this out. Arthur and Taylor 
put it succinctly in 1 994 when they wrote that 'whatever efforts are envisaged to enhance the 
economic status of Torres Strait Islanders generally, these will need to be doubled for those residing 
in the Torres Strait Regional Authority area. '32 
Although relations between Torres Strait Islanders of the homeland and those of the diaspora are 
sometimes testy, all Torres Strait Islander submissions to the Committee stressed that the Islanders 
are one people. In fact all submissions, apart from that of the TSRA, recommended that mainland 
Torres Strait Islanders be included in any plans for greater autonomy. Most suggest a separate 
commission to be responsible for all Torres Strait Islander affairs, and the Townsville-Thuringowa 
group, the largest Torres Strait Islander organisation beyond the S trait, detailed a structure which 
would allow mainland Torres Strait Islanders to participate in the planning for greater autonomy.33 
The TSRA, aware of the practical difficulties this presents, has opted for the more cautious 
approach outlined above :  strengthening the OTSIA and the TSIAB, and locking them into the 
Torres S trait region by way of the presiding Torres S trait Zone Commissioner. In evidence to the 
commission Lu i described this as a first step towards closer administrative relations, but to go 
further at present would be to put unbearable pressure on the TSRA's human and financial 
resources, and perhaps risk greater autonomy for the Torres Strait Region.34 
The TS RA's cautious approach, which is certainly borne out of a concern about its lack resources 
and the difficul ty of getting more in the current political and economic climate, may also be a 
response to uncertainty about the future of ATSIC. ATSIC is under siege from above and below, 
and there is the danger that the agenda for change in Torres Strait might be driven, or overtaken, by 
the momentum against ATSIC. This could impel the TSRA towards outcomes that have not been 
thought through. As we have seen, Sanders cautioned in 1994 that Aboriginal Regional Councils 
might regard a successful autonomous Torres S trait Regional Authority as a precedent for more 
Regional Councils shifting out of ATSIC. The Coalition Government's rhetoric is bloated with 
references to directing funds to the 'grass roots', to those ' most in need', and by-passing what has 
been disparagingly referred to as the 'Aboriginal industry'. While these considerations should not 
work against the achievement of greater autonomy in Torres S trait, Torres Strait Islanders of the 
d iaspora may be left in a weaker position, as small minorities in autonomous, directly funded 
Regional Councils. Furthermore, the Commonwealth may move to separate the TSRA from ATSIC 
too quickly, and the long-term TSRA goal of some form of provincial status, or free association 
with Austral ia, will be lost. There appears to be some waning of enthusiasm for self-government in 
Torres Strait itself, perhaps as a reaction to the Akee secession bids. Ironically perhaps even Akee's 
own submission to the Committee is unenthusiastic, focussing on the reformation of present 
structures. It seems therefore, that the TSRA's 2001 agenda has a rough ride ahead, and for 
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self-government to become reality the TSRA needs to maintain some control over the process . 
Whether the Commonwealth will agree to establ ish the Task Force proposed by the TSRA remains 
to be seen. The situation is in delicate balance. 
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Comment on Torres Strait Papers: 
.Jeremy Beckett, Sydney 
I would first like to express my appreciation of the inclusion of the Torres Strait Islanders in this 
workshop, particularly s ince they are represented by a Torres S trait Islander scholar, MacRose Elu. 
Over more than thirty years since I began working among the Islanders I have been frequently 
disappointed to find them ignored in discussions both of the insular Pacific and of indigenous Australia. 
Situated within the bounds, though on the margins, of metropolitan Austral ia, but maintaining a way 
of life that is more like that of the Pacific Islanders than of the mainland Aborigines, they have tended 
to slip between the two scholarly domains. 
Not only was the culture of the Strait almost continuous with that of their Papuan neighbours, prior to 
the European presence, but as Steve Mullins shows in his book1, the dominant cultural influence during 
the last quarter of the 19th century came from Pacific Islanders who came as divers and missionaries, 
and sometimes stayed to marry Torres Strait women. These connection weakened during the 20th 
century, but because Torres Strait Islanders remained in occupation of their ancestral homes, they were 
able to carry on a way of life that had much in common with the insular Pacific. They have also tended 
to compare themselves with the peoples of the Pacific, rather than with mainland Aborigines, and have 
followed the process of decolonisation there with interest. 
From the turn of the century, however, Islanders found themselves subject to the same legal and 
administrative surveillance as the Queensland Aborigines, and they joined in the protest movement of 
the 1960s in the hope of throwing off the kinds of irksome restraints that MacRose Elu describes 
(chapter 16) .  The civil rights issues of the 1960s gave way in the 1970s to an emphasis on indigenous 
identity, which tended to separate Aborigines from Torres Strait Islanders and, as Clive Moore's chapter 
shows (chapter 25), from the descendants of the South Sea Island cane workers. While Torres Strait 
leaders welcomed the intervention of the Commonwealth Government as a means of pressuring the 
Queensland Government, they were less comfortable working with pan-indigenous organisations like 
the National Aboriginal Conference and the Aboriginal and Torres S trait Islander Commission. It is 
ironic that, although the Murray Island Land case led to the overturning of terra nullius, Torres Strait 
leaders had earl ier held aloof from the land rights struggle, believing that they already owned the 
islands where they lived, and they were slow to see the need for the l itigation. 
The movements for separation from ATSIC, for regional autonomy, and at times, for secession from 
Australia, which Steve Mullins describes (chapter 17), were informed in greater or less degree by the 
example of decolonisation in the island Pacific. The model of the Cook Islands, with its guaranteed 
right of entry to New Zealand, for a while seemed attractive to the moderate leadership of the Torres 
Strait Regional Authority. 
The Cook Islands model is not without its ironies. Because of economic stagnation at home, the 
majority of the Cook Islander population have emigrated to New Zealand, where their status v ia-a-vis 
the ind igenous Maori population remains problematical . For much the same kinds of economic reasons, 
the majority of Torres Strait Islanders also live on the mainland. While these mainland Islanders 
remained under the aegis of ATSIC, they were entitled to make claims on the funds it controlled, 
though they often complained that Aboriginal-dominated organisations denied them their fair share; 
but with the withdrawal of the TSRA, and prospect of some kind of Regional Autonomy, their right 
to claim assistance from ATSIC is put in doubt. For its part, the TSRA insists that its resources are fully 
committed in meeting the special needs of its island dwelling constituency, and that the mainland 
Islanders, hav ing opted for proximity to standard services and cheap consumer goods, must fend for 
themselves. The mainlanders, for their part, have demanded representation in the TSRlL. 
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The TSRJ\, however, has its own internal rivalries, with the Eastern Islanders complain ing that their 
needs are neglected in favour of other communities, and demanding a less centralised system of 
government. The Eastern Islanders have long been the radicals of the Strait, and they also make up most 
of the leadership of Islanders on the mainland; it is not therefore surprising that the two have formed 
an alliance. Its immediate manifestation has been the lodging of land and sea rights claims, outside the 
framework of the TSRA The role of expatriates in domestic pol itics, with their freedom from 
community pressures, their access to various kinds of expertise as well as the media, is of course 
familiar to anyone working in the post-colonial Pacific. 
1 .  Steve Mul lins,  Torres Strait: a hist01y of colon ial occupation and culture contact, 1864-1897, 
Rockh ampton, 1 995 .  
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Governm ent Irreverence in Australian Indigenous Affairs:  
Colonialism, Im perialism and Culture 
Christine Fletcher, North Australian Research Unit, ANU 
Democracy is linked to the relationship between social capital and civic trust. Many of the fundamental 
democratic values at the core of Austral ia ' s  parliamentary institutions were brought here during 
European settlement, but they only applied to newcomers, not the Aborigines. Solidarity among the 
colonial workers in the 19th century, the emergence of capital and federation in 1901 further entrenched 
those values. It is clear by the way that institutions have been establ ished and, more recently, by the 
national debates over race and cul ture, that recognition of social capital in Australia is associated more 
with the non-indigenous than with the indigenous population. This l ies at the heart of relations between 
black and wh ite Australians. This paper aims to explain some of the root causes of this unbalanced 
relationsh ip by illustrating how Austral ian colonists reinforced their settlement of the continent by 
constructing a civil society which had strong ties to the origins of the settlers . 
Austral ia has constantly attempted to reassure itself of what Said describes as ' the superlative values 
of white (ie English) civilisation ' .1 These values are reflected in past immigration pol icies and, so far 
as Aboriginal society is concerned, the same values were reinforced in the post-colonial period by 
government through the period of attempted assimilation. Assimilation was accompanied by the 
doctrine of Lerra nullius, meaning 'vacant land ' ,  the official response to Aboriginal claims to land . Until 
recently, governments pretended that Australia was virtually uninhabited before 1788. Governments 
accepted that Aborigines were here, but the official view was that, since there was no indication of 
farming or sedentary practices, the land was vacant. 
Such attitudes eroded Aboriginal culture, downgrading their legitimacy in system and shifting the focus 
away from the problems they faced . Other policies, notably the national referendum in 1967, considered 
a milestone in black and white relations, were intended to stem the damage caused to the Aborigines, 
but governments remain reluctant to concede any form of compensation for the traumas caused by the 
earlier policies . Aside from the Redfern Speech by Prime Minister Keating in 1992, in which he 
acknowledged for the first time the atrocities committed against Aboriginal people, Austral ia has never 
apologised for the past. A recent example of this reluctance to compromise was voiced by the Prime 
Minister, .John Howard, in 1 996. The following extract was taken from an interview on the question 
of growing racism, particularly against Aboriginal people. In an interview with John Laws on national 
radio, Mr Howard said :  
I sympathise fundamentally with Australians who are insulted when they are told that we have 
a racist bigoted past. And Australians are told that quite regularly. Our children are taught 
that. Some of the school curricula go close to teaching children that we have a racist bigoted 
past. Now, of course, we treated Aborigines very, very badly in the past - ve1y, very badly -
but to tell ch ildren whose parents were no part of that maltreatment, to tell children who 
themselves have been no part of it, that we 're all part of a, sort of, a racist bigoted history, is 
something that Australians reJect. 2 
Aborigines have typically received a bad press through general isations. Anecdotes contribute to the 
characterisation of Aborigines in relation to welfare, for example.3 
The Indigenous people 
The philosophical basis of Aboriginal culture is among the most ancient on earth. According to United 
Nations Special Rapporteur Jose R Martinez Cob, indigenous societies are distinguished from others 
by their 'pre-invasion and pre-colonial ' characteristics.4 Langton, an Aboriginal scholar, writes : 
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Before contact, there were Yolngu, Pi�ian�;a�;ara, Warlpiri, Waka Waka, Guugu Yimidhirr, or 
whatever the 'Gadigal '  or 'Eora ' actually call themselves, and so on . . .  Guugu Yimidlzirr 
began to see whites only in terms of an identifiable and different group rather than random 
individuals one hundred years after contact when the effect of colonisation had proved so 
consistently brutal and devastating. 5 
Aborigines are a minority in the Austral ian population but in some areas the numbers are substantial, 
and birth rates are increas ing - by the year 2000, the indigenous population may reach 300,000. 
Presently, they number around 280,000 in a population of 18 million. Before the first British settlers 
in the 1770s that population was thought to number between 500,000 and one mill ion.6 
The needs of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders were accommodated in their own system of law -
as Bonner asserts, there was ' no administrative class in the European sense ' 7 no institutions even 
vaguely resembled western style structures . Some insight into the values of Aboriginal society can be 
found in anthropological research and, more recently, from the works of historians such as Henry 
Reynolds and others but insight into Aboriginal culture comes from revelations by indigenous people 
themselves. 
From a governance perspective, the cultural differences between the two societies appear to be deeply 
embedded in their separate histories of ideas. For example, western society puts a value on property 
wh ich some observers bel ieve is the absolute basis for the permanent transition to colonisation, 
particularly in countries such as the United States and Australia, where settler populations d ispossessed 
the indigenous populations and almost completely disempowered them.8 
Social control by the colonials 
Understand ing western society - and civil society - is as much a part of the puzzle of the relationship 
between indigenous and non-indigenous Austral ians as recognising that Aboriginal people have special 
rights. Western values almost entirely overwhelmed the Aboriginal people - particularly property and 
the networking of community-driven associations which were thriving by late 19th century. The 
emergence of unions, groups, parties, organisations, associations and corporations strengthened the 
development of civil society and further marginal ised the indigenous population.9 Networks of civil 
structures which formed in all of the colonies became an major influence on the direction of social and 
pol itical development in Australia. 10 According to Walzer, each country has its peculiar political values 
which, in combination with democratic institutions, keep churning out the recipe for that particular type 
of civil society.1 1 Arguably, civil society in Austral ia is democratically organised through the freedoms 
and rights of association notably in areas of unions, clubs, parties, groups, and whatever else non­
government activ ity people might choose to engage in. Martin Krygier in a recent portrayal said : 
In modern conditions, one large element of public decency is civility . . .  Australia exemplifies, 
impe1jectly but well, tlze practical ideal of civil society - ideal, because it can serve as a 
normative standard, though it cannot be perfectly realised anywhere; practical, because it has 
been realised to a considerable degree in certain places and times, among them here and 
now . . .  
L ike any society, ours is not without incivilities, the deepest of which have occurred to the 
aboriginal population. 12 
Austral ian civil society evolved alongs ide colonial land acquisitions and postwar soldier settlement 
reward systems. Institutions such as the unions, for example, became bastions of the principles of free 
association. The Amalgamated Shearers Union, united under the Austral ian Labour Federation, and 
others con tributed, along with churches and other organisations, to the transformation to social 
democracy and the emergence of the mass party movement, a process which was integral to colonial 
maturity and to Austral ia ' s  transformation into a federation. 13 
Understanding the philosophy of civil society and free association helps to explain why western society 
still attempts to squander indigenous cultural values - particularly native title claims to land. Australia 's  
relatively stable political conditions encouraged the freedoms that support multiculturalism and one 
would expect these values to alter the predominance of Anglo-Celtic traditions on civil society. From 
155 
most accounts, the different cultural values brought to Australia by post war immigrants were to be 
regulated within the wider community by the values of Austral ian democracy but the core institutions 
which provide the framework for social values (and property values) remain grounded in British and 
European tradition. Oddly, the values that foster tolerance derive from the same set of principles. 
According to Birrell, 
the immigration programs of earlier years laid the foundations of an ethnic movement which 
has since shaped Government cultural and immigration policies . . .  to this end it provided funds 
for ethnic languages and cultures, including ethnic TV and radio, as well as ethnic specific 
welfare services14 
Where did the Aboriginal population fit? Australia's celebration of diversity took place after the White 
Australia Policy was abandoned. The White A ustralia Policy is an indicator of the type of society that 
Austral ia had become - mainly white, British, and western. The indigenous people were at their most 
vulnerable in that period, when governments were taking Aboriginal children away from their famil ies 
and attempting to assimilate them into white society, and convince them to discard their beliefs and 
embrace Anglo-Celtic values. Possibly, these factors combined to create an ideal pol itical cl imate for 
governments to introduce their Aboriginal assimilation policies. 
Land as the basis for survival 
The colonial military and marine establishment, followed by ex-convicts, became the first non­
indigenous landholding class, modifying British common law to suit their needs. At each point of 
settlement around the coast, whites chose the most fertile lands and brought their Anglo-Celtic 
inheritance to the task of developing infrastructure and securing their property claims. Aborigines were 
pushed off their lands and away from their ancestral country. By the 20th century, the six colonies had 
reached agreement over federation and, with the creation of the Commonwealth, all land, whether 
gazetted under speci fic legislation or held in trust, fell within the jurisdiction of the Crown. The desire 
for land in Austral ia became the motivating factor in what Else-Mitchell calls ' the development of a 
nation and an influence on the disposition of the population across the continent ' : 
!low the land, which for many centuries before had been occupied by the aboriginal races and 
identified with their cultures and religions, could be exploited in this fashion is itself a 
paradox. But it was the product of a curiously devised principle of British colonial law which 
established the territorial sovereignty of the Crown and laid the foundations of our systems of 
land disposal and tenure. 1 5  
The ancient jurisdictions that existed before white settlement remained in place but the boundaries of 
leaseholds and settlements began to layer and undermine the Aboriginal jurisdictions. From a colonial 
perspective, Aboriginal land was crowded out by British property laws. Indigenous jurisdictions are 
comprised of more than territorial occupation - jurisdictions are a complex of territorial lands governed 
by other universal and community factors, such as social, economic, cultural and political relations. 
Since white settlement, the complications of multiple jurisdictions have been compounded by political 
circumstances and by state borders. 
Because Aborigines were dispossessed, they had little hold over what was happening to them - they had 
virtually no connection with the system in which they were trapped. Problems were compounded by the 
government 's  official pol icy of terra nullius - an idea adopted by Australian governments which, to 
avoid conceding benefits of land ownership to Aborigines, held the l ine of occupation of Austral ia at 
1788 - terra nullius was reinforced by a decision, low on the scorecard of judicial ethics, by Justice 
Blackburn in 1971 .  Two decades after the Blackburn decision, the High Court brought down the Mabo 
judgement in 1992 which seemed finally to s ignal a renaissance of Aboriginal pol itical power and a 
perception that structures between black and white Austral ia had begun to mesh in the form of 
reconcil iation. Yet pol itical dialogue between indigenous peoples within the states and territories 
remains impoverished16• The Commonweal th Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1 976 
was a huge leap forward, relaxing the rigid land regulations that, for political and economic reasons, had 
resulted in all land being tied up for use exclusively through non-indigenous transactions. 
11ze Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territ01y) Act 1976 and the recent Native Title Act 1 993, are 
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bench marks for Aboriginal progress in the overall system of land tenure. But, it would be misleading 
to say that th is represents a form of decolonisation. Aboriginal land tenure, ownership and rights 
prov ides an add ition to, and perhaps, a form of opposition to, the institutions of colonial ism but such 
institu tions have global economic imperatives built into their roots, making it difficul t  to concede that 
there is are zero-based relationships going on between indigenous societies and non-indigenous 
governments .  From the very beginning of white settlement, land was regulated by the colonial 
governments. Allocation of land became a function of governments ,  whether or not Aborigines lived 
on the land . In fact, once the early settlers had decided on building a dwell ing, they viewed Aborigines 
as a dangerous nu isance and a threat to their newly acqu ired property. 
Colonial Imperial ism, public administration and public policy 
Colonialism in Austral ia has been characterised by a form of cultural imperial ism . First, there is a type 
of imperial ism which was imported - carried over from the British/European inheritance and reflected 
in attitudes towards indigenous societies. This refers to the treatment of Aboriginal people over the past 
two centuries and to their exclusion from our governing institutions. The second type of imperial ism 
is that raised by Said in his analysis of British J iterature : 1 7 for example, Dickens represented British 
colonial ism in Great Expectations as unleavened and unattractive, an imperial culture engineered by the 
pecul iar behaviour of low classes. In other words, people who freely chose to become colonials 
compromised their British cultural inheritance. Hughes, the Australian expatriate and republ ican, refers 
to th is relationship as a form of social apartheid .18 Arguably, offshoots of this monoculturalism emerged 
in a most v irulent form through the practice of ass imilation pol icies - seemingly a contradiction in 
rhetorical terms. In real ity, assimilation sprang from the urge to take Aborigines away from their 
traditional way of life, quarantine them in a cultural vacuum (institutions) and re-educate them in the 
ways of western civil isation - how to hold a knife and fork, sit on chairs, wear shoes, live in houses, 
enter the work force and, eventually, produce pale skinned children. Ass imilation was intended to 
overcome the weakness in non-Aboriginal human behaviour in which a community finds itself in a 
punitive mode perhaps because of frustration at not understanding its own peculiar colonial values. In 
h is critique of imperial ism and culture, for example, Said concludes that: 
bringing civilisation to primitive or barbaric peoples (had) the disturbingly familiar ideas 
about flogging or death or extended punishment being required wizen ' they '  misbehaved or 
became rebellious, because ' they '  mainly understood force or violence best; ' they '  were not 
like 'us ', and for that reason deserved to be ruled19 
Some people subscribe to this philosophy even today, indeed, as the shades are drawn on the 20th 
century, Austral ia seems to be emerging from a stable period of social j ustice into a dark phase of public 
racism and monoculturalism. The system of government leaves l ittle room for indigenous philosophies 
to be taken into account, at l east in day to day relationships between administration and society. 
Attempts to reform public administration have produced mixed results - success has been dogged by 
the historical lack of substantial organic relationships between the indigenous peoples and non­
indigenous society. The following section suggests how this has influenced the development of public 
administration - a key link between government and indigenous peoples. 
Gains and Losses 
Almost all the positive changes in Aboriginal affairs are l inked to the reforms initiated as a result of the 
1967 Commonwealth referendum. The most obvious gains occurred through legislation - changes to 
land tenure systems (leaseholds, land rights), local government structures, anti-discrimination legislation 
- and reform in the Commonwealth and state bureaucracies, government expenditure, and in judicial 
decisions (Mabo and Native Title). But as a colleague recently observed: only when there is a change 
of government and we face hard times can the gains of the past be truly measured. In Aboriginal affairs, 
when pol icies become obscured by reforms and when financial support is considerably diminished, that 
is when the gains made by the indigenous people of Austral ia over the last decade or so will becomes 
clear. During the Hawke and Keating administrations the indigenous peoples made some advances 
towards self-determination across various policy areas. However, following the Howard government' s 
election to office in March 1996, the pol icy fortunes of the indigenous population plunged. 
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A large portion of the legislative reforms that have taken place fall under the jurisd iction of the 
Commonwealth government: for example, the Anti-Discrimination Act 1975, the Aboriginal Land 
Rights (Northern Territ01y) Act 1976 and the Native Title Act 1 993. Where j urisdictions are shared, 
state Acts run parallel to Commonwealth legislation but under the Constitution, the Commonwealth has 
the power to override concurrent state legislation. Also, the shift towards the Commonwealth that 
occurred after the 1 967 referendum was motivated by the historical neglect by state governments of their 
Aboriginal constituents. Thirty years after the referendum there is l ittle institutional recognition of 
Aboriginal rights and virtually no constitutional protection. Apart from legislation (which can be 
changed at any time) there is no special protection for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and 
their health and well-being remains at a level experienced by people in the third world. 
During the 1980s and early 1990s, cultural imperialism against Aborigines was confined to dark corners 
of the nation 's mind, contained by social and political attitudes that were vigorously promoted through 
strategies for social and administrative reform. The question of whether or not improvements 
experienced by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples under the Keating administration would 
survive a change of regime was not an obvious consideration - the indigenous people themselves had 
lobbied relentlessly for change during this period. Policy reforms do not offer any long term security. 
Indeed, it is not unrealistic to assume that, in the case of social and political reform, unless society builds 
on the foundations of legislative change, then it is possible that the l ife of the reforms might only last 
as long as the l ife of the government in office. The philosophy of cul tural and social d iversity that 
prevailed under the Keating administration was thrown into confusion by the Howard government and 
by some pol iticians who have set out to weaken the political profile of the indigenous community. 
Most discussions between governments and the Aboriginal peoples about what sort of governmental 
structure might be the most suitable for providing access and service to indigenous societies have been 
ad hoe. There has been a lot of debate on the early days of government attempts to engage in dialogue 
with Aboriginal people, particularly in the 1970s when the NACC and NAC were formed and then 
abandoned.20 But, except for relationships between indigenous communities and the resource industry, 
dialogue between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal policy-makers is often carried out on the edge of crises 
or pol icy failures. Generally, there l ittle attention is devoted to the question of what type of strategic 
negotiating framework might be the most suitable. 
The significance of constructing policy frameworks between indigenous communities and governments 
ha'> been recognised at a local level in pol icy area such as local government, and in transfer of payments 
from commonwealth to state and local governments . However, in substantive terms, there has never 
been any systematic approach to these issues. Health issues, housing policies, lack of infrastructure and, 
recently, problems of substance abuse, are treated in isolation - responses vary from 'bring in the army' 
though to setting up a health clinic - rather than as symptomatic of other, colonial-style, circumstances 
in which some indigenous communities remain trapped.21 
Self-determination and government 
Self-determ ination was popularised as a principle for reinstating freedom in countries which were 
colonised and in Australia, self-determination became the key to Aboriginal solidarity and a potential 
means of achiev ing empowerment and an improved quality of life. It remains that way today because 
self-determination has never truly been real ised in the sense that the Aboriginal people have never 
gained self-governing autonomy - there have been gains at a local government level but the outcomes 
are only as strong as the commitment of the legislators . Aborigines are no longer the objects of 
assimilation but as people with special rights, they remain economically and politically vulnerable.22 
Sel f-determination was always the principle for reform. It was used to sweep away the trappings of 
assimilation and, as an administrative principle, it was l inked closely to decentral isation - an attempt to 
move away from strong central control . The Department of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA), which first 
appeared in the early 1970s, did not exactly embody self-determination but it was the first serious 
attempt to support indigenous community development in remote areas. DAA was the first national 
organisation to l iaise with the states, territories and local governments and with other commonwealth 
agencies.  But there were no prov isions to include Aboriginal people in the decision-making process 
nor any way that they could have their say in community development. This is a large part of the 
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explanation why OM became redundant in the late 80s to be replaced by the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC). ATSIC inherited the administrative side of DAA and, along with 
it, an Aboriginal constituency which had begun the long haul back to reclaiming land and culture. By 
the end of the 1980s, various types of Aboriginal land rights legislation had been passed by the 
Commonwealth Parl iament, and in the Parl iaments of New South Wales and South Austral ia and there 
were special Aboriginal community governance provisions in some slates .23 
ATSIC was designed to be different from other government departments. Its primary aim was to lever 
government resources quickly and directly into areas where they were most needed - at the community 
level. The way through to this was seen to l ie in the design of the organisation itself which explains 
why it was created as a pecul iar form of administrative democracy. As we now know, for ATSIC to 
serve its Aboriginal constituents, it was forced to challenge the integrity of its own accountability 
principles and, for many people out.'iide of the organisation, that was seen as unacceptable. Members 
of its own Aboriginal constituency had a confl icting v iew of accountability and ATSIC, targeted for 
being different, has had to bear its burden publicly. Moreover, as Aboriginal society advanced its own 
cultural strengths, ATSIC's  skills in resolving differences increasingly became seen as political . Also 
governments meticulously avoided discussions of divided sovereignty, even as a principle, or in its most 
basic local governmental form.24 From an administrative point of view, this added a touch of 
superficiality to any long term delivery of self-determination. 
Concluding commen ts 
Decolonisation is not necessarily followed by the reinstatement of land to the indigenous population. 
Moreover, how do we measure democracy for Aboriginal people? The United Nations mandate of self­
determination was s imply a guide rather than a rule. Assimilation had trapped Aborigines in a system 
that was completely foreign . Assimilation was leveraged out of the system by the introduction of self­
dctermination, but ironically assimilation was operating in Australia in the post-war period at the same 
time that Australia was lobbying the United Nations to free its near neighbours in Southeast Asia from 
the shackles of European colonisation. By that time, civil society bore the hallmarks of the non­
indigenous society. 
Colon ial ism has many forms. In keeping with the type of societies in the Asia/Pacific region, and in 
N"rica, colonisation was an inheritance of foreign occupation - usually by Europeans. However, in 
international parlance, colonial governments mostly packed up the resources of the country that they 
occup ied and departed for their own homelands (with the notable exception of the French in the Pacific 
region and, until the mid 1 970s, the Australians in PNG). Austral ia became a colony of the British 
Empire in 1788 and by the 20th century it wielded de facto colonial powers in Papua New Guinea and 
against the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples of Austral ia. Colon ialism remains part of 
Austral ia 's  constitutional ties lo the British Parliament and in government attitudes towards the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. 
Debates over the value of social capital have, for the moment, been captured by racist rhetoric. When 
racism abates, is when the losses faced by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders - the flaws in our 
institutional structures and cultures - will become most apparent. 
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The Retu rn of the Kia p :  recolonising ru ral Papua New Guinea 
Glenn Banks (Defence Force Academy) and Chris Ballard (ANU) 
A ustralia has used the people of New Guinea well, historically speaking, and it is the hope of 
all A ustralians in New Guinea that when self-government does come, there will still be a place 
for us. James S inclair, ex-kiap . 1  
The Patrol Officer or kiap was the face of  government in most of  colonial Papua and New Guinea. Due  
to the l imited and peculiar nature of  Australian colonialism,2 kiaps were vested with a remarkable 
concentration of powers. To communities remote from the burgeoning bureaucracy in Port Moresby, kiaps 
were effectively ' the government' and appeared to hold the keys to modernisation and advancement. With 
the rap id shift lo self-government in 1973 and Independence in 1975 large numbers of these kiaps (and 
other officers) left the service and, in many cases, the country. Independence also marked another step in 
the decline of the kiap model of government, a process which began with the increas ing special isation of 
public servants posted to rural areas.3 Patrol officers (still often referred to as kiaps) continue to exist today, 
although their powers are a fraction of what they were at the height of the colonial period. 
One of the ironies of contemporary Papua New Guinea is that the Austral ian kiap, the ultimate icon of 
colonial rule, has reappeared as the visible face of the mineral resource industry. Former kiaps (and other 
ex-colon ial officers) now fill most of the expatriate positions within the mining companies which are 
concerned with Community Affairs/ Relations/ Development. The irony is particularly apparent in the l ight 
of recent charges that the dominance of Australian companies in the minerals sector mirrors the extension 
of Austral ian metropol itan control during the colonial era, albeit without the responsibil ities of the latter. 
Weiner, writing in reference to ex-kiaps in the oil industry, argues that this practice is ' neo-colonialism ' ,  
as ' in the use of ex-colonial officers, the company i s  effectively reproducing its dominant and unconscious 
colonial attitude towards village peoples of the tropical world .  ' 4 
This ' recolonisation ' of rural Papua New Guinea by the kiap raises a number of issues. How do 
'born-again ' kiaps conceive of their current roles, and how do they compare with their former roles? What 
are the impl ications of this recolonisation for rural communities? Why has the colonial kiap been such a 
useful model for resource companies? How are the roles of these kiaps perceived and contrasted by rural 
communities? I lere we prov ide an in itial exploration, after describing the key features of the kiap model 
of government, and the political and social environment which has enabled their return. 
Kiaps in the Colonial Order 
From the 1 930s, kiaps formed the basis of colonial administration in rural Papua and New Guinea. Hubert 
Murray, Governor of Papua for over thirty years, had ensured a lasting role for expatriates in the operation 
of the government apparatus by pursu ing a paternalistic framework for governance in which ' Indigenous 
societies or leaders per se had no functional place ' .5 This was in marked contrast to British and French 
theories of colonial administration. Expatriate kiaps and District officers were central components of the 
administrative framework. 
The roles of the kiap were numerous and varied. The most romantic, of course, was the patrol into un­
contacted areas . This initial contact and exploration function aimed, nominally at least, at extending the 
scope of administration authority, gave rise to legendary accounts of hardship and endurance, painting an 
image of the kiap as rugged and individual istic. More commonly rou tine patroll ing was carried out 
episodically to remind areas on the periphery of the colonial state of the authority of the administration :  to 
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make ' the connection between a modest outpost and a mighty empire ' . 6  Much of  the administration effort 
was focussed on pacification - end ing the tribal fighting that was endemic in many areas . Kiaps operated 
with Papua New Guinean policemen, and had the power to hold hearings, deliver verdicts and sentences, 
and to imprison offenders. In this role, kiaps were remarkably successful, at least in the Highlands. This 
was largely, Gordon argues, because they tended to let the parties resolve disputes themselves : ' Kiaps had 
a basic anthropological training; enough to real ise that matters or d isputes were more complex than they 
appear on the surface, and thus should be left alone. ' 7 
There was a final frantic burst of patrolling just prior to self-government in 1973 and Independence in 1975 
focussed on election education and the compilation of electoral rolls. In a sense this established an 
unsustainable level of government activity in rural areas, a l evel with which the activities of the 
Independent government would always be compared unfavourably by rural communities. 
Of course, not all kiap activity was benign: coercion and force were central to the power that kiaps exerted. 
Armed police gave patrols and kiaps more than adequate firepower to back up the force of law. Polier 
argues that in places, demonstration created ' fear in local subjects ' ,  and by this means ' local forms of 
violence were replaced by new state-sanctioned forms ' .8 
In addition to their role in law and order, kiaps were ' one-stop ' government agents. Within their local 
sphere of influence they controlled labour recruitment, health and education service delivery, road and 
airstrip construction, local government councils, and the minutiae of daily administration. In this 
'generalist' role as providers of all things, kiaps were the strategic keyholders to modernity for these rural 
communities . One older Enga cited by Gordon stated that ' the first kiaps gave beads, salt, steel axes -
everyone wanted these things so they all followed the kiap and stopped fighting. We stopped fighting 
because the kiap told us to and obeyed because we did not want to lose the source of these things. '9 
One final aspect of the kiap in the colon ial order was a focus on the kiap as a 'practical man of action ' . 10 
They were expected to maintain and control all aspects of their Patrol post (often going for extended 
periods without seeing another government officer other than their police) and to patrol as regularly as 
possible: ' the field is the real theatre of administration ' according to the 1970 Standing Instructions. 
Although patrol reports had to be written and submitted (according to strict guidel ines, especially in terms 
of promptness), the kiap was not a policy maker or paper administrator. 1 1  In this sense, kiaps were merely 
implementing policy dictated from Austral ia, albeit through Port Moresby, rather than being involved in 
developing plans for local-scale development 
Mining and Governance 
Administration revenue from min ing was critical to the extension and functioning of the New Guinea 
administration from 1926 to 1 940. 12 Revenue from the B ulolo dredges allowed the Administration to 
increase its reach into peripheral parts of the colony. Airstrips and roads were constructed at an increasing 
rate, agricultural extension blossomed, and spending on ' District Services ' - the grassroots of administration 
- increased dramatically between 1926/7 and 1939/40. 
However, al other times, and most particularly from the late 1980s, state revenues from mining appear to 
have played a limited role in maintaining or extending state control over rural areas. The much documented 
recent decline in the ' reach' of the state13 sits oddly with the boom in government revenues from the sector, 
particularly in the 1990s. This indicates the s ignificance of state infrastructures and technologies in 
translating the benefits of mineral resources into state control and development. In particular, the daily 
contact that kiaps had with the local populace, and the ability of the one government agent to both enforce 
the law and provide access lo the wealth of the unseen government appears to be an element in 
contemporary government services which is lacking. 
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In the virtual absence of the state, the resource projects have become a focus for local interests and 
aspirations. This trend has been exacerbated by the remote peripheral parts of Papua New Guinea in which 
the m ines have been located . They have essential ly become ' opportunity enclaves '  in a sea of political, 
social and economic unrest and decline. In this way they have emerged as ' mini-states ' in the province, or 
even region, in which they operate. This role is reinforced by schemes such as the Tax Credit Scheme, 
which allows the developer to provide public infrastructure (roads, schools, aid posts etc) within the 
province and receive a 100 per cent tax credit for this expenditure from the national government. 
Companies routinely provide a range of social (youth and women) and economic (business development) 
services to the communities in which they locate; they have come to mirror the activities conventionally 
associated with governments. In charge of many of these activities and programs are recycled Austral ian 
kiaps, usually recruited by colleagues who have already made the transition. 
Kiaps  in the Mining Industry 
There are many precedents for shuffling between government posts and private mining in Papua New 
Guinea. One of the earl iest and most successful to make the switch was Cecil Levien. He switched from 
being District Officer at Morobe in 1922, to become a major player in developing the Wau-Bulolo field in 
the late 1 920s. In the early 1930s the Leahy brothers worked closely with Jim Taylor, patrol officer par 
excellence, during their exploration of the Wahgi valley. Jack Hides, Jim Taylor and John Black, each 
involved in long exploratory patrols, routinely panned for gold in the rivers they crossed. In 1 948 a poorly 
informed scramble for leases at Porgera saw John Black and two others quit administration posts to 
participate . Jim Taylor followed suit several years later, and among his varied interests was a gold lease at 
Porgera which he retained until the mid-1970s. This trend continued until the end of the colonial regime: 
in 1 973, the Porgera kiap, Jack Scott, switched to working for the mineral exploration company at Porgera. 
The 1980s minerals boom which saw the development of the Ok Tedi, Misima, Porgera, and Mt Kare 
mines saw the widespread recruitment of ex-kiaps by resource developers, classically to Community 
Relations .  In itial ly much of their work involved the negotiation of land access and compensation issues, 
but as the operations matured (with the notable exception of Mt Kare, on which more below) the scope of 
their activities, and their numbers, increased. 
Without a comprehensive survey, we know of over 25 ex-Administration personnel who occupy or have 
occupied most of the key community l iaison positions in the industry. They are distributed throughout the 
major mines and prospects, including Porgera ( 1 3  indiv iduals at one time or another), Lihir (6), Misima 
(2), Ok Tedi (2), and Ku tubu (3). At Porgera, half of the ten expatriate Community Affairs staff currently 
employed are ex-Administration personnel, including the manager, along with the Port Moresby-based 
Corporate Affairs manager. In many cases, but by no means all ,  they have returned to areas in which they 
operated as kiaps. When further staff are required, they often recruit through networks of former colleagues. 
Many tasks which confront community l iaison staff are strikingly familiar to those who were kiaps. They 
become embroiled in mediating in d isputes, overseeing compensation payments, determining land 
ownership and group membership, censusing, and as mediators in labour relations. Today, however, they 
rarely go on patrol. Instead, visits to communities are made by vehicle where roads exist, or by helicopter. 
J\ frequent complaint by communities is that where the kiaps of old would sleep in the villages while on 
patrol and were more accessible, hel icopter visits tend to be brief and allow less contact, particularly in 
dispersed communities. Partly this is a function of age:  a returning Porgera kiap tried to repeat a patrol he 
had made 23 years earl ier and discovered that, l ike state capacity, the years had not treated his body kindly. 
It also reflects the differing nature of their employers - instead of being the mobile agents of a thinly spread 
administration, they now operate for a highly centralised and locally focussed corporation .  
In one critical regard, the positions they now occupy put them, in the communities '  eyes, in the same place 
163 
that they occup ied under the colonial regime. With access to senior corporate management, and with control 
over matters such as business contracts and the discretion to spread community funding, these ex-kiaps are 
again seen to be the gatekeepers to modernity and weal th .  
Crucially, even where Community Relations people are not ex-kiaps, it i s  a ' kiap model ' , focussed on  the 
daily management of the local environment, that is instituted. In many cases they employ as assistants and 
colleagues, Papua New Guineans who worked under them during the colonial period. The weaknesses of 
the kiap model can also been discerned in the operations of Community Relations sections at virtually all 
mine sites. Specifically there is a focus on the daily management of the local environment, or reactive 
' fire-fighting ' .  This focus on day-to-day administration and management of the local social environment 
has meant longer term policy development has often been overlooked. 14  
'Ibe different pol itical and social context in which they now operate often frustrates these born-again kiaps. 
A lack of  government support and services for the communities in which they operate, is a constant 
concern. The classic case was a series of reports written by a sequence of ex-kiaps brought in by CRA 
Minerals to assist with landownership studies at the problematic Mt Kare al luvial mine in Enga Prov ince 
during l 988- 1 992. J\11 were frustrated by dealing with disputing groups of l andowners with little or no 
government intervention, and having no power themselves to become involved in controlling the situation. 
One wrote : 
11ie Government, remote and preoccupied with its own internal politicking, has shown scant 
interest in recognising that a problem exists, let alone addressing itself to finding a solution. It 
must be anticipated that the Governmen� through its disinterest, will permit the situation to drift 
out of control. Even then it must be doubted whether any effective measures to assert Government 
authority will be taken. 15 
Two points about this novel context are worth highlighting. First, as consultants and Community Affairs 
staff, ex-kiaps become involved in much more protracted processes of negotiation than they did when they 
were kiaps. No longer are they arbitrarily able to ' settle '  disputes. Part of the reason for this is their lack 
of legislative resources. Second, they obviously do not have the same recourse to the deployment of state 
violence that they did before. As a result they feel they are, to employ a phrase used by a Community 
J\lfairs manager comparing his current role with that of his time in the colonial administration, 'flying by 
the seat of our pants ' .  
Conclusions 
'Australian kiaps sat at the gate of the money haus and everything worked smoothly . . .  Just because they 
were Austral ians their people were very happy to send money. ' 16 
To us, two possible conclusions can be drawn from this return of the kiap .  The first is that the continued 
utility of the kiap model highlights aspects of the technological requirements of administration in rural 
Papua New Guinea. In particular daily contact, and building relationships with the people  they deal with 
are critical elements in the success of both the kiap model, and their current roles. 
Second, the return ing Austral ian kiap still has a legitimacy amongst rural Papua New Guineans that 
contemporary government officers do not. Clearly this legitimacy is derived from their gatekeeper role -
as company Community Relations staff they can access more resources more effectively than a government 
officer. The continuing l ink between providing ' development' and legitimacy is critical in explaining the 
' failure '  of government. 
With the benefit of 30 years hindsight we can reflect on Sinclair ' s  question which opened this paper -
whether there would be a place for Pax Australiana in the 'brave new world' of an Independent Papua New 
Gu inea. The short answer is yes, although in place of the sureties of the Pax A ustraliana, kiaps 
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reincarnated as community affairs officers for the mineral resource industry have been engaged in a more 
l imited, but increasingly more compl icated, Pax Corporata. 
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I a m  not a stupid native! 
Decolonising Images and Imagination in Solomon Islands 
Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, Pol itical and Social Change, ANU 
Decolonisation is a power relation in which an emerging independent state uses indigenous elites, 
community leaders and other individuals to exert control over a defined boundary, often created by the 
withdrawing imperial power. The role of indiv iduals in legitimising the state ' s  control is s ignificant. 
Michel Foucault, d iscussing the relationship between power and individuals, asserts that the individual is 
merely an instrument for the transmission of power: ' They are not the target of power. They help transmit 
it' . 1  This is an important observation when one considers how and why indigenous peoples in post-colonial 
societies submit to and are used for the transmission of power - a process that often leaves them powerless, 
decades after independence. To understand this, it is pertinent to explore the perceptions created about 
indigenous peoples and how those perceptions have been inherited and localised. In Melanesia, and the 
Pacific islands in general , such perceptions are embodied in concepts such as ' native ' ,  'bush kanaka' ,  and 
'boy ' .  These concepts were used extensively in the colonial era to define the power relation between the 
colonial masters and their Melanesian subjects, and to reinforce their differing positions in that relationship. 
Consequently, because these power relations have been established and institutionalised through colonially 
established institutions such as churches, schools and administrative structures, decolonisation often fails 
to erase the nature of the relationship between Europeans (who represent the former colonial powers) and 
indigenous peoples. Hence, despite the decolonisation of Melanesia, the relationship between Melanesians 
and their white counterparts continues to be overshadowed by perceptions created during the colonial era 
and perpetuated since by Melanesians. In writing about decolonisation in Oceania, and more specifically 
on Austral ian policies toward the participation of Papua New Guineans in the pol itical process in colonial 
Papua New Guinea, J. W. Davidson noted that 'because it  is based on emotion - a sense of cultural 
superiority and an impulse to dominate - it creates a prejudice against local people with a good 
understanding of Western institutions. ' 2 This prejudice is often exacerbated by Melanesians ' acceptance 
of the negative perceptions Europeans have about them. During the relatively short period of colonial 
control, many Islanders came to accept their status as native colonial subjects, inferior to their European 
masters . This is despite the fact that many Melanesian societies sought to reestablish their dignity and 
independence through social-based proto-nationalist movements such as the Ma'asina Rule movement in 
Solomon Islands, the John Forum Movement in Vanuatu and the Mataungan Association in Papua New 
Gu inea. However, these movements were suppressed and dismissed by the colonial authorities as irrational, 
millenarian and cargo cultic.3 Such treatment of indigenous social movements contributed to the negative 
perception that often outlives constitutional independence and perpetuates an imbalanced power relation. 
In Solomon Islands, nearly two decades after pol itical independence, many Solomon Islanders still have 
inferior perceptions of themselves as compared to Europeans (and increasingly Asians). These perceptions 
were inherited from the colonial era and perpetrated concepts such as ' native ' ,  ' bush kanaka ' ,  and 'boy ' .  
Although these terms are slowly disappearing from mainstream vocabulary, the disempowering discourse 
they served persists. It influences how Islanders relate to outs ide ideologies, institutions and people. 
'Ibis paper explores how the concepts of native, boy and bush kanaka in Solomon Islands were created and 
maintained, and how that contributes to the maintenance of colonial discourses decades after constitutional 
independence. These concepts have also been inherited, internalised and generally accepted by Solomon 
Islanders, thus perpetuating the nature of power relation between indigenous people and Europeans. In that 
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relationship the native Solomon Islander is viewed as inferior compared to the Westerner (and increasingly 
Asian) . The paper argues that decolonisation should involve the deconstruction of the native d iscourse so 
as to enable the Solomon Islander to reconstruct h is/her image and imagination of h is/her future. If that is 
achieved then decolonisation will be an empowering process that goes beyond constitutional changes. There 
are four sections:  ( 1 )  I use my personal experiences to illustrate how Solomon Islanders are confronted by 
the native identity and how we react to it; (2) a discussion of how the native is created and maintained in 
both the colon ial and post-colonial societies; (3) a demonstration of how in nearly all post-colonial 
societies, the native is no longer an exclusively European perception . Rather, it has been inherited, 
internalised, and accepted by Solomon Islanders; (4) this has implications for the process of decolonisation. 
Discovering and Con fronting My Nativeness 
It took years of exposure and interaction with many ideas and individuals for me to real ise and confront my 
native identity. I had to go far from home to come to terms with the fact that the native d iscourse has played 
an important role in my self-perceptions and relationships with others. I was born in a l ittle vil lage on the 
Weather Coast of Guadalcanal, in Solomon Islands, where there were many natives. Like my parents, 
grandparents, and those before us, I was born a native. Well, at least that was how European masters 
regarded us. To the colonial administrators, missionaries and Solomon Islander elites in  Honiara, we were 
not just natives - we were bush kanakas. That was because the Weather Coast of Guadalcanal was, until 
the 1970s, isolated from the m�jor impacts of colonialism. Those who had gone to work in the plantations 
on the other side of the island, and elsewhere, were referred to, not only as natives and bush kanakas, but 
as boys, not men. In the late 1980s, while doing university studies, I began to ask questions : how did we 
acquire the native identity? ;  what are the perceptions attached to being a native? 
As a child in the village in the 1970s, I heard terms such as native, bush kanaka, and boy used by European 
colonial administrators and missionaries to refer to us. Then, the words simply meant somebody who had 
' no savy' about European knowledge and language, and limited access to European goods. Later I real ised 
the sal ience of these concepts and the profound impact they had on images created about Solomon 
Islanders, our self-perceptions, and how we imagine our future. It was at the University of the South Pacific 
that I began to real ise how many of these images have been internalised, adopted, inherited and used by 
us. These concepts became important as discourses for the maintenance of a power relation that favoured 
the non-native. 
During my first year at USP, Vilisoni Hereniko was beginning to carve his path as a Pacific Islander 
playwright, a path which took him to the Manoa campus of the University of 1-Iawai ' i . In that first year at 
USP, Hereniko produced Leo Hannett' s play The Ungrateful Daughter. One of the characters in the play 
was the native Houseboy, Tomtom who works in the home of the Australian couple, Mr and Mrs Carney. 
In this play, Tomtom is an ignorant native who is impossible to transform into an Australian. Here, Tomtom 
depicts the stupid native Houseboy who is scold and shouted at by the Carneys. I aud itioned for a part in 
the play and was offered the character Tomtom. That was in 1985 .  S ince then I have been attempting to 
understand Tomtom, his role as a Houseboy and the complexity that lies behind the innocence he portrays 
to the Carneys. Why is it that a Melanesian man has been reduced to a Houseboy, doing tasks that in his 
society are reserved for women? Why has he lost his dignity to the extent of washing Mrs Carney's 
underwear? In h is society, he wouldn't even touch or go under women 's  clothes. 
Another character is Ebonita, the Papua New Guinean adopted daughter of the Carneys. The Australians 
were trying to transform Ebonita into an Australian because that was perceived as the most noble thing for 
a native to do. An Australian was regarded as complicated and thus higher in Darwin's strata of evolution. 
It was assumed that to get out of being native one needed to be transformed - to become l ike one 's master. 
Ebonita, the native adopted daughter, is going through that transformation. In one scene Ebonita, frustrated 
by the comments of her adopted family, admits her nativeness by exclaiming: ' But I am a native! ' 
167 
The Ungrateful Daughter, set in early 1970 Papua New Guinea, is an anticolonial play targeted at 
Australian pol icies, particularly in relation to large-scale resource development. However, what struck me 
most was the interaction between the concept of native and the processes of colonialism and decolonisation. 
Through the play (and especial ly in the characters Tomtom and Ebonita) I started to confront my own 
nativeness. Tomtom, the obedient Houseboy, demonstrates the disempowering native discourse at work. 
I l is presence in the home of the Carneys is unnoticed except as a Houseboy serving the needs and 
answering ' yes Sir' , ' yes Mrs ' to their commands. To the Carneys he is the typical native whose cultures 
and customs are primitive and therefore irrelevant for the colonisers. When Tomtom refused to wash Mrs 
Carney's underwear because, as he stated ' hemi tambu long pies blong mi. Man i no ken holem tanget blong 
ol mere. Bae i kasem sik, bae i no napu kasim kaput . . .  ' (it' s  tambu where I come from. A man cannot hold 
a woman 's  clothes. l ie wil l  get s ick and won ' t  be able to catch possums), he was dismissed as ' lazy and 
making excuses ' .  Here, the colonial masters refuse to acknowledge that the native possesses a complex set 
of cultures that regulate his everyday l ife. By dismissing native cultures as superstitious, the colonial 
process disempowers and simplifies the native to a mere artefact for the articulation of colonial policies . 
In Foucault's terms, he is just an individual essential in the transmission of colonial power.4 In the play, 
Ebonita takes on the confrontational role that leads to decolonisation. It is her adoption that gave her the 
opportunity to understand the colonial masters and her education equipped her to revolt. Here, Ebonita is 
the beacon for decolonisation. 
It was not only I lannett 's  Ungrateful Daughter that made me confront my native identity. At USP I also 
met the Samoan novelist, Albert Wendt, who became not only my teacher, but an important mentor in the 
reconstruction of my self-image. His novels Sons for the Return Home, Flying-fox in a Freedom Tree, 
Leaves of the Banyan Tree, Pouliuli, The Birth and Death of a Miracle Man, and numerous other works 
became important in influencing how I confront and deal with being a native. I also read Vincent Eri ' s  
Tlze Crocodile. 5 Numerous Pacific Islander poets also became important. Ruperaki Petaia 's  Kidnapped 
began my questions about my education. Recently, the poems of my friend and colleague Teresia Teaiwa 
were important. As she ventures to discover her place in the Pacific Islands as a person of mixed parentage, 
I venture into rediscovering my integrity - to shift from being a stupid native. Subramani's Altering 
Imaginations6 helped alter my imagination about myself as a native and how I relate to others. 
My exposure to the reconstruction of my self-image was compounded by my introduction to Pacific history. 
In particular, I was introduced to the Canberra school and its campaigns for the decolonisation of Pacific 
history. My first history classes at the University of the South Pacific were dominated by the works of J. 
W. Davidson, Donald Denoon, Hurry Maude and others, most of whom originated from ANU (in 
particular, what I found to be the confusingly winding corridors of the Coombs building which housed, 
amongst other things, the Division of Pacific and Asian History). Central in the endeavours of these 
distinguished scholars was the idea of creating a Pacific h istory that is ' island centred and Islander oriented ' 
- a history, not only about Pacific Islanders, but also from Islanders ' perspectives. The idea was to 
empower Pacific Islanders through history. Amongst the first set of readings I was given was Maude' s  
Pacific Ilist01y - Past, Present and Future: 
Pacific lzistmy is not only a fascinating specialisation in its own right, studying a regional 
laboratmy of historical variables in miniature that will enable it to make an increasing 
contribution to the discipline as a whole, but that it also has a very practical and therapeutic role 
to enact in assisting the rehabilitation of the Pacific people at the end of a traumatic era of 
European political, economic and technological ascendancy by renewing their self-respect and 
providing them with a secure historical base from which to play their part as responsible citizens 
of independent or self goveming communities in a new world 1. 
This statement appealed tremendously to a teenage Solomon Islander exposed to the concepts of 
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decolonisation and empowerment for the first time. I succumbed to the discipl ine of  h istory and quietly 
vowed to rediscover my historical roots in an attempt to empower myself. In so doing, I d iscovered the 
works of Paci fic Islander historians. But I was disappointed. There were only a few - Brij Lal, the late 
Sione Latukefu, Malama Meleisea, John Waiko among the most prominent. Worse still, most can only be 
found in Austral ia and New Zealand, where Pacific history is manufactured and written. The Pacific islands 
are only the research laboratories and teaching ground. After years of being taught that h istory will 
empower me, and of teaching Pacific history to fellow Pacific Islanders, I have come to question why 
Pacific Islanders, and Solomon Islanders in particular, have not been empowered. Why is it that decades 
after the Canberra school was born, the Pacific History Association is still dominated by non-Pacific 
Islanders? J\s for the goal of creating an ' island oriented h istory ' ,  I soon realised that the doctrine, as Ian 
Campbell puts it, is ' by now acquiring grey hairs ' . 8 Such questions have beckoned me to come to terms 
with my native, bush kanaka, and boy identity. 
The works of these historians were supplemented by the contributions of anthropologists, who sought to 
explain Pacific societies, and push to the core of anthropological discourses such as ethnological 
investigations. It was then that I began to be acquainted with the truth behind concepts such as the noble 
savage and the preconceptions of early Europeans in the Pacific Islands. Through my readings of 
anthropology I began to discover European construction of the non-European man, and how that has 
influenced European attitudes towards non-European peoples.9 Also, as Campbell observed, European 
perceptions of Islanders have changed over the years: ' the emphasis passed from purity and virtue to 
observed vices such as treachery, theft, cruelty, poverty and oppression . . .  a sequence from noble savage 
to sinful savage, and successively, comic savage, degraded savage, and finally, disgusting savage' . 10 This 
proved pertinent in my understanding of power relations between White people and Solomon Islanders. 
I real ised the anthropological obsessions with Solomon Islands and the Pacific islands in general . An 
obsession led a senior delegate from American Samoa at the Second South Pacific Conference to say that 
' the Pacific Islander was beginning to feel l ike a gold-fish in a bowl, forever being watched, measured, 
weighed and interrogated ' .  Similarly, a representative from French Polynesia observed that ' in Tahiti they 
now defined the nuclear family as man, wife, children and social anthropologist' . 1 1  In Solomon Islands, 
anthropology was also thriving in its creation of the Solomon Islander whom the anthropologist places in 
a basket labeled the Melanesian native. Roger Keesing in his attempt to find the ' typical primitive social 
group ' ,  j ourneyed into the heart of the Kwaio society in the mountains of Malaita. For the waneagu of 
Kwaio, it was more an attempt to comprehend why a white man had left his home and abundant material 
goods to live with them. They knew noth ing about anthropologists, anthropological discourses and the 
images that have been created of the Kwaio man as the most primitive and hostile of Solomon Islanders -
images that later I found as photographs hanging on the walls of the Coombs Building where Keesing 
carved his career. The Kwaio accepted Keesing into their society and when he died his ashes were taken 
back to Kwaio. In recounting his first encounter with the Kwaio people, Keesing wrote :  
I knew the Kwaio could be dangerous and hostile to outsiders. But  I hoped that their suspicion 
would be tempered because I was an American who had come to study their customs: both 
'custom ' and Americans were symbols of Malaita resistance to colonialism. I was to learn only 
years later that I had come as the fulfilment of prophecy and in response to their sacrifices and 
prayers. 12 
When Keesing decided to study Malaitans, he was inspired (like other adventurous anthropologists) by the 
' early tale of dark savagery, cannibal ism, and treacherous violence ' in the Melanesian islands ' and none 
more than Malaita ' .  These as he later learned, were the constructions of missionaries and planters. He 
wrote: 'I found when I arrived that these Kwaio featured as the most dangerous villains and darkest and 
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wildest heathens in the colonial ist conversations of planters and missionaries ' .  Colonial ists have chosen 
to disregard the fact that there is a complex set of customs that d istinguish the Kwaio as more than just 
native villains and heathens. Keesing came to understand and respect that complexity and as he later wrote: 
'Suffice it to say that in five trips in the course of fifteen years, my life has become intertwined with theirs 
in deeply reward ing bonds ' .  What Keesing did not note is that over the years the Kwaio themselves and 
other Solomon Islanders have come to accept the Kwaio as the most feared villains and darkest heathens, 
despite the fact that Kwaio culture resembles other Solomon Islands societies. The only difference is that 
not all Solomon Islands societies murdered a prominent colonial administrator as the Kwaio did in 1927. 13 
Other anthropologists - notably Marshall Sahl ins and Ann Chowning - sought to interpret Melanesian 
cultures and customs. Their interpretations of the Melanesian contributed towards the creation of my 
Melanesian-ness and nativeness. But how and why did that creation take place? 
Creating the Native 
In Solomon Islands, as elsewhere, the concept of native has become accepted as part of the indigenous 
person ' s  identity. In accepting the native, what is often forgotten is that the native is not original. It is a 
concept and form of identity created as a consequence of colonialism and the interaction with the West, and 
consolidated by institu tions such as schools and churches that are associated with colonial ism. The native 
is similar to what Edward Said calls the orient, which he states is a Western creation. It is a consequence 
of Western attempts to distinguish itself as different from and better off than the rest of human society. 14 
These forces and the desire to be distinct has given rise to the notion of native. 
The native, l ike the orient, is a European invention. Said explained that to the European who created 
oriental ism, the orient is ' a  place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable 
experience' . It is the image of the other that helps to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, 
idea, personal ity, experience. The orient is not merely imaginative, but part of European ' material ' 
civil isation and culture. Said explores orientalism as a style of thought based upon an ontological and 
ep istemological distinction between ' the orient ' and (most of the time) ' the accident ' .  It is basically the 
distinction between the East and the West as the parting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social 
descriptions, and political accounts concerning the orient, its people, customs, ' mind ' ,  destiny, etc. 15 
S imilarly, the native in Solomon Islands is an European creation which manifests the superiority of the 
colonial power. 'lbe native is not merely a distinction between East and West, but also between master and 
subject, superior and inferior. The native identity, therefore, is not easily erased by constitutional and 
structural changes such as independence. Rather it continues to exist as part of the post-colonial culture, 
embedded in the psychology of the Solomon Islander. 
The experiences are similar to those of African societies. Dickson Mungazi, in The Mind of Black Africa, 
discusses how the West was fascinated and preoccupied with the black skin : 'European preoccupation with 
skin pigmentation was the primary basis used for interaction and social relationships between people. 
Nothing else seemed to matter. To Europeans of that time skin color was an important criterion used to 
determine a person 's  place in society ' . 16 In Solomon Islands, as elsewhere, the native is created to transmit 
and manifest Western power. In this relationship the native is perceived as inferior and hence, needs to be 
taken to the higher level of civilisation defined by Western European ideologies. That justifies colonialism, 
a vehicle for civilising, educating and Christianising the native in order to transform him. Western scholars, 
therefore, treat the native as a subject for capturing the imagination of the Western public. Here the native 
is depicted and treated very carefully to ensure it is d istinct from the West - the native is a savage who is 
simultaneously romantic and fascinating. The work of Christian missionaries has also become significant 
in painting that picture of the native. A Roman Catholic priest after being appointed as parish priest on the 
Weather Coast of Guadalcanal, for example, made the following remarks in a letter of 28 October, 1 9 1 1 ,  
to a colleague i n  Austral ia: 
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11ze white men haven 't ventured here yet to run their stores and while this has its advantages it 
also means that we have to go without quite a few things. Spiritually Avuavu is not marvelous. 
11zese people's morals are incredibly corrupt. There might be more savage tribes elsewhere in 
tlze Solomons but in tlze above field there is no worse. As recently as this week I came across a 
few instances. Poor people: God's grace will have to be very powe7ful to convert them and after 
that to make tlzem persevere. Say a little prayer for them . . .  'may the good Lord take this into 
account and hasten the hour of grace for this splendid people around us ' . 1 7 
Such statements depict the native not just as Rousseau ' s  noble savage. The native has, as Campbell puts 
it, ' becomes less noble' . 1 8  What did not change is the status of the native in relation with the European. 
Keesing writes that to the Europeans Solomon Islanders were 'brutish savages the missionary could tum 
into docile children; strong animals  the blackbirder could tum into beasts of burden on the sugar and 
coconut plantations and lawless cannibals the District Officer could  turn into tame subjects ' . 19 Such 
perceptions influenced Islanders '  self-perceptions and their relationship with Europeans. The superiority -
inferiority nature of the relationship is now perpetuated by local elites and the institutions they inherited. 
After years of heing called a native, the Solomon Islander internalises the identity and begins to act l ike one 
in relations with Europeans. Some attempt to rid the native identity, by imitating the European. This creates 
a con ll ict of identity. The creative work of Solomon Islanders reflects an attempt to solve the native 's  
identity crisis and re-establish its dignity. Sam Alasia, in h is collection of poems titled Hostage, explores 
how the native is trapped in an identity crisis.20 This Man, a play by the late Francis Bugotu, 21 explores how 
the native attempts to find an identity and d ignity by giving the native a sense of being, and belonging. In 
the play the native looks at himself and asks : 'This Man ! who is he? Who am I ? '  July Makini's (formerly 
July Sipolo) works have also reflects the d ilemma of the native women. Her collection of poems Mi Mere, 
22 explores the native woman and the conflicts she encounters. Celestine Kulaghoe, Solomon Island ' s  best 
known poet, attempts to come to terms with the confusions of identity that the native reflects. 
one day i long to have been 
my grandfather. 
another day i long to be 
my own grandson. 
today i wish i d idn't have 
two hands.23 
This is the most difficult of tasks. The decolonisation of Solomon Islanders ' images and imagination must 
involve a realisation that he/she is not just  a stupid native. 
The Native and Decolonisation in Solomon Islands 
Nearly two decades after independence, the native d iscourse still holds a s ignificant place in Solomon 
Islanders perceptions. These perceptions continue to determine images and relations between the native and 
former colonial powers. Francis Bugotu, writing about decolonisation, stated that ' it is a big disadvantage 
in this world to be black. lhe trouble with us Solomon Islanders is that we are too black. . . .  we are treated 
as boys rather than men. We were children not knowing what was good for us - loveable little barefooted 
dears with fuzzy-wuzzy hair' .24 Such perceptions were compounded by what Keesing described as ' the 
blatantly presumptuous British assurance of cultural superiority and paternalism in dealing with the 
"child-l ike savages", have withered Melanesian pride and identity ' .25 For the native in Solomon Islands, 
decolonisation cannot be meaningful unless it deconstructs the native d iscourse - it must rid the indigenous 
person of the negative images of the colonial era. This is the only way to offset the persistent and 
unbalanced relations between Solomon Islanders and Europeans. This is not just changing government 
structures . It is as much a spiritual process as it is a process of cultural transformation .  
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For me, what i s  left i s  to shed the negative images often attached to my nativeness. Decolonisation has just 
began as I interact more with my 'white '  friends, colleagues and counterparts. Trough them and their 
reassuarances, I began my path towards self confidence and the realisation that I am not a stupid native. 
Decolonisation should be a process of rediscovering one' s  dignity as it is of making constitutional changes. 
Independence, therefore, is only the beginning of that process, not the end. 
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Decolonising the Mind : 
toward s  an alternative vision for Education in the Solomon Islands 
Stanley Hou ma, Solomon Islands College of Higher Education 
This paper is about re-thinking education in the Solomon Islands as an important process of 
decolonisation, achieving greater sovereignty and development towards a more desirable d irection for 
its people. 
More specifically, it is my v ision of the need to redirect and provide more relevant and meaningful 
education for the majority of Solomon Island people. A process this paper argues would require some 
degree of decolonisation of the mind. This presentation is more a sharing of an idea, rather than a fully 
researched report. 
Here I define education as an introduction to worthwhile learning. In d istinguishing between formal 
and informal education, Konai Thaman defined formal education as 'organised, institutional learning 
(such as that which occurs in schools and universities), and informal education is what goes on in a 
community without any formal organisation or assessment' . 1 Relevant education in my opinion is one 
which offers opportunity for people to learn to live meaningful and rewarding l ives. This could occur 
both in school and the community. Decolonisation, for this paper is seen as a state of freedom for 
deciding on a country's own destination. 
There are also bas ic assumptions which underlie this discussion : 
1 .  Formal education is more important and valuable than informal education. 
2. Academic subjects such as Maths and English are accorded higher status than practical (vocational) 
subjects like Industrial Arts and Agriculture. 
3 .  'The lifestyle led by formal education graduates is better than those who are educated and l ive in the 
v illages. 
Education in the Solomon Islands (as in most Pacific Island societies before European contact) was 
informal and rarely institutional ised . Education was a preparation for life in a person's own socio­
political and physical environment. Education was synonymous with the idea of socialisation in western 
society. Education was an integral aspect of life where every member of a community was an educator 
and young people learnt through observation and communal participation. Education was relevant. 
In 1893, when Solomon Islands became a British Protectorate informal (traditional) education, though 
still practised has become overshadowed by an institutionalised western education. The reason for this 
introduction was that ' the coloniser real ised from the outset that the colony would eventually become 
a sovereign entity and the manner in which to realise this was through formal education ' .2 However, 
this could also be viewed as the colonial means of reproducing capitalist social relations, and creating 
a consumer society for colonial introduced products. Formal education therefore ass isted to entrench 
the Solomon Islands into the capitalist global network as a Protectorate. This was realised through the 
colonial monopoly over contact, control and access to formal education during the colonial period. 
Through this, colonial ism transformed the values that form the basis of important educational practices .  
Goldsmith made the following conclusion about the fate of traditional societies under colonial ism. 'The 
colonial powers sought to destroy the cultural pattern of traditional societies largely because of their 
essential features prevented traditional people from subordinating social, ecological and spiritual 
imperatives to the short term economic ends served by participation in the colonial economy. There is 
no better way of destroying a society than undermining its educational system. ' 3 Formal education is  
very much isolated from the Islanders, as  it reflects elements of colonial culture. 
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Even fourteen years after independence, formal education is still not relevant for the majority of 
Solomon Islanders, rather it contributes to their al ienation from their communities and the continuing 
colonisation of their minds. The continuing use of a foreign language of the colonial power as the only 
official language of formal education and the medium of instruction contributes to the colonisation role 
of formal education. 
'lbe isolation of the school and its curriculum from the culture, values and activities of the community 
has further contributed to alienation of young people. Many fundamental elements of the people's way 
of l ife are ignored . For example, the sequence of the curriculum content is decided in total disregard 
to the cycle of activ ities of the community. Many children are therefore growing up without an 
appreciation and knowledge of the customs and values of their people. Educational planning has 
generally been based on the 'manpower needs of the wage and salary economy, rather than on the needs 
of integral human development. The curriculum emphasises academic subjects and cognitive skills 
rather than practical and social skills needed for community development' .4 
The education system has failed to help the majority of graduates to participate positively in the 
community. Many return to their communities to find that the education they have received has not 
prepared them to utilise the resource development opportunities available. They feel failures, no longer 
value village l ife, traditions and obligations. They also lack the social and spiritual attitudes and values 
desirable for l ife in the community. 
'Jbese have combined to create a generation of frustrated school leavers, disillusioned parents who feel 
they have wasted their money and teachers and schools which are seen to have failed the community. 
'lbe situation is indeed a vicious cycle, because the country continues to expand the formal education 
sector to increase access, but this in tum increases the number of frustrated people with false hopes and 
low self esteem and confidence. Instead it increases the market for foreign product output, because the 
people are educated to become consumers of foreign goods and services. 
Formal education, instead of providing our society with a new spirit and hope for advancement, has by 
and large provided a means of assuring its demise. 
Decolonising the Mind: a renewed vision for education 
ls there a vis ion for the future? The situation I have described cannot be allowed to continue. The 
national government need to adopt a philosophy of education which contains a decolonised vision of 
an education system which would be relevant to the social, spiritual and resource development needs 
and opportunities of the majority of Solomon Island people.  This v is ion is one which is based on and 
aims to achieve the decolonisation of the mind, so that education does not merely take an approach 
which continues to reflect continu ing colonisation of people's thinking, behaviour and attitudes. 
It is a decolonised vision for education, that accepts the local culture and builds upon it to develop 
Solomon Islanders who : 
are committed to their own personal development and see education as a continuing life long 
process; 
develop a productive work ethic, and value both rural and urban community development in 
the context of national development; 
are prepared for life in the community, accepting the limitations of our small island country and 
living with their means; 
are capable of participating in further training for manpower needs. 
This decolonised vision for education holds the v iew that the above goals will be best achieved by 
prov iding a basic education which : 
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strengthens people's identification with, rather than alienation from their communities; 
gives a degree of competence in subjects such as English, Maths and Science, as it is vital that 
citizens in a developing country acquire functional literacy. 
Such a system takes the knowledge, skills and attitudes of the people as its starting point, targets the 
development needs and opportunities of the community and provides additional knowledge and skill 
s necessary for contemporary living. 
What I have tried to communicate is an alternative approach to education, as a means to achieving a 
greater degree of decolonisation in Solomon Islands. The vital note of formal education in the 
colonisation of the people was highlighted, as it had been used to transform traditional societies to 
adopt new lifestyles, and develop a consumer dependent mental ity. Further it has moulded a huge 
number of frustrated people with marginal identities. This paper takes the view that a balanced 
philosophy for education is vital for decolonisation and the renewed philosophy for education can be 
possible only if there is a decolonisation of the mind. If formal education in its colonial form is an 
instrument of colonisation then an alternative approach to education is essential as an instrument of 
decolonisation. This paper is suggesting a renewed vision for education to develop a truly decolonised 
society. 
1 .  Konai Thaman, 'Reclaiming a place: culture and higher education i n  Oceania '  , paper presented at 
S ICIIE ' s  lOth anniversary, 1 994. See also R. Sharp·, Knowledge, ideology and politics of schooling, 
London, 1 990. 
2. L. Kii, 'Taking us to the present from pre-colonial to post-independence issues and problems 
pertinent in our education system' ,  Ibid. 
3 .  E .  Goldsmith, The way: a n  ecological world view, Boston, 1 993, 285 . 
4 .  Philosophy of Education for Papua New Guinea ,  1 986, 6 .  
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Decolonising the Intellectual  Mind-Set :  the Case of Papua New Guinea 
Rona N. Nad ile, Public Policy Progra m ,  ANU 
Thank you for the opportunity to speak at this workshop . I feel honoured to have been invited. First 
I acknowledge Greg Fry of the Department of International Relations, for his Framing the Islands: 
Knowledge and Power in Changing Australian Images of ' the South Pacijic ' . 1 In the face of adverse 
reporting and longstanding perceptions on the Pacific Islands and especially Papua New Guinea, he has 
taken a bold step, not just for Islanders, but recognising the good qualities in people. I am inspired by 
what he wrote and encouraged that others are thinking along similar l ines. Thank you Greg! 
When I started thinking about this topic, I did not know about Greg' s  Paper. As I survey the literature, 
the issues surrounding decolonisation are broad, relating to religion, culture, politics, orientalism, and 
of course framing the Pacific Islands, the Pacific paradise.2 Coming from outside Political Science, I 
find the literature overwhelming. I focus on Papua New Guinea. 
This paper is exploratory, based on l iterature survey and personal observation. My target audience are 
Papua New Guineans, and aid donors and consultants who make or influence pol icy-making and 
implementation. I also have in mind researchers, academics, investors and others with an interest in 
PNG. The intent of this paper is to promote positive thinking and attitudes, that Papua New Guineans 
can rise above intellectual inferiority, corruption and crime and remake Papua New Guinea. This can 
be achieved when appropriate and workable government policies are implemented. S imultaneously, 
people - citizens and non-citizens in the public and private sectors - play a l eading role in influencing 
the pol icy process from an intel lectual perspective.  
Decolonising comes from ' colony ' ,  which means several things but one that relates to this workshop 
is ' any territory pol itically controlled by a distant state ' .  Decolonising is the dismantl ing of political 
control from a distant state and allowing local control. ' Intellectual ' involves abil ity to think 
analytically, ' and understand ideas and information ' .  This paper refers to the d ismantling of certain 
fixed perceptions and patronising attitudes about Papua New Guineans' mental capacity. Unless the 
negative, degrading thinking and attitudes are dismantled, colonial ism of the mind will remain - hence 
the continuation of intellectual dependency. I base my d iscussion on two basic questions :  Why is 
decolonisation such a difficult task? and Can we really decolonise? and for what purpose? First I want 
to read a story. 
Quack, Quack - I ' m  a Chicken !3 
Once upon a time (yes, this is a sort of fairy tale, or a parable), there was a farmer who, among other 
th ings, raised chickens. One day as he was out on h is tractor he passed by a small pond. Next to the 
water he found the scattered remains of a female duck - apparently killed by a fox. 
The farmer also came upon a nest of duck eggs that the fox had somehow missed. He carefully 
scooped up the eggs, carried them back to the barn, and placed them in the nest of the barnyard hen. 
The trick worked.  The old mother chook got the idea that the eggs were hers. As maternal instinct 
kicked in, she sat on the eggs, just as she always d id, until they finally hatched. 
The ducklings never knew the difference. They assumed that the old hen was their mother and 
followed her around the barnyard just the way baby  chicks would usually do. The rest of the 
chickens didn ' t  know the difference either. They readily accepted the ducklings as members of the 
family. 
Until one day, when a summer rainstorm had left a huge puddle of water in the barnyard. The 
chickens carefully p icked their way around the edges of the water. But without even thinking, the 
ducklings just waddled over. 
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The mother hen was greatly alarmed. ' Get out of there this instant ! ' she frantically cried. 'You can't 
do that. You're chickens. You'll drown ! '  Reluctantly the ducklings left the puddle. The water had 
fel t  so good in the hot sun. 
The incident was only the beginning of the ducklings ' confusion . They did their best to blend into 
the chicken cu lture, but they continued to suffer embarrassing lapses. Sometimes when they tried to 
cluck, they quacked instead. 
Sometimes when they got excited, they would flap their wings and start to fly - until they 
remembered that they were chickens and chickens didn't do that. Their embarrassment slowly grew 
into frustration and finally deepened into depress ion. Something wasn ' t  right, and they couldn ' t  
figure out  what it was. 
One night a wise old owl sitting in a nearby tree saw the ducklings and said, 'Whooooooooo . . .  are 
you ? '  ' Chickens ' ,  they replied sheepishly. (Sorry, I couldn't resist that. ) They were ashamed to 
admit it. They knew they were not very good representatives of the chicken community. ' Don't be 
ridiculous ' ,  the owl replied. ' You're not chickens. You're ducks ! '  
' What do you mean? ' they repl ied. ' I  mean j ust what I said ' ,  the owl smiled. 
' You're not chickens. You're not made to cluck and scratch the ground. Haven't you ever felt l ike 
swimming across a pond? Haven't you ever felt l ike spreading your wings and flying away?' 
' Yes ! ' they replied. 'Yes, we've felt that way many times . But we were always told that we couldn't. 
We were always told that we weren't supposed to. '  
' I lorsefeathers ! '  cried the owl . ' You're ducks ! You were made to swim! You were made to fly! ' 
The duckl ings stared up at the owl in disbelief, then looked around excitedly. ' Well ' ,  the owl finally 
said, 'what are you waiting for? ' 
This story illustrates what many Papua New Guineans experience with the mixed messages we 
receive about us as a people - thinking (analytical thinking ! )  and understanding, intell igent people. 
For example, Thomas concludes his d iscussion of problems of educational provision in PNG by 
hoping that ' Papua New Guinean educators who are presently grappl ing with this problem, and who 
are themselves products of an Austral ian-model school system, will be able to devise a system of 
education for an independent Papua New Guinea whose social benefits will far outweigh the social 
costs .  '4 After twenty-one years of independence we should be able to but we have not, and we 
continue to receive prescriptions on how to govern and ways to develop . The basic colonial 
poli tical, bureaucratic and socio-economic systems and structures continue to be regenerated. We 
have grown accustomed to our colonial heritage. 
Why Decolon isation i s  Difficult 
In  spite of the policies and strategies of colonial ism, the change that was brought about in the 
process at the time in the history of PNG, in one way was good.  Contrary to popular bel ief and 
experience elsewhere, I think colonial ism was a blessing in d isguise -colonialism was freedom in 
the scattered and isolated societies . Being colonised was so good that when we try to decolonise, we 
cannot quite do it. Instead, we poeticize decolonisation in poetry such as ' Emerging Countries ' and 
' Transition ' ;5 we romanticise it with songs such as 'Port Moresby' by Mari Ell ingson.6 Was there a 
city in traditional times? No: so when did Port Moresby become the ' City of Our Dreams ' ?  Port 
Moresby was a colonial city and we are sad that it is no longer the city of our dreams, no longer the 
l ight of our land and the pride of our hearts. And we pol iticise decolonisation. The founders of 
PNG's nationhood proclaimed that we lowered the Australian flag as we raised the PNG flag in 
1975 . We did not tear down or burn the Australian flag.7 That first day of independence was 
greeted with joy by politicians and their followers, sadness by those who had nurtured a 
relationship, and confusion by the rural majority who did not understand what independence was all 
about. 
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It seems that these expressions in poetry, song and political statements reflect the impact of 
colonisation on the l ives of the people. Colonialism touched l ives in a significant moment, and for 
PNG I th ink it was mostly a good and cherished experience. Perhaps this is why PNG has an 
unusually dose relationship with Australia. Saffu described this relationship wel l :  
There is not  likely to be another country, even in the South Pacific, whose prime minister 
sent a congratulatory message to the New South Wales government on Sydney winning the 
competition to stage the Olympic Games in 2000; whose prime minister and opposition 
leader both routinely congratulate the winner in Australian general elections and 
commiserate with the loser; where all normal official work comes to a stand-still on 
Melbourne Cup day; where fanatical partisanship during the state of origin rugby clashes 
in A ustralia seems to polarise the population; where telecasts from at least four Australian 
TV stations are available to the elite (admittedly alongside telecasts from Malaysia, the 
Philippines and the U S); and where Australia is the only country to which off-peak 
reduced telephone charges apply. 8 
The essential ingredients of this relationship are historical . For example, the cherished experiences 
already mentioned, but also Austral ia's involvement with the two World Wars and the Cold War led 
to security relations, then there is business and trade, education and training, political and 
diplomatic relations, and to a lesser degree, immigration, scientific and cultural relations .  These are 
some of the important bases of the relationship. 
In traditional Papua New Guinea societies, we were a people, strong and courageous, defending our 
shores and fighting our own battles. We were intelligent and full of wisdom in the deal ings of our 
traditional societal norms and expectations. We had socio-economic systems that were rel iable and 
workable. We had laws and penalties that worked, and we housed, fed and clothed ourselves. In 
essence, we were highly self rel iant and independent. We did not depend on anyone beyond our 
lands and shores for assistance. 
The emergence of colonial ism that led to civilisation and modernisation, shifted us from being 
somebody, to being nobody. This is a significant turning point. I think we lost ourselves as the 
people that we were. We became l ike adopted children, dependent on the adopted parent to provide 
for us - thinking analytically for us and giving us lots of money to spend on whatever we choose. So 
there remains a bel ief that we were noth ing, we were nobody, and the Whiteman came and made us 
(or tried to make us) into somebody. There was freedom from fear, s ickness and disease and other 
advantages such as improved roads, transport, communications and so on. Although these 
improvements also come with new fears, d isease and hosts of other problems,  this is why 
colonialism is perceived as good because it was a liberating experience in various forms. 
Going hack to the Whiteman making us into somebody, I think Papa Austral ia ( ' Papa' more 
appropriate than ' Mama' as most decisions are made by men in government ! )  tried to make us into 
somebody that we are not. Now Australia's patience and the heart of giving has become weary while 
PNG has become quite l ike a spoilt teenager, rebellious and wasteful .  Like the ducks in the story, 
we have been turned into somebody else, but deep within us we know we are intelligent and 
confident people. Our orientation to regain this position comes with mixed messages so we are still 
waiting to make a leap and hopefully fly without further delay. There is a missing l ink that I believe 
must be restored to make us the people that we were - strong and courageous, intell igent and 
confident to run the affairs of our country independently. What is l ikely to prolong the waiting is 
where Austral ian politicians, business, bureaucrats and other donor agencies still ' influence aspects 
of pol icy-making and implementation . . .  through their control over . . .  aid funds '9 At the same time 
Government (politicians) do not ' grow up and out' of the corruptive practices of governance, and 
PNG intellectuals do not take a stand on aspects of the policy process. 
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Can We Really Decolon ise? 
And for what purpose should we decolonise? When the colonial legacy l ives on for decades and the 
systems and structures have become assimilated into the local cultures, institutions and agencies, it 
seems impossible to truly  decolonise. However much we may try, there are some things that I 
bel ieve will remain part of our systems and structures. I do think though that certain areas can be 
decolonised . One is the mind, the thinking of people, so that confidence in the intellectual capacity 
of the people can be rebuilt and restored. 
How can the mind be decolonised? Briefly, by building human resource capacity through education 
and training in both informal and formal settings in the private and public sectors. The day before 
independence, The Age reported 3 ,100 graduates. Data s ince independence are not available. Tables 
1 and 2 present only Papua New Guineans studying in Australia under government sponsorship .  
According to AusAid, the fields of study in Table 1 indicate the needs of the country, while Table 2 
shows the relative strength of undergraduate programs in PNG. 53% of students are doing 
post-graduate studies in Austral ia. The distribution of awards may be questioned. Do we really need 
more economics, business and administration (36%)  personnel than agriculture ( 4%) and education 
(6% )? Whether or not the awards were based on human resource assessment in PNG is not known. 
And there remains a gender imbalance where 29% are female students, and 71  % male. 10 
There are two national Professors (both male), about four female Ph D graduates, a dozen males 
with Ph D degrees and probably hundreds more with Masters and Undergraduate degrees. What 
happened to the graduates, the intellectuals? Papua New Guineans have made headl ines in the 
political and bureaucratic arena, the diplomatic service and the judiciary and the court systems.  But 
when it comes to intellectual matters, we are inferior. We have publ ished less and there are no 
known intel lectuals as a corporate body for government to call upon to think analytically over issues 
such as corruption, law and order, health and education, land tenure and Bougainville. Papua New 
Guinea needs Papua New Guinean intellectuals more now than ever, to influence government 
policy making and implementation. 
Table 1: AusAid Sponsored PNG Students, 3 1 March 1 996 
Num ber of Students Field of Study 
15 (3%) 
20 (4%) 
16  (3%) 
39 (8%) 
182 (36%) 
32 (6%) 
55 ( 1 1 %) 
48 (10%) 
28 (6%) 
68 ( 13%) 
Tota l :  503 
Other courses 
Agriculture and Related Study 
Architecture, Building and Survey 
Arts, Humanities and Social Science 
Economics, Business and Administration 
Education 
Engineering 
Health and Community Services 
Law and Legal Studies 
Natural sciences 
Table 2:  Progra ms 
Number of Awards 
46 (9%) 
159 (3 1 %) 
55 ( 1 1  %) 
132 (26%) 
33 (6%) 
8 (2%) 
49 ( 10%) 
25 (5 %) 
Total:  507 
Type of Award 
Ph Ds (Doctoral Studies) 
Postgraduate Masters 
Postgraduate Diploma and Certificates 
Undergraduate 
Other Undergraduate 
Other Postgraduate 
TAFE and Technical Colleges 
Other (e.g . .  Trainees) 
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I have tried to show that colonial ism was not altogether a bad experience. It brought freedom in 
various forms, and much has been cherished. There is no doubt that decolonisation is difficult, as 
colonial systems and structures (and the English language) become part of PNG society. Political 
and other forms of decolonisation have been tried. We need an alternative to truly decolonise the 
intellectual legacy. That alternative I bel ieve is intellectual capacity - to rebuild and transform in 
order to remake us as the people that we were, and even better. We will make mistakes, and we may 
fail; but we need to give ourselves a chance, and I plead with those who have an interest in our 
affairs, to be positive and encouraging - to bring out the best in the people. 
1 .  Greg Fry, Framing the islands: knowledge and power in changing Australian images of 'The South 
Pacific ', Department of International Relations Working Paper 5, 1 996 .  
2 .  B .S .  Turner, Orientalism, Postmode111ism and Globalism, London, 1 994; E. Said , ' From orientalism ' , 
in P .  Will iams and L. Chrisman (eds.) , Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial The01y , New York, 1 993 .  
3 .  'Quack, Quack - I 'm  a Chicken ! '  is  from Loving the God Who Loves You, Eastbourne, 1 993 .  
4 .  E.B.  Thomas, ' Problems of educational provision in Papua New Guinea: an area of scattered 
population ' ,  in E.B. Thomas, Papua New Guinea Education, London, 1 976 .  
5 .  A Jerewai, 'Emerging countries ' ,  Papua New Guinea Writing, 9 ( 1 973), 14 ;  0. Lebasi, 'Transition ' ,  
Ibid. , 10  ( 1 9 73), 9. 
6.  M. Ellingson, ' Port Moresby',  The ve1y best of Salima, Vol. 2, Chin H. Min, Port Moresby, 1 994. 
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8 .  Yaw Saffu, ' Papua New Guinea' ,  in  Trood, et al . (eds.) , The Asia-Australia Survey 1 994, MacMillan, 
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9 .  Ib id. , 225 . 
10 .  'Snapshot of  Training' , Australian Agency for International Development ,  1 995. 
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Whose voices are heard? Ora l  history and the d ecolonisation of history. 
Roderic Lacey, Australian Catholic University, Ballarat 
Prologue: Pale, haye kekcep score 
Vincente Diaz, in his perceptive rev iew of tales of demise and survival in Guam, tells how Mavis 
Warner Van Peenen, wife of an American naval officer, recorded how a young Chamorro girl asked 
two Spanish priests playing tennis Agana in 1 94 1 :  Pale, haye kekeep score? Van Peenen notes some 
of the historical nuances of such a phrase from the mouth of a Chamorro : 
Father, who is keeping the score? . . .  Pale the Chamorro adaptation of the Spanish word 
Padre; haye, a pure Chamorro interrogative pronoun meaning who ?; Kekeep, an English 
word but the first syllable reduplicated in the Chamorro manner to show tense, and finally the 
word score a pure English word. 
Against Van Peenen ' s  pessimism concerning the demise of the purity of Chamorro l anguage, Diaz 
argues that the quotation s ignifies durability and tenacity. Here is evidence as much of Chamorro 
influence on how Spanish and Engl ish are used on Guam, as on the impact of these languages on a 
passive people. 1 
. . .  It reveals a political history of the subject(ificat)ion of English and Spanish terms by 
Chamorro linguistic rules . . .  It begins by addressing the priest properly, that is, in his 
vernacular as well as with the appropriate title, padre, but through the flicking of a Chamorro 
tongue (pale). It pauses and then continues in Chamorro with its own interrogative pronoun 
haye who and then taps into the English term keep, subjected, however, to a persistent 
Chamorro rule of reduplication for what is grammatically called the present tense (kekeep ). 
The utterance ends with the unadulterated (vs pure) English word score . . .  
17ze utterance of 1941 is more than an  instance of a prewar Chamorro discursive maneuver, 
an operation on the remnants of Spanish and American language and colonialism, on Gam. 
It also provides a contempora1y political commentary: whose frame of reference will prevail 
- who gets to keep score in the contest that features Spanish padres playing an American sport 
in the land of the Clzamorros? . . .  In the form recollected by Van Peenen in 1 941, the 
Chamorro language is still keeping score . .  
Who, indeed, i s  keeping score, or whose voice i s  heard? The wife of an American colonial official or 
a contemporary Chamorro-speaking scholar of Filipino-Pohnpeian ancestry, American educated, now 
teaching in the University of Guam? Diaz is certain of where he stands and whose voice he is hearing. 
By way of kekeeping score - for this is a good way to narrate Guam 's history as any other 
chronological accounting of discrete events along a Eurocent1·ic calendar - let me suggest, 
then, not the collection of a quain t  lore of a primitive folk in doom, but the re-collection of 
island memories that wait restlessly in the ritual of everyday language of everyday island 
historical realities. 
From this case do I propose that not only are Chamorro voices, traditions, language and categories 
surviv ing, but that they are al ive and v ibrant, and that if we are attentive to their nuances they subvert 
and operate on the remnants of Spanish and American colonial ism? Does this case show that Chamorro 
voices are best heard and mediated by Chamorro historians, educated in America, who can decolonise 
imperial h istory by attentive reinterpretation of colonial sources in ways that free authentic native 
voices? As a start, these may be the most appropriate arguments derived from this Chamorro case. 
Edward Said gives us constant reminders of the web, structures, politics and language of imperial ism, 
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and points up  ways in  which the colonised assert their own identity and their own history:2 
. . .  this study proposes itself as a step towards an understanding not so much of Western 
politics and of the non-Western world in those politics as of the strength of Western cultural 
discourse, a strength too ofien mistaken as merely decorative or superstructural. My hope is 
to illustrate the formidable structure of cultural domination, and specifically for formerly 
colonized peoples, the dangers and temptations of employing this structure upon themselves 
or upon others. 3 
That attentiveness to the strength of the native Chamorro voice which Diaz urges, takes on fresh 
meaning in the context of this warning. In what forms do indigenous and non-indigenous Pacific Island 
historians mediate to us the native voices in oral sources? We need to be armed as readers with the 
hermeneutics of suspicion (to borrow from feminist scholars of Scripture) .4 And, in these terms, 
perhaps we need to ask not only whose voices are heard; but in what shape, form, tongue; and have 
we ways of entangl ing these messy imperial entanglements? 
Said suggests the pathway of the inventory. The foundation for this pathway he has taken from Antonio 
Gramsci who wrote in his Prison Notebooks: 
11ze starting-point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of what one really is, and is 
lozowing thyself as a product of the historical process to date, which has deposited in you an 
infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory . . .  [TJ herefore it is imperative at the outset to 
compile such an invent01y. 5 
Said builds on th is foundation: 
Much of the personal investment in this study derives from my awareness of being an Oriental 
as a child growing up in two British colonies. All of my education, in [Palestine and Egypt] 
and in the United States, has been Western, and yet that deep early awareness has persisted. 
In many ways my study of Orientalism has been an attempt to inventory the traces upon me, 
the Oriental subject, of the culture whose domination has been so powelful a factor in the life 
of all Orientals . . . Whether what I have achieved is the inventory prescribed by Gramsci is not 
for me to judge, although I have felt it important to be conscious of trying to produce one . . . .  6 
Said ' s  proposal is an important starting-point to free Pacific historians of colonial domination in both 
language and understanding. lb.is inventory is one voice that should be heard in decolonising history. 
In the introduction to Redemption Songs: A Life of Te Kooti Arikirangi Te Turuki, Judith Binney points 
to the long debate in New Zealand about the writing of Maori history. She notes that the main trend 
has been to ensure that Maori understandings and values be given full weight. The debate is about 
narrating history in ways meaningful to Maori. Assessing what weight might be given to Pakeha written 
accounts and Maori oral and written sources, Binney argues that 
The debate must be about the ability to understand the issues involved, and the strength of the 
ideas developed in the writing . . .  The act of writing history can be conceived as an encounter 
between the multifaceted human past and the individual who is constructing the present 
narrative. This construction of hist01y as literature, however, is very different from 
self representation by the participants. The act of historical reconstruction allows different 
voices to speak; it reveals people in their own times and contexts, which are not our own and 
should not be seen to be like our own .. . But no one owns the past; no one owns that 
complexity of shared experiences and human and cultural exchange. Tlte past is inhabited by 
all own ancestors. In 1 9th-century Aotearoa our ancestors are entwined . . . . 7 
lbis vision of the entanglements of Maori and Pakeha ancestors and their sources imbues this sensitive 
biography, in which she represents a Maori leader in ways that will illuminate him for Maori, as well 
as for Pakeha, by respecting Maori ways of seeing.8 Despite these entanglements, she reminds us that 
conflict between historical sources cannot be reconciled, nor should their d ifferences be smoothed 
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away; this variety of sources cannot simply be interwoven. Rather, she seeks to juxtapose different 
ways of recording and narrating history, to maintain historical integrity and to attend to competing 
understandings.9 
We now seem caught in this net of interpretation and its different contexts and demands. These writers 
urge us to attend to different voices if we are to free historical sources, understanding and writing from 
the invasions of colonisation and domination. Diaz alerts us to the ways in which native voices, 
traditions, language and categories undermine the dominant powers of colonisers. Said reminds us that 
by making an inventory of these shaping forces, it is possible to both use and to subvert the strength 
of the language and forms of domination, and for colonised people to assert their own identity and their 
own h istory. Binney seeks a just balance between competing histories, world views and sources by 
recognising differences and juxtaposing, not blending. those differences to ensure that different voices 
are allowed to be heard and that Maori understandings and values be given full weight. She draws on 
a variety of sources, of voices : official printed archives, personal and public manuscripts, newspapers, 
Maori and Pakeha oral traditions and testimonies, as well as photographs and other v isual records .  
There is  a common thread through these positions: the decolonising of history requires attentive and 
subtle strategies, draws on a wide range of sources and recognises, through a hermeneutics of suspicion, 
the contexts, filters and positions from which voices are represented. Oral sources, while allowing 
indigenous voices to be heard, have real value when located in their determining contexts and when 
not heard in isolation, and are recognised with other sources, not reconciled or smoothed away. 
Some cases from Papua New Guinea 
Two cases are considered : one from the Tolai of New Britain and the other from the Enga of the 
Highlands. First we need to smooth the ground. Pangia, an elder from the Mulapini tribe at Mulitaka 
in the Lagaip district in the west of Enga Province, was deeply suspicious of me when I questioned him 
abou t his ancestral h istory in .July 1 972. In the following month, his adopted son, Philip Pata, who 
worked with me as a research assistant, sat in the men 's  house with Pangia, who allowed him to 
taperecord their conversation. 
I can tell you how our community began and the names of fathers and sons from our founder 
down to me and my sons. But I know that this knowledge is incomplete. Wlzen my grandfather 
and father taught me in our mens house they did not tell me that a curious European would 
come and put me to the test by asking many questions about the times before . . .  10 
Pangia and I were related to his past, his people 's history, in two different ways : for him this thread of 
genealogical history which bound him to his place and gave him his name and identity were central to 
his being a Mulapini man. For me as outsider, speaking another language, my questions were part of 
my strategy of inquiry into Enga men 's  knowledge about strands of their oral traditions. But, in the face 
of my curiosity as a European, Pangia was seeing what had been whole for him and his ancestors as 
now incomplete. That d isturbed him. Nevertheless Pangia taught Philip Pata the elements of that 
genealogical history. His teaching was embodied in kongali pii (picture language), symbol ic, poetic 
language. 
Binney, working with Te Kooti ' s  teaching by parable and the vast body of songs (awaita) attributed 
to him by his followers in the Ringatu faith, argues: 
Far ji·om paralysing initiative . . . prophetic traditions . . .  offer alternative understandings, as 
the language of allegory and symbol is the language of multivalence of meaning. We who 
claim to live in an age of signs tend to construct much more narrowly defined messages and 
forget tlze infinite variety of shadow and light which is maintained through a language of 
symbols . . .  Thus many layers of experience were, and still are, transmitted in Maori culture. 1 1  
So, i f  w e  are to decolonise history b y  listening to indigenous voices, those voices, i f  embodied in oral 
traditions, tales of survival, songs, chants, performances, may well be in a symbolic voice with multiple 
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meanings. For curious Europeans, posing their questions which el icit these voices, the task of 
translation and mediation may be heavy and challenging. 
Conscious of the implications of Pangia ' s  wise teaching, I was moved to pose for these and any other 
indigenous oral sources five questions which must be asked: 
What kind or form of oral source is this? 
What is the context of this tradition? 
What is its territory, span or provenance? 
What is i ts generational depth?  
I low was the tradition transmitted and what were the circumstances in which this variant was 
recorded? 12 
Klaus Neumann in his work on Tolai history, notes that the main thrust of this d issertation is to develop 
a methodology for writing history in Papua New Guinea, laying the ground work for employing oral 
traditions as historical evidence by analysing their context. He attests to the value of this undertaking 
and notes that my summary h istory of the Enga makes up j ust ten pages. 1 3  
My dream in 1 975 was that even though the ten page overview was only a sketch, an outsider 's  view, 
.
. .  it is i11dige11ous to Enga tradition, it grows out of Enga sources. It is also incomplete, only 
a beginning, written in the hope that what is begun by a non-Enga can be challenged and 
remade by younger Enga historians as they build up their history as an integral part of the 
hist01y of this new young nation. 14 
Twenty years later, that dream is coming to realisation. Those five questions suggest a methodological 
pathway through which indigenous voices can be both heard and assessed in the world of academic 
history. But if we are attentive to who is keeping score, we need to be alert to the colonizing forces at 
work in the academy, which may be filtering those voices, or even stifling them. 
Constructing The Tolai Past 
Klaus Neumann's  1 992 study, Not the Way It Really Was, has attracted varied and strong attention. 
Whether or not he was conscious of Said ' s  counsel to make personal inventories, Neumann constructed 
his writing in a specific way, through which Tolai recorded testimonies are contrasted with a focused 
series of methodological studies which plot his own movement through this process of inquiry. In his 
introductory chapter, Neumann proposes : 
17ie odd-numbered chapters of this book, in which I try to write a history, are all concerned 
with the colonial past. I have used different forms of presentation and selected episodes to 
highlight different themes . . .  In glosses I try to explain aspects of Tolai society as I proceed: 
what might seem a series of casual remarks to help the non-Tolai reader represents my 
understanding of crucial features of Tolai society and becomes an important part of my history 
of the Tolai. 11ze even-numbered chapters t1y to establish the contexts in which this history 
has been produced and in which Tolai produce their histories. The odd and even chapters are 
not aiming at different discourses. My writing throughout is part of an academic discourse. 
I do not strive to pull together different threads to make one rope, but insist on the virtues of 
the allusion and advocate a deliberate and shameless eclecticism. In juxtaposing my reading 
of European authors with my listening to Papua New Guinean story tellers and my 
u11derstanding of how Tolai view their past with my ideas about how the past could be 
constructed, I propose points of contact. 15 
Once more, a historian seeks strategies by which indigenous voices can be heard. He juxtaposes 
different threads to give space to those voices. The result is that accepted historical categories are 
questioned and sometimes subverted. But note: My writing throughout is part of an academic 
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discourse .  According to the judgement of Pangia such knowledge and discourse generated by a 
curious European can create a sense of incompletion for indigenous story tellers. 
Neumann takes this issue further: 
. . .  111ere are several options for oral historians once they have decided to write history. One 
is to convey as much of the oral-aural and visual contexts as possible in writing by describing 
the setting of the performance and transcribing the stories in a way that tells the reader how 
the words are intoned and which gestures accompany them. [He has chosen that particular 
option] . . .  Once history is written in a language different from that which the oral histories 
used, it becomes much more difficult to convey the spoken word. 
l ie then grapples with issues about translating from oral texts in native tongues to written texts in the 
language of writer and reader. With the use of the tape recorder, translators need to strive for an 
authentic rendering of the oral text. Caution is necessary here, as Walter Ong has stressed : a literate 
person cannot fully recover a sense of what the word is to purely oral people. 16 He concludes : 
. . .  I have chosen different ways of quoting oral histories: summarising them in my own words 
or translating them as accurately as possible. 171is . . .  [is] an indication of the tension between 
the desire to let the reader listen to Tolai histories and the realisation that the most the reader 
can get is my own perceptions and recreations of the histories. I claim to use oral histories 
as elements of my hist01y rather than as mere raw material. 17 
Here are deep, troubled waters . The historian constructs his/her work, shap ing what is received from 
raw sources. So when we turn to histories of Pacific Islanders, even those based largely upon 
indigenous oral sources, whose voices are heard? How do we hear those voices in the written texts, 
when they are translated into readers ' languages and mediated by h istorians obeying the rules of 
academia? 
Neumann concludes with an affirmation of h is stance as a practising oral h istorian who creates spaces 
in which Tolai voices may be heard. 
My work has been an exercise in translation and mediation. Tolai concepts needed to be 
translated so that non-Tolai could understand them. Papua New Guinea languages needed 
to be translated into English. And a way of thinking that had developed in a particular 
European culture, within the jiwnework of its language, needed to be mediated for Tolai, for 
Australian academicians and for an American publisher. 
J\n exercise in translation and mediation. That is the task of those who seek to accompany Pacific 
Islanders in processes by which they and their pasts are decolonised, freed and heard, not only in their 
own islands and tongues, but in larger postcolonial worlds. A bridge, too. 1bis book has not only had 
to bridge the different contexts in which it developed. 
lie writes of those contexts : libraries; conversations at men ' s  secluded places on the Gazelle; writing 
in the shade of an open hut; working on a word processor in the seclusion of a Canberra office; long 
stretches of relaxed silence; sitting with friends on beach or in the bush. And the task in hand:  
As a professional historian, my task is to construct a past that transcends the present. But this 
obligation is limited by my affinity to the past and present in question. Historians who 
recognise such an obligation for themselves have to find their own position between claims 
such as the claim that the Tolai past belongs exclusively to Tolai and the need to contradict 
the process of world history with a diversity of nonparochial and shared histories. They are 
tom between the desire to mediate othemess, and the need to retain it. Professional historians 
working in Papua New Guinea are privileged to be able to construct the past from written 
material as well as from the histories women and men choose to tell. Both oral histories and 
traditions, and written accounts need to be brushed against the grain in a way that does not 
dissolve the co/awful imagery of oral accounts into the rigidity of a historical narrative that 
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knows only one truth, that of the author craving an objective reconstruction of what really 
was. 1 8 
Here the historian is conceived as mediator, translator between cultures and bridge between contexts, 
as well as one who balances and sustains what is revealed from sources both written and oral . It is 
through the attentive and skilled oral historian that readers hear the voices of Islanders . What 
possibil ities are revealed and what voices heard if historians work in partnership with a native speaker? 
Historical Vines: Enga Voices 
My dream of Enga historians who would build on my work has now come to fruition. Over a decade 
of intensive inquiry by Polly Wiessner, a German-speaking anthropologist and Aldi Tumu, an Enga 
historian, their work is now reaching publication . In their second chapter they write: 
In reconstructing Enga history from oral traditions, it is possible to draw on a variety of 
sources, some with a direct historical intent and content and others that are not intrinsically 
historical but which can shed light on the past . . .  The oral traditions used will not be outside 
the reach or the reader - throughout the text we will give translated passages from many of the 
relevant testimonies . . .  to convey a feeling of how Enga portray their own history and to 
document our reasoning. We have also chosen this format because even though it is easy for 
us to say that some 200-300 cassettes are available for others to use, they rarely will do so. 
Except for the re-analysis of formalised songs, poetry, formulae or specific testimonies 
selected by the original investigators, it is hard to work with the material of others, as we 
discovered in tTying to use recordings by Paul Brennan and Roderic Lacey In the absence of 
contextual information, subjective impressions, evaluations, non-verbal clues, remarks made 
ajier interviews and the possibility to ask questions at the end, testimonies collected by others 
are difficult to evaluate and inte1pret. A series of interviews yields far more than texts. Rather 
it rejlects the cultural heritage and life experience of an individual. Without a sense of the 
person, it is hard to evaluate testimonies and place them in a broader scheme.19 
Here is a significant convergence between the strategies of investigators. Each investigator has been 
able to hear and listen to the voices of Islanders face to face, travelling to the places and contexts 
inhab ited by the Islanders to l isten there in the Islanders ' own cultural and h istorical contexts. By 
donning their walking boots, they engage the protagonists in situ, not in texts, libraries or documents, 
though all these help them to interpret, translate and to understand what is being told. 
And each is working as mediator, translator, builder of bridges in partnership . In the case of Polly 
Wiessner and Aldi Tumu, this was a partnership between a curious European and an Enga investigator, 
working in partnership with Enga tellers. In the other cases an American-educated Chamorro-speaker 
worked with his Chamorro tellers of tales; a Pakeha worked with Tuhoe and members of Te Kooti 's 
Ringatu faith; and a German historian, writing in English, worked with Tolai tellers . 
These partnerships are not exercises in colonial dominance, but reciprocal encounters and conversations 
between tel lers and listeners, questioners and respondents . They can extend over time to those who 
have travelled these paths of meeting between cultures before. As Wiessner and Tumu propose:  
As a final note wizen Lacey had completed his investigations of Enga oral traditions as history 
he wrote, Where, then, are the historical conclusions from these explorations? The answer 
is that they still lie dormant because more evidence is needed by which claims of origin 
traditions can be tested and interpreted. Now it is necessary for Enga, with guides and maps 
like these, to gather evidence together so that the history of their people can be written. This 
was our goal. We realise that on our Journey back through time we have left much ground 
uncovered and have raised more questions than we have answered. Never-the-less, we do 
hope that the material presented here will make it possible for Enga to look back into their 
past and encourage the younger generation to build on our research, Just as we have built on 
that of Lacey, and to go further.20 
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The outcome of their ten-year cooperation is an investigation of the course of history of selected Enga 
tribes and clans over the last two hundred years, especially as expressed in changes in the tee exchange 
system, fertility and initiation rituals, patterns of settlement and warfare. Throughout this history the 
voices of many protagonists, tellers and teachers of traditions are recorded and translated. That fleeting 
vision I caught in just ten pages became many pages packed with v ivid details and people. This may 
now become a stimulus to exploration, questioning and reshaping by historians, Enga and other. 
Voices are heard that are mediated and translated; they are voices of Islanders in Pacific contexts 
beyond empires and in larger spheres . They give us heart and open the l ives of Islanders to further 
conversations and question ing. 
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Ulli  Beier, Africa, and Decolonisation 
Donald Denoon , ANU 
From the mid-1960s, Australians in Papua New Guinea often looked to Africa for models for 
managing decolonisation . This paper questions the relevance of this approach, focusing on Horst 
Ulrich Beier and Georgina Beier, probably the most successful African imports of that era. 
Natives Becoming Citizens 
Stewart Firth argues that ' the Native', invented by colonial ideologues, was an essential concept in 
colon ial ism: masculine, child-l ike and essential ised, he - with his Native Wife - was first the 
artefact then the focus of pol icy. 1 The Native had evolved from the Savage, but could he become a 
Citizen? His community was not yet a nation, inhabiting a territory, not yet a country. 
Paul I lasluck, in the Austral ian 'progressive' tradition, eschewed politics and rel ied on the technical 
expertise of an interventionist state to achieve material advance. 'I was virtually the Premier and the 
whole of a state Cabinet,' he said,2 and among other things he articulated a vision of post-colonial 
relations with Australia. To that d istant end he set performance indicators and targets for services, 
and extracted increasing granl'i to fund them. But material progress and pol itical stability were 
awkward bed-fellows. Was there such a thing as ' stable progress'? mused an official with a taste for 
semantics . And what was a suitable term for the not-yet-citizens of the not-yet-nation?  Hasluck 
was uncomfortable with 'Native'. In 1956  he proclaimed : 
[1] here are undoubtedly many unpleasant associations with the term . . .  and a suggestion of 
inferiority, and these terms are undoubtedly objectionable to maladjusted people like the 
Indians. 
Neither Papuan nor New Guinean nor Papua-New Guinean would serve, since these terms 
marginalised Australians: 
the best we can do is to use the term native only as an adjective and to use some care in the 
selection of the nouns which we place after it. 3 
So the laws were cleansed of offending terms, but pol itical correctness did not alter the reality of 
discrimination, and Australian residents were slow to grasp Hasluck's v ision. When Jul ius Chan 
returned from school in Queensland, and applied for membership of a club in Port Moresby, he was 
black-balled .4 
' Educated natives' l ike Chan touched the boundaries between Natives and Citizens. Papuans were 
Austral ian citizens in international law, and New Guineans were Australian protected persons, but 
neither had a right to enter Austral ia, since they were not ' constituent members of the Australian 
community'. They were in effect stateless, and travel was governed by regulations for ' Removal of 
Native People from the Territory', and permits (not visas, much less passports) were issued only to 
specific categories of people. 
In 1 958, the first Papuan tourist blazed a bureaucratic trail . 'Lily Tau' had already visited Australia 
as a nursemaid . She left her employers to become a typist, but they offered her hospital ity. The 
Administrator approved : 
The girl is a mature type who has adopted European dress and living standards and has 
saved suj]icient money to pay her fare . . .  
I can see no  o�;ection to granting permission for a native person to leave the Territory in 
these circumstances, provided that the bona fides of the applicant stand up to close 
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examination and that each application is dealt with on its individual merits following a 
close investigation into the characte1� background and motives of those concerned with it 
and to the relationship between the applicant and the persons in Australia who are to be 
visited . . .  
Cleland hoped that ' individual native people [would] build up  personal contacts with individual 
Austral ian citizens'. The District Commissioner would investigate every appl ication, and Austral ian 
officials would conduct random checks on tourists and their hosts .5 The attention of two 
governments, two ministers and several police might seem excessive for a three months' vis it to a 
serving police officer. In fact ' Lily' was picking at the seams of both colonial Papua New Guinea 
and White Austral ia. Administrative reform could not unravel colonial structures. Only in the 
1960s were people al lowed to drink alcohol, wear shirts, commit adultery, play rugby, or watch 
uncensored films - on equal terms with Australians. Although legal barriers fell ,  there was l ittle 
inter-racial socialising. Papua New Guineans did not feel at home in Port Moresby. 
Ull i  and Georgina6 
Ulli was born in Prussia in 1 922, and educated piece-meal in Berlin, Palestine and London. A 
refugee from Germany and Palestine, he found a haven in London and a home in Nigeria. His fame 
rested not on h is equestrian career, nor his Phonetics degree, nor his Extra-Mural Tutorship at 
lbadan University. He was becoming a legendary editor of magazines in contemporary and 
trad itional African li terature, creator of artists' clubs, and impresario for African folk-opera. In 
1 967 he was aged 45 . Georgina, much younger, trained as an artist in London, and found her 
vocation in Oshogbo, working with painters and sculptors with shallow roots in Yoruba society, 
sl ight exposure to colonial education, and almost l imitless imagination. 
Civil war was the spur to taking leave from Nigeria, but other circumstances also suggested a break. 
The journals Odu (historical) and Black 01pheus (literary and artistic) were flourishing under 
Nigerian editors; the Mbari artists '  club in lbadan had run its course; the time had come to let 
Oshogbo artists organise their own exhibitions and negotiate their own sales . And they wanted to 
stop being curiosities who had ' gone Native ' . New Guinea was still ' the last unknown'  for Africans 
and Europeans . .J . I l .  I lolmes's account of his Orokolo mission, In Primitive New Guinea, was the 
only relevant book in Ibadan University. In London the Beiers met Anthony Forge who shared their 
delight in ind igenous art; and in Ted Wolfers's United Nations newsletters they read the first 
political commentary. They were a l ittle better prepared than other new-comers, but not much. 
The Un iversity of Pa pua New Guinea 
UPNG advertised a lectureship in Third World Literature in such broad terms that Ulli could teach 
exactly how he wished. 'African Literature' was now a feature of American college courses and 
even in British universities. It was taught in East and West Africa too - alongside British l iterature, 
its central ity not yet acknowledged. UPNG must be remarkably innovative. Efficient too : Ulli's 
appl ication was accepted by return of mail .  Yet the country was so remote that Ulli and Georgina 
must surely be unknown. 
The University bore the imprint of John Gunther, a doctor of alarming temper.7 He had created the 
post-war Public Heal th Department out of the rubble of war, capturing buildings for hospitals and 
despatching Melanesians to train as therapeutic shock troops.  Now he wanted the best possible 
univers i ty, and he wanted it now. Gunther was egalitarian except when he was autocratic. Ulli and 
Georgina were startled to see Kauage, a labourer, drop in for a beer with Gunther on his way home 
to barracks . A deranged historian punched Gunther so violently  that his teeth and spectacles fell 
off - and explained 'I love you, you bastard ! '  Determined to remedy decades of neglect, youthful 
staff devised imaginative courses . 
They combed Austral ia and Papua New Guinea for students. Vincent Eri was a public servant; Leo 
l lannet had been expelled from a seminary; John Waiko flew in with an axe and a spare shirt. 
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Diversity increased when John Kasaipwalova arrived with a background in radical politics at 
Queensl and Univers ity. They had few preconceptions about university l ife, and they could expect 
gl ittering opportunities in government. Social distinctions were slow to crystallise: students and 
staff addressed each other by their first names, and migrants might be undiscovered sculptors. 
When plays were produced, labourers and lecturers rubbed shoulders in the audience, and on stage. 
Isolated on the outskirts of town, and bound together in a new enterprise, the community was 
unusual ly close. 
The University was moving to its permanent site when the Beiers arrived. 
The bleakness of Port Moresby town was awful. Even the University was a rather hideous 
compound, because there were no fully grown trees, and the rows of ugly houses rose out 
of what seemed like a desert. Our house was a very depressing and ugly place. The 
houses were II-shaped, with a long corridor. One side of this corridor was fly-wire. 
Georgina covered that wall with a huge mural. Papua New Guineans would glance at it 
shyly, without commenting. (In Nigeria there would have been a big, noisy crowd within 
minutes.) This was our first clear indication of how different the people were, ji·om 
Nigerians . . .  Essentially we were trying to conceal the house. 
Frank .Johnson was Professor of Language and Literature. Fearing that phonetics might d ismay 
student.<>, he recruited Literature teachers - Ulli and Prithvindra Chakravarti - and l inked each Litera­
ture course to a Language segment. Thus, according to the Handbook of Courses, one first-year 
course was 'four approaches to the grammatical analysis of English sentences ' using R.L. Allen's 
English Grammars and English Grammar, leading to ' the literature of developing countries in 
Engl ish ' ,  featuring Amos Tutuola's l inguistically anarchic Palmwine Drinkard. 
The Literature segments had an explicit political purpose. 
Students come out of mission schools with the notion that poetly is an English invention. 
'Civilised ' countries produce ' literature ' while 'primitive ' peoples produce folklore ' 
which has curiosity value but no litera1y merit. To counteract these prejudices we started 
tlze sequence witlz a compulsory course called 'Oral Tradition '. Each student had to . . .  
collect material which was then translated and analysed . .  
My second assumption was that . . .  English was . . .  imposed on Nigerians, Jamaicans, 
Kenyans or New Guineans by facts of history. They have to live with it and use i� whether 
they like it or not. Their success in using this language depends on their ability to twist 
and modify and adapt the language to their own needs, until it is no longer a foreign 
tongue. 
Only senior students would read Sartre, Brecht, Ionesco or Shakespeare. 
Some students brought their own poems, stories and plays to d iscuss, but he was reluctant to start a 
formal class in ' creative writing ' :  
I was forced into this adventure because my best students couldn 't stand the Language 
segment of the course . . . 
Creative Writing must be done ve1y well or not at all; so I attached conditions. Only a 
small number of students could be accepted, by invitation, if they had shown serious 
interest in writing. 11ie conditions were necessary because no single teacher can help 
eve1y promising student. . .  You must be  able to tell a student 'You may be  a genius, but 
someone else will have to talk to you about your writing, because it does not evoke a 
response in me '. 
Students engaged in an unusual relationship. It was rare for a History student to publish an essay, 
and impossible for a Physicist - but Creative Writing was public property, judged by an aud ience. 
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Students were treated individually, and often the teacher had to refrain from teaching: 
If one has more facility with words, it is easy to make the student 's work slick, to make it 
look better and sound better and read better, with more form and shape. But that is 
precisely what one should not do . . .  
J1 creative writing class is not  an  effective way to produce professional writers; but i t  is a 
wonde1f ul device to build a student's personality. 
John Waiko remembers his expectations when he arrived from an Anglican school, where he had 
learned to doubt the value of the folk-knowledge which he acquired as a child, and was sadly 
persuaded that the purpose of education was to learn only the lore of the Europeans. That judgment 
was shaken by Hank Nelson and Ken Inglis in History; then Literature rebuilt his confidence in his 
Binandere people and he plunged into Creative Writing. He could develop his ideas in Binandere 
but needed advice on expressing them in English; then he sought techniques for staging a play in an 
urban setting. His most power( ul device was to incorporate B inandere dance to uncover the tension 
between village values and the colonial establ ishment. The Unexpected Hawk was one of several 
plays successfully staged on the campus. 
This relationship was not bounded by the classroom: when John brought his father to Port 
Moresby, they stayed in the Beiers' outhouse. Like many of his peers, he needed advice on English 
expression. They were were frustrated by having to use their second or third language among each 
other and with authorities. Yet they had to master English if only to vent that anger. Well-wishers 
assured them that Papua New Guinea would soon be independent, but until each felt confident 
among other students and with Austral ians, these assurances rang hollow. 
111 is was a moment in Papua New Guinea 's histmy when a man had to be highly articulate 
and capable of formulating ideas, if he was to play a part in shaping the destiny of his 
country. 
By the end of 1968 there was a flourishing series, Papuan Pocket Poets, priced at 60 cents .  I t  
included poems from the Pacific, Malay folk poetry, Yoruba hunters' poems, lgbo and Indonesian 
poetry, and children's poems from around the world .  As in Black Orpheus, a locally-centred inter­
national ism presented Papua New Guinean writers on equal terms with everyone else. Kovave 
publ ished stories, poems and plays . These serials, together w ith Kiki's Ten Thousand Years in a 
Lifetime, Eri's Crocodile, Somare's Sana, and Ulli's work with Kiki - Hohao - suddenly comprised a 
substantial body of l iterature. 
The books addressed mainly Engl ish-speaking readers, but the plays spoke to wider audiences, 
dealing with issues common to the whole country. Plays were often staged in the open-air, where 
gardeners and cleaners mingled with academics and students; and they exploited slap-stick satire 
and solemn dance-drama. Three plays enjoyed wider influence when the Prompt Theatre Company 
took them to Canberra in 1 970. The Minister for Territories sent officers to explain that Papua New 
Guineans were really grateful to a paternal administration, despite the playwrights. This was not the 
work of professionals :  much of the output was so topical that it has dated. Most writers went on to 
politics, government, or business; yet a generation who had something urgent to say was 
empowered to say it trenchantly. 
Off-campus Encounters 
Their first contact with a Papua New Guinean bears repetition. In transit at Brisbane airport, Ulli 
and Georgina and the infant Sebastian were surrounded by public servants, traders, missionaries 
and all their families. Most were dressed in tropical formal style, so the flamboyant Beiers felt 
conspicuous. One other passenger was also conspicuous: 
/le stood out from the crowd, not just because he was the only black person there, but 
because he moved with the relaxed self-assurance of a man who has a purpose in life. !le 
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wore his European clothes casually and as he  stood there, alone, holding his brief case, my 
wife and I were independently reminded of Ezekiel Mphahlele. Was it merely an outward 
resemblance, the short, muscular figure, the serious, almost grave expression ? . . .  We later 
found that he had in fact the same passion and warmth, the same capacity for anger, the 
same outspokenness as our South African friend . . .  
[When] the loudspeaker called us on board the plane . . .  the Papuan came up and said 
simply: ' You seem to have rather a lot to cany, let me help you. ' 
Albert Maori Kiki was the first Papuan we ever met. 8 
A friendship and partnership developed, from which emerged Ten Thousand Years in a Lifetime. 
Working on that, they visited Orokolo (by coincidence, the locale of Holmes's In Primitive New 
Guinea.) They found a cultural revival focused on carved Hohao boards. Carving had lapsed with 
the influence of missionaries and the departure of young men. In the 1930s the Eravo houses had 
been razed by Christian converts and the old men had decided, sadly, not to rebuild them: as the 
young men migrated to earn money, there was not enough manpower for initiation festivals. For 
forty years there was no carving, until the Catholic priest, Father Compte, made the people revive 
the trad ition . 
The traditional Jlohao boards had to be carved according to very rigid conventions . . .  The 
vocabulmy of the artist was very restricted and in judging such a work the people of 
Orokolo would say: ' it is correct ' - rather than 'it is beautiful' .  
Wizen Father Compte asked the people to carve Hohao boards, they . . .  took great pains to 
remember the correct designs, but they soon realised that the Father did not know what the 
symbols meant and was not interested in their fimction. So for the first time the new artists 
began to use these symbols as pure 'design ', dissociated from its original meaning or 
fimction. 11ze boards became less austere, more ornate, sometimes exuberant and 
baroque. A whole new art form could have developed from this beginning - but there was 
no community to respond positively, so eventually the activity degenerated into a 
meaningless tourist art. 
The Beiers had one introduction. .Tim Burns, a teacher on Karkar island, subscribed to Black 
Orpheus, and suggested that they meet Alan Nattachee. As a child in the 1 930s, Alan boarded at 
the Catholic school on Yule Island,  where he p icked up a scrap of paper and was awed to read 
Tennyson's ' In Memoriam ' .  He resolved to become the Melanesian Tennyson. During the Pacific 
War, yaws ate away much of his nose. Disfigurement added to a disturbing presence. Even 
wearing a golden laurel wreath - bestowed by Poets Laureate International - he was not mocked but 
nervously respected. 
I was really fond of this Papuan eccentric, but I did not really appreciate his pompous 
poet1y, nor the naive ideas of 'progress ' which they contained. 
I asked him whether he might translate some traditional Mekeo poems for me. One day he 
appeared at my door with a dozen elderly men: lean and dignified and wrapped in the red 
laplaps that had become the national dress of the Mekeos. For two hours they sang into 
my tape recorder, and then listened back to the entire recital. 
For the next two months Alan came to my house every day to work on the translation. It 
took some time to persuade him to drop the flowery Tennysonian language and find a form 
simple and clean enough to do justice to the ancient chants. The result was Aia, a collec­
tion of chants in praise of the creator, published in Papua Pocket Poets. 
Another chance encounter was an imposing h ighlander who worked as an office-cleaner. Kauage 
wanted to draw, and a friend brought his drawings - imitations of school-book illustrations - to 
Georgina, who met him: 
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he sat on a chair in my house, cradling his head in his arms, twisting his body nervously, 
bending his toes. His discomfort was enormous. Yet there was a soft desperation . . .  and his 
smile was beautijitl, but it ended in a sigh. In spite of his nervousness this man was 
impressive. I could not believe that the awful drawings matched the man he ought to be. 
11zen, in a corner of one sheet of paper, I noticed a minute scribble. He said it was a 
spider. 11zat scribble was the only drawing he hadn 't copied. I asked him if he couldn 't 
draw some more spiders . . .  
She  offered to buy  the spiders; then through larger insects to creatures from his imagination; next 
she taught him to beat rel ief designs on metal . Metal work absorbed his energy and slowed him 
down to concentrate on a single enterprise. By 1969 he mounted his first exhibition. The awkward 
labourer blossomed into a cheerful artist whose exhibitions always sold out. 
There was no style for urban l iving. The dignity of Kauage and other villagers was humbled by 
mission styles or trade-store clothes, l iving in barracks or squatter settlements, relying on broken 
English or Pidgin. Georgina met Marie Aihi during a visit to Yule Island mission. At eighteen she 
was working in the mission clinic, among her own people but isolated by growing up in the 
mission. Georgina brought her to town and encouraged her to channel her sense of design into 
screen-printing. As she prospered, her kin increased their demands; and Marie lacked the villagers' 
skills in dealing with these demands. 
Georgina recorded the climax:  
In July I970 a festival was held in Marie's village, Waima. . .  The dancers were 
magnificently decorated. . .  with superb face paintings in yellow, red and black. They 
danced throughout the night and the next day and another night  . . .  But while this was going 
on, the village teenagers [organised] an electric guitar band to which they danced 
Westernised dances. . .  Marie divided her attention between the two, though she felt ill at 
ease in both. . .  She allowed her face to be painted in yellows and reds and wore a 
traditional grass skir� but compromised by tying her hair with a red chiffon sca1f and 
wearing plastic earrings. She appeared like a stranger in her own village . . . .  After the 
festival she travelled back to Bereina, in an open truck through a coconut plantation. 
A coconut suddenly fell on the truck and grazed Marie's head. She was not really badly 
hurt but became convinced that sorcerers had made the coconut fall on her head and that 
they probably meant to kill her. 
She withdrew from screen-printing, gave away her possessions, and returned to v illage obscurity. 
She had, however, launched a small revolution in urban styles. Georgina's other proteges went 
further, through I larahara Prints, marketing new textile des igns. Ilarahara did not flourish for long, 
but it did arouse an appetite for adapted traditional designs. 
The end of colonial ism left many people in an affluent setting which they had not the money to 
enjoy, grasping a heritage which was difficult to adapt but impossible to escape, facing choices 
which a conservative regime had long denied. Ulli and Georgina developed ind ividual 
relationsh ips, but they also brought isolated people together so that each reached out to the others -
in textiles, poetry, books, paint, or copper. 
At first sight Ulli and Georgina can be seen as contributing towards decolonisation and even nation­
building on a Nigerian model . Ull i observes : 
It was no accident that Kiki 's Ten Thousand Years in a Lifetime was written by the 
secreta1y of Pangu Pati, because the birth of Literature was part of a process of political 
awakening. 17ze poems, plays, biographies and fiction that followed Kiki's book in rapid 
succession were part of a general process of self-examination. The writers f ulfil/ed an 
important political function: they helped to raise the level of political consciousness on and 
off the campus. 11zey forged links with the young politicians and with Highland workers. 
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Closer inspection suggests another agenda. Austral ians rather than Melanesians saw Africa as an 
analogue:  Austral ians appointed Ull i, and it may be symbol ical that he met Albert Maori Kiki in 
Brisbane. Papua New Guineans were not d isplaced Nigerians: there was no counterpart to the 
ancient urban Yoruba mil ieu, the English-speaking intelligentsia and their newspapers . It was 
Yoruba cu lture in fin-de-s iecle mode which offered scope for Ulli, Georgina and their artist friends. 
Ull i  was much more directive in relation to Papua New Guinean poets than Soyinka or /\chebe 
would tolerate. Ull i  had never taught l i terature to African undergraduates, nor would any African 
un iversity endorse his syl labus. Nor was the contrast sharp only among elites. Folk-opera was 
inconceivable in societies with no paying audiences. The closest N·rican analogy lay through 
Georgina to the artists of Oshogbo, who also emerged from no indigenous tradition of painting or 
scuplture. 
The Beiers' successes owed more to the experience of a Jewish child in Weimar Germany. The 
col lapse of Wilhelmine constraints allowed a window of creative opportunity until the Third Reich 
slammed it shut. Ull i's, and Georgina's, values were grounded in suspicion of all government 
au thority, especially as it affected artists. In their clearly stated v iew, the best time to be an artist is 
the interval between an old and a new orthodoxy. That mind-set was confirmed by Ulli 's 
adolescence in Palestine under a collapsing British colonialism and before the triumph of Israel. It 
was en trenched in Nigeria, where the most favourable environment for Soyinka, Twins Seven 
Seven, Muraina or Achebe was the twil ight of colonialism rather than the daylight of independence. 
In Papu a New Guinea in the 1960s they took unalloyed pleasure in breaking the colonial s ilence; 
for those few years they could consign to a remote future their anx ious expectation of new 
orthodoxies . 
1 .  Stewart Firth elaborates this notion in ' Colonial Asdministration and the Invention of the Native ' ,  
and Vicki  Lukere explores t he 'Nat ive Wife ' ,  both in D. Denoon, S .  Firth, J .  Linnekin, M. Meleisea and K. 
Nero (eds), The Cambridge Jlisto1y of the Pacific Islanders, Cambridge, 1 997. 
2. Paul I lasluck, A Time for Building: Australian Administration in Papua New Guinea, 1951 -1 963 , 
Melbourne Universi ty  Press, 1 976 . 
3 .  Australian Department of Territories archives, A 452, 62/3210, Minister's minute, 27 January 1956. 
4 .  South Pacific Post, 6 April 1 962. 
5 .  Cleland to Department, 8 September 1 958.  
6 .  The fol lowing sections are based on interviews with Ull i  and Georgine from 1 975 onwards. I have 
the transcripts, and have been trying to transform them into a biography. Unless otherwise indicated, 
i talicised quotes are from these interviews. 
7. John Gunther 's  career was recorded in interrviews with Hank Nelson at UPNG during his Vice 
Chancellorship. His impact on public health is discussed in D. Denoon with K. Dugan and L. Marshall, 
Public llealth in Papua New Guinea, Cambridge, 1 988 .  
8 .  Int roduction, A.M. Kiki, Ten Thousand Years in a L ifetime, Brisbane, 1 968 .  
1 94 
Decolonising the History of Australia 's  South Sea Islanders :  
politics and cu rriculu m materials 
Cl ive Moore, University o f  Queensland 
In early November 1996 two booklets arrived in the mail : they were the final draft of an AusAID and 
Queensland government-sponsored curriculum project begun in 1994, part of a package of reconcil iation 
benefits arranged by the Federal government for Austral ian South Sea Islanders .  The first contains fifty­
eight pages of stories and activ ities for primary schools; the second, sixty-six pages of text intended for use 
in secondary schools. Both were written in collaboration with Australia's South Sea Islander communities. 1 
These curriculum materials provide a wide variety of sources on the history and present-day l ife-style of the 
Islander communities, the descendants of some 50,00a2 Pacific Islands indentured labourers brought to 
Queensland between 1863 and 1904, predominantly to work in the sugar industry but also in the colony's 
pastoral and maritime industries up until the 1880s.3 When the published material finds its way into the 
Austral ian school system it will be the product of a very drawn out process of consultation between 
historians, teachers, the Education Department bureaucracy, and the Islanders themselves, including 
individual and family contributors, community reference groups and teachers. While these materials will be 
valuable in allowing students and teachers easy access to teaching resources useful for all levels of the 
primary and secondary system, the final product also has its own history. The booklets represent the 
interface between decolonised Pacific scholarship and the decolonisation of the Austral ian South Sea 
Islander community which, since the mid-1970s has sought and achieved recognition as a unique and 
d isadvantaged Austral ian ethnic group. In this process they have also asserted their right to contest 
interpretation of their own history. 
Liberating itself from the apron-strings of Imperial h istory, 1950s and 1960s Pacific history became Island 
and Islander-centred, but not necessarily Islander-written. In the 1970s and 1980s another stage of historical 
d ecolonisation began, as Pacific Islanders began to train and work as academic historians, and Pacific 
Islander individuals and communities became involved in publ ishing historical projects. Incorporating 
Pacific Islander viewpoints into curriculum materials destined for schools is another necessary step in the 
process of producing Islander-centric history. Scholarly interest in the South Sea Islander community dates 
back to B . 1 1 .  Molseworth's 19 17  University of Queensland MA thesis4: s ince then a huge l iterature has 
developed on the topic, which in many ways has been quite crucial to the development of modern Pacific 
h istory.5 Earlier documentary studies were augmented by fieldwork in Australia and Melanesia in the 1 960s 
and l 970s6, which began to uncover differences in interpretations between academic historians, descendants 
of Queensland 's ' Kanakas' in the islands, and the Islander communities in Australia. These differences have 
become pronounced, as Austral ian Islanders pursued a political agenda, part of which was to decolonise 
control of their h istory, asserting their rights to be the dominant interpreters of their collective past. 
The Fight for Recognition 
The 1970s and 1980s were also quite crucial to the Islander community in several other ways. They were 
propitious decades for collecting oral testimony: the last of the original 'Kanaka' generation had d ied and the 
older Islanders real ised that it would soon be too late to recall much about their past. They cooperated 
will ingly with academics attempting to collect and store oral testimony, to ensure that their history could be 
preserved for future generations. The 1970s were also the beginning of the re-linking between the remnant 
Austral ian community and their kin and linguistic groups in Melanesia. What were once grand adventures 
when the Corowa, Mussing, Enares, Bobongie and Fatnowna families first re-establ ished the connections 
with their islands of origin, have now become common-place yearly visits back and forth across the Coral 
Sea. The two processes, academic interest in the community and re-l inking with the islands, revived 
Islander interest in their history and culture. At the same time the Austral ian media also 'discovered' the 
Islanders, placing considerable stress on injustices and ill-treatment suffered last century, but also giving the 
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Islanders a voice and a sense of identity and cul tural resil ience.7 Several Australians of South Sea descent, 
particularly Faith Bandier, Nasuven Enares and Noel Fatnowna, had political and media profiles which were 
used to the Islander communities' advantage. Allied to this was the emergence of substantial Islander 
published histories in biographical, family history and novel forms.8 
Also in the mid- 1970s the Islanders began to organise politically to confront S tate and Federal governments 
with demands for recognition as a separate ethnic group and compensation for past and present 
disadvantages. Modern Islander pol itics emerged in the heady Whitlam days in the first half of the 1970s. 
The expansion of financial benefits provided for indigenous Austral ians in the 1 960s and 1970s brought to 
the boil long-term antagonisms between the South Sea Islander communities and Aborigines and Torres 
Strait Islanders. Despite the mixed immigrant/indigenous ancestry of many Islanders they were accused of 
trying to get access to indigenous benefits illegally. Although most local officials turned a bl ind eye to 
distinguishing 'Islander' descent, South Sea Islanders began to be removed from executive positions and 
even membership of indigenous organisations, and by 1974 Commonwealth policy was that South Sea 
Islanders ' were inel igible for any special financial assistance.9 
Some early South Sea Islander activists had been involved in the struggle for Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander rights or worked in indigenous organisations. For example, Patricia Corowa worked in the office of 
Gordon Bryant, Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Evelyn Scott worked for Aboriginal Hostels, and Olive 
Darr ran an Aboriginal Housing Cooperative in Ayr. The doyen of Islander activists is Faith Bandier, co­
founder of the Aboriginal -Australian Fellowship in 1956, the forerunner to the Federal Council for 
Aboriginal Advancement. Born in 1918  to an Islander family from Tumbulgum in northern New South 
Wales, Bandier through the circumstances of her adult l ife in Sydney knew influential Austral ians such as 
Lady .Jessie Street, along with many politicians. Bandier became Federal Secretary of the Federal Council 
for the Advancement of Aborigines and Torres S trait Islanders, and a crucial leader of the 1967 referendum 
campaign to enable the Commonwealth government to include indigenous Australians in the national 
census and to legislate for them. Bandier was an influential driving force behind the referendum campaign 
and the face that charmed the Austral ian public. As Barry Cohen relates: 
During the campaign Bandier addressed hundreds of business and community organisations, 
public meetings and rallies, and appeared endlessly on radio, television and in the print media 
selling the message that the time had come to "do something" about the plight of the Aboriginal 
people. It was an extraordinary performance. 
It was not the number of appearances she made but the manner of those appearances that won over 
non-Aboriginal audiences. No matter how hostile, ignorant, stupid or racist the question, her 
response was always the same. The slight pause and then the beaming smile followed by a polite, 
patient, articulate and detailed answer. 10 
Faith Bandier may have been identified by Australians as of indigenous origin, but she is proudly of 
Ambrym Island, Scottish and Indian descent. 1 1  As recounted in a television interview in 1994, she turned 
her formidable talents to help her own people fight for recognition : 
I became interested in my own people after the Referendum and I discovered that some of them 
were fronting up as Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders in order to receive those benefits which 
f1owed on as a result of the Referendum. I was saddened by that and I feared that they would lose 
their identity. They were in this country through no choice of their own and the ve1y fact they have 
sufTered racial discrimination in the same way as the Aborigines had placed the Islanders in a very 
special categ01y. They are perhaps the most deprived of all groups now in A ustralia. And they 
have been deprived socially, equally as much as the Torres Strait Islanders and Aborigines. 12 
After a casual d iscussion with Prime Minister Gough Whitlam in 1973, Bandier decided that the Islanders 
needed their own national organisation, which she formed in 1974. Although there are now many regional 
South Sea Islander organisations, the Australian South Sea Islanders United Council (ASSIUC) was the first 
of any substance, and remains the only national organisation.  During 1974 ASSIUC branches were 
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establ ished in metropol itan centres and towns along the coast of northern New South Wales and 
Queensland. ASSIUC's inaugural meeting took place in Tweed Heads in January and its first national 
conference was held in Mackay in May 1975 . The Mackay conference drew delegates from major Islander 
communities - Mackay, Ayr-Home Hill, Rockhampton, Townsville, Gladstone, Nambour, Bowen, Tweed 
Heads, and from Sydney and Canberra. Mackay's Daily Mercury reported ASSIUC's principal aims as : 
* To prov ide a national council to be a forum and a voice for the Australian-born descendants of those 
South Sea Islanders brought by force as indentured labour or who came voluntarily to work in Australia 
before 1906. 
* To gain official recognition for South Sea Islanders by the Australian, State, territorial and local 
governments as a d isadvantaged minority group. 
* To get legislation passed which will provide the additional assistance necessary to enable South Sea 
Isl anders to attain equal ity of life with other Austral ians. 
* To prov ide communication centres for education purposes, both universal and special ist, to overcome the 
social and economic handicaps which now exist in the South Sea Islander community. 
* To provide the opportunity to acquire housing and o ther shelter of the standard required by South S ea 
Islanders. 
* To combat racial discrimination and other prejudices. 
* To foster mutual understanding and respect between South Sea Islanders and other Austral ians. 
* To create programmes designed to activate the creative and technological needs of South Sea Islanders. 13 
Prompted by an J\SSIUC delegation to Canberra, the Federal government set up an Interdepartmental 
Committee to report on the Islander community. 14 The 1 977 report was insufficiently researched, claiming 
only 3,000 to 3,500 South Sea Islanders, when there were that number in Mackay district alone, the 1970s 
total community probably numbering 10,000 to 15,000. However the general conclusion was correct: 
17zeir socio-economic status and conditions have generally been below those of the white 
community tlzus giving the group the appearance of being a deprived coloured minority. 15 
The report found that 37% of those surveyed l ived below the poverty line with a further 12 per cent l iving 
close to the poverty l ive, when the figure for the total Australian community in 1973 was 12 .5% While 
recognising this disadvantage and that some South Sea Islanders were receiving special benefits intended 
for Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, the report did not recommend extending these benefits as a right 
to the Islander community, stressing that they should be made more aware of existing benefits and programs 
for the wider Austral ian community.  The only other relevant government initiative in the 1970s came 
through the 1 977 Royal Commission into Human Relationships, which reported that the majority of 
Australians regarded South Sea Islanders as indigenous but that they were denied indigenous benefits. The 
Royal Commission recommended that ' action should be taken to extend to them eligibil ity for benefits now 
available to J\boriginals ' , 1 6  but the recommendation was never implemented. Despite valiant attempts by 
Senators Jim Keefe and George Georges, and J\l Grassby as Commissioner for Community Relations, to 
criticise the inept IDC report, 1 7  the ' life was not meant to be easy' philosophy of the government meant that 
Islanders were stripped of most defacto access to indigenous benefits and left to fend for themselves . 
J\lthough ASSIUC continued to exist in name, it had no political force, beset from its beginning by internal 
family and district rivalries which characterise the community. 1 8  The only positive 1 970s response came, 
unexpectedly, from the Queensland government: in 1 975 Queensland recognised South Sea Islanders as a 
" distinct ethnic group"  and the next year appointed Noel Fatnowna as a Special Commissioner for Pacific 
Islanders, within an Aboriginal and Islander Commission, a position he held until, disillusioned by the 
manipulations of the Bjelke-Petersen government, he resigned in 1983. 19 Then in 1988 Queensland gave 
South Sea Islanders full access to the ind igenous programs of its Department of Community Services. 
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This unsatisfactory state of affairs continued until the 1990s. In  1990 Faith Bandier once more mobilised 
her extensive contacts to make another attempt to seek justice for the Islanders. The result  was a February 
1991 report by the Evatt Foundation on the current situation of the Islanders, based on fieldwork by 
Nasuven Enares . This was followed by a revival of ASSIUC and a national conference in Townsville at 
Easter the same year. The 1991  report recommended that South Sea Islanders be recognised as a 
disadvantaged ethnic group, acknowledged for their contribution to building the nation and their long-term 
support for the rights of indigenous Australians. The general conclusion was that they were in need of the 
same types of special benefits as Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders .20 The Evatt Foundation made eight 
recommendations including special legislation, special benefits and a much needed more detailed survey. 
This survey occurred at the request of Attorney-General Michael Duffy in August 1991 ,  under the auspices 
of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission and the Office of Multicultural Affairs. Colin 
Menzies was commissioned to undertake a survey and census. His excellent December 1992 report, The 
Call for Recognition, based on extensive contact with the Islander communities, informative newsletters, 
and use of a census modelled on the 1991  Australian census, collected d irect information on 4,435 
Islanders. Menzies estimated their total number as between 10,000 and 20,000, many of whom actually 
identified as indigenous Austral ians. More than half had Aboriginal or Torres Strait forebears, their ethnic 
identification depending on where they l ived: in Torres S trait, in mainland Aboriginal communities, in the 
old sugar districts, or as individuals or families scattered through east coast urban and rural Austral ia. His 
conclusion was that 10,000 to 12,000 Australians self-identified as South Sea Islanders . 
Although the younger generation are staying at school longer than did their parents, and 6.7% had university 
or TAFE education, Menzies' report showed that educationally, compared with other Australians, the 
Islanders consistently under-achieve. Around one-third of self-identified Islanders had received Abstudy 
while completing their education, but about one-quarter of the Abstudy recipients had no indigenous 
ancestry. South Sea Islanders were also found to have an unemployment rate that was two and a half times 
the national average and despite their participation in indigenous housing cooperatives for more than twenty 
years, Islanders had a home ownership rate of less than half the national average. Almost one-sixth of 
Islander households were tenants of the Queensland Department of Family Services and Aboriginal and 
Islander Affairs. Their dwellings were 50% more crowded than the Australian average. 
The Islanders have remained mainly manual workers :21 Menzies concluded that Islander women were in 
more skilled occupations than indigenous women, but Islander men tend to be in less skilled occupations 
than indigenous men. The 1992 average income for all Islanders who had left school was $270 and half 
received less than $249 per week. In 1992 the average Austral ian female weekly earnings were $397: only 
one-third of Islander women received that much; and Australian women in full-time work received an 
average of $530 per week, a figure equalled by only twenty per cent of Islander women. Islander men were 
worse off: only one-s ixth received more than $598, the average Australian male weekly earnings; and only 
one-tenth of Islander men in full-time employment earned more than the $665 Australian male average. 
They were also more l ikely to be involved in seasonal work, and taking this into account "South Sea 
Islanders were almost as poor on average as Aboriginal people "  .22 Menzies described the Islanders as "a 
black minority group that has lived on the fringes of white society, getting irregular, mainly manual work" 
and suffering "persistent and pervasive poverty" .23 His forecast was that now or within the next few years 
South Sea Islanders would replace Aborigines as the poorest community in Australia. 
In an unrelated move, the Austral ian government created a new ministry: Gordon Bilney took office as 
Minister for Development Cooperation and Pacific Islanders Affairs, and showed considerable interest in 
South Sea Islanders, partly motivated by the political flack he had received from the governments of 
Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands who told him to deal with the problems of their Austral ian kin. Bilney 
originally proposed "an act of reconciliation with Australian South Sea Islanders and the countries of their 
ancestors "24, but was quietly persuaded that this was inappropriate. His vision of a totally kidnapped people 
perpetuated the immigrants' 'victim status', which fitted badly against modern scholarly concepts of 
' Islander agency';25 and wiser diplomats blanched at the possibil ity of having to organise Melanesian 
propitiatory ceremonies with offerings of shell-wealth and sacrificed pigs. A quieter, saner path was sought. 
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Between the 1992 report and the final Commonwealth recommendations, as their response, the Queensland 
government mobil ised to help the Islanders through the Ministry for Housing, Local Government and 
Plann ing, and the Bureau of Ethnic Affairs . Housing conferences were held which led to the formation of 
South Sea Islander housing cooperatives. Less successfully, the Bureau of Ethnic Affairs set about 'social 
working' the Islanders into Regional Councils, a well-meaning but disastrous bureaucratic interference 
which created incorporated organisations capable of administering government funds, but cut across the 
already numerous district-level Islander-initiated organisations.26 Local and State government funding also 
establ ished newsletters, Wan Tok at Mackay, and Nuise Blong Yumi in Rockhampton, intended to help 
network between individuals and government agencies. 
Faced with such a damning report at a time when reconcil iation with indigenous citizens was a central 
philosophy of the Keating government, and encouraged by B ilney, in August 1994 Attorney-General 
Michael Lavarch introduced a package of special benefits specifically for Austral ia's South Sea Islanders. 
Ninety-three years after attempting to deport all Islanders the Commonwealth recommended that they be 
formally recognised as a "unique minority group which is severely disadvantaged as a consequence of racial 
d iscrimination " and that government agencies should consider this forgotten group of Australians a "high­
need group in equal opportunity, access and equity programs" . Watched by representatives of the Islander 
communities in the v is itors' gallery, Lavarch told the House that: 
Like Faith Bandler 's father, they were often brought against their will. In other words, they were 
treated no better than slaves. This is the ugly truth of the matter. This sorry chapter in Australian 
hist01y was referred to as blackbirding, which is of itself an obnoxious term. 
No other group came to A ustralia with less status than did the South Sea Jslanders . . .  They are not 
indigenous, nor are they descended from mainstream settler migrants. Their historical experience 
in Australia has generally been one of lack of control over their own affairs and exclusion.21 
Specific recommendations were made to provide schemes comparable to Abstudy and other educational 
support programs, and to appoint two community l iaison officers for three years . The final recommendation 
was to increase general Austral ian awareness of the Islanders and their role in the nation's history. This 
involved setting up a Cultural Awareness Awards Scheme to assist Islanders to visit their islands of origin to 
re-establish family and cul tural l inks28, preserving heritage s ites, establ ishing a travelling museum 
exhibition29, and developing school curriculum materials. 
Cu rriculum Politics: Decolonising History? 
When the invitation arrived to participate in the Queensland-based curriculum project Max Quanchi, Steve 
Mull ins, Sharon Bennett and I jumped at the chance. For me it was a way of returning to the Islander 
community som� small part of what they have given to me in friendship and in my academic l ife over the 
last two decades. Despite valiant attempts to d iversify my academic career, l ike John Wayne and Western 
movies I have become type-cast as an historian of the Queensland labour trade. Max Quanchi, representing 
the History Teachers' Association, had the broad Pacific history and school curriculum development skills 
needed. Like Doug Munro before him, Quanchi had become fascinated with Queensland's South Sea 
Islanders - the fate of Pacific h istorians who move to Queensland. Steve Mullins had expertise in Torres 
Strait history and curriculum development: based in Rockhampton he was able to l ink in with the central 
Queensland Islander community .  Sharon Bennett, representing the Geography Teachers' Association, had 
skills in geography and education, combined with a secondary teaching background. 
The committee managing the curriculum project was an astute mix of Education Department managers, 
representatives of professional teachers' associations, and the Islander communities. Planning stages used 
Brisbane-based conferences and tele-conferences, with the project manager travelling extensively amongst 
the Islander communities explaining the project and the absolute necessity of their involvement in the 
development process, both conceptually and practically. The Islanders on the committee were not expected 
to be experts in curriculum development, but to l iaise with their communities, collect materials and act as a 
conduit to the central committee and the writers. We work-shopped what we wanted to cover overall and 
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ended up,  two years later, with two booklets of materials. The first, in two sections, was designed for 
primary schools : illustrated Islander stories for early childhood classes, and modern Islander family-based 
stories and histories for upper primary students. The second booklet was for secondary schools, again at 
two l evels, for lower and upper level students .  In the final draft of the secondary materials Clive Moore, 
Max Quanchi and Sharon Bennett share equal authorship, but in earlier drafts Quanchi and Bennett worked 
on the first part under Moore's critical gaze, and Moore wrote the second half, tempered by the wise counsel 
of Quanchi and Bennett. 
The lower secondary materials covered eleven themes : why were South Sea Islanders introduced into 
Austral ia in the nineteenth century?; key events in Islander history; what is heritage and what is worth 
keeping for future generations?;  the Commonwealth's Deportation of the Islanders ( 1901-08); going to war; 
playing sport; going to church; a comparison of working l ives in 1895, 1 935 and 1995; going home to the 
islands ;  the call for recognition as a unique and disadvantaged ethnic group; and four Islanders expressing 
their ideas about the future. The upper secondary materials covered only three themes: was labour 
migration a process of kidnapping or d id it involve voluntarism?;  racism, conflict and oppression; and lobby 
groups, power and the call for recognition. The materials are well illustrated with photographs and cartoons. 
When the drafts were presented lo the communities only the secondary materials came in for major 
criticism, to an extent that at one very fraught committee meeting the politically sensitive Education 
Department officers considered holding them back for further revision, while issuing the unproblematic 
primary booklet. 
Several issues were intertwined in the brouhaha. First was the political empowerment of the Islander 
community, for which they had fought for twenty years, 1 974- 1994. In 1994 they achieved their most 
remarkable political success since 1906.30 In the 1990s Commonwealth and State governments caved into 
pressure and promised to right some of the very obvious wrongs done between 1863 and 1994. The 1990s 
Islander communities, although largely ignorant of the 1 906 success, were justly proud of their 1 994 v ictory 
and saw control of interpretation of their own history in Austral ia as part of their achievement. 
Terminology and imaging were also problematic. Contemporary Islander opinion is divided over the use of 
'Kanaka' and 'Blackbirding'; some want the words expunged from the English language, while others have 
used " Kanaka" in the titles of their organisations and in public d isplays. 'Blackbirding' is often used to 
mean the entire 1 863- 1 904 labour trade, as well as specifically to describe 'kidnapping'. We chose to use 
'Islanders' or 'South Sea Islanders' as the general textual terms, but it is impossible never to use nineteenth 
century words which appear in quotations .  There were objections to using verbatim quotations in Pidgin 
Engl ish from the 1 906 Royal Commission, which many of today's Islanders (who have l ittle knowledge of 
Pidgin) viewed as demeaning, and l ikewise there was discontent over use of cartoons from last century 
which either depicted their forebears as savages or uppity natives mimicking Europeans. 
Another problem was the total mismatch between their v iew of their history and that of Moore and Quanchi, 
whose view was academically informed by primary research and hundreds historical items which in full or 
in part discuss the history of Austral ia's South Sea Islanders in l ast century and this. This was particularly 
evident when it came to the kidnapping versus voluntarism debate. We presented the now standard view: 
that indenture is not slavery.  Kidnapping certainly occurred and should be condemned, but the majority 
enl isted will ingly, the process involving very active agency by the recruits and passage masters . We also 
used the term 'cul tural kidnapping', meaning that Europeans were decidedly taking cultural advantage of the 
Islanders' desires to obtain new technology, and loosening the bonds and demands of small scale societies. 
They became more speedily upwardly mobile in their descent groups when, and if, they returned. What we 
stressed was that history is about interpretation and there will always be different views of the historical 
process, even different accounts of the same event. The upper secondary unit begins by saying that: 
111e activities in this unit are based on the premises that students should be confronted with 
different inte1pretations and that the study of history is an exercise in making Judgements about 
what might have happened in the past. 
J\.lthough most Islanders acknowledge some degree of voluntarism, most also bel ieve that kidnapping 
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continued right through to the 1 890s and 1900s, and that "indenture" is another word for "slavery" .  They 
are largely uninformed by academic history, having absorbed their knowledge from stories recounted by 
older family members, from local h istory sources, from the numerous Islander-authored h istories publ ished 
in recent years, and from the media. Most non-academic sources present the labour trade as the equivalent 
of kidnapping and slavery and the Islanders as v ictims, never expressing ' agency' in shaping their lives. The 
Islanders' perceptions of their forebears' participation in the labour trade, as expressed in their own words 
throughout the project, stress kidnapping and slavery . They largely fail to comprehend arguments about 
myth and interpretation in h istory, and fail to distinguish between their contemporary political agenda -
which is based on being victims of the historical process - and objective assessment by outsiders . One 
example is the ins istence of the Islanders on the Committee that their forebears were "brought to Australia" ,  
not, as Quanchi and Moore suggested, that they "came" to Australia" .  
The Islanders are at odds with academic historians in numerous other ways. They have tried to insist that 
what they see as negative aspects of their h istory not be presented. Their v ision of Melanesia is almost that 
of tourist brochures : an idyll ic island life-style, where food is plentiful and violence and brutality are rare, or 
only provoked by wicked Europeans. What I hoped was a complex explanation of the d ifferences between 
European racism and ethnic prejudices held by the Islanders against Europeans, Aborigines and other 
Melanes ians, was severely criticised. The communities want to suppress any reference to antagonism 
between Islanders and Aborigines, embarrassed by their forebears excesses last century and, despite their 
indigenous ancestry, their al ienation from indigenous groupings today. Perhaps the most horror was 
reserved for 'bachelor families' . In one section we dealt with the Melanesian family and the overwhelmingly 
male environment in which Isl anders lived in Australia last century: only about six per cent of labourers 
were women, and even with marriages to Aboriginal women and some others, most of the Islanders lived in 
a totally male world.  We thought that, without stress ing the obvious, we would describe their relationships 
as 'bachelor famil ies' which offered security and friendship .  The present-day community is unwill ing to 
contemplate what they see as a slur on the sexuality of the first Australian generation. 
There have also been problems with management and editing the project. There can be no doubt that the 
Education Department managers progressed along a steep learning curve when dealing with Islander 
community politics. They had not fully anticipated the deep divisions and rivalries between regions, 
political groupings, island groups, families and indiv iduals. The project has also been very Brisbane­
ccntric, and despite its exemplary design and rhetoric of equal ity, there has been more than a degree of not 
always subtle manipulation. Although an effort was made to involve experienced academic and curriculum 
development personnel , no similar attempt was made to seek out the most qual ified Islanders .  While the 
Islander representatives by-and-large did an excellent job of l iaising with the regional communities, their 
appears to have been no real guiding principle in their selection, and some communities questioned the 
committee members' right to a mandate to speak on their behalf. Some committee members saw their 
involvement as a chance to boost the prestige of their own families; and having succeeded, disappeared. 
The authors always ended as 'whipping boys' for the project, despite the Islander community not providing 
necessary materials to represent their opinions, and the Education Department manager, in an attempt to be 
impartial , not providing enough support. In the main meeting when the drafts were discussed, there was no 
attempt to j ustify or support academic decisions, and there was what seemed to be del iberate sabotage of our 
endeavours .  We always knew that we were dealing with contested views and had intended to alleviate this 
by letting into the text statements and comments produced by the community, which would provide an 
alternative view and enliven our words. This we had announced in a frontispiece requesting comments and 
explaining that we intended working these into the materials as alternative views. Strangely, this note had 
gone astray when the draft went out to the communities, which led to unnecessary antagonism and ill­
feel ings. The most benign interpretation is that gremlins dwell in the photocopier of the Queensland 
Education Department. 
The editors and the staff of Education Department's Equity Unit were other unanticipated loose cannon on 
our labour-trade schooner. Outs ide contractors, totally anonymous and uncontactable, the editors produced 
visually attractive text but also made uncalled for alterations beyond their brief. Some changes requested by 
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the au thors and the Islander communities went undone, while the editors decided to make improvements of 
their own . Sentences and paragraphs moved around the text, sections changed place. Barely a sentence 
escaped. Take for example my section on the contentious issue of whether the Islanders were slaves. 
Having spent two paragraphs succinctly defining ' slavery' and describing the end of importation of slaves 
into British territory in 1808 and the end of slavery itself in 1834, along with explanation of origin of the 
indenture contracts used in Queensland, which are plainly different from slavery, I found slipped into the 
final draft: 'However, th is somewhat benign view of indentured labour in Queensland is contested by 
members of many ASSI communities. ' The lack of communication with the editors is lamentable and may 
have caused considerable damage to the final product. 
Late in the debate the Education Department Equity Unit decided to weigh in. Armed with self-righteous 
knowledge of correct-speak they decided that the whole approach used in the secondary booklet was 
lamen tably Eurocentric. They had no knowledge of the history of Australia's South Sea Islanders, but 
presumed the Islanders were an extension of the indigenous community and decided that what we said was 
complex explanation was negativ ity. While they were correct to suggest some changes, leaving their 
wasp ish input until mid-December 1996 when the whole project was due at the printers by the end of 
January 1 997 was hardly welcome. 
What does all this mean to the production of curriculum materials and to politics in the Australian South 
Sea Islander communities? N"ter twenty years of dealings with the Islanders I had few illusions regarding 
the Melanesian pol itical process as it has survived in this immigrant community. I was very aware of the 
internal dynamics, between regions, famil ies, indiv iduals  and political groupings. What I had not really 
anticipated was the antagonisms and resentment towards individuals such as myself who are identifiable as 
academic gate-keepers . That I have published more than thirty chapters and articles, as well as other 
substantial works, and that I hold probably the largest personal arch ival and photographic collection on 
Australian's South Sea Islanders, has certainly been of use to the curriculum project. But equally, my 
academic knowledge opened me up for criticism and jealousy. This is complicated by my seeming 
identification with the Solomon Islander minority, particularly with Malaitans and with Melanesians at 
Mackay, which has also al ienated the Islander majority who are of New Hebridean descent, and those from 
other regions who want stress put on their own areas and families. 
The main points under debate in building these materials centre around the ownership of history and the 
pol itical empowerment of the South Sea Islander community. A close inspection of the materials clearly 
shows the inner tensions between the Islanders' current political agenda, their quest for empowerment and 
recogn ition, and their understand ing of their history, balanced against attempts by h istorians, geographers 
and educators to accommodate the communities' v iews while maintaining acade'mic integrity. By insisting 
on their victim status, particularly by concentrating on the kidnapping/slavery issue, the Islanders have not 
decolon ised their history and largely have conducted a politically naive campaign, albeit successful. 
Admittedly, the kidnapping/slavery card is the most emotive and explosive, and inflicts maximum political 
embarrassment. But their fixation on debatable nineteenth century issues, at the expense of a much stronger 
argument for compensation based on discrimination this century, and the low socio-economic standing of 
the contemporary community, has meant that they have not presented a fully nuanced case. 
They succeeded largely because they were dealing with a Labor Federal government bent on reconciliation 
with ind igenous Austral ians, and a Queensland Labor government supportive of national endeavours . This 
conclusion is backed by the decl ine in government support since the coal ition returned to power in 
Queensland and federally.31 Government compassion has also declined due to the frustration of dealing 
with a divided Islander community which is its own worst enemy. There really is no united Australian 
South Sea Islander community :  it is a figment of the bureaucratic and academic imagination. Other than 
Faith Bandier, who is now elderly and has always been an individual not a team player, there are no 
recognised unassailable national leaders . Other leaders have operated successfully only at a regional level, 
or like Nasuven Enares have been side-lined through petty jealousy from less competent competitors . 
I learned more about the pol itics of education bureaucracy than that of Austral ia's South Sea Islanders .  I 
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hope that the product is worth while and is used in the schools. In the long haul we produced a valuable 
resource for use by Australian students, which provides a sensitive history of one important immigrant 
community, and allows them to be proud of their achievements in Austral ia. Once the shouting is over, I 
hope we have gone some way to fulfil the desires of this quite unique ethnic community to be recognised as 
integral and valued in the development of our nation. 
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Whose Initiative: Getting Out or Pushing Out 
Peter Larmour, National Centre for Develop ment Studies, ANU 
The Soulh Pacific provides examples of each of the four possible combinations of metropol itan pull 
and ind igenous push. 
- no pull, no push. The metropol itan government and indigenous leaders both want colonial rule to 
continue. The Northern Marianas, for example, opted to remain with the US while its neighbours 
opted for 'free association' .  American Samoa is currently neither pulling, nor pushed. 
- pull and push. Bolh s ides want the relationship to end, as in Kiribati or Nauru (Pollock, chapter 
12). 
- pull without push. The metropol itan government might want to leave and local leaders want it to 
stay, as in Fij i  in the 1960s (Lal , chapter 4). 
- push without pull. There are examples of this normal nationalist story in Nauman opposition to 
Austral ian colonial ru le, and in the Vanua' aku Pati's declaration of a Peoples Provisional 
Government in the colonial New Hebrides in the late 1970s, where the British were pull ing, but the 
French were not (Ambrose and Morgan, chapters 6 and 7). 
In praclice, preferences for 'push' and 'pull ' changed through time, partly in response to each other, 
while lhe local side rarely spoke with one voice. A focus on metropol itan-local push and pull also 
m isses lwo olher levels of analysis. First, there were 'network effects', in which (for example) 
British pol icy lowards the Pacific was determined by early policy towards the Caribbean, which 
disenchanted Britain with 'free association' . Second, decolonisation was an intrins ically 
international process because it created new, internationally recognised, states. Other states could 
determine the terms on which they recognised the new entrants to the system. The specifically 
international characteristics of decolonisation in the South Pacific included 
- a declining threshold of what was internationally regarded as v iable, so that smaller and smaller 
states became acceptable as independent; 
- acceptance of fine gradations of sovereignty, such as free association, or independence without 
UN membership; 
- tolerance of tokens of sovereignty as a resource (tax havens, the sale of stamps, passports etc); 
- some wil l ingness to recognise the results of freely chosen breakups of colonial territories (as in the 
breakup of the US Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or the separation of Kiribati and Tuvalu). 
There was l ittle international sympathy for Bougainville secession, however. 
Explaining Decolonisation 
Here I look at some explanations offered for the process of decolonisation. I am less interested in 
whether they are right or wrong than in the types of explanation they offer, to whom or what they 
ascribe agency, and so on. I have chosen surveys that include more than one country. 
In chronological order, Davidson1 refers to the world setting, to the actions of island leaders, and to 
the environment of the islands (small, poor etc.). Larmour2 refers to the inequality of the two sides 
in negotiating decolonisation, and to the relationships between the negotiators and their respective 
domestic constituencies. Macdonald3 contrasts the decolonisation of Oceania with other parts of the 
world, and finds 'a critical factor in the decolonization of Oceania is the smallness of the 
dependencies . '4 Bertram finds decolonisation 'promoted and designed more by the metropolitan 
powers than by local initiative,'5 and marked by closer integration with metropolitan growth poles . 
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Firth6 explains decolonisation in terms of the strategic interests of the colonial powers, modified by 
their ability to res ist external pressure, and (in Austral ia's case) domestic racism that ruled out the 
option of free association which Firth's explanations would otherwise predict. Ghai finds the 
decolonisation of the region largely driven by the interests of the colonial powers, often against 
local resistance, and sees constitutions running ahead of indigenous political forces, promoting 
rather than containing change.7 
Gaffaney is the most theoretical ly elaborate.8 He refers to the strategic interests of states, and the 
calculations they might make of the costs of governing colonies, compared to the costs of 
alternatives . He asks if a theory of colonisation also works backwards as a theory of decolonisation, 
and finds it does not: the calculus of state interests that explains the colonisation of Micronesia does 
not explain its ending (but see Petersen, chapter 10). Dependency and unity of local elites, and local 
and international moral pressures need to be factored in to a more complex explanation of 
decolonisation. 
The writers differ according to the emphasis they give to structural conditions, and agency, and they 
have different ideas about where agency l ies : 
- in the colony (Davidson, especially) 
- in the metropole (Ghai and Bertram, especially) 
- in empire/ network effects (Macdonald, especially), or 
- in the international system itself. 
They posit different kinds of agent, collective or indiv idual .  For example, men are the agents in 
Davidson's work, while states are agents in Firth and Gaffaney's. Communities - Indian and Fij ian -
are often treated as agents in discussing decolonisation in Fij i, as are social movements such as the 
Mau in Western Samoa, or Maasina Ruru in Solomon Islands. Even God is agent in some accounts 
(Liua 'ana, chapter 5) .  
Power in Decolonisation 
One way of thinking about the question of agency or initiative is as a question of power. Gaffaney, 
for example, found 'real agency and power in the periphery' . A paradox of the process of 
decolonisation is the radically different quantities of power apparently available to the metropole, 
compared to the colony, yet the appearance is given that 'the little guy won' or 'the mouse roared'. 
This disj unction between resources and outcomes, might be explained in several ways: 
- the colony played a weak hand better; 
- the colony had more leverage on the ground; 
- the issue was more salient to the colony than the metropole; 
- the colony had powerful allies; 
- the outcome in fact benefited metropole rather than colony; or 
- inequal ities were mitigated by the juridical equality of s tates. 
Colonial negotiators were new to the game, though they could employ skilled negotiators l ike Yash 
Ghai. The colonies certainly had more at stake, so they might put more effort into the exercise. 
They had all ies, as in the support Vanuatu nationalists found in the UN. J\us�r�lia v.:as generally 
supportive of Britain ' s  withdrawal from Solomon Islands,  and French and Bntish withdrawal from 
Vanuatu (though not French withdrawal from New Caledo�ia, _
see Sma�l and Doug�as, chapt�r� 8 
and 9). The US, on the other hand, was more on the colonial side than it had been m, 
say, Afnca. 
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The issue may h inge on what is meant by 'power', and its relationship to force. It is exercised against 
resistance: if both metropole and colony want decolonisation, or neither do, then power is hardly 
being exercised. So the two logical possibilities of pull/push and no-pull/no-push do not seem to 
involve power. By the same token, res istance must be possible: if New Zealand were to arrest and 
deport the population of Tokelau they would be using force rather than power. 
Power is not a universal quantity, but characteristic of a relationship (France is powerful in relation 
to New Caledonia, rather than to the US). Decolonisation has been both a domestic and an 
international process, and states look inwards to the societies they claim to govern, and outwards to 
other states .9 Metropolitan governments faced at least two domestic constituencies, in the colony, 
and at home. So we might ask of each, how powerful it was 
- in relation to pressure from within the colony, 
- in relation to pressure from within the metropole, 
- in relation to other states ( eg the US ), and 
- in relation to the international system. 
In the period of decolonisation, all five metropol itan governments were democracies at home, and 
so to a similar extent subject to domestic political pressure (if it  were mobil ised). France was 
distinctively vulnerable in that voters, indigenous and settler, in its Pacific colonies could also vote 
in France. All had introduced some form of democracy within the colony, though their 
Governors/Administrators/High Commiss ioners were not responsible to the elected legislatures . 
They were weak against extra-parl iamentary pressure in their colonies, particularly if it could attract 
attention where they were vulnerable - in the international arena, and though the media at home. 
The US became particularly vulnerable to political pressure in its colonies, after Peace Corps 
lawyers opened up opportunities for local people to l itigate against the US.  The big d ifference 
between the colonial powers was probably in relation to international pressure: the US most able to 
resist it; Australia and New Zealand least, and the UK and France somewhere between. 
A distinctive combination of strength and weakness may go some way to explain d ifferent 
decolonisation pol icies; or the possibility of having a 'policy' rather than surrendering to the 
inevitable. Britain, for example, was Jess reactive in the South Pacific that it had been in Africa. 
Hugh Tinker wrote cri tically in 1968 of the idea that 'decolonisation was planned in any sense' . 
Instead, he said, British governments 'worked to one rule only: identify the l eader, than hand over to 
him'. 1 0  By 1973, however, they were planning, or at least going through the motions of an 
interdepartmental Programme Analysis and Review, which identified its preferred policy as ' to 
rel ieve IIMG of direct responsibil ity for as many as possible of the remaining territories ' . 1 1  The 
Programme Analysis and Rev iew survived a change of government and was implemented 
completely in the South Pacific during the 1970s. 
There are other forms of power than the abil ity to get someone to do something they would 
otherwise not want to. Stephen Lukes identified two : 12 the power to set the agenda, so that d isputes 
do not emerge to be resolved by the visible exercise of power, and the power to change peoples' 
ideas, by education or advertising, so that the v is ible exercise of power, or the manipulation of 
agendas is no longer necessary. Colonisers often had power to set the agenda, and whether or not 
'decolonisation' was on it. Independent media were often absent. 
Ideas could be changed. For example, the British Programme Analysis and Review, under the 
headline 'good faith', noted that British governments had promised to be guided by ' the wishes of 
the peoples concerned ', but went on to suggest that 
if local wishes are opposed to the course favoured by HMG 's illterests, it is surely our task 
to seek to change them, using appropriate information programmes and, if necessary, 
economic inducements or deterrents. This could apply to territories reluctant to seek 
independence. 
Decolon isation as Reversal or Cul mination 
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To what extent do we need to explain decolonisation? The prefix 'de-' suggests a reversal, so that to 
explain decolonisation we need first to explain colonisation. The same factors might be present 
(economic interests, mil itary power, racist th inking, international support) but acting in reverse. 
Thus, for example, British decolonisation is often explained as an historical reversal : changed 
economic in terests, decl ining military power, anti-racism, and loss of support in the UN. Gaffaney 
addressed this question of the symmetry of colonisation and decolonisation, and showed clearly that 
in Micrones ia decolon isation was not colonisation put it reverse :  it was more compl icated, and 
additional factors came into play (local elites, moral issues). 
At the doctrinal level, decolonisation is in some ways the culmination of colonisation, rather than its 
reversal or extinction. In the idea of trusteeship, decolonisation is immanent within colonisation -
though it may take a long time (and much of the Pacific debate was about timing, rather than 
outcome). Trusteeship in the Pacific was not only a self serving colonial doctrine, but an 
international legal framework within which the activities of some, but not al l, the colonial powers 
were regularly scrutinised, and which (in the absence of other interests) loomed large on some 
official horizons. 
Hood's framework13 for understanding policy reversals helps isolate this self cancelling character of 
colonisation. Trying to explain why public administration theory changed so radically from 
Keynes ian and progressive assumptions in the 1980s, Hood identified four kinds of explanations: 
- changing interests ; 
- changing environment; 
- changing ideas; 
- the decay or self destruction of pol icies from within. 
The decolonisation of the Pacific provides examples of each. First, the balance of interests 
changed. New commodities became more valuable. Other countries became more powerful. New 
domestic forces had less interest in empire. New governments owed debts to different 
constituencies. 
Second, the environment changed. Technological changes made coal ing stations and (later) airports 
less significant, and locations for testing nuclear weapons more important. 
Th ird, ideas changed. The racist th inking that underpinned imperialism was discredited after the 
second World War. There were new ideas about the possibil ities of development, and the role of the 
state in achieving it. 
So far so good. Hood's fourth kind of explanation is perhaps the most interesting. He argued that 
some policies were not simply d iscredited by changing interest groups, environments or new ideas. 
They also contained the seeds of their own destruction, and decayed - as it were - from within. 
Thus, in Hood's examples from the Keynesian welfare state, national ised enterprise created its own 
unexpected pathologies such as poor customer service that helped discredit  it, while free medical 
care led to continual increases in demand for health services. 
Colonialism has its own self destruct mechanisms. It creates the forces that eventually supersede it: 
arbitrary colonial territories that become national spaces; racist ideas that create anti-white or non­
racist reactions; ideas about human rights and democracy that subvert authoritarian colonial 
institutions; educated elites ready to replace colonial administrators; and local entrepreneurs who 
come to demand protection from foreign companies. 
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